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The History of Civilization
Edited by C. K. OGDEN, M.A.

Macedonian Imperialism

The History of Civilization

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A full list of the SERIES will be found at the end of this volume.



ALEXANDER THE GREAT
Azara Bust (Louvre)



ANTIOCHOS THE GREAT
(il ouvre)

(front)

Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East

By

PIERRE JOUGUET

*Sometime Member of the French School at Athens, Professor at
the University of Paris, Correspondent of the Institute of France*

With 7 plates, 4 maps, and a plan

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Translated by
M. R. DOBIE

I beg
Gustave Saint-Plancat and Paul Collart
to accept the dedication
of this volume
and to join me in offering it as a tribute
to the memory of our friends
Jean Lesquier and Alexandre Piromaly.
P. J.

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FOREWORD

IMPERIALISM AND HELLENIC CIVILIZATION

In the Foreword to "The Formation of the Greek People" I set forth the plan of our Greek series. Two of the volumes devoted to Hellenism, I said, "give an outline of the great historical framework. They analyse the various contingencies, of place, race, and individuals, and bring out the circumstances of every kind which contributed to the organization of the Greek cities, created Hellenic civilization, and then caused it to radiate far and wide." We have, as far as it is possible, explained the "Greek miracle", the splendid efflorescence of an individualism which had been seen nowhere else. We have defined the characteristics of the Greek spirit in religion, art, and speculation, and the original constitution of the City. Now, therefore, in this last volume, we have to study the new conditions which favoured the expansion of Hellenism, while causing it to be profoundly transformed. Here M. Pierre Jouguet deals with the problem raised by M. Jardé in "The Formation of the Greek People": How in that fundamentally individualistic Greece, where small collective individualities were as intensely living and tenacious of independence as individual men, did political unity, born late and imposed from outside, affect the civilization which was expressed by the common language, the κοινή, and had hitherto been the one bond uniting the Greeks?

With the victory of Macedonia, of the "territorial state" more or less Hellenized but originally alien to Hellenism,¹ over the City State, the polis, whose expansion consisted in the creation of other cities, a new epoch of history begins, a new world rises. The essential factor of this development is imperialism.

We have seen that the history of mankind, being based on the identity of its elements, tends to the organization of men in

¹ See below, p. 69.

groups and the fusion of groups with one another. Human affinities, racial affinities, interest, of course—instinctive altruism and reasoning altruism—here play their unifying part.¹ But we have also noted that egoism, that of groups and that of individuals, the will to power and betterment, also creates unity—in its own way—by domination and subjection; that is, properly speaking, imperialism.

Sometimes, too, imperialism is tempered, is tinged with motives and sentiments which render it less oppressive, and fit to become a factor for deep-seated unity. Such was the case with the imperialism of Macedonia.

I have already observed that Macedonia—whose army was the heart of the nation, whose King was the leader and comrade of his soldiers—played a part in Greece similar to that which the military state of Prussia was to play in Germany.² But the will to power, which in Philip had given the hegemony to Macedonia, was not merely strengthened in Alexander; it was actually enriched, and ennobled by various elements.

In this volume M. Jouguet has well brought out the complex nature, the charming and sometimes disconcerting character of Alexander, the hero of that prodigious epic, who was so prematurely buried in the purple of his victories.

What first strikes one in Alexander is "the inner energy which makes man truly a man"³ and consequently a leader of men,⁴ the ἀρετή, identical with the virtù of the Italians of the Renaissance. In him, intensity of character is accompanied by a powerful imagination for conceiving projects and, for carrying them out, an extraordinary clearness of mind—save in moments of physical drunkenness, spiritual intoxication, or passion. Literature and philosophy nourished his imagination

¹ Cf. Camille Jullian, Introductory Lecture at the Collège de France, 6th Dec., 1911: "... The ancient world, civilized cities and barbarian hordes, seems to have confusedly obeyed internal forces which led it to merge in a single humanity" (*Revue Bleue*, 6th Jan., 1912).

² *The Formation of the Greek People*, Foreword, p. xvi.

³ Below, p. 61. See the whole passage, which is very remarkable. Cf. A. Reinach, *L'Hellénisation du monde antique*, p. 180, and H. G. Wells, *Outline of History* (curious explanation of Alexander's character).

⁴ "Alexander aroused in his soldiers an enthusiasm bordering on fetishism, such as was not known by any after him except Cæsar and Napoleon" (Reinach, *op. cit.*, p. 178).

and fortified his thought. An assiduous reader of Homer, he wished, by his courage and magnanimity, to re-embody the hero of the *Iliad*.¹ A pupil of Aristotle, he owed to the encyclopædic mind of his teacher something of his vast breadth of conception² and of his faith in reason. He placed his genius and the military power which he had inherited at the service of a certain idea of Hellenism which was in the moral air of his day, took more definite shape in him, and was amplified by the very course of his victories.

To be a Greek, in those days, was, first of all, to be contrasted, as a free citizen, with the "Barbarian" subject of a despot; it was to cherish the pride of Salamis; it was to aspire to a fuller vengeance on the erstwhile invader. In addition, the dazzling wealth of the East and the precedents of myth and legend—Dionysos, Heracles, Achilles, the Argonauts—added their suggestion to those of national pride. But to be a Greek was also to be contrasted with the citizen of the narrow polis as a man who was fully a man just because he was a Greek, and whose worth lay in his culture. What made the Greek, Isocrates proclaimed in his *Panegyric*, was "education", not "origin"; so every cultivated man, πεπαιδευμένος, was a Hellene.

Panhellenism thus conceived ended in cosmopolitanism. Amid the everlasting wars of cities and conflicts of parties which were exhausting Hellas more and more, the Wise Man came to look for law in his conscience, for true liberty in moral liberty, and for his true fatherland "wherever wisdom reigns".³ Moreover, the exiles, cityless men (ἀπόλιδες), the condottieri of antiquity, ready to go all over the world, alone or in bands, for love of adventure or greed for gain, put these cosmopolitan tendencies—less nobly, it is true—into practice.

In these circumstances, the magnificent plan of a world-empire—τῶν ὅλων μοναρχία—founded by a philosopher-king, was bound to attract the genius who had sat at the feet of Aristotle. "Being accustomed to leave the circle of facts to soar into the sphere of ideas," he rose to the principle that there

¹ Alexander was descended from Achilles. In the Troad he performed a ceremony at his tomb. On the "epic fire and chivalrous beauty of the episode", see, G. Radet, "Notes sur l'histoire d'Alexandre," ii, in *Revue des Etudes anciennes*, xxvii (1925).

² See E. Egger, *Mémoires de littérature ancienne : Aristote considéré comme précepteur d'Alexandre le Grand*, p. 454.

³ A. Reinach, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

must be one single master for men, just as there is only one sun to light the earth.¹ Besides, did he not afterwards himself become the Sun God, Ra? Did he not find, for the domination of the world, a basis in the supernatural? ² And, by a strange metamorphosis, did not the philosopher-king develop into a god-king?

No doubt Alexander first appears as the leader of the war of revenge on the barbarians and the colonizer of Mediterranean Asia. But his ambition, the development of which we follow with keen interest in Part One of this book, gradually carries him away. It makes him the heir of the Pharaohs and, like them, the incarnation of Ra; it makes him the successor of the King of Kings, in this capacity, too, revered as a god and clad with the "glory" of which the Avesta speaks.³ In Memphis, in Babylon, in Persepolis, he is intoxicated with mystical grandeur and Oriental magnificence. Paying no heed to smouldering discontents, he drives on towards mysterious India, "on the confines of the earth". But in all the exaltation of conquest he never loses a certain sense of realities, and concerns himself with noble tasks. He is the discoverer of new lands,⁴ the organizer of mankind. He has sympathy with the conquered peoples, especially with the Persians, who had greeted him as a second Cyrus.⁵ He wishes to unite nations and races—even by ties of blood—and to fuse two worlds in one. The polis continues to send out swarms, and Asia is covered with Greek cities; but Alexander incorporates "barbarians" in them. What is more, he refuses to believe "that the great cities of the East, in which the fusion of races of which he dreamed might find a favourable soil, had ceased to play their part". "As he planned to mingle the races to establish concord and peace, so he sought to increase trade between the peoples to ensure their welfare."⁶

¹ See Radet, "Notes, etc.," iv, *ibid.*, xxvii (1925), pp. 202, 206.

² See Radet, "Notes, etc.," vi, *ibid.*, xxviii (1926), pp. 213 ff.

³ See pp. 30, 76. On the god-king and the strength given to the Government by the royal religion, see pp. 286 ff.; also Moret, *The Nile*, and Huart, *Ancient Persia*, both in this series.

⁴ See Jardé, in *Revue des Études grecques*, xxxviii (1925), p. 129, rev. of Endres, *Geographischer Horizont und Politik bei Alexander d. Gr.*

⁵ See Huart, *Ancient Persia*, and my Foreword, p. xv.

⁶ Below, pp. 80, 90, 99, 101, 108, 110.

The imperialism of an Alexander was creative of a "new order of things". In his powerful brain he bore fruitful thoughts of human interest. Truly one can see in this very complete hero one of the most striking and noblest types of man as a force.¹

At the end of Part One, M. Jouguet draws a striking geographical picture of the Empire and shows how its founder had sketched out its organization. Alexander had to educate the barbarians to political life and to restrain political life in the Greek cities, which should become a kind of municipia, and so to reconcile liberty with centralization. But divergent forces—conflicting interests, heterogeneous manners and culture—were soon at work, breaking up what the will of one man had unified—without there being a fixed centre of the unity, as in the Roman Empire afterwards. Above all, rival ambitions, first of men and then of dynasties, undid Alexander's work, which was too hasty and too immoderately extensive to hold together.

Even if the idea of empire was not dead,² yet, between the death of the Conqueror and the extension of the Roman power to the East, over a century goes by in which three several monarchies play a capital part³ and compete with each other for supremacy and wealth. Indeed, it was just at this time, when the East was rent by conflicts, intrigues, and intestine convulsions, that Rome grew great in the West, drove the Greeks from it, pressed forward to Macedonia, and set out on the conquest of the Mediterranean world.⁴

The history and organization of this intermediate period are admirably set forth by M. Jouguet, who dwells especially upon Egypt, for the excellent reasons which he gives. In this volume, chapters will be found dealing with a period of Egyptian civilization which has not hitherto been studied fully enough. They form a continuation to "The Nile and Egyptian Civilization", as they will themselves be completed by a later volume,

¹ See Reinach's fine passages, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–12. One cannot remain unmoved, thinking of Reinach himself, when one reads: "We may dream of what he would have become, had he lived the usual span of men, instead of dying in the flower of his youth like the heroes and the sons of the gods."

² Below, p. 242.

³ Below, p. 159.

⁴ See below, p. 170. On Roman imperialism, *cf.* Homo, *Primitive Italy*, and Chapot, *The Roman Empire*, both in this series.

"The Roman Empire". So *Egypt* holds a place in the "History of Civilization" corresponding to its great past, its peculiar character, its model administration, and its wide influence.¹

To understand the features of the Hellenistic age, we must realize the importance of the cities. New ones were founded incessantly, bearing the names of kings and queens.² They exerted a powerful attraction, and the extraordinary development of some was a veritable revolution—in particular, the growth of the huge Egyptian capital, "marvellous Alexandria."³ M. Jouguet rightly lays emphasis on the contrast presented, in Egypt and in Asia, by the city, which kept some characteristics of the polis, and the bulk of the kingdom, where the subject people, the agricultural proletariat, worked under the eye of military colonies. "The people, which had been almost everything in the Greek commonwealths, was no longer anything in the Hellenistic kingdoms."⁴

The population of the cities increased steadily, and became more and more mixed. Greece, exhausted, lacked men, if not brains; Egyptians, Jews, in crowds, were Hellenized, and with Hellenic culture acquired some of the rights of the city.⁵ There was a remarkable economic development, to which technical knowledge was contributed by the Greeks and habits of industry by certain Asiatics. The new capitals of Hellenism—Alexandria, Antioch, Pergamon, Rhodes—were centres of a brilliant, if limited, intellectual activity, partly due to the initiative of the Kings.

On the life of the spirit in this Hellenistic age, M. Jouguet gives precise and illuminating indications, but is deliberately brief. They may easily be supplemented from other volumes in the "History of Civilization"—"The Greek Spirit in

¹ See below, p. 281.

² There were Alexandrias in numbers, Ptolemaïses, Antiochs, Seleuceias, Apameias, Laodiceias, a Stratoniceia.

³ Below, pp. 270, 278.

⁴ Maurice Croiset, *La Civilisation hellénique*, vol. ii, p. 52.

⁵ Here we meet the "Jewish problem", which will reappear in V. Chapot, *The Roman Empire*, and A. Lods, *Israel and Judaism*, both to be published in this series. For the confines of the Empire—Parthia, Bactriana, India—see *The Roman Empire, Ancient Persia, and India*.

Religion," "Art in Greece," "Greek Thought," and "The Roman Spirit in Religion, Thought, and Art"—*this last volume might be entitled Rome and Greece.*

In the place of a national literature, an "open-air" literature, as it has been called,¹ born of collective beliefs and public life, there appear the works of literary men, written for a Court and a limited public. Most of the traditional forms disappear—the epic, in its primitive form, tragedy, comedy, oratory. Yet the masterpieces accumulated in the libraries weigh upon men's minds; there is borrowing, imitation. No doubt cold-blooded erudition is sometimes lightened by ingenious care for form, happy realism, and even sincerity of feeling. Theocritus enriches poetry by the faithful and picturesque interpretation of Sicilian landscape and manners. But on the whole this literature is artificial, a mosaic of reminiscences, the patient composition of dilettanti for dilettanti; and it was just this character which made it so easy to imitate and caused it to exercise a lasting influence in later times.²

Art presents similar features. It is scholarly, delighting in virtuosity and triumphing in realism. Marble and paint are asked to give the illusion of life, which is reproduced in its most various aspects, from the most pathetic to the most trivial.³

In the Hellenistic Cosmopolis, art had no object but individual enjoyment. Kings and private persons, the new aristocracy of wealthy merchants, demanded the same luxury as the gods. "Formerly man subordinated himself to the gods; now he is their equal."⁴ Human personality expanded; woman played a part of increasing importance. Sapped by individualism, the old beliefs fell to pieces; the individual conscience, which no longer had its armour of duties to the City and the national gods, was troubled, asked questions, sought a rule of life.⁵

In the intellectual élite, thought travelled in new directions—two very different directions, the divergence of which would one day, long afterwards, lead to serious crises.

¹ A. Croiset, in Reinach, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

² See H. Ouvre, *Les Formes littéraires de la pensée grecque*, Conclusion, p. 549, and Legrand, *La Poésie alexandrine*, for the element of "renovation" and "modernity" in the Alexandrians.

³ See De Ridder and Deonna, *Art in Greece*, pt. i, ch. ix; pt. iv, ch. vi; and Grenier, *The Roman Spirit*, pp. 242 ff.

⁴ Deonna, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Cf. Grenier, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 ff.

⁵ See Robin, *Greek Thought*, bk. iv, beginning.

*In the evolution of Greek thought, we have seen an admirable logical effort creating reason, or mental logic, and then reflection about reason itself, or theoretical logic. Reason, rendered more modest and more prudent by this return upon itself, starting from a constructive scepticism, would inaugurate positive, experimental science. It has been possible to say that the first universities were opened in Alexandria and Pergamon. In compensation for what it lost on the Agora, Greek thought enriched itself in the Museum. M. Alfred Croiset has summed up in a few vigorous, sober pages what was the "incontestable greatness" of the Alexandrian age: "the indefatigable curiosity which at that time drove men's minds to multiply inquiries and information in every direction. They wanted to know everything, to explain everything. They interrogated old texts . . . They travelled over the inhabited earth . . . They carried to a very high pitch the study of the sciences properly so called, which tended to become definitely separated from philosophy . . . What is all this, if it is not the very principle of the scientific spirit?"*¹

The other current combined, in varying proportions, reasoning and mysticism. No doubt, many thinkers were sages preoccupied with moral life rather than speculators. But there was no lack of eclectics who preserved and amalgamated the systems of the past, not without mingling Oriental superstitions with philosophy. That, above all, was the great novelty. The mysticism of the Mysteries, which, among the Greeks, had attracted the masses by promising immortal life, salvation, to the initiate, and had been contaminated by Oriental elements—the worship of Isis the Egyptian, of Serapis, of the Mother Goddess of Asia Minor, of Adonis the Syrian, or of the Persian Mithra—now won over the thinkers, and mingled with rational speculation to disturb it. The last constructions of Greek philosophy, Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, were at once the survival and the renunciation of Hellenism.² Alexandria had become the "meeting-place of the world", a meeting-place of ideas and beliefs, and there a syncretism

¹ "La Transformation morale de l'Hellénisme," in A. Reinach, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

² See A. Croiset, *op. cit.*, p. 274, and M. Croiset, *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 88, 119.

was elaborated which contained the germs of a great future, but also of spiritual strife.¹

The historical subject-matter of the present volume owes a special character to the strong personality of the protagonist, of some of the Diadochi and Epigoni, and of secondary personages, adventurers, leaders of mercenary bands, who acted from personal ambition, unbridled individualism—a sheer need of acting. This exaltation of selfish passions, of which Greece was to die, furnished the Hellenistic monarchies with a supply of energy and talent. Here—and chiefly in Part Two—we do not find an unfolding of social or mental logic so much as in other volumes; it is chiefly characters, circumstances, chances, that make history—a history full of tragedies. In short, contingencies appear in the foreground.²

Yet we can say that, in the economic sphere and in the intellectual sphere,³ something survived of the unity, realized for a moment by Alexander, which answered a profound desire of the whole οἰκουμένη. We know of the distant relations of West and East. We know that they never ceased to affect one another. In the bringing of these two worlds closer together lies the capital interest of the Hellenistic age, as M. Jouguet has well brought out. The attempt at fusion was a noble chimera of Alexander; but “the barriers . . . were now definitely down”.⁴ The Eastern world grew more and more Hellenized, while Hellenism was “barbarized”. Greece gave her language, her literature, some of her ideas and fashions, and some of her myths and gods. What the West received from the East was, first, the idea of empire and king-worship and lessons in centralized administration, the contagion of an emphatic, dazzling art, and, lastly, the mystical atmosphere. The Greek spirit “plunged into the dark depths of Oriental cosmogonies”⁵; what it had rejected, in the triumph of reason and moderation, established its sway over it again.

¹ See A. Causse, *Israël et la vision de l'humanité*, p. 102. Söderblom, *Manuel de l'histoire des religions*, French ed., p. 515, brings out the character, at once individualistic and universalistic, of all this syncretic movement. I may refer to later volumes in this series on Israel and Jesus.

² Below, pp. 127–8, 167–9.

³ Below, p. 172.

⁴ Deonna, in *op. cit.*, p. 111. Cf. Causse, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁵ G. Rodier, *Études de philosophie grecque*, Pref. by E. Gilson, p. vii.

In this book, so learned yet so attractive, full of clearly told narratives, happy psychological observations, and striking portraits, the reader will appreciate our collaborator's extreme caution. "The historian depends on his sources,"¹ and M. Jouguet complains of his own too scanty sources, of his wretched sources.² Badly served by the ancient historians, too often dependant on the "archives of stone", which "are not so varied or so rich as they might be",³ he has had plentiful evidence only for Egypt, thanks to the papyri. The sands and kôms of Egypt still hold many secrets.⁴ Methodical researches and the exploration of inner Asia, hardly commenced,⁵ will, he believes and desires, supplement and check the present work, which is a provisional inventory of our knowledge.

Once again, our volumes appeal to the militant historian and present him with vistas of conquests over the immense unknown world of the past.

HENRI BERR.

¹ P. 234.

² Pp. 107-8, 231.

³ Pp. 393, 235-6.

⁴ P. 393.

⁵ P. 235.

INTRODUCTION

THE dagger-blow which struck down Philip of Macedon at the end of the year 336,¹ came near to shaking the power of the kingdom and making an end of the plans for war in Asia which, in the previous year, the King had caused the confederate Greeks to accept as a national conflict.² But the youth of barely twenty, who was to be Alexander the Great, was able to take up an inheritance which might have slipped from feebler hands. On the pretext of punishing the murderers and their accomplices, he made away with suspect persons and caused his rights to be acknowledged in Thessaly, at Delphi, and at Corinth, where the representatives of the states belonging to the Confederation nominated him president of the alliance and Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenes.³ A victorious expedition against the Barbarians, who were threatening his Northern frontier, took him to the Danube.⁴ Meanwhile, Greece was restless ; a thunderbolt of a campaign, ending with the sack of Thebes, restored obedience and peace. Alexander could then turn his forces against the Great King. In ten years, the Persian Empire was overthrown and replaced by a Græco-Macedonian Empire, which soon split up into great monarchical states. Hellenism spread over all the East.

The idea of an empire, that is, of a single power extending its rule to subject peoples of different races, was foreign to Hellenism. The Greek thought of the State only in the form of a small republic concentrated in a city, whose magistrates, chosen by a citizen-body, exercised their authority over the city itself and over the country district surrounding it. The system of the City-state has been described in other volumes in this series,⁵ and it has been seen that Hellenism conquered new domains only by founding

¹ **CXVII**, vol. iii, pp. 59-60.

² Diod., xvi.89.8. *Cf.* U. Koehler, in **LIII** ; *cf.* below, p. 6.

³ Wilcken, in **LIII**, 1922, pp. 97 ff.

⁴ Vulle, in **LVII**, xix, p. 190 ; **CXVII**, vol. iii, 2, pp. 352-64.

⁵ **CXX**.

new cities. If a stronger city imposed her influence and authority on others, it was as the president of a confederation, as a guardian over cities which were allied, but in theory independent. Athens and Sparta succeeded in transforming their hegemony into a true domination, but only for a time. One hears of their Empires and their imperialism, but in this case we should take the words in a limited sense, for neither Athens nor Sparta sought to incorporate states other than Greek into her Empire. Their conception was so strictly national that the avowed object of their policy was to unite the Greeks under their sway to resist the Barbarians.

True imperialism is of Eastern origin. In *From Tribe to Empire* it is the history of the East, down to the first millennium before Christ, which is related. There Messrs. Moret and Davy show how, in primitive tribes, power gradually became concentrated in the hands of a king of divine character and right, and then these powerful monarchies, driven by the "ambition" of their sovereigns no less than by "geographical and economic needs", subjugated the less developed neighbouring peoples, and finally came into conflict one with another, founding from the Nile to the Indus, by conquest and by diplomacy, great empires inhabited by millions of souls. But, vast as these empires were, they soon ceased to satisfy the aspirations of their masters. They, as the vicars or sons of the gods, presently asserted their divine right to the empire of the world. Such an ambition may even have made its appearance in the third millennium before Christ, in Babylonia. No doubt, when Naram-Sin (2768-2712) proclaimed himself King of the Four Regions, he only meant the regions of Mesopotamia, and when Dungi, of the Dynasty of Ur (about 2456), assumed the same title, he was only thinking of the countries of Akkad, Elam, Subartu (Assyria), and Amurru (Northern Syria); but in their eyes the whole civilized world was contained within those limits. Their power was bestowed on them by the gods, such as Ea of Nippur. Marduk of Babylon guaranteed it to Hammurabi and his successors. In Egypt, in the time of the XVIIIth and XIXth Dynasties, Amon-Ra bound all foreign lands to the fist of Pharaoh. The Assyrian Kings called themselves "Kings of the Universe", and, from Tiglath-Pileser I (1100 B.C.) onwards, they took over the

terms of the Babylonian royal title, and became in their turn Kings of the Four Countries of the World. After them, the Achæmenids, whose Empire absorbed all the empires of the East, were "Great Kings", "Kings of Kings", "Kings of the Lands of the Wide World", and with the inheritance of Darius Alexander took up these pretensions to universal kingship.¹

Once these pretensions had driven Darius I and Xerxes forth against Greece; but since then the Great Kings, losing much of their military strength, had ceased to think of conquest in the Hellenic Mediterranean.² The Peloponnesian War and those which followed, relieved Iran of all anxiety on the western side. The attempts to deliver the Greek cities of Asia from the Persian yoke, inspired by Lysander at the time of the Spartan hegemony, failed because of the divisions of the Greeks themselves, and the treaty of 387, named after Antalcidas, consecrated both the rule of the Great King over the shores of Asia Minor and the preponderant influence of his diplomacy and his gold in Hellenic affairs.

The descendants of the great Darius were content with this hegemony "by corruption". One might have supposed that Artaxerxes III Ochus (358-336), who had restored the Empire and recovered Egypt (345), would have been more dangerous than his predecessors. When Philip had laid siege to Perinthos, thereby asserting his claim to the Hellespont, Ochus had broken with him and supported the Perinthians, and then sent a body of troops across into Thrace. But this was a defensive measure, and the quarrel was with Macedon, not with the Greeks, among whom Persia might find allies. Then Ochus died, poisoned; his son Arses reigned but a moment; and Darius III Codomannus, who succeeded him, could only think of defence. In sum, the Great Kings seem to have renounced all aggressive action in Europe. In Greece, on the contrary, from the beginning of the 4th century, we find the idea growing up of a war both of reprisals against Persia and of Asiatic conquest.

Isocrates,³ of all writers, defended and spread abroad this idea with the most talent and perseverance. For fifty years he never ceased to preach, in his writings, the alliance

¹ CXXXV, pp. 286-312.

² CCXXVII, pp. 66 ff.

³ CLV.

of the Greek states for revenge on the Barbarians, and the acquisition of great territories for colonization in Asia. He untiringly proclaimed that their kinship of blood and culture laid upon the Hellenes the duty of uniting, and that the superiority of their civilization made every attempt to establish their dominion over the Barbarians lawful. This, in his eyes, was the only remedy for the ills of Greece; so it would cease to be torn by sanguinary conflicts and would find, in new cities founded in the land conquered, a means of settling the wandering horde of banished men and of utilizing the rich activity of the Hellenic peoples. The weakness of the Persian Empire, revealed by the expedition of the Ten Thousand and the Revolt of the Satraps in the reign of Artaxerxes II, made success seem certain.

Such were the main theories of Isocrates; he hardly varied, except on the choice of leaders. After thinking that union should be effected under the hegemony of Athens, he ended by turning his eyes towards tyrants and kings—to Jason of Phæræ and to Philip of Macedon.

Isocrates was not an original thinker. The unity of Greece as against the Barbarians was felt by all Hellenes, and the war of reprisals against the Great King was a theme familiar to the sophists, at least since Gorgias had treated it in his Olympic discourse (392). No doubt, it did not take a very profound observer to see the need of expansion from which the Hellenic world was suffering. Checked in the West by the power of Carthage and the daily increasing resistance of the Italian peoples, it was manifestly cramped in a domain which had not been widened since the 6th century. On every side it overflowed its limits, casting upon the world, especially eastwards, its adventurers, mercenaries, engineers, physicians, artists, and traders. The colonization which Isocrates had in mind—the foundation of cities in the vast tracts of Asia Minor, “from Cilicia to Sinope,” where the Barbarians would be reduced to the condition of “Periceci”—was in conformity with Greek tradition. One can, therefore, say that Isocrates was a forerunner; but he was not an originator, and even when, in a famous and prophetic sentence,¹ he says that it is civilization and not race which makes the Greek, he is only expressing the cosmopolitan tendencies of his day.

¹ Isocr., iv.50.

Yet, though his ideas seem to correspond so well with the spirit of his time, it is very difficult to trace his influence on contemporary politics.

Are we to suppose that his work had no far-reaching influence? Certainly it did not touch the masses, whom it never sought to touch. It did not inspire the orators and statesmen of the Greek cities. Isocrates speaks of them with contempt, and it is indeed strange and significant that no echo of his thoughts is found even among the defenders of the Macedonian policy.

The fact was, that Greece was engrossed in internal disputes, and in struggles between the cities for hegemony. No doubt, the national patriotism which had awakened at the time of the Persian Wars was not quite dead. It sometimes revived at the call of statesmen. But it had become far less general and far weaker, especially since the power of Philip had arisen. Those who were perhaps most attached to the ideal of Greek liberties felt that these were threatened by the hegemony of the King, whose people stood outside Hellenism. It was quite forgotten that Persia was the hereditary enemy, and although Alexander was careful to proclaim himself the champion of the Hellenes, these continued to be the sentiments of the Greeks during the conquest. Greece took but little part in the enterprise by contributing soldiers.

Yet the writings of Isocrates must have had some effect. He was read everywhere, and he numbered among his disciples many of those who became "the intellectual guides of Greece".¹ If his own temperament and the state of the country prevented his having any direct influence on the peoples and their demagogues, he was aware of it. He chiefly sought to influence, and he did influence, individuals of the select few. That is why—as if, unlike contemporary thinkers, his mind went beyond the narrow framework of the city, which was certainly unfit to undertake the struggle against the Barbarians—he did not hesitate to turn to kings like Philip.

Had Philip forgotten the speech which the writer had addressed to him in 346?² He at least seems to have adopted the spirit of it when he founded the Confederation of Corinth

¹ *OXVII*, vol. iii, p. 525.

² *The Speech to Philip*.

under his own leadership, and caused himself to be nominated General (Strategos) with full powers for the war against Persia.

It is true that the ideas which animated Philip's policy after Chæroneia have been much disputed, and it has been denied that he conceived the intention of embarking upon an expedition against the Great King on a large scale. It is suggested that the troops which Attalos and Parmenion led into the Troad in the spring of 336 had no other mission than the liberation of the Greek cities of Asia, which task was incumbent on anyone who wished for hegemony in Greece. Philip's sole ambition, according to this theory, was to organize Hellenism under the empire of Macedonia.¹ It is true that the King's views were not those of the orator. The pacification of Greece and the aspirations of national patriotism must have been for him a means rather than an end. He thought chiefly of the greatness of his own kingdom. But it really seems that, to justify the domination of Macedon over the Hellenes, it was not enough to give the Greeks of Asia their liberty. Philip, no less than Isocrates, must have seen that the ills of Greece had to be cured, and that, for that object, new lands and horizons must be opened to it—that is, that the plan of Isocrates must be realized, at least in part.

Besides, it was not Philip, but Alexander who was to conduct the war in Asia, Alexander, whose impetuous genius certainly went beyond the ideas of Isocrates and the plans of Philip.

He had inherited from his father that lucid mind which, giving him a clear view of what was possible, tempered the ardour of his imagination and his passion for adventure. He conceived vast designs, but he could put them off if necessary, and approach his object gradually. But he was not only Philip's son; his mother was the violent, ambitious Olympias, a princess of wild Epeiros, who is depicted as a monster of extravagant pride. Given to mystical transports, she was initiated in the orgiastic cults of the Cabeiri, Orpheus, and Dionysos, and it was even said that, like a Bacchante,

¹ U. Koehler, in *LIII*, 1892, p. 510; 1908, pp. 120 ff.; *CXXXI*, p. 298. For the contrary view, Kaerst, in *LVI*, p. 14 n. 1; *CXXV*, p. 270 ff.

she used to surround herself with serpent familiars.¹ With the same indomitable pride, Alexander was to show, not her superstitiousness, but something of her religious fever, in the idea which he conceived of his person and his mission ; he felt that he was of divine race, descended from Heracles, perhaps the son of a god. Sometimes this feeling showed itself in a repulsive way ; it even made him commit crimes ; but ordinarily it animated a generous nature, conscious of a high mission, sensible to friendship, and capable of every charm. Several monuments give us a notion of Alexander's features, as idealized by the art of Lysippos (Pl. I), and tradition tells us of the royal nobility of his bearing, of the fire of his glance, terrible in anger, and even of the mysterious perfume which rose from his breath and his skin.² Alexander had all the physical and moral gifts of a leader of men, and retained his ascendancy over his soldiers to the end. Yet, little by little, his excessive genius isolated him in the midst of his comrades. With more enthusiasm and sincerity than his father, the pupil of Aristotle, who passionately devoured the *Iliad*, proclaimed himself the avenger of Greece. He also had a wider conception of the greatness of Macedonia. But soon the East revealed a world more in harmony with his temperament. Gradually we find him abandoning purely Macedonian and Greek conceptions, to adopt, and even to outrun, the Asiatic ideal, dreaming of the fusion of races in a world-empire.

¹ Plut., *Alex.*, 2, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

PART ONE

ALEXANDER'S CONQUEST

CHAPTER I

THE WAR OF REPRISALS¹

THE force of about 10,000 men which Philip sent into Asia had found a redoubtable opponent in Memnon of Rhodes, who commanded the Great King's mercenaries.² At the beginning of Alexander's reign, the Macedonians held only Rhoeteion in the Troad and the great city of Abydos on the Hellespont, when Parmenion was called back to prepare for the departure of the great army. It crossed the straits in the spring of 334.

I

ALEXANDER'S ARMY³

It was the army which Philip had organized. We do not know its exact effectives. Alexander had left Antipatros 12,000 foot and 1,500 horse, to protect Macedon and to watch Greece. The troops which crossed into Asia with the King may have numbered about 32,000 foot and 5,000 horse.⁴ The phalangites or Foot-Companions (*pezetairoi*) formed the infantry of the line. Like hoplites, they wore heavy armour—helmet, greaves, a small shield, and probably a leather cuirass fitted with metal—and their offensive weapons were the sword and, above all, the sarissa, the long, heavy pike with which the line of battle bristled. In the time of Alexander this sarissa varied in length, according to the rank in which its bearer stood, for all or almost all points had to stick out beyond the front line. The longest, which could hardly be

¹ Chief sources : Arr., *Anab.*, i.1 ; ii.12 ; Diod., xvii.16-38 ; Plut. *Alex.*, 15-28 ; Curt., iii ; Just., xi.5.1-9.

² CCXL, pp. 802 ff.

³ CLVII, CLVIII, CLIX, and Nuetzell *ad* Curt.

⁴ Judeich, in LVII, viii, p. 376 n. 2 ; CXVII, vol. iii, 2, pp. 322-52.

held except with both hands, seems to have measured about 18 feet. It is possible that the men behind the fifth rank, at the beginning of a battle, held their pikes upright. But at this period the phalanx was not yet the compact and rather unwieldy mass which it became later, when, to make up for the inferiority of the soldiers and to preserve its power for resistance and impact, it was always in close, deep formation, and, though still invincible in forward attack, when accidents of the ground did not break the line, it was helpless if a manœuvre of the enemy succeeded in enveloping it or taking it on the flank. Philip and Alexander always managed to keep the phalanx mobile.

The phalanx was divided into *taxeis*, each probably recruited in a district of Macedonia. At first there seem to have been six or seven; the strength of the *taxis* is reckoned at 1,536; this would give a phalanx of between 9,216 and 10,752 men. The *taxis*, therefore, must have contained three pentacosiararchies of 512 men, subdivided into smaller units. The smallest was the file (*stichos*) of 16 men. But the intermediate divisions are less certain; from Arrian's *Anabasis*, there seems to have been a company, called the *lochos*.¹ This may correspond to the *taxis* of the tactical writers, an unit of 128 men; this is approximately the strength of the *lochos* of mercenary armies like Xenophon's Ten Thousand. Between the file and the *lochos* we may presume that there was a tactical division corresponding to the *enomotia*, but it is not mentioned by the historians of Alexander. It must have been a body of 32 men, perhaps arranged in four files of eight (the *stichos* being really a double file).² Only exceptionally did Alexander, by doubling the files, give his phalangites the formation of 16 men in depth, which became usual later. It is true that he arranged them in a compact mass (*συνασπισμός*), but sometimes each unit kept its independence and the space required for manœuvring. Thus the Macedonian infantry of the line did not forget the example set by Epaminondas when he disposed his offensive wing in deep order, nor the teaching of the great tacticians of the 5th and 4th centuries, such as Demosthenes and Iphicrates. The *lochoi* sometimes charged in column (*λόχοι ὄρθοι*), the

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.9.6; iv.21, 25.2.

² But see CXVIII, vol. ii, p. 425 n. 3.

enomotiai in each marching one behind the other; these were the tactics invented by Xenophon. The *taxeis* of the phalanx were commanded by tried officers, some of whom were later to play a part of the first importance—Perdiccas, Cœnos, Meleagros, Amyntas, Philip, son of Amyntas, and later Polyperchon. Crateros, one of the chief men in the army, had commanded a *taxis* of the phalanx, and perhaps the whole phalanx.

The Macedonian infantry of the line had an important rôle in battle, but it was to the heavy cavalry of the *hetairoi*, or Companions, that Philip and Alexander entrusted the decisive attack.¹ Macedonia was a country of horsemen; on their great estates, the nobles practised horsemanship from their youth up. For a long time the cavalry was the main strength of the national army, when the properly Macedonian infantry was doubtless formed entirely of the unequal contingents levied by the nobles on their lands. But Philip, who gave the phalanx its powerful unity, no doubt also gave more cohesion and strength to the bodies of heavy cavalry. It may have been he who extended the honourable names of *hetairos* (Companion) and *pezetairos* (Foot-Companion) to his soldiers, the title of *hetairos* having been hitherto reserved for the nobles who surrounded the King and formed his Council.

The Macedonian trooper was armed with the helmet, the metal cuirass, the sword, and, above all, the sarissa. He seems to have carried the shield only when fighting on foot. His horse wore only a blanket, and, like all ancient horsemen, the Macedonian rode without stirrups. The cavalry was divided into *ilai*, recruited locally. At Arbela, eight are mentioned; Plutarch mentions thirteen at the Granicos. The total strength must have been 1,800 or 1,500 men. The whole cavalry was under the command of the Hipparch Philotas, the son of Parmenion. One *ile*, that of Cleitos, son of Dropides, was called the Royal Ile.

Macedonia supplied also regiments of light infantry. The name of hypaspists, by which they are called, originally applied rather to the arm-bearers of the Foot-Companions. But Philip, anxious to reduce the train and to have his troops always ready for action, had compelled his phalangites

¹ Plaumann, in CVII, s.v. "Hetairos".

to carry their own victuals and arms ; so one servant was enough for ten foot-soldiers, and there was only one for each horseman. The hypaspists then became the peltasts of the Macedonian army. They wore the short tunic and the large felt hat, the *kausia*,¹ and were armed with a small shield and a short spear. During the Asiatic campaign, the hypaspists were divided into chiliarchies, of which we hear of four. As in the case of the Companions, and perhaps of the Foot-Companions, a chosen body of them belonged to the Royal Guard (*agema*).

The light cavalry was recruited chiefly among the allies ; but there were, no doubt, Macedonians also among the *sarissophoroi*, who were armed and dressed like the Pæonian horsemen, and performed the same service. We can imagine them, from the Thracian coins, with their trousers, leather-fringed cuirass, maned helmet, and spear. In battle, they had to prepare for and cover, by charging on the flanks, the attack of the cavalry of the Companions ; on the march, they were used as scouts and for intelligence work. The same was probably true of the Thracian *prodromoi*, who formed with the Pæonians an effective of 900 horse. But of all the allies the Thessalian squadrons were the most numerous, containing 1,800 horsemen in all. The contingent of the other Greek allies was not over 600. All these bodies, divided into *ilai* like the Macedonian cavalry, were commanded by Macedonian officers.

The subject and allied peoples also supplied foot-soldiers. Diodorus mentions 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians, armed as peltasts, in the manner of their nation. The infantry contingent sent by the Confederation of Corinth was as much as 7,000 men. Lastly, there were 5,000 mercenaries.

The army must have been followed by an artillery park and siege-engines. Alexander made use of light catapults which threw javelins (*euthytōna*), machines for throwing stones (*palintōna*), towers, and rams, and we know that his engineers aroused the admiration of contemporaries. The artillery and siege-train must, in some cases, have been a drag on the columns. Yet Philip had been at pains to cut down *impedimenta*, and Alexander had decided that his

¹ CCXXVIII, vol. ii, Tafel 45 ; CXL, Tafel 6.

troops should live on the enemy country. For all that, the baggage-train must have been considerable. It included the army-servants and the waggons which carried arms and camp-gear, and later it would be increased by the soldiers' wives and children. In such a long and distant expedition it was an unavoidable burden; but Alexander contrived to turn it to the benefit of recruiting.

The King always marched with the land army, and was accompanied by the Royal Pages (βασιλικοὶ παῖδες) recruited among the young Macedonian nobles. A Staff of ten officers, the *somatophylakes*, formed his Council. There were also body-guards, called sometimes *somatophylakes* and sometimes hypaspists, with confusing results. Lastly, the élite of the army formed the Guard, composed of a detachment (*agema*) of hypaspists, an *ile* of Companions (the Royal Ile), and perhaps also an *agema* of phalangites.

The fleet consisted of as many as 160 or even 182 ships, most of them of the latest type, for, though we still find triremes, there were many quadriremes and quinquiremes. But at first the Macedonians never felt that they were really masters of the sea, and Alexander's communications with Macedonia were not certain until he held the coasts of Asia Minor and Phœnicia. The Great King had the ships of the latter nation on his side, and Alexander might always fear intervention on the part of the powerful Athenian navy.

The uncertain attitude of the Greeks and the inferiority of his fleet, were, without doubt, the greatest dangers which threatened him. But we must not suppose that the enemy whom he was to meet on land was to be despised. Persia could bring out against the Macedonians its multitudes of men and horses.¹ The figures given by the ancient historians are too high and too divergent to be even mentioned, and modern criticism has greatly reduced them. The Persian army was, however, far more numerous than the Macedonian force. At Issos, for example, according to the most moderate estimate, against Alexander's 25,000 or 30,000 men, Darius could marshal 100,000. Only half took part in the battle.² Many of these troops were simply an undisciplined, ill-armed horde, but the Persian cavalry and, still more, that which

¹ CCXXVII, pp. 69-72, 77-8.

² CXVII, vol. iii, 2, pp. 354-5.

came from Bactriana and Sogdiana, were excellent. There were warlike tribesmen from Hyrcania and Parthia. Best of all, there were the Greek mercenaries (10,000 at Issos). The two hundred scythed cars which Darius put into the line were an antiquated arm, which inspired no alarm among the Macedonians, but the elephants were a surprise.

Yet Alexander's little army was to triumph over all these obstacles. It owed this to its organization, its dash, and its power of resistance ; it also owed it to the military genius of its leader. The reigns of Philip and Alexander are a turning-point in the history of war, which had never before been conducted on so grand a scale. Not only was the theatre of operations of a size hitherto unknown, but no previous Greek army had sought and gained such decisive advantages. These were not the old battles, limited in effect, in which the victor was content to remain master of the field selected, and was unable to follow up his advantage to the end or to annihilate the forces of the enemy. Alexander gave military strength its full power ; in developing the cavalry, he created not only the instrument of attack, but also that of merciless pursuit, which alone could turn defeat into rout. His forced marches are no less justly famous than his thunderbolt charges. Now, it is these latter which decide the fortune of the battle. At the head of his Companions, massed on the right and covered on the extreme right by the light cavalry and light infantry, the King hurls himself on the enemy's centre. The right wing of the phalanx supports or renews the attack on the opposite line, while the left wing, which comprises the other part of the phalanx, some light troops, and the cavalry of the allies, advances more slowly, to hold the enemy's right. Such, roughly, is the plan of a battle of Alexander. But his warfare is not made up entirely of battles, and the Macedonian army seems to have been as admirable in the marches which prepared for battles as in the battles themselves. Alexander unceasingly made his troops more and more mobile, and made wonderful use of his light corps. At the head of his hypaspists, his Agrianians, that incomparable corps of javelin-men, and the *ilai* of his light cavalry, he conquered the most inaccessible tribes by daring raids, turned the most difficult positions, and forced the most stubbornly defended passes. Lastly, in addition to the fighting army, he



ALEXANDER IN BATTLE

From the Sidon Sarcophagus

succeeded—for the first time in history—in organizing a real army of occupation in the conquered Satrapies.

II

FROM THE GRANICOS TO ISSOS

While the fleet was collected in Lake Cercinitis, ready to take the sea by Amphipolis and the mouths of the Strymon, Alexander, setting out from Pella, led his army by land in twenty days to Sestos in the Chersonese, and, leaving Parmenion to transport it over to Abydos, himself made for Elæus, where he sacrificed to Protesilaos, the first hero slain in the Trojan War. There he was joined by the fleet, and sailed with it, steering his own ship, to the Dardanian shores. At the Port of the Achæans, near Ilion, he landed, and after casting his spear on the ground, in sign of conquest, he set up altars to Zeus Apobaterios, to Athene, and to his ancestor Heracles. Then, crowned with gold by the pilot Menœtios, he went up to Ilion, and dedicated his own armour in the Temple of Athene Ilias, taking in exchange a suit which had been previously offered there. Finally, having been visited by the Athenian exile Chares, the lord of the principality of Sigeion, he laid a wreath on the tomb of Achilles, while that of Patroclus was similarly honoured by Hephæstion.¹ We have no reason to doubt that when Alexander behaved in this theatrical way he was sincerely imbued with Hellenic patriotism, pride in belonging to the divine race of the heroes, and the feeling that a time was coming worthy of a new Homer; but it is also plain that all these actions were skilfully calculated to strike the imagination of men, and to convince the world that a new Achilles was arming for the traditional feud of the Greeks (March–April, 334).

From Ilion, Alexander rejoined the army, which was awaiting him at Arisbe. Thence, by way of Percote, the neighbourhood of Lampsacos, which sent him an embassy with the learned Anaximenes, the upper valley of the Practios, Colonæ (Bua Tepe, near the village of Arabadurah), the valley of the Kemer Chaï, Hermoton (or Hermason), the massif of Pityus, which he turned on the North, and Priapos,

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, i.11.6–12.2; Diod., xvii.17.8 ff.; Radet, in *LXXVIII*, 1911–14, p. 25.

where he left a garrison, he arrived, in the evening of the fourth day, in the lower valley of the Granicos.¹

The Persian army, composed of 20,000 Asiatic horse and 20,000 Greek mercenaries, commanded by a body of Satraps and nobles, was waiting for him, drawn up near the right bank, on a rise of the ground which follows the river for three miles, a little below the village of Chinar Kopruk. It was in two echelons, the cavalry in front, ready to charge the Macedonians as soon as they set foot on the bank, and the Greek mercenaries behind, on the higher part of the ground.

Memnon of Rhodes, who appreciated Alexander's army at its true value, would have allowed it to advance unopposed, while the fleet, one of the chief forces of the Empire, carried the war into Macedonia, relying on the Greek states, which would certainly have been won over by gold, the first successes of Persia, and hatred of Macedonia. But Persian pride, and also suspicion of their foreign adviser, blinded the Satraps to the wisdom of his plan, and Arsites, the Governor of Phrygia, declared that he would not allow a single house in his Satrapy to be burned.

In the Macedonian camp, Parmenion advised that they should halt and wait for the morrow, to tire out the patience of the Persians, who would not dare to cross the river and would end by abandoning the ground. Alexander drew the army up in battle-order. "The Granicos," he said, "cannot stop men who have crossed the Hellespont."

The traditional post of the King of Macedon was at the extreme right of his army, and the Persians must have expected his attack on their extreme left. They are said to have been deceived by a clever manœuvre of Alexander. While the cavalry and some light troops attacked the extreme right of the Persians, Alexander, at the head of the Companions, advanced obliquely to his left, and, leaping into the river and allowing the current to carry him to a point rather lower down on the opposite bank, charged the enemy's left wing near where it touched the centre of the line of battle. The valour of the King and the dash of his Macedonians

¹ Judeich, in *LVII*, 1908, pp. 373-84. For the battle of the Granicos, see Josef Keil, "Der Kampf um den Granikosübergang und das strategische Problem der Issoschlacht," in *Mitteilungen des Vereins klassischer Philologen in Wien*, i (1924), No. 62.

overcame resistance. The Persian line was broken and the redoubtable cavalry fled on all sides. The Greek mercenaries were still a menace; but they saw the defeat of the Persians, they had no orders, they did not know where to move. Advantage must be taken of the perplexity into which this uncertainty threw them; foot, horse, and all came up to storm the position. It was taken, after terrible bloodshed.¹ Thus the Persian army which might have defended Asia Minor as far as the Tauros was annihilated. To the very entrance of Syria, Alexander had nothing before him but the garrisons left in the towns (May, 334).²

Alexander's attitude after the battle clearly shows the significance of his undertaking. The two thousand Greek mercenaries who escaped the massacre were sent to do forced labour in Macedonia. These Greeks had fought against the cause of Hellenism; and that was the cause which Alexander wished to make triumphant. The dedication of the three hundred Persian panoplies offered in the Parthenon said as much: *Alexander and the Hellenes except the Lacedæmonians*.

The first result of the victory was the submission of Hellespontine Phrygia. The Satrap Arsites was dead, and Parmenion had taken possession of Dascyleion, the capital of the Satrapy. Alexander left this province under the command of Calas, and marched on Sardis, the ancient capital of the Kings of Lydia, and the largest Asiatic city in Anatolia. Mithrines, who was in command of the fort, surrendered it.

Having taken Sardis, Alexander advanced on Ephesos, which he reached in three days. Like almost all Greek cities, Ephesos was rent by factions. The democrats, who were hostile to the Persians, had seized the power during Philip's reign; but Autophradates had overthrown them, and the oligarchical party, led by Syrrhax, now ruled, in the interests of the Great King and with the support of Memnon, who had fled to Ephesos after the Granicos. Another enemy of Alexander, Amyntas, son of Antiochos, who had fled from Macedon on the death of Philip, was there with a force of Greek mercenaries. On the approach of the Macedonians,

¹ LVII, 1908, pp. 393-4. For a contrary view, see Lehmann-Haupt, in LVII, 1911, pp. 230-44; CXXV, p. 338 n. 1.

² Plut., *Camillus*, 19.6.

revolution broke out in the city. The democracy was restored, and Syrophax and his family were stoned to death. Alexander recalled the exiles and won over the powerful priesthood by assigning to Artemis of the Ephesians the tribute which the city previously paid to the Great King.

The enemies of Alexander had fled from Ephesos to Miletos, and to Miletos the army and fleet turned. Hegesistratos, who there commanded the mercenaries in the service of Darius, had thoughts of betraying the place, but, on the arrival of Memnon, he changed his mind, and the city had to be besieged. It was a hard siege, for, although the Macedonian fleet had succeeded in establishing itself on the islet of Lade, and so could blockade the harbour, the Persian fleet was moored on the promontory of Mycale, which commanded the northern entrance of the Latmic Gulf. However, the Macedonian ships were able to avoid a battle with these superior forces, while maintaining the blockade, and Alexander, by occupying Mycale with his land troops, prevented the Persians from mooring, so that they were so to speak blockaded on the sea. The garrison of mercenaries could not hold out, and the city was taken after several assaults (July, 334).

There remained Halicarnassos, the ancient capital of Mausolos, the son of Hecatomnos, with its two citadels, that of the island and that of Salmacis. Mausolos had been succeeded by his brother Idrieus, and later by Ada, the latter's widow and sister. But Pixodaros, a third son of Hecatomnos, afterwards compelled Ada to flee to Alinda, and, after first thinking of alliance with Philip, had turned to the Persians, and had given his daughter to the Satrap Orontobates.¹ Old Ada came to meet Alexander, who restored the Satrapy of Caria to her, and she adopted him as her son. But to exercise the rights thus acquired, it was necessary to take Halicarnassos.

All Alexander's enemies had collected there—Memnon, Amyntas, and the Athenians Ephialtes and Thrasybulos. After the fall of Miletos, Alexander had unwisely dismissed his fleet. So he could not obtain a complete victory at Halicarnassos. He took the lower town, but the two citadels remained in the hands of the garrison, and he had to leave

¹ CCXL, pp. 226-65 ; CVII, s.v. "Ada," "Hecatomnos," etc.

8,000 foot-soldiers and 200 cavalry under Ptolemy before the stronghold. The next year, Memnon showed the young conqueror that one does not renounce the use of the sea with impunity.

From Halicarnassos, Alexander made for Lycia, where he met no great resistance. He had to take Hyparna, which was held by mercenaries, but made terms with Telmissos, Phaselis, and the cities of the Xanthos valley, and, going up the river, campaigned in the mountainous Hinterland, the Mylias, in these winter months; then, avoiding Termessos, which was unfriendly, he returned to the coast at Phaselis, by the passes of the Arycandos.¹

Pamphylia and, beyond it, mountainous Pisidia, which Alexander was now to enter, belonged to the Persian Empire only in name. In fact, the cities were independent, and there was rivalry between them. Their quarrels proved useful to the conqueror. From Phaselis to Perge, the army marched in two columns; a kind of flank-guard followed the mountains by a road prepared by the Thracian pioneers, while Alexander and the mass of the army took the coast road, which was passable at the time in consequence of North winds—exceptional in those parts—which seemed to hold back the sea to let the King proceed. On the way, he received the submission of Aspendos and of Side, an Æolian colony; but he did not stay long enough to complete the conquest of the country. He left this task to the Satrap of Lycia, to which Pamphylia and Pisidia were attached. From Perge Alexander set out for Phrygia. Going inland again by the valley of the Istanos and forcing the passes in spite of the opposition of the Termessians, he treated with Selge, the enemy of Termessos, went on to Sagalassos, which he took, then, by Lake Ascania, reached Celænæ, where he left 1,500 men to receive the submission of the thousand Carians and hundred Greek mercenaries who were defending it, and finally came to Gordion (Bela-Hissar).² There he found reinforcements from Macedon and Greece, and was rejoined by Parmenion, who had taken a part of the troops from Lycia to winter at Sardis.

¹ At Phaselis the plot of Alexander of Lyncestis was discovered. His brothers had been killed in 336, on the King's accession. This Alexander was executed later.

² COXXXVI, p. 225.

Thus ended the first campaign of the expedition to Asia. Alexander had shown remarkable prudence. In battle his rule was to drive straight at the head of the opposing army, but on the march he was able to resist the impulse to press on to the centre of an Empire whose weakness he had been able to feel at the very first contact. He wanted first to make sure of a solid base of operations. This was all the more necessary because the Persian fleet might at any moment assume the mastery of the sea and arouse the hostility of Greece on his rear. He could not go far into Asia until he was sure that the forces of Antipatros would not have to meet a pressure too strong for them. In the conflict on which Alexander had engaged, the sympathies of Greece were on the whole with the Persians, and Memnon knew it. The idea of a war of revenge against the Barbarians did not make Macedonian hegemony any more agreeable to the Greeks. Yet the readers of Isocrates could already see the accomplishment of the projects which the great writer had proposed to Philip. By the conquest of the sea-board provinces and of Phrygia, a vast district reaching as far as the Sangarios was opened to Hellenic colonization, and even Macedon might be content with this increase of territory, if more daring undertakings were fated to fail.

It was quite certain that Alexander would not be content. He had called himself the avenger of Greece, and had begun the war in the capacity of Strategos of all the Hellenes, but he meant the war chiefly to serve the greatness of Macedonia. That is why there were so few Greeks in the army, which was mainly Macedonian; the Macedonians alone were sufficiently attached to the royal house of their country to follow Alexander in an undertaking for which Asia Minor was already too small a prize. Isocrates had proposed two plans: one placed the frontier of the domain to be conquered for Hellenism at the Halys, and the other consisted in the annihilation of the Persian Empire.¹ Philip would perhaps have been content with the former; the victories of Alexander were to go beyond the limits of the latter. He could not, therefore, remain long at Gordion, where the incident of the Gordian Knot, which need not be related here, gave him a promise of the empire of Asia and perhaps of the world

¹ Isocr., *Phil.*, 120.

(May, 333).¹ He even started without waiting for the complete disappearance of the storm which was gathering in Greece.

In the winter of 334, Darius had at last decided to give Memnon the chief command of the fleet. The latter tried to carry out a plan which might have been disastrous to the Macedonian. He had many Phœnician ships, ten vessels from Rhodes, ten from Lycia, three from Mallos and Soli, and mercenaries. In Greece, there was talk of a landing by Memnon, and there was great excitement in Eubœa. But the Rhodian first turned his attention to the islands. He recaptured Chios, which was delivered to him by the oligarchical party and its leader Apollonides, and then, proceeding to Lesbos, reinstated the tyrant Aristonikos at Methymna, whence he had been driven out by Chares, and laid siege to Mitylene. The city was still holding out when Memnon died. Darius may not have realized all that his death meant to himself. Autophradates and his nephew Pharnabazus took command of the fleet, pending the decision of the King, who seems to have called a kind of Council of War, at which Memnon's plan was abandoned. The King resolved to place himself at the head of an army and to march against Alexander. Autophradates and Pharnabazus were confirmed in their command. They had overpowered Mitylene, which was compelled to drive out the Macedonian garrison, to recall the exiles, to make terms on the basis of the Peace of Antalcidas, and to submit to the tyrant Diogenes. Pharnabazus had recaptured Miletos and the lower city of Halicarnassos. But, although the two commanders kept their naval forces, they had to give up their mercenaries, since the idea of a landing in Greece was abandoned, and these went to swell the army which Darius was preparing at Babylon. Alexander had, however, seen his mistake in dismissing his fleet, and had given Hegelochos and Amphoterios, the brother of Crateros, the task of forming a new one. There was nearly a serious conflict with the Athenians, who complained that Hegelochos had seized vessels coming from the Euxine, and they would, perhaps, have taken action with a strong squadron if their ships had not been restored to them. Greece was restless at the prospect of a decisive

¹ Radet, in *LXXXVIII*, 1917, pp. 98-100.

battle between Darius and Alexander. But, now that Memnon's plan was given up, a victory in Asia could not fail to stop all inclinations to rebellion. Therefore, as soon as Alexander learned that Darius was marching towards Cilicia, he hastened to forestall him. He left Gordion in the summer of 333.

At Ancyra, whither he went first, he was met by an embassy from the Paphlagonians. From Ancyra he was able to reduce Cappadocia as far as the Halys, and even a little beyond it ; then he turned south and entered Cilicia, forcing the Cilician Gates (the passes of Gulek Boghaz). Arsames, the Satrap of Cilicia, fled before he had time to lay the country waste or to burn Tarsos. At Tarsos, Alexander fell ill after bathing in the Cydnos (the incident of the physician Philip), and his advance was delayed, but he had sent on Parmenion to occupy the passes (Karanluk-Kapu) between Cilicia and the plain of Issos, watered by the Pinaros, and those between that plain and Syria (the Merkez and Bailan Passes). He himself, after taking Anchialos (perhaps to secure the road from Laranda and Iconion), marched on Soli, which surrendered, reduced the Cilician hillmen by a seven days' raid, returned to Soli, where he established the democrats, and at the same time learned of Ptolemy's victory over Orontobates in Caria, the fall of the citadels of Halicarnassos, Myndos, and Caunos, and the submission of Cos. By Tarsos, he made for Mallos, where he was informed that Darius was at Sochi, in Syria, two days' march from the Syrian Gates. Alexander hastened to meet him, crossing the plain of Issos and going through the gorges of Merkez, until he reached Myriandos in Syria, not far from Alexandretta.

At Sochi the King of Persia had ground favourable to his cavalry. He did not, however, remain there, but, by the passes of the Amanos (Arslan Boghaz, Koprak Kalessi), he advanced to the plain of Issos, where he would not have room for deploying his squadrons. He arrived there when Alexander had already left the place. According to the story, Darius meant to meet Alexander, having grown impatient of waiting for him in vain ; but it is possible, as has been maintained, that the Great King left Sochi when his adversary was already in Syria, and intended to turn him, in order to force him to

give battle.¹ In any case, in this critical situation, Alexander at once turned about, and marched straight for the enemy. Going once more through the Syrian Gates, which, strangely enough, were not guarded, he entered the plain of Issos, slowly deploying his line of battle more and more, opposite the Persian army, which was drawn up beyond the Pinaros.²

The story of the battle cannot be told in a few words. The victory was complete, and, as always, it was decided by a charge of the King and the Companions on the centre, where Darius was stationed. Alexander succeeded in preventing the enemy from enveloping his wings, and he managed to stop the pursuit in time to return to the support of his left wing, which was yielding, and to defeat the Greek mercenaries of the Great King, who, taking advantage of a gap which appeared in the line, were already surrounding the Macedonian phalanx (autumn, 333). Darius fled, giving the signal for a general rout, and leaving his wife and child in the hands of the victor, who treated them generously.

¹ **CXVII**, 2nd ed., vol. iii, 2, pp. 354-65. Bibliography in **CXXV**, p. 365 n. 1. Cf. Arr., *Anab.*, ii.8-11; Diod., xvii.33 ff.; Curt., iii.8 ff.; Pol., xii.17-22.

² Or perhaps, as Ct. Bourgeois suggests, the Payas. See M. Dieulafoy, "La Bataille d'Issus: analyse critique d'un manuscrit du Ct. Bourgeois," *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et belles-lettres*, vol. xxxix (1914), pp. 41-76. For the battle, see also J. Keil, "Der Kampf um den Granikosübergang und das strategische Problem der Issoschlacht," in *Mit. des Vereins klassischer Philologen in Wien*, i (1924), No. 62.

CHAPTER II

THE EMPIRE OF ASIA ¹

I

PHŒNICIA AND EGYPT

DARIUS was fleeing towards Thapsacos, with barely 4,000 men ; other bodies of fugitives made for Asia Minor, where Alexander's Satraps dispersed them ; 8,000 mercenaries escaped to Tripolis in Phœnicia, whence several went to Cyprus, and from there to Egypt.

But the most important consequence of the battle was the effect produced in the Greek world. Ptolemy's victory at Halicarnassos had only partly kept the Carian coast in the power of Alexander, and Pharnabazus had reduced Tenedos and then Sigeion, the domain of Chares, who was compelled to go over to the Persian side. The friends of Persia did not yet despair of raising Greece, and were in communication with Agis, the King of Sparta. In Athens, Demosthenes was foretelling the downfall of Alexander. But the Persian squadrons were defeated among the Cyclades and in the Hellespont, and when Pharnabazus and Autophradates attempted another demonstration off Siphnos with their hundred ships, the Greeks did not dare to move. Agis, it is true, went to Halicarnassos to ask for ships, men, and money. Then came the news of Issos. Greece received it with stupefaction. Agis alone persevered in his purpose, but after the defeat of the royal army the Persian admirals considered that they could not give him more than ten ships and thirty talents, with which he recruited troops in Tænaron and tried to raise Crete.

The Persian fleet was now the only serious danger in the West. The Phœnician coast might serve it as a base. Accordingly, leaving Darius to take refuge in Babylon, Alexander proceeded to Arados, while Parmenion was sent to Damascus,

¹ Chief sources : Arr., *Anab.*, ii.12 ; iv.21 ; Diod., xvii.89-88 ; Plut., *Alex.*, 24-66 ; Curt., iv.1-viii.8 ; Just., xi.10 ; xii.7.

whither, at the time of Issos, Cophen, the son of Artabazus, had taken the baggage of Darius.

The Phœnician cities were prosperous under Persian rule, which allowed them real independence. Since the fall of the Athenian Empire, they had no longer had to fear the commercial rivalry of Athens. United among themselves, and united to Persia, to whom they gave the mastery of the sea, they might have been a formidable obstacle to Alexander. But they were divided. Sidon had taken part in the Revolt of the Satraps in the time of Artaxerxes II, and remembered the reprisals which that king had taken; Tyre and Arados had remained neutral. Gerostratos, King of Arados, was with the Persian fleet, but the city, which owed more of its wealth to its possessions on land than to its trade, neither could nor would resist. Straton, the son of Gerostratos, presented Alexander with a golden wreath, and delivered the town to him, with Marathos, Sigon, and Mariamne. Byblos and Sidon surrendered some time afterwards. But Tyre was to check Alexander.

He was at Sidon, when an embassy came from Tyre, with the royal prince Azemilcus at its head. Tyre would have maintained its neutrality, but Alexander did not desire this. As a descendant of Heracles, he demanded the right of sacrificing to the national god Melkarth, whom the Greeks called Heracles of Tyre. The Tyrians refused; if Alexander entered the sanctuary of Melkarth as a king, it would mean that the god gave him the power over his city and consecrated him as the lawful heir of the Tyrian Kings. No doubt this was exactly what Alexander wanted. Therefore the decision had to be left to force of arms.

So began the famous siege of Tyre, which was to last seven months (January to August, 332).¹ The new town, where the Tyrians had shut themselves up, was on an island with two harbours, the Sidonian Harbour on the north, and the Egyptian Harbour on the south. With materials taken mostly from the old city on the mainland, Old Tyre, Alexander built a mole out towards the island. But when the structure reached deep water, difficulties increased, and one day a Tyrian fire-ship succeeded in burning the end of the mole and the engines which the Macedonians were setting up on it.

It was plain that Tyre could only be taken by a blockade by land and water. This was what had given the Tyrians confidence. The Persian fleet was mistress of the sea, and they thought that they could count on the help of Carthage, whither they may for a moment have contemplated sending their women and children. But the envoys from Carthage had refused assistance and the Persian fleet was about to break up of its own accord.

For the Persian fleet was made up of Phœnician and Cypriot ships. Now, most of the Phœnician cities were in the hands of Alexander, and this fact made the Cypriots inclined to favour him. Spontaneously, the Persian fleet dispersed, the crews rowing the ships back to their homes. The Kings of Arados and Byblos set the example. Presently Alexander had eighty Phœnician ships, about ten vessels from Rhodes, as many from Cilicia and Lycia, and the Cypriot contingent, which included the ships of Pnytagoras, the hereditary ruler of Salamis.

While his preparations were being completed, a ten days' raid enabled him to reduce the Arab pillagers of Antilebanon, Ituræans and Druses. On his return he found the fleet ready and the 4,000 mercenaries whom Cleandros had raised for him in the Peloponnese waiting. Tyre was attacked by land and blockaded by sea. For a long time it held out. At length the southern walls began to yield, and the Macedonians effected an entrance into the town. At the same time, the two harbours were forced. There was frightful carnage. The Tyrians put up an obstinate resistance in the Agenorion. The fury of the Macedonians was at its height; during the siege they had seen their captured comrades thrown down from the walls. Alexander treated Tyre severely. Eight thousand Tyrians were massacred in the last struggle. Only those were spared who had taken refuge in the Temple of Melkarth, among whom were King Azemilcus and the envoys from Carthage. Thirty thousand persons were sold as slaves. The sanguinary success was celebrated by feasts to Heracles.

The fall of Tyre created a great impression and had important consequences. The kingship seems to have been abolished; henceforward we only hear of Phrurachs in Tyre. The city became a Macedonian garrison. Lastly, and above

all, in Tyre there fell the greatest centre of that Phœnician civilization which predominated in Syria and might have been an obstacle to Hellenic penetration. This result Alexander had obtained with the help of Phœnician ships¹ (August, 332).

In the midst of these miraculous successes, a letter and ambassadors had twice come from Darius—first at Marathos, and again when the siege of Tyre was at its height. In the ensuing negotiations we can see how far Alexander's ideas now rose beyond the programme of recovering the rights of Greece. In Phœnicia there appears for the first time the opposition, which was to become daily more acute, between the conceptions of the young conqueror and those of the old comrades of Philip. Darius had owned himself conquered; while protesting against the aggression of Macedonia, he offered alliance, and a large ransom for his harem, but he did not give Alexander the title of King. The latter answered by recalling the Persian Wars and the intrigues of Persia against Macedon, and demanded to be treated as a king, and as the lord of Asia. In the letter which came to Tyre, the Great King greeted Alexander by the royal title, renewed his offer of a ransom, and, in addition, proposed to give him his daughter in marriage and surrendered all Asia west of the Halys to him—that is, in the words of Isocrates, "Asia from Cilicia to Sinope." At the Council, Parmenion was for accepting these terms. But Alexander was no longer content to reign over a Græco-Macedonian Empire, even one which extended so far into Asia. What he now wanted was the whole of Asia, which had been promised to him at Gordion. The Empire could not have two masters. The throne of the Great King would be to the victor.²

This was the sense of his reply to Darius, and after the fall of Tyre, he took the road to Egypt, whither, without doubt, he was called by the hostility of the people against Persia. On the way, he was once more held up at Gaza, where the eunuch Batis organized resistance. A siege of two months was needed to take the town. The horrible scenes of Tyre were enacted over again. The garrison was massacred, and

¹ Kaerst, in *GVII*, i, p. 1422; *CXXIV*, p. 284.

² Radet, in *LXXXVIII*, 1925, pp. 183 ff.

the women and children were sold as slaves. A new population was installed in the city, which, like Tyre, became a Macedonian stronghold.¹ Alexander could then go on to Egypt, where, for the first time, the divine majesty of Oriental kingship was to be revealed to him.²

Seven days' march took the army from Gaza to Pelusion. The fleet followed it along the coast to the same port, and while the ships went up the Nile to Memphis, Alexander advanced to that city across the desert. At Heliopolis he crossed the river. The Satrap Mazaces had offered no resistance, and had even massacred the Greek mercenaries taken to Egypt by the traitor Amyntas. Egypt was, therefore, defenceless, and Alexander had on his side Egyptian hatred of the Persians, their rage at the sacrilegious conduct of Cambyses and the cruelty of Ochus, and their memory of continual struggles for independence against the Great Kings. To the Egyptian gods he showed the utmost respect, sacrificing to Apis and in the very Temple of Ptah.³ This was an act of great consequence. On principle Pharaoh alone could perform the Ritual before his father the God; although his place was usually taken by a Prophet, the latter was only a substitute, playing the part of the sovereign and assuming the royal attributes. When Alexander was thus received in the temples as a King, he became, in the eyes of all, the son and heir of the God and the lawful sovereign of the Two Lands of Egypt. We can guess his feelings, as he entered the religious gloom of the chapels, recited the obscure formulas taught him by the Hierogrammateus, performed the gestures which reanimated the soul of the God in his shrine, and himself received the exhalation of the divine breath.⁴ The pupil of Aristotle was not, like his master, guided by pure reason. His spirit moved readily in a world of mystical ideas, such as would illuminate and enflame his pride. He, too, was a child of Zeus, and there were stories in Macedonia

¹ Alexander's visit to Jerusalem is mentioned by Joseph., *Ant. Jud.*, xi.8.3-7 (Nobert, 313-45); cf. below, p. 96.

² On Alexander in Egypt, see Victor Ehrenberg, *Alexander und Ägypten* (*Beihefte zum alten Orient*, No. 7), Leipzig, 1926.

³ CLXV, pp. 2-3 n. 2; Pseudo-Call., i.34; CLXXVII, pp. 167-9.

⁴ For the Egyptian theory of kingship and religious ritual, see Moret, *The Nile and Egyptian Civilization*, in this series, *passim*.

of his divine birth ; in the Temple of Ptah, he must have felt himself a true god.

But the Temple of Ptah was not Greek, and Alexander had been brought up on Hellenism. In the Oasis of Siwa there was an Egyptian sanctuary with an oracle famous in the Mediterranean world and sung by Pindar.¹ It was dedicated to Amon, whom the Greeks identified with Zeus. Of Zeus Amon Alexander would ask the secret of his divine origin.

From Memphis, where he held games and received the Greek ambassadors, he went down to the coast by the Canopic Arm. The mystical dreams of his pride did not make him forget the realities of his Empire. Egypt, as she was more and more drawn into the circle of the Ægean world, was turning her activities more and more towards the sea. The Pharaohs had long ago left their old capitals in the South, and reigned in the Delta. There was the true heart of the country, so much so that Alexander had not even thought it necessary to go as far as the First Cataract ; a small body sent up towards Elephantine had been sufficient to inform the peoples of the Thebaïd that they had a new lord. But Egypt had no port worthy of her on the Mediterranean. Neither Pelusion nor the ancient Milesian colony of Naucratis, inland on the Canopic Arm, could meet the needs of a new world. So, on the narrow strip of land between the sea and Lake Mareotis, to which a canal could bring the water and the barges of the Nile, under the lee of the island of Pharos, known to Homer, which was to be joined to the shore by a mole seven stades long, so as to form two harbours, Alexander traced, in the midst of his dealings with the supernatural, the foundations of the future Alexandria.² Then, with part of his army, he went along the coast to Parætonion, where he received a deferential embassy from Cyrene, and then struck southwards.

From Parætonion to Siwa, it is ten days' march over the desert. The army did it, accompanied by signs from the gods. Rains exceptional in those parts were held to be miraculous ; snakes or birds fleeing before the advanced

¹ **CLXXVII**, pp. 170-1 ; Radet, in **LXXXVIII**, 1925, pp. 201-2, and 1926, pp. 213-40 ; **CXXXI**, pp. 302-4.

² V. Groningen, in **CCXXV**, pp. 200-11 ; cf. below, p. 278.

guards seemed to show the way.¹ At length they came to the Temple of Amon. There Alexander was received into the sanctuary by the Prophet, and could see, sculptured on the walls, the same theogamies as we still contemplate at Luxor or in the *Mammisis* of Upper Egypt—the union of the god with queens and the divine birth of Pharaoh. Proud Olympias was surely no less worthy of the embraces of a god. Since Alexander was Pharaoh, he was a god, and the Egyptian priest had no difficulty in entering into the ideas of the new lord of his country. He gave the King “the answer which he wanted”, and, when Alexander asked whether all his father’s murderers had been punished, he told him that he had indeed punished all the assassins, but that he should speak more piously of his father, who was immortal. Alexander returned to Memphis, stamped with the divine character proper to all kings of the East; now it was less possible than ever for him to accept the Halys as his frontier, or even the Euphrates, as Darius would presently propose. For the son of the King of the Gods there could be no throne but that of the King of Kings. He must, therefore, march against Darius.

While he was in Egypt, he received the fruits of his Phœnician victories. Hegelochos, his admiral, came and reported the return of Tenedos and Chios to the Macedonian cause, the recapture of Mitylene from Chares, and the submission of Cos. Pharnabazus had managed to escape; the other prisoners whom Hegelochos brought with him were banished to distant Elephantine. Alexander need now feel no fears from the sea. Antipatros would no longer have to cope both with the malcontents of Greece and the Persian fleet; the latter no longer existed, the islands were faithful to the Macedonians, and in Greece the only open hostility came from Agis.

II

ARBELA AND THE CONQUEST OF ASIA

Alexander returned to Tyre, where, amid sacrifices and games, he received the envoys of Athens, who obtained the

¹ CCXV, p. 413 n. 2; Pietschmann, in CVII, vol. i, pp. 1858–60.

release of the prisoners of the Granicos. The fleet of Amphoterios stood ready to support the loyal allies in the Peloponnese. The King and army took the road leading to the Euphrates over the deserts. At Thapsacos the river was crossed by a bridge of boats (July–August, 331). Mazæus, sent by Darius with 8,000 horse, had fallen back at the approach of Alexander; Darius was waiting for him in Assyria. Alexander therefore did not march on Babylon, but towards the Tigris, by the north, in the direction of Nisibis. He must have advanced cautiously, for he did not cross the Tigris, not far from Jazirah, until about the 20th or 21st September; then he turned south, through the district called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right and the Gordyæan Mountains on his left. On the fourth day, his scouts informed him that the Persian army was at Gaugamela, on the plateau of Kermelis between Mosul and Erbil (Arbela) not far from the site of Nineveh. There the decisive battle was fought, on ground more favourable to the manœuvres of the Asiatic cavalry than at Issos. But, just as at Issos, Alexander was able to avoid being enveloped; and, as at Issos, it was a charge of the Companions, led by the King, which, breaking in the enemy's centre, caused the rout. As at Issos, lastly, the victor, not letting himself be carried away in the pursuit, returned in time to support his shaken left and to cut down those of the enemy who, having pierced his line, had gone to pillage his camp (1st October, 331).¹

The victory opened the road to Babylon. Darius resigned himself to this, and fled towards Media, along the Armenian Mountains accompanied only by the Bactrian cavalry, the *Melophoroi*, and 2,000 Greek mercenaries. In the heart of Asia he might hope to raise more hordes of warriors. In the meantime, he abandoned not only Babylon and Susa, ancient Chaldæa and ancient Elam, but also the holy cities of Persia—Persepolis and Pasargadæ.

Alexander seems to have advanced slowly at first, for Babylon was only about 300 miles from Arbela, and he did not arrive there until about the end of October, 331. Not far from the great city, the frontier of Babylonia was closed by a wall 20 parasangs (68 miles) long, built entirely of baked

¹ Bibliography in Kaerst, CVII, s.v. "Alexandros," i, p. 1424, and CXXV, p. 394 n. 1; CXVII, iii, 2, p. 315.

bricks, bonded with asphalt, a product of the country.¹ According to Xenophon, who saw it with the Ten Thousand, it was a hundred feet high and twenty thick. The army doubtless went through by what was known as the Babylon Gate, on the left bank of the Euphrates. Soon they must have caught sight of the huge brick city, with its girdle of walls and towers. The outer rampart (Nimilli Bel, the Foundation of Bel), which, in Herodotos's words, formed the cuirass of the city,² had long been ruined, but the inner rampart (Imgur Bel, Bel Manifests his Grace) "hardly less weak", still stood.³ Babylon might, therefore, have defended itself. The siege of that vast town, 360 stades round, with a great river running through it, would have been a long and difficult undertaking. But a large part of the population must have been hostile to the Persians, and Mazæus, the Satrap who had fought at Arbela, at the head of the Syrians, thought it wiser to surrender without fighting. The inhabitants came out to meet Alexander, led by their chiefs. Mazæus was given the government of the country, but a Greek Strategos was attached to him, to command the troops, and a financial administrator. The army rested thirty days in Babylon. It was the biggest Eastern city which it had yet entered, since Memphis. The great Temple of Bel, the two palaces, the hanging gardens, and the bridge over the Euphrates were celebrated among the Greeks. What the rude conquerors thought, amid the mystical, voluptuous turmoil of the great Asiatic city, we can only imagine. It has been said that the young King's reason for keeping his army there so long was that he regarded their stay there as the preparation for more intimate relations between the peoples whom he wished to unite in an empire which was already of a size far beyond the ideas familiar to Hellenism. In Babylon, as in Memphis, he took good care not to imitate Xerxes, who had carried off the statue of Bel Marduk. On the contrary, he followed the advice of the "Chaldæans", that is, the priests. Perhaps, like Cyrus before him, he received the investiture by entering the temple (E-Sagila) and taking the statue

¹ Xen., *Anab.*, ii.4.12.

² Hdt., i.181.

³ CLXIII, i, pp. 248-9; CVII, s.v. "Babylon" (Baumstark); L. W. King, *A History of Babylon*, pp. 22 ff.

of the god by the hand. The sanctuary was falling into ruin ; he gave orders that it should be rebuilt.¹

From Babylon he sent Polyxenos to Susa to protect the treasure, amounting to 50,000 talents of silver. In that city everything was ready for submission. Alexander took twenty days to go from Babylon to Susa (near Dizful), where he held games and settled the administration of the country. Greece seems to have caused him some concern, for, when he sent Menes to the sea as Hyparch of Syria, Phœnicia, and Cilicia, he gave him 30,000 talents of silver, with orders to give Antipatros as much as he should need to carry on the struggle against Sparta.

He would learn that the danger was past ; but it had been really serious. No doubt the breaking up of the Persian fleet at the time of the siege of Tyre had put a stop to rebellious intentions in Greece ; but Sparta still held out. Agis seems to have secured a predominant influence in Crete, the pirates of which ranged the seas. Gradually he won over the greater part of the Peloponnese—Elis, Achæa, except Pellene, and almost all Arcadia. Only Megalopolis and Messene resisted him. He succeeded in defeating a Macedonian force commanded by Corrhagos and laying siege to Megalopolis. North of the Isthmus, it is true, not a state had moved. Athens, to which Alexander had sent back the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton from Susa, refused to be carried away by the orators of the extreme party, and even Demosthenes counselled peace. But Antipatros was faced with many dangers. Not only had the pretensions of Olympias to the throne of Epeiros, which had been vacant since the King, Alexander, was killed during his campaign in Italy, created diplomatic difficulties, but the Macedonian general commanding Thrace, Memnon, revolted with the peoples whom he was supposed to control. Nevertheless, in the presence of the danger which threatened the Macedonian power in the south, Antipatros managed to come to terms with Memnon, and to send almost all his forces—an army of 40,000 men—against the Peloponnese. Agis, who commanded 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse, was defeated and slain before Megalopolis, in the autumn of 331. The Peloponnesian

¹ Oppert, in *LXXXIV*, 1898, p. 414 ; L. W. King, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

League was dissolved, and Sparta had to enter the Confederation of Corinth. The sovereignty of Macedonia was now acknowledged, and all the more completely when, shortly afterwards, news arrived of the victory of Arbela.

Alexander had already gone forwards on his path of conquest. From Susa, he made for Persepolis, first following the carriage-road which the Great King's court took on its journeys, through the country of the Uxians (Khuzistan). The people of the plain were submissive and peaceful, but the hillmen had never recognized the King's authority. A lightning expedition brought them to their senses, and they were compelled to promise a tribute of horses, baggage-animals, and small cattle. But a more serious danger awaited the army at the very doors of Persia. The Satrap Ariobarzanes was preparing to defend them with a force of 40,000 men. They were, however, turned and forced by a skilful manœuvre of Alexander, and, while Ariobarzanes fled into the mountains, the Macedonian crossed the Araxes by a bridge which he built, and arrived in Persepolis in time to prevent the treasures being dissipated by the garrison. This was the true capital of the Achæmenids, the city of the royal palaces and tombs. It was looted, the inhabitants were massacred or enslaved, and, on a tragic night which tradition has filled with legends, the palace was given to the flames. Historians, and German historians in particular, have indulged in explanations and excuses for these savage and probably useless acts of destruction. They see in them a symbol, a measure of deep policy. No doubt the King wished in this manner to avenge the burning of the Acropolis by Xerxes and to mark the fall of the reigning house. But was it not enough that he was seated on the throne of Cyrus ? ¹

While Alexander was at Susa, Darius was waiting in Media, as if he hoped that some disorder would arise in the victorious armies. But on learning that the Macedonian was in Persia, he resolved to flee to Hyrcania, on the shores of the Caspian, to organize resistance. There he could no doubt count on the forces of his Eastern provinces, the most warlike in his Empire. Ariobarzanes had joined him, and he had with him several Persian lords, the Bactrian horsemen of Bessus, and a body of 2,000 Greek mercenaries. The Caspian Gates,

¹ Plut., *Alex.*, 37 ; *OX*, vol. viii, pp. 395-6.

through which Hyrcania was reached, were easy to defend. Darius sent his harem and baggage there, and went himself to Ecbatana, to prepare for his departure.

Alexander had left Persepolis, and was marching towards Media, reducing on the way the peoples of Parætacene (the district of Ispahan). Three days' march from Ecbatana, Bisthanes, one of Darius's "Faithful", who had, however, deserted him, brought news that the Persian King had fled five days before, accompanied by 6,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and taking all the treasure with him. Alexander then hastened on to Ecbatana. He stayed there long enough to dismiss his Thessalian horsemen and to establish a garrison in the city to protect the treasure brought from Persepolis. Having sent Parmenion with the mercenaries and Thracians to Hyrcania and Cadusia, and Cleitos to Parthia, he himself, with the light troops, hurried in pursuit of the fugitives. He went so fast that he exhausted men and horses; in eleven days he did the journey from Ecbatana to Rhagæ (Ray, a little south of Teheran), one day's march from the Caspian Gates (Sir Darra). There he was obliged to rest five days. Darius was now through the Gates, and had already been deserted by many of his followers, who surrendered to Alexander. Oxydates, a Persian who had a grievance against the Great King, reported that the royal camp was not far from the pass. Alexander went through, and, after a well-cultivated plain, found himself on the steppe. The band of fugitives was making for Hecatompylos (Shahrud), but Darius was now nothing but a prisoner, borne on a chariot and surrounded by conspirators. Only Artabazus and the Greeks remained obstinately faithful. Barsaëntes and Bessus thought of giving him up; if the Macedonian delayed in arriving, Bessus was to don the royal tiara.

The treachery of the "Faithful" was made known to Alexander by Bagistanes of Babylon and Antibelus, son of Mazæus. Without waiting for Cœnos, whom he had sent foraging, and leaving the rest of his force to Crateros, he sped forward at daybreak with his swiftest elements, and only halted about noon of the next day. A night march brought them next morning to the camp which Darius had just left. They had to start again in the evening, and march for another whole night and until midday, to find another deserted camp.

There Alexander was told of a short cut. He took it, with horsemen and mounted foot-soldiers, while Nicanor and Attalos led the rest by the road. After a march of 400 stades, Alexander fell on the convoy, only to find that Darius had been murdered by Barsaëntes and Satibarzanes, who had fled with 600 cavalry (summer of 330).

The death of Darius removed very serious difficulties. What could Alexander have done with him, if he had taken him alive ? To let his adversary live would surely have been dangerous. But when he was dead, Alexander could pay royal honours to him, and take action against the rebels in the name of the violated majesty of the throne. Darius was buried in the royal tombs of Persepolis. His " Faithful " were received into favour by Alexander ; Artabazus was especially praised for his courageous loyalty, and was given the Satrapy of Bactriana.

III

BESSUS AND SPITAMENES

Before Alexander left Hyrcania in pursuit of the Satrap murderers, he had to make sure of the complete submission of the country. He led two expeditions, one against the Tapurians, mountain peoples of the present Tabaristan, and one against the Mardians, who dwelt in the eastern part of Mazandaran, as far as the Qizil Uzain. During this second expedition the ambassadors sent to Darius by the Greeks were brought before Alexander. True to the principles of his policy towards the Hellenes, he released those of Sinope and Chalcedon, which did not belong to the Confederation of Corinth, but imprisoned those of Athens and Sparta ; the Greek mercenaries who had entered the Persian service before 334 he incorporated in his army. At Zadracarta (Astarabad), where he had ordered all his columns to meet, he learned that Bessus had assumed the tiara and the name of Artaxerxes, and was going, by way of Parthia, to Bactriana, which might thus become the last stronghold of national resistance. He was accompanied by Nabarzanes and others, but Sati-barzanes, who supported him, had returned to his government in Aria, and Barsaëntes to Drangiana.

Alexander decided to march to Aria, and reached Susia (Tuz, near Meshed), going up the valley of the Atrek. There he received the submission of Satibarzanes, to whom he restored his Satrapy, and was making ready to turn against Bessus, when he learned that Aria had risen, under this same Satibarzanes. Anaxippos, Alexander's Strategos, had been massacred with his troops. It was therefore necessary to go further into Aria, to punish the culprits. The rebellious Satrap, however, made his escape. To hold the country, a Greek colony, Arian Alexandria, was established at Herat, which may perhaps be identified with Artacoana, the capital of the province. Then Alexander turned to Drangiana, where Barsaëntes, who had taken refuge among the Indians, was delivered up, and put to death.

Phrada-Phrophthasia (Pishavaran), the capital of Drangiana, was the scene of the trial of Philotas. This tragedy showed that, for all his glory, the growing pride and ambition of the King were not unanimously approved by the Macedonian nobility. There seemed no limit to what Alexander would attempt, and many preferred the more moderate projects of Philip, whose most faithful friend and counsellor had been Parmenion. Parmenion's son, Philotas, was involved in a plot against the King's life. He was convicted of having at least failed to reveal the danger to the King, was condemned by the assembly of the Macedonians, and was stoned to death in the customary way. On Alexander's orders, the aged Parmenion was put to death at Ecbatana (autumn, 330).

So Alexander descended to murder, and of the most odious kind, to defend an enterprise of which he alone perhaps saw the greatness. To the accomplishment of his purpose he sacrificed his most valuable advisers. The friends of Philotas, Amyntas and his brothers, were acquitted by the assembly of the army, but the King's vengeance later found another victim in the person of Demetrios, the Body-guard. Not the least astonishing thing in the astonishing story of the Macedonian conquest is that the army and people were so attached to a king who every day appeared more isolated in the idea which he shared with none.

When Demetrios was executed the army was among the Ariasprians, a people of peaceful farmers, who had been called the "Benefactors" since they had aided Cyrus in his

expedition against the Scythians. They gave a friendly reception to the Macedonians, who went on from their country into Arachosia.

From Arachosia, Alexander was preparing to march against Bessus in Bactriana, when he learned that another revolt had broken out in Aria, where Satibarzanes had reappeared. A force was sent against him under Artabazus, Erigyios, and Caranos, and this time Satibarzanes was defeated and slain by Erigyios in a terrible struggle. There remained Bessus and his followers. He had with him 7,000 Bactrian horsemen and the Dahæ of the Jaxartes. While the Macedonian Memnon, who had been left as Strategos in Arachosia, proceeded to organize that outermost province, in the north of which were the valleys leading by the Kabul River to India, and to found a new Alexandria in the district, the army marched towards the Paropamisos Mountains (the Hindu Kush), which bounded Bactriana on the south. The Macedonians took them for the Caucasus, and, carrying the myths of Greece with them, imagined that these were the snow-covered rocks on which Zeus had once chained the Titan Prometheus. From Kandahar, by Ghazni, they reached the upper valley of the Kabul, towards the end of 330 (November), and there laid the foundations of another colony, Caucasian Alexandria, to be the Greek city of the Satrapy of the Paropamisadæ.

They crossed the mountains in the spring of 329, and came by Drapsaca into Bactriana. Bessus had left the country after ravaging the plain between the Paropamisos and the Oxus, and was making for Nautaca (Karshi or Shahr-i-Sabz), where he meant to winter.

In Bactriana, Alexander had to storm Aornos (Khulm), which also became an Alexandria, and Zariaspa or Bactra (Balkh). Then he, too, crossed the Oxus (Amu Darya), not far from the modern Kilif, by a sort of floating bridge made of tent-hides, stuffed with straw and other dry materials, and so found himself in Sogdiana.

Then Spitamenes and Oxyartes decided to betray Bessus. They undertook to give him up, if Alexander sent troops to them. This delicate mission was entrusted to Ptolemy, the new Body-guard. Bessus was traced to a village where he was camping, and was surrendered by the inhabitants.

Alexander made him stand, with a collar about his neck, at the side of the road along which the army was to pass, asked him why he had killed Darius, and, after having him flogged as a traitor to his King, sent him to Bactra to be tried. Then the army marched to Maracanda (Samarkand), the capital of the frontier Satrapy in the extreme North of the Empire, separated by the Jaxartes (Sir Darya) from barbarous peoples whom Alexander and his companions, confusing the Jaxartes with the Tanaïs, took for the Scythians of Europe.

The capture of Bessus was not sufficient to establish peace in the Satrapies of Sogdiana and Bactriana, and Alexander was compelled to stay two years in the ends of his Empire before he could attempt the further conquests in India which he had in view. The peoples of these provinces, who were, perhaps, akin to the Persians, bore the rule of the Achæmenids easily, and it was with some reason that Bessus had expected them to support him. There were still Satraps hostile to Alexander who, although they did not take the title of King, maintained a fairly stout resistance, and Spitamenes, the very man who had betrayed Bessus, suddenly showed himself a dangerous enemy. He had auxiliaries in the barbarians of the borders, Sacæ and Massagetæ, several tribes of whom seem to have adopted a threatening attitude towards the Macedonians. Immediately after the capture of Bessus, Alexander had found it necessary to punish a group of 30,000 barbarians who had massacred Macedonian posts on the Jaxartes, and he had had to storm seven fortified towns, probably built along the frontier, in which other barbarians had installed themselves after putting the Macedonian garrisons to the sword. During this time, news came that Spitamenes was besieging Maracanda. While Alexander himself conducted a raid over the Jaxartes, forced the "Scythian" tribes to submit, and then busied himself with the foundation of the most advanced colony of his Empire, incorrectly called Alexandria of the Tanaïs (Khujand), he sent a small army to the help of the garrison of Maracanda. But Spitamenes, skilful in retreat, was equally so in making a sudden reappearance, and inflicted a bloody defeat on Alexander's generals, who thought that they had driven him away, on the River Polytimetos (Zarafshan). Alexander had

to appear himself, and ravaged the valley of the river almost to Bokhara, but he failed to take Spitamenes. Then he went into winter quarters at Bactra. There Bessus was tried. His ears and nose were cut off, in the Persian manner, and he was sent to Ecbatana to be executed. At Bactra, Alexander also received the submission of Pharasmanes, Prince of the Chorasmians, who dwelt east of the Caspian, and a friendly embassy from the "Scythians" of the Jaxartes. In the spring of 328, he was compelled to return to Sogdiana, which was disturbed. While that province was ranged by Alexander's columns, which met at Maracanda, Spitamenes had reappeared in Bactriana and attacked the garrison of Zariaspa. Peithon, who commanded it, forced him to withdraw, but the Macedonian troops fell into an ambush and Peithon himself was taken prisoner. Crateros, with a larger force, once more compelled Spitamenes to retreat. On the approach of winter, Alexander, leaving Cœnos in Sogdiana, came to Nautaca with the intention of wintering there. Spitamenes reappeared in Bactriana, with Sogdians, Bactrians, and Massagetæ; forced to flee, and deserted by the Sogdians and Bactrians, the elusive Persian at last fell victim to the treachery of the Massagetæ, who sent his head to Alexander (328-7).

Most of the winter was spent at Nautaca, in settling the administration of the Empire. Old Artabazus, in the course of the struggle with Spitamenes, had asked to be relieved of his government of Bactriana. Alexander appointed the Macedonian Amyntas as his successor. Phrataphernes of Parthia was instructed to bring back the disobedient Satrap of the Tapurians and Mardians. Atropates took the place of Oxydates in Media, and part of the country has kept his name to our own day (Atropatene, Azerbaijan). In the spring of 327, while Crateros was reducing Catanes and Austanes in Parætacene, Alexander took the last rebellious strongholds in Sogdiana and Bactriana. The two Persian nobles who had taken refuge there were received into his favour. One of them was an old comrade of Bessus, named Oxyartes, and Alexander married his daughter, the beautiful Roxana.

So ended two years of hard fighting in the depths of Asia. Alexander had had to cope not only with the enemy, but

sometimes with the opposition of his own people. The army, indeed, followed him faithfully, but his ideas were more and more cutting him off from his comrades. The murder of Parmenion marked a breach which had existed for a long time, and at Maracanda, in the spring of 328, the death of Cleitos, son of Dropides, again brought it to light, in an odious and tragic manner. It is a well-known story how, in one of the drunken orgies which seem to have been a too frequent pleasure of the coarse Macedonians, Alexander killed his friend, for the crime of setting Philip's glory above his own.¹

Many must have thought that the old King's plans had been exceeded to a dangerous extent. It was very fine that Macedon should rule Asia, but when Alexander ascended the throne of Cyrus he adopted the manners of a Great King. That he should make his Asiatic subjects worship him, after the Persian custom, was tolerable; but he had wanted to impose the same rule on the Macedonians and Greeks, and the attempt had partially failed. Many had approved of the protest of Callisthenes, Aristotle's nephew and the historian of the King.² There was bitterness, too, over the place which he gave to the conquered in the army and in the administration of the Empire. Then a plot was discovered among the Royal Pages, the object of which was to stab the King. The conspiracy originated in the desire for personal vengeance of one of these young men, who considered that he had been unjustly punished by the King's orders. But the fact that he found accomplices among his comrades shows that all, brought up on the lectures of the philosophers, regarded the pretensions of the new tyrant as intolerable to the dignity of free men. That was why Callisthenes was among those condemned (327).³

No doubt, this discontent had not sunk deep into the mass of the army, over which Alexander maintained all his influence. Directly after the conspiracy of the Pages, that marvellous

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.8-9; Plut., *Alex.*, 50-4; Curt., viii.1; Just., xii.6; **CXXXI**, pp. 319-24.

² Arr., *Anab.*, iv.9.5-13.1; Plut., *Alex.*, 54; Curt., viii.5.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.13-14; Plut., *Alex.*, 54 ff.; Curt., viii.7-8; **CXXXI**, pp. 325-9.

leader of men took his troops over the frontiers of the Persian Empire into India, where the Great Kings had hardly set foot, so showing that as soon as his purpose was achieved his imagination conceived yet vaster enterprises. Greece and Asia were not enough for him ; he must have the empire of the world.

CHAPTER III

INDIA AND THE EMPIRE OF THE WORLD ¹

I

THE CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB

INDIA was at that time almost a land of mystery. The great Darius had caused the valley of the Indus to be explored by Scylax of Caryanda, and was able to annex part of the country; but for a long time the frontier of the Persian Empire was at the Paropamisos, and the valley of the Ganges, separated from that of the Indus by a vast desert, had always been practically unknown. There were Indian elephants and troops in the Persian army; but the soldiers probably came from the mountains bordering on the Empire.

Among the Greeks, Hecataëos and Herodotos probably knew and made use of a narrative by Scylax. Ctesias, a physician at the court of Artaxerxes II, had gathered some notions of the land and its inhabitants, but these were mixed up with wild fables. India was still a country of marvels. It never ceased to be that. But what a distance there is between the writings of the 5th and 4th centuries and what the Greeks of the 3rd century learned from the stories of travellers like Megasthenes and Nearchos, of which we have a résumé in Arrian's *Indica*! For the knowledge of India, Alexander's expedition indeed opens a new age.²

No doubt this amazing adventure would have been impossible if the Macedonian had not found divided and rival states before him. He was still in Sogdiana, when Taxiles,³ one of the Rajahs of the northern valley of the Indus, came

¹ Chief sources: Arr., *Anab.*, iv.22; vii.30; Diod., xvii.84-116; Plut., *Alex.*, 55-77; Arr., *Ind.*; Just., xii.7-10; Curt., viii-x; CXLVI-CLII.

² CXLVI.

³ Taxiles, from *Taxila*, his capital, the prince of an *Ambhi* dynasty, of the warrior caste of Kshatriyas (S. Lévi, in XCIV, 1890, pp. 234-6).

to ask for his help against his enemies, and particularly against Porus, King of the Pauravas, whose principality was divided from his by the Hydaspes (Jehlam). The nation was, therefore, not united politically, and, in addition, the various peoples differed in culture and manners. The religion was not everywhere the same, and Brahminism was far from being universally practised. Alexander must have been informed about the state of things in India by the Indian prince Sisicottus, who had formerly attached himself to Bessus and now followed the fortunes of the Macedonians.

By the valley of the Kabul they entered that of the Indus. Leaving Bactra in the spring of 327, Alexander recrossed the Paropamisos Mountains and reached Nicæa (Baghrām or Kabul).¹ He was at the head of a considerable army; its strength may be reckoned at 120,000 men, 60,000 of whom were combatants. The Europeans were hardly more than 30,000; Alexander had had to incorporate a great number of Orientals. By mixing nations in his army, he was preparing for their fusion in the Empire. The Asiatics were distributed in units organized and armed in the Macedonian manner. The superior officers immediately under Alexander were still mainly Macedonians. The tactical corps and divisions were a little different from what they had been at Issos and Arbela; not only had Alexander reinforced his light troops, which were so useful in pursuit and quick raids, by creating new arms like the hippacontists and hippotoxotæ, perhaps recruited among the Barbarians,² but since Susa he had split the *ile* into two *lochoi*, to make it more mobile,³ and had combined the *ilai* in two, and later in four, hipparchies of a thousand horsemen. To the *taxeis* of the phalanx, numbering eleven (or twelve), two pentacosiarchies were added. They were divided into chiliarchies like the hypaspists.

First of all, the tribes of the Cophen valley had to be subdued. At Nicæa, Alexander received the gifts and war-elephants brought by Taxiles and the other princes; then, dividing his army into two columns, he ordered Hephæstion and Perdicas to reduce the peoples of the

¹ CXLIX, pp. 232 ff.

² Arr., *Anab.*, iii.24.1.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.16.11.

southern bank, while he dealt with those of the northern. The southern army made its way as far as Peucela,¹ the prince of which was obliged to flee to Abisares, the Rajah of Hazara and Kashmir. The two generals were before the King in reaching the Indus, over which a bridge was thrown. In the meantime, Alexander, having crossed the Choaspes (Kunar), was waging pitiless war on the Açvakas (Assaceni),² and taking their fortified towns by storm. Aornos,³ where Heracles himself was said to have failed, gave him especial trouble ; he had to pursue the enemy into the hills (Dyrta). At last, the army crossed the Indus and came to the capital of Taxiles,⁴ where the ambassadors of Abisares and of the "Nomarch Doxares" were received. Then they made ready for the war on Porus.

It began at the end of the spring of 326. To reach Porus, it was necessary to cross the Hydaspes. But the Indian prince was guarding the river with a considerable army. Alexander had encamped on the bank, not far from Jalalpur.⁵ It was the season of the rains, which caused the Macedonians some hardship, but helped the manœuvre of Alexander, who, having no hope that the crossing would be given to him, decided, as Arrian says, to "steal" it. Leaving Crateros in the camp with the greater part of the troops, he instructed him to keep the enemy busy, while he himself, with part of his cavalry and the hypaspists, crossed the river 150 stades up stream, at a point where the bank was thickly wooded, opposite an island also covered with jungle (Yamar). A great battle was fought, near Mong, ending, thanks to a skilful cavalry manœuvre, in complete victory for Alexander. Porus, whose son was killed in the battle, fought bravely, and received his kingdom back from the hands of his vanquisher (May-June, 326).⁶

Indeed, he received more than his kingdom, for, after founding two Greek cities, Nicæa (Mong) and Bucephala

¹ CXXIII, p. 130 n. 2 ; Cunningham, p. 49.

² From Açva, horse ; cf. CXLIX, p. 333.

³ Tomaschek, in CVII, vol. i, p. 2659 ; CXLIX, pp. 335-8.

⁴ S. Lévi, in XCIV, 8th S., vol. xv, pp. 236 ff.

⁵ CXLIX, pp. 344 ff.

⁶ Arr., *Anab.*, v.6-19 ; Plut., *Alex.*, 60 ; Diod., xvii.87 ; Curt., viii.18. Cf. CXXV, p. 458 n. 1, p. 467 ; Cavaignac, in XCIV, 1923, pp. 332-4.

(Jalalpur ?) ¹—the latter in honour of his famous horse, who died there—and then receiving the submission of Abisares, who had tried to support Porus, Alexander reduced the neighbouring hill-tribes who were enemies of Porus, such as the Glausæ or Glaucanici (Kalakas, Kalajas, Kalachas),² and gave him their territory. Then, having sent Philip and Tyriaspes against the Assaceni, who had revolted, he started right through the Punjab, crossing the Accsines (Chenab), and Hydraotes (Ravi) and subduing the peoples of the district, who were called the “Kingless Indians” (Azattas). The Cathæans put up an active resistance,³ but he took Sangala (Samkala), the capital of Sophytes (Saubhuta), who surrendered, as did his neighbour Phegelas (Bhagala).⁴ Meanwhile, Hephæstion defeated a rebel, a kinsman and namesake of Porus. Alexander advanced thus to the Hyphasis (Beas), but did not cross it. It is said that he wanted to take his army into the valley of the Ganges, over a vast desert, but was held back by the opposition of his exhausted troops. He, therefore, returned the way he had come, after building twelve monumental altars to mark the eastern limit of his conquests.⁵ The two protected kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were like the marches of his Empire. But, true to his policy of Hellenization, he had founded some Greek cities, particularly an Alexandria on the Accsines. He now proposed to go down the Indus, which he must have reached by the Hydaspes and Accsines.

II

THE JOURNEY DOWN THE INDUS

In the autumn of 326, a large fleet ⁶ was ready. It was built at the expense of thirty-three great personages of the Court and the Staffs, and was manned by Phœnicians, Cypriots, Egyptians, and Greeks, under the command of Nearchos. The King's ship was piloted by Onesicritos. The army

¹ CXLIX, p. 110 n. 3.

² CXLIX, p. 111 n. 2.

³ CXLIX, p. 347.

⁴ S. Lévi, in XCIV, 8th S., vol. xv, pp. 237-9.

⁵ CXLIX, pp. 343 ff.; site unknown.

⁶ The authorities give different figures. Cf. Arr., *Anab.*, vi.2.4 (two thousand); *Ind.*, 19.7 (eight hundred); etc.

had just received reinforcements. Before they started, in an assembly of the army leaders and native princes, Porus was proclaimed King of the Indians who had been subdued. But a shadow had been cast on their hopes by the death of Cœnos, one of the most faithful comrades of Alexander, and one of the most popular leaders in the army.

When Alexander embarked at Nicæa (Mong), he took on board the archers, Agrianians, hypaspists, and cavalry of the Guard. The rest of the army followed on the two banks, Crateros on the right and Hephæstion, with the greater part of the troops and two hundred elephants, on the left. In this manner they went down the Hydaspes to its confluence with the Acesines. There the rapids did some damage to the fleet, but it was easily repaired. Some riverside tribes, such as the Sibæ, submitted without resistance ; others had to be reduced. The most hostile were the Mallians (Malavas) and the Oxydracæ (Kshudrakas),¹ who seem to have lived in the valley of the Hydraotes. Alexander crossed the deserts between that river and the Acesines, fell upon the centre of the country of the Mallians, and took six of their towns, including a city of Brahmins. The capital of the Mallians, which is placed somewhere near Multan (the beds of the two rivers have probably shifted since ancient times), was one of the last to fall.² This city, whither the fugitives had retired, Alexander entered almost alone, carried away by his daring, and he was dangerously wounded. With the report of his death, dismay spread among the army, which had remained on the banks of the Acesines. Alexander hastened to embark on the Hydraotes, and when he came to the confluence he caused the curtains of his cabin to be opened, and waved his hand to his troops to reassure them. Impressed by the defeat of the Mallians, the Oxydracæ submitted, and, before resuming the march to the Indus (February, 325), Alexander, who had already founded an Alexandria on the Acesines (near Wazirabad), decided that at the junction of that river with the Indus another Alexandria³ should mark the frontier of the Satrapy of the Upper Indus, which was given to Philip of Elimiotis, the brother of the treasurer Harpalos. The chief town of the Sogdi or Sodræ (Çudras) became the seat of a

¹ **CXLIX**, pp. 350 ff.

² **CXLIX**, pp. 351 ff.

³ **CXXV**, p. 464 n. 4 (according to Lassen).

Greek colony, Alexandria of the Sogdi (near Fazilpur).¹ Then there was trouble with the King of Mushika (Musicanus),² whose country must have extended from about Bukkur to Sehwan, with the "Nomarch" Oxycanus or Porticanus (Prastha, table-land), and with Sambus (Çambhu), whose capital, Sindamina, must be Sehwan. The Brahmins, one of whose towns was captured, seem to have incited Musicanus to a revolt, which was put down by Peithon, and submission was made by Mœris or Sœris (Saurya dynasty), Prince of Patala, a town situated at the top of the delta, either in the neighbourhood of the modern Tatta or about Haidarabad.³

Alexander was obliged to separate himself from part of his troops, probably because it was necessary to display his force on the roads of Arachosia and Drangiana, where he had not yet been, and on account of news received from some of the Eastern Satrapies. The military colonists of Bactriana had revolted. Among the Ariasprians of the Etymander, Ordanes had risen. Crateros, with four *taxeis* and the veterans to be conducted back to Macedonia, went up the valley of Shikarpur (a town about twelve miles from the right bank of the Indus) and through the Bolan Pass, and took Quetta and Kandahar. He had orders to rejoin the King in Carmania.

Alexander reached Patala towards the end of July. The governor and almost the whole population had deserted it. They were brought back into the city, where once again the foundations of a new Alexandria were laid, which was to have a fort and shipbuilding yards. In the desert on the east, water-cisterns were built for travellers. Then, leaving Hephæstion and the main body of the troops to complete this work, Alexander, with Leonnatos and 9,000 men, descended the western arm of the river until he reached, with considerable difficulty, the island of Cilluta. Here, though not yet out of the river, the Macedonians for the first time saw the ebb and flow of the tide, and fled in terror. But Alexander, with those vessels which were seaworthy, sailed out to an island off the coast, where he performed sacrifices ordained by Amon. Then, returning to Patala, he twice sailed down to the sea by the eastern arm, and built a fort, arsenals, and tanks,

¹ CXXV, p. 464 n. 6.

² Capital Alor (CXLIX, p. 157 n. 2).

³ Haidarabad ? CXLIX, pp. 356-7.

thus providing all that was lacking in a country which he clearly wished to make a permanent part of his Empire (July, 325).

III

THE RETURN

It may seem strange that, to return to the centre of that Empire, Alexander should have chosen the hardest road, which keeps near the sea over the terrible deserts of Gedrosia. It is one of the most desolate regions in the world. It is the southern part of that vast desert, covered with great salt marshes, almost always inaccessible, the Kavirs, the worst of which, the Dasht-i-Lut, lies between Sijistan and Kirman, while that nearest the sea is a lake, the Milan-i-Sihun, between Bam and Jask. From one wretched oasis to the next, even more wretched, the daring traveller finds a few caravan-routes, and south of Bam the road from Bam to Bampur is at this day intersected by a track connecting the oases of Baluchistan with those of Kirman ; but south of this road is an arid region which no European has ever seen. Now, Alexander marched in the extreme south, along the coast. Could he not have taken the route by which he had sent Crateros, and reached Drangiana and Arachosia by the Bolan valley ? He certainly was aware of the difficulties of the road and the climate, for he chose for his departure the season when the rains are not too heavy (August, 325).

But the King doubtless wished to make a tour of all the frontiers of his Empire, and particularly that which divided it from savagery and the unknown. The pursuit of Darius had taken him into Hyrcania, and he had not left that region until he had subdued the hillmen on the shores of the Caspian. To capture Bessus, he had gone into Sogdiana, as far as the banks of the Jaxartes, and it is probable that he would have shown himself there, even if there had been no Bessus. Now he had just spent ten months in following the courses of the Indian rivers and establishing the Eastern marches of the Empire. The Asiatic shore of the Indian Ocean, which in his eyes marked the limits of the habitable world, must have seemed no less important to a genius which was so eager to build the future. This sea, stretching out into mystery, might,

as much as the land-routes, serve for communication between the Mediterranean countries and the regions of the Far East. He knew that it was on these waters that the Persian Gulf opened, and consequently the routes of the Tigris and Euphrates, and he may have guessed that, beyond the Arabian peninsula, it gave access to the Red Sea and the shores of distant Egypt. It must, therefore, be explored, and, since ancient navigation never went far from the coast, the best method of acquiring sufficient knowledge of the seaways was to make the land and sea armies follow two parallel routes. Nearchos was entrusted with the equipment of a fleet of a hundred ships, to be manned by 12,000 soldiers and 2,000 seamen. Marching through the coast provinces, Alexander would secure the points at which the fleet could put in, and, so far as possible, would provide fresh water and victuals on those unknown and desolate shores.

Leaving Patala (August, 325), Alexander entered the territory of the Arabitæ, a tribe of independent Indians, separated from the Oreitæ on the west by the River Arabis. The Oreitæ were also reckoned among the Indians, but their language and manners were different.¹ The Arabitæ fled before the King. Hephæstion was ordered to bring them back and subdue them, while Alexander, overcoming the resistance of the Oreitæ, reached their capital, Rhambacia (Sonmiani) on the sea, where Hephæstion afterwards founded another Alexandria. The Oreitæ and Arabitæ were to be attached to the Satrapy of Arachosia and Gedrosia under Apollophanes, and, while Leonnatos stayed some time in the country to pacify it and to prepare for the provisioning of the fleet, the army defeated the Oreitæ and Gedrosians in the passes between the territories of the two peoples, and plunged into the desert.

It was a torrid region.² Water was only to be found near the mountains, a long way from the sea. Now, Alexander was obliged to keep as near the coast as possible, to prepare landing-places for the fleet. They usually marched at night, for the vegetation gave no shelter from the pitiless rays of the sun. A few date-palms raised their shadeless fronds in the burning air. Myrrh, it is true, grew abundantly, and the

¹ Strabo, 720 ; Arr., *Ind.*, 25.2.

² Arr., *Anab.*, vi.22 ff. ; Strabo, 722-3.

Phœnicians who followed the army did not fail to collect it. They also gathered spikenard (*Nardostachys jatamansi*), the scent of which went up under the tread of the army. They saw, too, with surprise, seaweed with white flowers, in basins which were only covered at high tide, and thickets of acanthus (*Acacia catechu*), which had thorns "strong enough to pull a rider off his horse" and a juice which caused blindness. But corn was scarce, and they were overcome with fatigue, thirst, and hunger. The column was followed by an enormous train of baggage, servants, women, and children. Pack-animals died, baggage had to be abandoned, and the way was covered with sick and stragglers. Some were taken with overpowering sleepiness, and only woke up when the column was far ahead; the stronger managed to catch it up, following the footprints, but many were lost and died. Even the guides were not sure of the way, and nearly lost the army in these wastes. The soldiers saw with bitterness that a great part of the corn, requisitioned with difficulty whenever they came to a miserable hamlet, was sent to the coast, where the fleet was expected to put in for provisions. The sacks of corn were sealed with the King's seal. One day, the escort accompanying a convoy broke the seal and took the corn, and such was the general distress that Alexander could only pardon them. Many killed pack-animals and ate them, afterwards saying that they had died of the heat. Presently the "Etesian" winds brought down rain in the mountains, and then there were sudden inundations. Once, when camp had been pitched in the dry bed of a torrent, the water came down so suddenly that it carried away the royal train, all the baggage-animals, and a great number of men, women, and children. At last, after sixty days of hardships, they reached Pura (Bampur?),¹ the capital of the province, where they could rest. But here they learned that Philip, the Satrap of the Upper Indus, had been killed in a mutiny of the mercenary troops, and that Apollophanes, the Satrap of Gedrosia, whom Alexander wished to remove from his office, had fallen in a battle between Leonnatos and the Oreitæ.

In Carmania, Alexander was joined by Crateros. But he was obliged to act with severity. On every side, in the

¹ **CXLIX**, pp. 357-8. Bunbury (*Hist. of Ancient Geography*, i, p. 519) thinks that the sufferings of the army have been exaggerated.

absence of the master, troubles were breaking out in the huge, hardly constituted Empire. Cleandros and Sitalces, the Strategi of Media, were put to death for looting temples. Heracon, acquitted on this charge, was afterwards executed on an accusation of the people of Susa. These were the officers whom Alexander had once entrusted with the killing of Parmenion.

No news of Nearchos had reached the King since they had left the country of the Oreitæ.¹ He was awaited anxiously. He had started later than the army, and difficulties had begun in India, where a suspicious restlessness reigned. He had sailed about the 21st September, and had doubled Cape Monze (Muwari), but the winds detained him four days in Sangada, on the coast of the Arabitæ. He gave Alexander's name to the port.² On the 23rd October he again started, on a sea which was rendered difficult by reefs and surprisingly heavy swells. Everything was calculated to astonish his men, who for the first time saw large whales. Beyond the mouth of the Arabis, he was caught in a terrible storm, in which three of his ships foundered. He managed, however, to land on the coast of the Oreitæ, at Cocala (Phur, or Pur, Creek), and there found Leonnatos, who had just defeated the barbarians. Then, after a well-earned rest, he arrived, at the beginning of November, at the mouth of the Tomeros (Hingol), where he had to fight a battle with the natives. By the 21st he was off the coast of the Ichthyophagi, primitive tribes of fishermen, who lived in miserable huts built of wreckage, shells, and bones of large fish. Their domain was 7,400 stades long, from Malana (Cape Malan) to Dragaseira (Ras Jagin), and had no resources whatever. Even to-day all its food comes from the sea, and "camels and sheep may be seen feeding out of the same basket of powdered fish as their master".³ At this time the crews had much to endure. Fearing desertions, Nearchos, contrary to custom, kept his ships at sea day and night. At last, at Mosarna (the district of Gwarari and Kunbi), a Gedrosian named Hydraces was found, who was willing to act as pilot, and the fleet finally arrived on the coast of Carmania, at the

¹ *CLI* and Tomaschek, in *LXXV*, 1890, 8th Abh.; Arr., *Ind.*, 20 ff. (P. Chantraine's ed. and trans.).

² The present Karachi.

³ *CXXVI*, p. 51.

mouths of the Anamis, at Harmozeia (Ormuz), opposite the Arabian promontory of Maceta (Mussendum ?) from where they knew that the cinnamon was sent up to Babylon. All contact with the army had been lost since the coast of the Ichthyophagi, but some sailors who went on shore met a Greek mercenary, who told them that Alexander was five days' march away¹ and put Nearchos in touch with the Hyparch of the district. That official hastened to inform the King, but, since the men who had been sent on ahead of the admiral returned without having seen anything, it was supposed that the Hyparch was tricking them, and he was thrown into irons. In the meantime, Nearchos and his second in command, Archias of Pella, had left the fleet and gone to the camp. Their unkempt beards and hair and their ragged, tarry clothes made them unrecognizable. They had to tell their names to the King's messengers, whom they met on the way, and even Alexander, convinced that his fleet was lost, had difficulty in recognizing them. Nearchos was received with great joy and in great honour ; then Alexander ordered him to go on exploring the coast as far as the mouths of the Euphrates (December, 325).

Thus ended the conquest of Asia. Alexander now had to return to the centre of the Empire, to complete its organization, a task which required both an authority capable of enforcing its laws and a wisdom which would consider the present while not losing sight of the future. When Æschylos's Atossa saw in her dream Europe and Asia harnessed to the car of Xerxes, like two divine steeds, one, no doubt, bore the rein like a docile slave, but the other kicked under the yoke, covering the bit with bloody foam, and the Great King fell to the ground amid the wreck of his chariot. Since the days of the Persian Wars, Greece had not acquired a more manageable temper, and even Asia was not so docile as it might have appeared to the mother of Xerxes. The authority of the great Kings had often been paralysed by the independent spirit of the Satraps, and it stopped short at the borders of certain tribes of the desert and mountains. The very conquest had brought new difficulties. It was not merely a matter of persuading the Greek world and the Eastern world to live side by side, each according to its old

¹ Perhaps at Gulashgird, where an Alexandria was founded.

customs ; by casting Greece upon the East, Macedon had mingled them together, and a common way of life must be found, acceptable to the victor and the vanquished alike. Whatever it might be, it was plain that a balance of such delicacy could only be established and maintained by the watchful presence of a single, sovereign power, which should pay the utmost attention to the manifold interests and diverse passions of its peoples. After being absent ten months on the distant frontiers of his Empire, Alexander returned to his central provinces to find, in the conduct of his Satraps, signs of an unwholesome lack of discipline, natural enough in a time of wars and disturbances, to which the master's absence had given only too much opportunity. The King's best friends were often the guiltiest, and he was still in India when he learned of the flight of Harpalos.

IV

LAST ACTS AND LAST PROJECTS

So the first acts of the King on arriving at Pasargadæ, whither he had gone direct from Carmania with the light troops, while Hephæstion and the army followed the coast of Persia, had to be measures of repression. Not only had he to seek out the men who had sacrilegiously looted the tomb of the great Cyrus, but Atropates of Media brought to him a rebel named Baryaxes, who had assumed the "straight *kitaris* (turban)" and proclaimed himself Great King. At Persepolis Orxines, the successor of Phrasaortes in the Satrapy of Persia, having been convicted of exactions and sacrilegious thefts, was hanged, and in his place the King appointed the Macedonian Peucestas, recently promoted to *somatophylax*, whom he esteemed for his keenness in learning the language of the conquered and understanding and imitating their ways. From Persepolis he went to Susa ; on the way, when crossing the Pasitigris, he found Nearchos and his fleet, having accomplished their voyage. At the same time he was joined by Hephæstion. At Susa, a solemn and symbolic action revealed to the Empire the profound idea of the King and his generous desire to fuse Macedonians, Hellenes, and Persians in one people of equals. It is well known how, on one and the

same day, he made each of his most distinguished comrades marry a princess of the Persian nobility ; he himself, already married to Roxana, the daughter of Oxyartes, took the eldest and youngest of Darius's daughters as his wives. Moreover, to show the importance he attached to this example, he himself gave dowries to the brides and big presents to the ten thousand Macedonians, who, on that same day, married Asiatic women. Then 200,000 talents were devoted to paying the debts of the soldiers, and the great leaders received wreaths of gold (winter, 324).

After that Alexander embarked with his light troops on the ships of the fleet, to descend towards the sea by the Eulæos, while Hephæstion led the army into the Tigris valley. The King and the ships returned up the Tigris and met the rest at Opis. Discontent was brewing among the Macedonian troops. They resented the position which the King gave to Persians in the Government, and still more in the army. They felt that the King was neglecting his old comrades in favour of the conquered. He had opened the ranks of the Guard to Bactrians and Persians, and the cavalry of the Companions had been reinforced by a fifth hipparchy, to let in Asiatic horsemen. The men were tired to the point of exhaustion with following a King who was insatiable for conquests, and would finish by losing them at the end of the world. On the very day that Alexander released 10,000 veterans, mutiny broke out. They shouted that he should discharge them all ; if he had further distant journeys in view, he could make them alone with his father Amon. This sarcasm, which recalled the derisive and exasperating opposition which Alexander's pretensions to godhead aroused in the circles of the rhetors and philosophers, must have wounded his pride especially. He flung himself into the midst of the mutineers, he pointed out the thirteen ringleaders to his faithful hypaspists with his own finger and had them haled off to execution, and then, in a clever and impassioned speech, he reminded the Macedonians of all that his father and himself had done for them. From being a poor people of hillmen, they had become, thanks to their Kings, the masters of the world. And what profit had he got from it ? Well, let them go, and say in Macedonia that they had deserted their King, to be guarded by the conquered enemy.

Being sure of the impression which his words had made, he withdrew to his tent, and did not appear for two days. Then, as if the Macedonians were now mere strangers, he called the Persians about him and distributed them in the formations of the army and the Guard, even selecting superior officers and *somatophylakes* among them. After that, the Macedonians could no longer contain their emotions. They ran to the King and besought him, weeping, to take them once more to his side. The guilty would be punished; they themselves would follow him wherever he liked to lead. The reconciliation was sealed in tears. Alexander called all the Macedonians his "kinsmen". Feasts and sacrifices were held. The veterans were sent home to Macedon with their full pay and a bonus of a talent each. They were to be conducted by Crateros, assisted by Polyperchon. Crateros would take the place of Antipatros, who was on bad terms with Olympias, and perhaps suspect to Alexander, and Antipatros would bring out the new recruits (summer, 324).

The mutiny at Opis illustrates better than anything else could do, both the opposition which Alexander might find in his own army and the outbursts of sincere passion and spectacular indignation by which he contrived to maintain his ascendancy and to turn resistance to the accomplishment of his purposes. He had pardoned his troops, but the Persians remained in the army.

From Opis the King and army went up by the valley of the Zagros to Ecbatana, where Hephæstion died in the midst of festivities. We are told of the grief of the new Achilles over the body of his Patroclos and the splendid honours which were paid to the hero's remains. But the royal duty had to be done, and Alexander went into the present Luristan and reduced the Cossæans, who, like the Uxians of the mountains, had never obeyed the Great King.

Then, in the spring of 323, he once more took the road to Babylon. On the way he received embassies of the Greeks. There had been great agitation, since Alexander had ordered the recall of exiles and demanded divine honours for himself.¹ He had also received envoys from the Western peoples bordering on his Empire—the Eastern Libyans, who lived beyond Egypt and Cyrenaïca, the Ethiopians of the upper

¹ Cf. below, pp. 114–15.

valley of the Nile, the Scythians of Europe, the Celts of the Balkans, and perhaps the Carthaginians. His mind was busy with magnificent schemes. The voyage of Nearchos had shown that communication with the Eastern provinces was easier by sea than over the deserts. Alexander ordered that the seas should be explored. He had sent Heracleides to the Caspian to discover whether that sea, which was believed to open on the Ocean, communicated with the Euxine. Three successive expeditions were sent to reconnoitre the coasts of Arabia. Neither that of Archias nor that of Androstenes seems to have gone beyond the island of Tylos; Hieron of Soli may perhaps have gone as far as the Gulf of Suez. Thus was completed the exploration of the royal route which ran through the Ocean, by the southern coast of Asia, from the mouths of the Indus to the Red Sea, and, either by the tracks of the Arabian Desert and the valley of the Nile or by the famous canal of Necho, which Darius had restored, came to Alexandria. In this way the Ægean Sea was connected with the Indian Ocean.

Historians do not agree about the true extent of the last projects of Alexander. Some think that he only meant to ensure the permanence and prosperity of his Empire by the mastery of the seas which surrounded it, and that the conquests which he had in view—that of Carthage, for example—were intended to complete a vast whole, which should thus absorb all the trade of the world.¹

Certainly such economic ideas were not neglected by Alexander, who, in the wildest flights of his adventurous spirit, never lost sight of realities. But they were certainly not sufficient for him. From Darius he had inherited, not only the Empire of Asia, but the claim to the Empire of the world. Will it be supposed that this was too high a pretension for the descendant of Heracles and son of Zeus Amon? ² According to our sources, he intended to look for a route, by the Ocean, south of Libya, by which to enter on the conquest of the West. The details of the tradition may be doubted ³; but it certainly shows a true understanding of Alexander's spirit.⁴ The date of departure was fixed on the

¹ See especially E. Kornemann, in LVII, 1920, pp. 209–33.

² CXXV, pp. 507 ff.; CXXXV–CXXXVIII.

³ Tarn, in LXXX, 1921, pp. 1–17.

⁴ CXXXI, pp. 297–9.

20th of the month of Dæsius. But first the King, leaving Babylon, visited the canals of the Euphrates and caused work to be carried out on the Pallacopas,¹ a kind of basin by means of which the floods were regulated. Then he returned to his capital, where he was concentrating his troops for the coming expedition, and received, as a god, the *theoroi* sent by the cities of Greece. Meanwhile, gloomy portents were multiplying. While he was sailing on the canals of the Euphrates, the wind carried away his diadem and royal *kausia*; when the King left the throne for a moment, an unknown lunatic sat on it, in full Court; the Chaldeans reported a threatening oracle of Bel. Alexander was soon to die.

Plutarch and Arrian have preserved, from the Royal *Ephemerides*, almost minute details of the last days of Alexander, from the 15th to the 28th Dæsius. Their extracts differ in the letter, but in substance they are in perfect agreement. Plutarch, perhaps, in his Atticizing language, reproduces the actual tone of the document better; Arrian, who gives more details, has altered the style more. But both versions give a powerful impression of the stealthy advance of the destiny which, at the moment when the King appears full of life and glory, seems to insinuate itself humbly, and at first unnoticed, into the usual scheme of his days. Every narrative will seem pale beside the matter-of-fact but tragic entries in this official journal.²

According to Plutarch, Alexander had been troubled by gloomy signs and predictions. "The palace," he says, "was full of sacrifices, purifications, and prophecies." The Court was still in mourning for Hephæstion, but Amon of the Oasis, on being consulted, said that the dead man should be honoured as a hero. Festivities were resumed, and the King divided his time between sacrifices and drinking-bouts, in the Macedonian way.

"On the 16th, he had given a banquet in honour of Nearchos. In the evening he wanted to retire to his bedroom, but Medios, a Thessalian Companion, invited him to his house, for 'supper was likely to be pleasant' (Arrian). They drank long into the night, and on the 17th, after bathing and

¹ Strabo, 741.

² Arr., *Anab.*, vii.24-6; Plut., *Alex.*, 75-7; CCIII, pp. 82 ff.

sleeping, he again supped with Medios and drank until a late hour.

“After the carouse (the morning of the 18th) he bathed, and after his bath had a light meal; then he fell asleep in the bathroom, for he already had fever. He was then taken on a bed to the altars, and did sacrifice, as was his daily custom. Having sacrificed, he lay in his room until evening. He then gave instructions to his officers, arranging for the march of the troops by land and water and ordering preparations for departure; those who were going by land should start in three days, and those who were going by boat in four. From there he was carried on a bed to the bank of the river, which he crossed in a boat, to go to the park, where, after bathing, he rested.

“On the 19th, he again bathed and made the usual sacrifices, and then, lying in the vaulted chamber, he talked and played dice with Medios. He summoned his officers for the next morning and, after a light supper, returned to the vaulted room, and had fever all night.

“Next day (the 20th) after bathing and sacrificing, he gave his orders to Nearchos and the officers and arranged that the fleet should sail in two days.

“Next day (the 21st), after the usual bath and sacrifice, his fever gave him no rest. He summoned his officers, however, and ordered them to make all preparations for the departure of the ships. In the evening he bathed, and after the bath was already seriously ill.

“Next day (the 22nd) he was carried into the building adjoining the bathing-pool. He performed the usual sacrifices, and, although very ill, summoned the most important of his officers and gave them his orders for sailing.

“Next day (the 23rd), he was with great difficulty carried to the sacrifice, which he performed, but he gave no orders to his officers.

“He was very ill next day (the 24th), but did the sacrifices and gave orders that the Strategi should remain at Court and that the Chiliarchs and Pentacosiarchs should remain before the doors.

“He was at his worst on the 25th. He was carried from the park to the palace. The officers went into his room; he knew them, but could not speak to them, having lost his

voice. He had terrible fever all that night and the next two days (26th, 27th). On the 27th, the Macedonian soldiers wished to see him, some in the hope of seeing him still alive, others believing that his death was being concealed from them. They came to the doors, and, by shouts and threats, obliged the Companions to make way for them. The doors were opened, and all passed, one by one, unarmed, by the bed, where the King lay voiceless. He greeted every man with a painful movement of his head and a sign from his eyes."

On that day, the Royal *Ephemerides* add, Peithon, Attalos, Demophon, Peucestas, Cleomenes, Menidas, and Seleucos, who had slept in the Temple of Serapis,¹ asked the god whether they should carry Alexander into the sanctuary or pray and look after him according to the oracles of the god. A divine voice was heard, saying that it was better to leave him where he was. Alexander died soon after, on the 28th Dæsius, towards evening (13th June, 323).²

¹ The mention of Serapis, at this date, raises great difficulties. Several archæologists think that the Temple of Ea is meant—*Ea Sar Apsi* (Lehmann-Haupt, in Roscher's *Lexikon*, s.v. "Sarapis"). Others suggest Marduk (I. Lévy, in **XCIII**, 1913, p. 75; H. Winckler, in *Orient. Literaturzeitung*, 1902, p. 110; cf. **XXIV**, i, pp. 79–82). Marduk is supposed to have been identified with Osor-Hapi by the Macedonians, who knew this latter god at Memphis, or later with Serapis by the revisers (perhaps Ptolemy I himself; cf. Kornemann, **CCXXV**, p. 241) of the *Ephemerides*. For Osor-Hapi and Serapis, cf. below, pp. 236–7.

² Unger, in **LX**, vol. xxxix, p. 494; Gutschmid, *Gesch. Irans*, p. 16, 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE ¹

THIS expedition of Alexander, which has been recounted all too briefly above, strikes us, and struck the ancients, as a marvellous and extraordinarily successful adventure. It is a wonder that, in all those eleven years of fighting, exploration, and conquest, no accident occurs to overthrow an enterprise "which cannot fail in one country without failing in all the others, nor fail once without failing for ever".² So, in the ages in which there was a worship of Fortune, men spoke with a kind of religious admiration of the "fortune" of Alexander. Often, indeed, they only spoke of it thus to give the goddess the credit which a tradition of the philosophical rhetors refused to the King. But where the unintelligent pedantry of the sophists would see only lucky foolhardiness (*felix temeritas*, as Seneca says),³ others, fairer and more discerning, perceived the action of a clear, strong mind and the effects of the inner energy which makes man truly a man, the "virtue" (*ἀρετή*) which not only governs the acts of a hero, but is the very source of his power.⁴ Certainly no achievement bears the stamp of personal genius more clearly than that of Alexander. His conquest proceeds like the ordered accomplishment of a logical plan, and in this it is akin to the masterpieces of Hellenism. Once the road into Asia has been opened by the victory of the Granicos, two years are spent in securing a solid base and communications with Macedonia which cannot be cut; then, when the shore of Asia Minor has been subdued, after the downfall of Darius at Issos, this base is extended to Syria and Egypt; and it is only then that Alexander goes on into the heart of the enemy's country, where Arbela deals the

¹ For this chapter I may mention Helmut Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols., Munich, 1926, which I have not myself had the opportunity to utilize.

² Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, ix.8.

³ *De Benef.*, vii.8.1.

⁴ Plut., *On the Fortune of Alexander*.

decisive blow. We must not suppose that his plan was drawn up, complete in every detail, once for all. His actions are frequently governed by circumstances. He has, for example, to follow the flight of Darius into the Hyrcanian mountains, that of Bessus into Bactriana, and the summons of Taxiles to unknown India. But he obeys events only to master them, and to make their consequences serve the execution of ideas which create a new order of things. Sometimes he allows himself to be carried away by the mystical enthusiasm of his pride, as in the visit to the Oasis of Siwa, but he does not fail to take advantage of it for his purposes; from his visit to Amon, for example, he receives a divine prestige such as justifies his power in the eyes of the conquered peoples. On one single occasion it is possible, if we are to believe a doubtful tradition, that his work was saved against his own will—when his army refused to let itself be lost in the search for the distant valley of the Ganges. But as a rule, on whatever roads he is taken by the needs of conquest, he is able to arrange his marches and battles according to his constant object of laying down the frontiers and organizing the framework of the Empire which he means to found.

I

MACEDON AND GREECE

It is not easy to give in a few lines a definition of the Empire which was left an uncompleted structure by Alexander's death. It was a complex work, made up of dissimilar parts. The architect was a King of Macedon, and he never forgot his origin, even when, after he had accumulated many crowns, his suspicious comrades accused him of denying it. Alexander always wore the insignia of his national kingship—the purple cloak, the *kausia*, or great hat adorned with purple,¹ and the Macedonian boots. With the insignia, he retained to the end of his life the simple, free manners of his forbears.

Now, the power of the King in Macedonia² was not, perhaps, of a kind to be reconciled easily with the traditional

¹ Plut., *Eum.*, 8.

² CXX, pp. 324 ff.; CXXIII, i, pp. 23 ff.; CXXV, pp. 154 ff., etc.; CLXIX, pp. 189 ff.

institutions of the countries which Philip and Alexander had brought under their sway. In the Greece of the 5th and 4th centuries, the Macedonian kingship has an air of a survival from the heroic age. In Macedon, the city system, as developed in classical Hellenism, was not yet established. The State was not embodied in a city at all, and the population was divided into rural tribes and clans. The free cultivators composing these lived under the authority and on the land of their local chiefs, the great landowners, and under the patriarchal sovereignty of the King, who had religious, judicial, and military powers over the whole people, but was not essentially different from the nobles, his Companions, *ἑταῖροι*, who, in rank and blood, were almost his equals. By the side of the royal family, there were other princely families, which ruled certain districts like Eordæa, Elimiotis, and Lyncestis, and, being related to the reigning house, could also on occasion furnish kings. The King held his office by heredity, and the crown belonged by right of primogeniture to male children, or, lacking a son, to the nearest agnate; but the kingship at the same time depended on personal prestige and acceptance by the nobility. The King's powers were not limited by a written law or by principles which were always clearly defined, but, just because the kingship might be a powerful force in the presence of looser institutions, it was the kingship which really made Macedonian nationality. It was able to do this chiefly through the talent and perseverance of a succession of kings, whose work has often been compared to that of the Frankish Kings and the Kings of Prussia.

Philip was the first to organize the nation as a powerful unity. Without damaging the essential privileges of the nobility, he drew it more closely round the person of the King, causing the sons of the Companions to receive a common education, together with the princes, at his Court. The high offices and ranks reserved for the nobles also kept them near the King and established them as a more definitely graded body than they had previously formed. The mass of free men, though still bound by all the old ties to their tribes and their local lords, were made subject to military service, which made them feel more strongly that they all belonged to one people. While most of the nobles served in the cavalry

of the Companions, the free men formed the national infantry ; but the army was no longer the total of the battalions levied under the banner of each of the great lords who owed the King service of the common host. There were traces of local recruiting in the organization of the army even in Alexander's time, but it is none the less true that all free Macedonians were grouped by Philip in the homogeneous formations of an army directly subject to the orders of the King and of the officers appointed by him. Just as in the city-state, so in Macedonia the army was nothing but the State in arms. But there was this difference from what one finds in the cities, that the army did not confine itself to reflecting the divisions of society and the State, but made the very unity of the nation. The sentiment which animated this military people was pride in the national honour, and, since the centre of the nation was the King himself, this sentiment was not distinguished from loyalty to the family and person of the King. To serve the King was the duty and pride of every man ; but, in return, the King must serve his people. He might lead it as a chief or even as a master, but he must not forget that he commanded free men, sharing their labours as they shared his glory. They owed him fealty, but of this fealty they were the judges, for he could not punish the guilty without the assent of their Council. Between them and him there reigned a kind of rough, frank soldiers' comradeship.

II

GREECE. THE CHARACTER OF THE MACEDONIAN HEGEMONY

It is indeed a long way from a state organized on these principles to the Greek city, in which the only sovereign authority is that of the law created or traditionally accepted by the whole body of citizens, who thus have no masters but those that they have given themselves. The heroic kingship, of which the Macedonian kingship may have been the heir, had long been forgotten in Greece, even in those countries where the institutions of the past seemed to survive with most force. What a difference, for example, there is between the King of Macedon and the two Magistrate Kings of Sparta ! That is why, although the victory of

Chæroneia enabled Philip to speak to Greece as a master, he could not rule it as a king, nor make the Greeks his subjects. Already, when Thessaly had come under his sway, he had based his power in that country, not on the royal dignity, but on the office of Archon.¹ But he could not assume in his own person all the different magistracies which governed in the various cities of Greece. Philip certainly ruled over cities.² He had even founded some, for Greek civilization was so much bound up with city life and *political* life that it was impossible to Hellenize without founding cities. But we do not know how the sovereignty of the King had been reconciled with the autonomy necessary to towns worthy of the name of *city*. They were certainly not collected in a confederation with a central organ, for, although the King could suffer the properly controlled independence of several autonomous cities, he would not create a federal state inside the monarchic state. Indeed, each of the autonomous cities must have lost the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, such as the direction of its foreign policy, and so tended to be no more than a municipality. The Greek states could not be treated in this way. Philip wished to organize them under his authority, but he could not incorporate them in his kingdom. The victory of Macedon over Greece must have appeared as that of one Greek state over others. It gave hegemony, according to the Hellenic tradition, but not the right to destroy the other states. Hegemony could not be organized as a direct sovereignty, nor Greece as a conquered country.

Philip had, therefore, brought the states of Greece together in an alliance, of which he wished to be the head. It had its central organ in the Council or Synedrion of Corinth, composed of the representatives of all the states which were members,³ that is, of all Greek states north and south of the Isthmus, except Sparta, each having a number of votes proportionate to its population. The Thessalians had their delegates on the Council. The people of Macedonia was perhaps represented by the King alone. He convoked meetings, executed their decisions, and was the generalissimo of the federal army of 200,000 foot and 15,000 horse.

¹ Just., xi.3.2; Diod., xvii.41; CXXV, p. 342 n. 4.

² For the cities of Macedonia, see CLXIX, pp. 183 ff.

³ II, vol. ii, 184 and 160; A. Wilhelm, in LIII, 1911, Abh. 6; Pseudo-Dem., Περὶ συνθηκῶν. Cf. CCXXV, pp. 526-36.

The states which belonged to the Confederation kept their constitutions. They paid no tribute, but had to furnish the land and sea contingents required by the Council. They undertook to live at peace with one another and to remain allies of Macedonia. Freedom of navigation and trade was guaranteed. All declared themselves the enemies of tyrants, and no city was to receive a Macedonian garrison unless it was necessary for the common defence.

There was, then, in this hegemony of Macedonia, nothing more distasteful or burdensome than in those of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. It even appeared to offer advantages. Since the Confederation of Corinth comprised all the states of Greece and was open to other Hellenic cities, it seemed that it must establish that national unity which the Hellenes had hitherto shown themselves incapable of realizing; and, since it was avowedly created for the defence of the interests of Hellenism, and thus revived the question of the liberty of the Greeks of Asia, Hellas appeared to have recovered the spirit of the Persian Wars. The authority of Macedonia presented itself as a kind of guardianship which respected established constitutions. It might even have been less oppressive than those of Athens and Sparta over their allies.

But such a generous plan as this would have needed the sacrifice of many selfish interests and a spirit of harmony unprecedented in faction-ridden Greece. How could it be applied without recourse to constraint? The Macedonian can have had no illusions; he knew that he had the strength of his armies on his side, and that, if the Confederation did not secure for him the willing submission of the Greeks, he would easily make it the instrument of his domination. Now, the undying hostility of the anti-Macedonian party had shown itself immediately on Philip's death. To reduce it, nothing less would do than a swift and drastic campaign of Alexander and the terror of the sack of Thebes, and, in the time of the war of Agis, an Athenian orator¹ bitterly recounted Alexander's infringements of the treaties. No doubt it is impossible for us at this day to tell exactly how just his complaints were, but it is clear enough that the Macedonian hegemony, like all the others, even if it was accepted at the beginning, was bound to come into collision with the incurably

¹ Pseudo-Dem., *op. cit.*

particularistic spirit of the Greek cities. Now, for a master like Alexander, resistance could only be a justification for imposing his power by force.

We find, moreover, that there were motives for this resistance to Macedonia, which, perhaps, did not exist in respect of the Athenian, Spartan, and Theban hegemonies. Philip had been careful to avoid any title which would describe him as a master ; officially he was a president, a leader, a *hegemon*. But could the Greeks forget that he was a king ? In all these Greek republics, and especially in democracies like Athens, there was a keen dislike of submitting to a king. In the *Philippics* of Demosthenes we find the natural opposition between a monarchy like Philip's and a democracy like the Athenian strongly marked,¹ and when the orator spoke of the causes for profound hostility between free citizens and kings he could be quite sure of touching his hearers and arousing in them feelings which he certainly shared. Yet in the long run this incompatibility need not have been an unsurmountable obstacle. Disinclined as the Greek republics were to accept royal authority, the prestige of kings was great in the opinion of the public, and in certain circles it may have been on the increase. We may remember, for example, the tone in which Socrates, in the *First Alcibiades*, speaks of the King of Persia and even of the two Kings of Sparta.² Was not the Great King, for whose support the different Greek cities had not ceased to canvass, the true arbiter of policy in Greece ? It has even been observed that, in philosophical schools of the most different opinions, doctrines were developing which tended to exalt the power of a single man as against the sovereignty of the mass. There was, on the one hand, the individualistic doctrine of the sophists, as maintained by Thrasymachos in the *Republic* and Callicles in the *Gorgias*, which admits the right of strong and able tyrants to dominate ; and there was the Socratic doctrine which, starting from the idea of Knowledge, demands that the affairs of the State should be directed by the ablest men, and so favours the ideal monarchy, as painted by Plato in his *Republic*.³ It is, however, hard to suppose that these

¹ *Olynth.*, i.2.4 ; *Phil.*, ii.5.25 ; *Chers.*, 40 ff. ; etc.

² Plato, *Alcib.* I, i.120E-124B.

³ CXXV, chaps. ii, iii.

doctrines, even if they inspired tyrants and philosophers, were held in much honour among active statesmen. They certainly conflicted with the instinctive disposition of the people, and this disposition was to give birth to Alexander's most serious difficulties. The Greeks of the cities of Greece admired the power and wealth of kings, and more particularly the power and wealth of the Great King, but they thought that obedience to such masters was only fit for barbarians.

Now the enemies of Macedon represented the Macedonians as barbarians, and we remember the invective of Demosthenes against the coarseness of the "Macedonian man", whom he refused to regard as a Hellene.¹ Were the Macedonians really Greeks in race? The question has been much discussed by modern scholars, and some German historians consider that the answer should determine our judgment on the great and dramatic conflict between the champions of Greek liberty and the Kings of Macedon, who did not fear to bridle it that they might conquer the East for Greek civilization. If the Macedonians were not Hellenes, one must understand, even commend, those who fought against the tyranny of the foreigner. If the Macedonians were kinsmen of the Greeks, what must one think of the narrow patriotism of a man like Demosthenes, who, incapable of rising above his political prejudices, refused his city the glory of contributing with all her forces to the predestined work of Hellenism? The hegemony of a Greek state was nothing new in the history of Greece, and that of Macedonia could organize the Greek states in a mighty nation, which should rule and civilize the world.²

But, although it may be interesting to historical speculation, centuries afterwards, to propound the question thus, it did not appear in this clear form to the men of the time. Moreover, the insoluble question of race is not so important as is supposed. What is important, is to know whether, by their culture, sentiments, and disposition, the Macedonians felt that they were Greeks and were received as such by the Hellenes.

It seems fairly certain that they had gradually come to

¹ *E.g.*, *Phil.*, iii.31.

² J. Beloch, in *LVI*, *N.F.*, 43, p. 198; *CXVI*, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.; *CVIII*, vol. iii, pp. 150 ff.

Hellenism rather than that they had originally belonged to it. It is true that the language which they spoke, of which we know little, may be of the same family as Greek.¹ But it is also true that one can speak of the Hellenization of Macedonia. When the country opened its doors to Greek culture, it abandoned its language; the upper classes, at least, adopted Attic Greek, which was soon to be spoken by the whole of Hellenism. So little do the Macedonians seem to have belonged to the Hellenic community at the beginning, that they did not take part in the great Games of Greece, and when the Kings of Macedon were admitted to them it was not as Macedonians, but as Heraclids. Isocrates, in the *Philip*, praises them for not having imposed their kingship on the Hellenes, to whom kingship is always oppressive, and for having gone among foreigners to establish it. He, therefore, did not regard the Macedonians as Greeks. So, too, when, after the Sacred War, Philip obtained a voice in the Delphic Amphictiony, it was given to the King, not to the people of Macedonia.² It has been maintained that the Macedonians were Illyrians. Others prefer to regard them as a people related to the Epeirots; others, as a mixture of Greek, Albanian, and Thraco-Illyrian (Slavonic ?) elements.³ These are interesting controversies, but it is unnecessary for us to engage in them. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that the Hellenes and the Macedonians regarded themselves as different nations, and this feeling did not cease to be the source of great difficulties for the union of Greece under Macedonian rule. When that union was achieved, it was only by policy and force.

It seems that it could and should have been achieved by interest, and even by Hellenic patriotism. Not only did the Confederation of Corinth offer the possibility of uniting at last, but the war on which Alexander embarked against the King of Persia should surely have appeared to the Greeks as a national conflict. The deliverance of the Hellenes of Asia, as in the days of the Persian Wars, and the conquest of new territory for Hellenic colonization certainly afforded a remedy for the ills from which the whole of Greece was suffering. If everybody had felt this as strongly as Isocrates, dislike of accepting

¹ CXXVII, pp. 52-4, 272.

² CXXV, pp. 154-62.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-2; CLXIX, p. 178.

the hegemony of a king would have been but a weak obstacle, and Macedonia would have been easily received into the body of Hellenic nations. The mythical imagination was always fertile in Greece, and it would have found Greek ancestors for the Macedonian people as easily as it had done for the royal line.¹ But there were more serious difficulties—the resentment of those defeated at Chæroneia, the political selfishness of each city, the historical past, binding the great states to their traditions, and an invincible repugnance for accepting national unity imposed by a foreign sovereign. The illustrious cities which had once directed the policy of Greece endured their degradation, but did not accept it. Thebes was destroyed, and Sparta had been isolated and crushed since Megalopolis; but Athens was prosperous under the administration of Lycurgos, and still represented a considerable force. Her fleet was the biggest in Greece. If it had joined that of the Great King in 339, it might have prevented the expedition to Asia; if it had supported Macedonia, it would have contributed greatly to the success of Alexander's undertaking, for the King would have been sure of the mastery of the sea and would have had no fear of the diversion which Memnon wished to create in Greece. But Athens was unable to join either side. It would have been a disgrace to be allied to the King of Persia against the man who was going to restore freedom to the cities of the Asiatic coast; on the other hand, she did not forget that the greatness of Macedon had been achieved at her expense. The Athenian statesmen preferred an attitude of partial neutrality, which, as things turned out, resulted in the political effacement of their city.² Athens accepted the terms of the Confederation of Corinth, because Alexander had required only a moderate effort of the allies, and had demanded only a few ships from herself. The Empire to which he aspired was to be made chiefly by Macedonians, and for the King of Macedon.

The leaders of the anti-Macedonian party, such as Demosthenes, feared—not without reason, it must be owned—that the hegemony of Macedon and the unbounded increase of its power would be a danger to the city system, which

¹ See, moreover, *Hellanicos*, in *FHG*, i, 46; *Herod.*, i.56.

² *CXVI*, p. 53.

seemed to them essential to Hellenic liberty and culture, and, in order to fight this menacing power, they took their stand on the Treaty of Antalcidas, which, in proclaiming the autonomy of each state, consecrated the disunion of Greece and the preponderant influence of the Great King.¹ That influence was more distant and less dangerous than that of the King of Macedon, and they accepted it in the hope that it would permit Athens to build up her power again and to recover the leading position.

So Greece was in a peculiar situation. It was not properly incorporated in the Empire. It was attached to it by a treaty of alliance which consecrated the hegemony of one ally, without injuring the autonomy of the states. It was directed rather than ruled. But it did not resign itself readily to this secondary role, or to the menace which was always suspended over its liberties. And, indeed, while it was to be feared that Alexander could not be content with this hazardous, limited authority, it might also be foreseen that the most serious obstacles to the accomplishment of his designs would always come from Greece.

III

THE EAST

Macedonia and the Hellenic states were only the smallest part of Alexander's Empire. His dominion extended over the vast and diverse countries which had once belonged to the great Eastern Empires, which had fallen in the 6th century and had finally been absorbed by the Persian Empire. Here his power could not be based on the principles on which his hegemony in Greece rested, nor on the traditions and sentiments which consecrated his kingship in Macedonia. From the earliest times, the peoples of these Empires had been accustomed to obey the will of a king, whose authority had no limits but those of his strength. It is true that, in the immensity of Asia, divided by savage mountains and desert wastes, there had always been some wilder tribes, secure in accessible cantons, which kept their independent spirit and appeared only nominally in the list of subject nations.

¹ On Demosthenes and the Persians, see Cloché, in *LXXV*, 1920, pp. 108 ff.; *X*, 1923, pp. 97 ff.

But these were usually little-developed peoples, sometimes nomads. All which had been capable of forming real states had adopted the monarchical form, and could not conceive order except as obedience to an absolute lord.

This obedience was somewhat ennobled by its religious character. The power of the master was based on a divine right, whether he was actually a god, as in Egypt, or claimed to be the representative of the national god, as in Babylon and Assyria, or was supposed, as among the Persians, to be an emanation of the divine power (*hwareno*). No doubt, when these monarchies founded empires, the conquered peoples generally kept their own religion and manners, which it would have been very difficult to take away in any case, and the Government was content to demand of them respect for the worship of the King, tribute for the Treasury, and soldiers for the army. But the whole management of affairs was in the hands of the King and his representatives.

Alexander had no wish to make any change in these principles of government, and the element of superhuman greatness in the Eastern kingships was more calculated to attract than to shock him. He found it natural to accept their divine characteristics and rights for himself. This was certainly not the sentiment of the Greeks, nor even of the faithful but rude Macedonians who had helped him to conquer the world, and he died without being able to force this conception of royalty upon them. As we shall see, it entailed serious consequences, but it was itself a result of the wide extent of his conquest, and that is why Alexander did not clearly perceive the necessity for adopting it until the conquest was almost complete.

At the very beginning, it is true, he adopts the organization in Satrapies and appoints Satraps, but we do not yet clearly see on what principle he will base his power. Sometimes his only claim seems to be the mere fact of conquest; he is just the King of Macedon at the head of his victorious armies. Sometimes, on the other hand, he assumes some local dignity, such as shall legalize his rule over the people which he has just reduced. But in both cases alike, he seems to be inspired chiefly by a feeling of hostility to Persia, and he presents himself as the liberator of oppressed peoples. In Lydia, where he has no intention of reviving the forgotten kingdom

of Cræsus, he "gives the Lydians back their laws",¹ which Cyrus had taken from them. In Egypt, where he sacrifices as Pharaoh in the temples of Memphis and is proclaimed son of Amon in that of the Oasis, he is hailed as the liberator of the nation and the avenger of the gods insulted by Cambyases. In Babylon, he restores the dignity of the "Chaldæans", whom the Persians had degraded, and this hostility continues even after there have been many signs that it was about to cease. In Persepolis, the burning of the Palace seems to have been ordered as an act of vengeance, to wipe out the memory of the Achæmenian power. But everything changes after the death of Darius. Then Alexander takes his seat on the throne of the Great King. As if the victory of his armies had made the Macedonian the lawful successor of the Achæmenids, he proclaims that he will punish the murderers, and the matter of the *proskynesis* clearly shows that he is not content with the realities of a power consecrated only by the force of arms; he means to give it a secure foundation in the divine prestige of the Oriental King.

This attitude was forced upon the master of Asia, but it shocked those most attached to Macedonian and Greek traditions. It can, therefore, be understood that many disapproved of the extent of the conquest. Parmenion would have stopped after Issos. It is quite true that, if Alexander's object had been that defined by Isocrates, wide enough territories had then been opened to Greek colonization. By thus extending Greece into Asia, Alexander could have reigned over a number of cities, which would have acted as a centre of civilization and Hellenism, sacrificing part of their sovereignty to the hegemony of the King of Macedon. The barbarian peoples would have been, as far as possible, incorporated in the territories of the cities, while the rest were directly subject to the King. But for this it would have been necessary that the barbarian element should be the less important in rank and not too preponderant in numbers; otherwise Greece and Macedonia might have been swamped by the East. In this way alone could a kind of Hellenic Empire have been created, in which the city continued to be the centre of all truly human culture, and this is perhaps

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, i.17.4.

what Aristotle had in mind, when he dissuaded Philip from desiring a monarchy like that of the Great King. In the Greek philosophers political speculation never broke away from the Hellenic conception of the city.¹

But in Babylon or Ecbatana Alexander was very far away from these ideas, and, if he did not cease to regard himself as the representative of Hellenism, he neither could nor would think of expecting Hellenism by itself to make the unity of the Empire which he had conquered. Neither Greece nor Macedonia could supply enough colonists or soldiers. Besides, had not the Greeks, always in revolt against the very idea of Empire, shown themselves incapable of achieving unity? On the other hand, Alexander felt sympathy with his new subjects, especially the Persians, whose courage and loyalty to their King compelled his admiration. As early as his stay in Babylon, he made them take part in the government of the country, and he gave them a more and more important position. For, to his mind, it was no longer a question of securing the dominion of the Macedonians and Hellenes; he had to weld together the various races of the Empire, or, at least, the worthiest, whether they were barbarians or Greeks, and to place them on the same footing. This was the policy of agreement and fusion, symbolized by the marriages of Susa, which he tried to apply in such measures as he had time to take for the organization of his Empire.

IV

THE POWER OF THE KING *

Between Macedonia, Greece, and Asia, the three worlds which made up the Empire, union was maintained by the power of the King. But the contrasts dividing these three so different parts reappear in the King's person. What was there in common between the hegemony which he exercised in Greece, the national tradition on which his power was based in Macedonia, and the divine right which consecrated it in the East? To bring unity into the complex edifice of the Empire, it was necessary first to create it in the very person of its head and to find a principle which, being accepted by all, would justify his power to all.

¹ CXXV, pp. 89 ff.

* CXXV, pp. 475 ff.

It is natural to try first to find this principle in the force of Alexander's own personality. It was through his genius that he was the master of all, and this conception came to be clearly expressed in the coins of the Empire under the first successors of the Conqueror. While the Darics always show the same bowman, the nameless symbol of the royal power, these coins bear the image of Alexander. Thus his power is represented as a kind of tyranny, justified above all by his personal excellence, and the Empire of Alexander may be said to contain something recalling the individualistic doctrines of Thrasymachos and Callicles.

For it cannot be denied that Alexander was the builder of his own power. So much was the Empire based on his personal prestige that on his death it rapidly fell to pieces. But, although the excellence of an individual can create a right of sovereignty, it is only an ephemeral right, even in the case of an exceptional individual, and no lasting Empire could be founded on it. That a new man, owing nothing to his birth, should try to legalize his tyranny by a doctrine of this kind, is possible. But Alexander belonged to a line of kings. He was accustomed to regard kingship as a hereditary right, which has existed before the individual, and will survive him. So only can a true kingship be created.

Alexander would not, therefore, have dreamed of basing his kingship solely on his personal superiority, if he had had a purely human conception of that superiority and his consciousness of his genius had not been accompanied by belief in his godhead. His pride even led him to found a religion, and we have seen that he did not wait until he encountered the mystical absolutism of the East to believe himself the descendant of Zeus. There was nothing in this foreign to Greek ideas, as they are manifested in the worship of heroes. Like a new Heracles, Alexander thought that he had earned heaven by his deeds. When, at Bactra, he tried to enforce *proskynesis*, or prostration before the divine person of the sovereign, from the Macedonian and Greek Companions no less than from the Persians, the sophist who had to obtain acquiescence in his secret wishes based his arguments on the King's superhuman achievement.¹ But Alexander would not

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.10.7-9; Curt., viii.5.9-13; CXXV, pp. 480 ff.; CXXXI, pp. 308 ff.

have set such store by becoming a god, if he had not been an Eastern king, and it was doubtless in Egypt that he first perceived all the political consequences entailed, for himself and his descendants, by his supernatural birth. From then onwards it was not only to Greek ideas that he turned for the principle of his universal power; to found it, he took inspiration from the Oriental doctrines of the right divine.¹

We need not doubt that Alexander was sincere in adopting, in Egypt, Babylon, and Persia, the various theories of the divine right of kings, nor that when he made his Persian subjects worship him in his Court he really felt something divine in himself. His own faith made the resistance of the Macedonians and Greeks inconceivable to him, as did the feeling that there would be no real unity in the Empire if he was a god for only part of his subjects. But it was not until the last year of his reign (324) that he manifested the desire to have a worship among the Greeks. If, in this as in so many other respects, his work remained uncompleted, he showed the way to the Macedonian dynasties which reigned in the East after him; they made their power secure by exacting worship both from their Greek and from their barbarian subjects.

Having thus become a god-king, in the Oriental fashion, it was natural that Alexander should try to introduce into his Court the etiquette observed at the Court of the Great King. It is true that he never pressed the principle to its last consequences. *Proskynesis* could not be imposed on the Greeks

¹ I do not think that I have exaggerated the influence of the East on Alexander; but perhaps I have not laid enough stress on the Greek ideas which may have prepared him to adopt the royal religion and the programme of an universal monarchy. On this last point, pp. xiii-xiv of the Foreword give an excellent completion and correction of this omission. I should mention, in connexion with the royal worship, the theory maintained with impressive force by E. Meyer, CXXXI, pp. 304 ff. He shows that the idea of the divinity of kings was not foreign to Hellenism, and thinks that "it developed in the domain of Greek conceptions, without any foreign influence" (p. 308). He observes that not all Eastern kings are gods. But we may note that they are all kings by divine right. And, without doubt, if Alexander had not wanted to be an Eastern king, he would not have been so anxious to be worshipped. It is quite true that the Greeks were more shocked "by the Orientalization of Alexander than by his deification", but the worship of the king was clearly so much better suited to Eastern ideas than to Greek that it hardly succeeded except in Egypt and Asia.

or the Macedonians. So, too, while Alexander adopted part of the Medic costume, the great robe, ἐσθής, the turban, κίταρις, and the cloak, κάνδυς, Plutarch states that he never assumed the tiara or the wide trousers, and as a rule he maintained the dress and manners of a warrior-king of Macedonia.¹ No doubt, he took certain dignities and titles from the Persians. Like the Great King, he had round him his "Kinsmen", and this title is found again in the Hellenic kingdoms; after the mutiny of Opis, he gives the name to all the Macedonians. He may have kept up the custom of giving the title of Benefactor to persons who had done valuable service to the Empire. It is possible that certain of the Court officials, Chamberlain, Chief Pantler, Chief Cup-bearer, whom we find under the Diadochi, already existed in Alexander's time, and were Persian or Median in origin. But other institutions, such as the Royal Pages, are purely Macedonian.

All the great affairs of the Empire were handled by officials closely attached to the King. The Council of the ten Bodyguards was not only a General Staff, but a kind of ministry. Later, no doubt, the civil and military functions were separated, and genuine civil services grew up by the side of the *Somatophylakes*. But under Alexander everything retained a military aspect, and several institutions destined to become Imperial were first developed within the army.

In addition, there were already some purely civil high officials, the first of whom was the King's Chief Secretary (*Archigrammateus*), the celebrated Eumenes of Cardia, a Greek whose father had attached himself to Philip.² To him we owe the drafting of the official journal, recording all the acts of the King, which was later published under the name of *Royal Ephemerides*. The daily recording of the King's acts was a Persian custom, but it is not impossible that the same custom had existed at the Macedonian Court, at least since Philip's reign. It was kept up in the Hellenistic Courts. The duties of Eumenes cannot have been confined to writing this journal, and he had to deal with all the King's correspondence. At the Court of Ptolemy, together with the *Hypomnematographos*, who keeps the records, we shall find

¹ Plut., *Alex.*, 45.

² CLXVIII.

an Epistolographos, of whom Eumenes was perhaps also the first example.¹

In addition to the King's Secretariat, there was the Treasury, and it is known that Alexander entrusted it to one of his friends, Prince of Elimiotis, whose infirmities rendered him unfit for active service. Harpalos was a veritable Minister of Finance, and Alexander kept him in that post, in spite of a first infidelity at the time of Issos, until the day when he fled from Babylon to Greece, in 325. The central treasury of the Empire was kept first in Susa, then in Ecbatana, and then in Babylon.

Finally, in the last years of his reign, Alexander seems to have taken from Persia the institution of the Chiliarchy. This was originally the post of the officer commanding the thousand Body-guards of the Great King. Alexander may perhaps have made him the commander of the cavalry of the Companions, or, at least, of the *agema*, and some historians are inclined to think that this officer tended to become a kind of Prime Minister. During the last years of the reign, the post was held by Hephæstion. There is nothing to show that it was not an exclusively military appointment; the Chiliarch was, next to the King, the highest officer in the army.²

V

THE ARMY

The army had been transformed from what it was in 334. The conquest made ever greater numbers necessary. Alexander had crossed the Hellespont with about 35,000 men; at Arbela, in spite of the need for occupying conquered districts and of losses in battle, he was able to put into the field 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse.³ Reinforcements continually came to him from Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace. Between Arbela and the Indian campaign he appears to have received over 41,000 foot-soldiers and 6,580 horses. In

¹ Kaerst, in *CVII*, s.v. "Ephemerides"; Wilcken, in *LX*, 1894, p. 110; *CCXVIII*, pp. 9 ff.

² *CLXIII*, vol. i, p. 322; *CXVI*, vol. iii, 2, pp. 236, 243; *CLXI*, vol. iv, pp. 297 ff.; *CXXIII*, vol. i, p. 164.

³ 40,000 foot and 7,000 horse, according to Arr., *Anab.*, iii.12.5. But cf. *CXVII*, vol. iii, 2, pp. 333 ff.

addition he incorporated Orientals, and the Indian army is reckoned at 120,000 men. Moreover, the conditions of warfare were no longer quite the same. They required more mobile troops for swift, bold raids. The changes introduced into the army since Arbela bear witness to a constant effort to adapt a continually increasing military organization to new necessities of policy and warfare.

At the end of his reign, Alexander was preparing more thorough reforms, entailed by the new conditions of recruiting. It was absolutely necessary to open the ranks more and more to the conquered peoples. Being obliged, under pain of annihilation, to increase its strength continually, the army had to take in Asiatics, and it did so liberally. Among the Companions we find Persians, Bactrians, Sogdians, Arachosians, and those picked horsemen who were called *Euakai* (scouts?) in Drangiana, Aria, Parthia, and Persia.¹ The great Persian lords served in the Guard. After the marriages of Susa, special corps, armed and trained in the Macedonian manner, were formed of 30,000 young Persians, carefully picked, who learned Greek at the same time as soldiering. Arrian calls these youths *Epigonoï*, but the name applies also to the sons born of the unions which the Macedonian soldiers inevitably formed with Asiatic women. Alexander allowed these concubines to become lawful wives, and the sons were placed in regiments of soldiers' sons, pending their entrance into the regular units of the army.² Lastly, when the King died, he was engaged in organizing a new phalanx, which Droysen regarded as comparable to the manipular legion of the Romans. It was divided into decadarchies of twelve Persians, bowmen or javelin-men, placed between two *dekastateroi*, armed like the Foot-companions, and led by a Decadarch and a *dimoirites*. So we have, once more, the file of sixteen men. The *dekastateroi*, *dimoiritai*, and Decadarchs were Macedonians.

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, vii.6.3; R. de Lagarde, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1866, p. 200.

² Arr., *Anab.*, vii.6; Diod., xvii.108, 110; Plut., *Alex.*, 47; H. Droysen, in *GVII*, s.v. "Epigonoï"; *CLXXXIII*, pp. 833 ff.; *CCXIV*, p. 58 and n.

VI

ADMINISTRATION. THE SATRAPIES

The same policy of fusion appears in administrative principles. Alexander could not upset the organization of the Persian Empire, and he maintained the Satrapies.¹ At the beginning, in Asia Minor, for example, he was content to replace the Persian Satrap by a Macedonian Satrap, generally chosen from the Companions—Calas in Hellespontine Phrygia,² Asandros, succeeded by Menandros, in Lydia,³ Antigonos in Greater Phrygia,⁴ Balacros in Pisidia and Cilicia.⁵ But even at this time, if the man who governed in the Great King's name was not a Persian lord, but a local hereditary ruler, subject to the distant authority of Persia, Alexander, presenting himself as the liberator of enslaved nations, naturally left him in power. Thus, Ada remained on the throne of Caria until her death, and Alexander, to legalize his conquest, had recourse to the adoption which made him the Princess's heir. It is, moreover, to be believed that the independence of this protected principality was under the strict supervision of the Satrap of Lydia, Asandros. Finally, in these first years of the campaign, Alexander did not hesitate to employ Asiatics. Sabictas governed in his name Cappadocia⁶ west of the Halys, that is, as much of the country as had been conquered. In Syria,⁷ we find Macedonian Satraps again. The cities of Phœnicia kept their autonomy and their kings. Egypt was under a special government, and had no Satrap.

But in Babylon Alexander quite gave up the idea of reigning solely for and by means of the Macedonians. Babylonia was to keep its Persian Satrap,⁸ and we shall find Persian governors in Susiana,⁹ Media,¹⁰ Persia,¹¹ Parthia and Hyrcania,¹² Tabaristan,¹³ Parætacene,¹⁴ Aria,¹⁵

¹ Lehmann-Haupt, in *CVII*, s.v.

² *Ibid.*, i.12.8 ; 7.17.

³ *Ibid.*, ii.12.2 ; Diod., xviii.22.2.

⁴ Below, p. 96.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Diod., xvii.65 ; Curt., v.2.8 ff. ; *CXXII*, i, 849 n. 2.

⁶ Arr., iii.20.3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, iii.28.4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, iii.19.2.

⁹ Arr., *Anab.*, i.17.1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, i.29.3.

¹¹ Arr., *Anab.*, ii.4.2.

¹² Arr., *Anab.*, iii.16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, iii.18.11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, iii.22-3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, iii.25.8.

Drangiana,¹ the Paropamisadæ,² Bactriana,³ and even Carmania.⁴ But perhaps too much trust had been placed in the former "Faithful" of Darius. The revolt of Satibarzanes in Aria was doubtless a lesson, and thenceforward, for the frontier provinces, Alexander more often made use of his Macedonian Companions. The government of Western India (the Cophen valley down to the Indus) was entrusted first to Nicanor, and afterwards to Philip, son of Machatas, and the latter's authority extended, on the left bank of the Indus, to the Hydaspes in the east and southwards to the junction of the Acesines. Eastern India, after being governed for a short time by the same Philip, before he took over from Nicanor, remained divided between the protected Indian princes, the chief of whom were Taxiles and Porus. It is probable, too, that Philip exercised a general control over these two principalities. The southern valley of the Indus, from the junction of the Acesines to the sea, formed the Satrapy of Oxyartes and Peithon. There also independent rajahs were left for a time. But the revolt of Musicanus put an end to this arrangement. After Alexander had left, disorders broke out in India, which even compelled Nearchos to hasten the departure of the grand fleet; and it was not only the natives who made trouble. Alexander was in Carmania when he heard that Philip had been assassinated in a mutiny of the mercenaries. He sent orders to Eudamos and Taxiles to govern the Satrapy for the time being.⁵

We find Macedonians again in Arachosia and Gedrosia, which, after being governed separately, one by Menon and the other by Apollophanes and Thoas in succession, were united under the authority of Sibyrtios.⁶ Rebellious or dishonest Persians were replaced by Macedonians or Greeks—Satibarzanes in Aria and Arsames in Drangiana by Stasanor, who took the two provinces,⁷ and Aspastes in Carmania first by Sibyrtios⁸ and then by Tlepolemos.⁹ Even when the

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, vi.15.3; Curt., ix.9.10.

³ Arr., iii.29.1.

⁴ Curt., ix.10.21.

⁵ CXXIII, pp. 500-9.

⁶ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.22.2-8; iii.28; vi.27.1; Curt., vii.3.5; ix.10.20.

⁷ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.25.7-8; 29.5; vi.27.

⁸ *Ibid.*, v.6.2; vi.27.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vi.27.1; Ind., 36.8; *Successors of Alex.*, 35.

faithful Artabazus was compelled by age to retire, Bactriana and Sogdiana were given to Amyntas, son of Nicolaos.¹

But we must not suppose that the Macedonian was content to substitute his Satraps for those of Darius, and that the peoples of Asia felt no difference between the rule of Alexander and that of the Great King. In the Persian Empire the royal authority stopped short at the frontiers of certain districts occupied by peoples who were in fact independent. It was enough for the Achæmenids, in order to be masters of Asia, to hold the cultivated plains and the great roads connecting them, and it was enough for Alexander in his turn to occupy the same centres and roads, in order to overthrow the Empire of Darius.² But the Macedonians wished to advance their sway further than the Persians. Having long been accustomed to fight the Illyrian and Thracian peoples on their borders, the Macedonian army contained corps which were particularly fitted for bold campaigns over inaccessible country. The expeditions against the Pisidians, Uxians, and Scythians clearly show that the conquest of Asia, as Alexander conceived it, was to be a long business. He did not have the time to finish it.

Obeded everywhere, Alexander meant to be obeyed with more docility. Under the Great Kings, the Satraps too often behaved like independent sovereigns. Now they had to account to their King for all their actions. One may recall the executions ordered by Alexander in Carmania and later in Babylon. Moreover, the Satrap's power over his province was neither unlimited nor free from supervision. By the side of the Satrap, the civil governor, there was a military chief, and sometimes there were several. This principle seems to have been adopted chiefly after the occupation of Babylon, and in cases where a Satrapy was left to a Persian noble. It is manifest in Babylonia, where the Satrap is the Persian Mazæus, while the Strategi Apollodoros and Menes command the troops of the province and Agathon of Pydna is governor of the citadel.³ We find it again in Susiana, where Abulites is Satrap and the Companion Mazaros Phrurarch⁴; in Parthia and Hyrcania, where, with Amminaspes as civil

¹ *Anab.*, iii.29.1 ; iv.17.3.

² *CLXIII*, i, pp. 21-7.

³ *Arr.*, *Anab.*, iii.16 ; *Diod.*, xvii.64.5 ; *Curt.*, v.1.48-4.

⁴ *Arr.*, *Anab.*, iii.16.9.

governor, we find Tlepolemos, who perhaps had the title of *Episcopus* or Inspector of Troops ;¹ in the Paropamisadæ, directed first by the Persian Satrap Tyriaspes and then by Oxyartes, while the governor of the new capital, Alexandria, is Nicanor ;² and in Aria, where Anaxippos acts as Strategos beside the Satrap Satibarzanes.³ It is, indeed, possible that if we do not find the principle applied regularly wherever the Satrapy is in the hands of an Asiatic, it is only because our sources are incomplete. This division of power also appears in provinces where the Satrap is a Macedonian. In Lydia, for example, Pausanias commands the fortress of Sardis at the time when Asandros is the Satrap.⁴ Philip, son of Machatas, is governor of Peucelaotis, while Nicanor is Satrap of Western India.⁵ In Gedrosia, which was governed by Apolophanes and Thoas before Sibyrtios, the army is commanded by Leonnatos.⁶ Alexander does not, therefore, adopt a rigid system, or, at least, it is applied differently according to the circumstances.

Under the Satraps, there are sometimes, in certain districts or in certain castles, chiefs who may be independent. Our authorities call them Hyparchs. But this title is also used for the governors of extensive districts, covering several Satrapies.

Finally, finance is in great part out of the hands of the Satrap. By his side is an official entrusted with the assessment and collection of tribute and taxes, such as Nicias in Lydia, Asclepiodoros in Babylon, Callicrates in Susiana, and Tiridates in Persia.⁷ On the return from Egypt, at the time of the march on Arbela, we see the appearance of the intention to create larger financial districts. Cœranos of Beroëa is placed over the collection of tribute in Phœnicia, and Philoxenos over that in Asia west of the Tauros.⁸

Not all the territory of the Empire was subject to this administrative system. Egypt seems to have enjoyed greater autonomy.⁹ It was governed first by two natives, and then, on the retirement of one of them, by the other alone. Arrian

¹ *Ibid.*, iii.22.1 ; CXXV, i, p. 422 n. 8.

² Arr., *Anab.*, iv.22.5 ; vi.15.3.

³ *Ibid.*, iii.25.7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i.17.7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv.28.6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vi.22.2-3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, i.17.7 ; iii.16.4 ; Curt., v.2.17.

⁸ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, iii.5 ; Van Groningen, in C, 1925, pp. 108-5.

calls them Nomarchs. Only the provinces bordering on the Delta—Libya in the West and the Arabian territory beyond Heroöpolis—were given to Greeks, the former to Apollonios and the latter to Cleomenes of Naucratis. Each nome kept its own chief, and Cleomenes was entrusted with the collection of the tribute in general. The military forces were under the command of two Strategi, Peucestas and Balacros, while the fleet was under Polemon. Pantaleon of Pydna commanded the garrison of Memphis, and another Polemon, from Pella, that of Pelusion. The mercenaries had their own General, the Ætolian Lycidas, their Secretary, Eugnostos, and their two Inspectors. Obviously this régime could only be provisional. Cleomenes, who held the chief place through his financial office, ended by taking or being given the powers of Satrap.

In Phœnicia, most of the cities remained autonomous, and were not subject to the Satraps of Syria ; they kept their laws and their kings. Tyre and Gaza were enslaved and became Macedonian garrisons.¹

VII

THE GREEK CITIES

But it was above all the Greek cities which formed a separate world in the Empire, of which they were an essential part. To the end, Alexander was the representative of Hellenism. The East charmed him ; as it came under his sway he determined to govern for his barbarian subjects no less than for the Macedonians and Greeks, and he saw that the blending of races and nations was the only way to ensure the unity of his Empire. But this fusion was not to be a chaos. The Greek spirit was to give order and organization to the whole, and, far from being lost in the immensity of Asia, Greek civilization should place its own stamp upon it. Now, the necessary unit of this civilization was the city. A Greek who was not a citizen could not be imagined, and all that Greece had created could only have been produced in independent cities, ruled by a sovereign people. However

¹ Arados, Arr., *Anab.*, ii.13.7 ; Byblos, *ibid.*, ii.15.6 ; Sidon, Curt., xiv.1.15 ; Just., xi.10.8 ; Diod., xvii.46.8 ; **CXXIII**, i, p. 78 n. 5.

limited we may suppose him to have been, however burdensome the yoke of the State, every citizen was still conscious of his own dignity and worth, because he obeyed only the law, which was partly the result of his own will. So true is it that this individualism was the source of the Greek spirit, that that spirit was formed and transformed in the struggles of the individual to escape from the traditional restraint of the city ; but a character strong enough to conceive and undertake that struggle could be born only under the ægis of the institutions of the city, and particularly of democratic institutions, which were so fitted to inspire the free man with a lively sense of his dignity. This was something very different from the barbarians, even the most highly civilized, in their unassociated masses, lacking initiative and obedient to the orders of an absolute master. Hellenic culture could not really touch them unless they, too, became accustomed to *political* life, in the Greek sense of the word ; and the only way to prepare them for it was to set up on all sides new Greek cities, whose brilliance, manners, and laws would attract men and civilize them.

This part could be played, first, by the ancient cities of Ionia, Æolis, and Propontis. Alexander heaped honours and favours on them without end. Those which had declined from their former glory to the state of simple townships, he raised. At Ilion, he beautified the Temple of Athene and promised to restore the town to the rank of city. The ancient religious confederation of which it had been the centre revived.¹ Smyrna had become a mere group of villages, and the old site was almost deserted. The Nemeses, who appeared to Alexander while he slept after a tiring hunt on Mount Pagos, bade him restore the city.² The Ionians resumed their meetings at the Panionion at Mycale.³ Clazomenæ, which had shrunk on to an island, whither the inhabitants had withdrawn from fear of the Persians, recovered confidence and rebuilt its quarters on the mainland.⁴ At Erythræ, work was undertaken (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) to make an island of the promontory of Mimas.⁵ At Priene,

¹ Strabo, xiii.1.26 ; CCXIX, p. 44.

² CCXXXIX, pp. 44 ff. ; Pliny, NH, v.31.7 ; Paus., vii.5.2.

³ CCXLI, p. 2.

⁴ Paus., vii.3.5.

⁵ Paus., ii.1-5 ; Pliny, NH, v.116.

Alexander dedicated a temple to Athene.¹ To the Ephesians he offered to restore, at his own expense, the Temple of Artemis, which had been burnt in 356, provided that he was allowed to inscribe his name alone on the dedication, but they refused.² Miletos, on the other hand, sought and obtained his help in completing the restoration of the sanctuary of the Branchidæ; the prophetic spring, which had been dry since the destruction of the temple by the Persians in 494, flowed again,³ and the Milesians produced oracles confirming the divinity of the King. Everywhere Alexander showed the greatest respect for the traditions of the Hellenic past. It is certain that his reign was the beginning of an age of prosperity for all the cities of Asia Minor.

These cities of Asia and those of the Ægean were regarded as allies, and entered the Confederation of Corinth. This is certain in the case of the Cyclades, Thasos, Samothrace, Tenedos, and probably Chios and Lesbos; and it is to be supposed that is true of the cities of the coast.⁴ But the difficult problem was to reconcile the autonomy of these little states with the sovereignty of the King. Both sides had to make sacrifices. Alexander did not treat all cities alike. All kept their laws, their assemblies, and their magistrates. How, indeed, could they be taken away? Even under Persian rule, they had continued to enjoy a Hellenic constitution; only the Persian Satraps favoured oligarchy, and, still more, tyranny. Alexander restored democracy everywhere; he always showed himself implacably hostile to tyrants. In the fight for the possession of the islands, the tyrants were sometimes overthrown, and sometimes reinstated, according as the city gave itself to Alexander or was retaken by the Persians. He was content to banish the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party at Chios to distant Elephantine; but he delivered the tyrants to their cities, which were at liberty to treat them as they wished, and we can guess in the case of Eresos, for example, what use they made of the liberty.⁵

Did all these democracies, restored and protected by their

¹ V, 3.

² Radet, *Ephesiaca*, p. 18.

³ CCXLI, p. 2; Pseudo-Callisth., iii.33.

⁴ Wilcken, in LIII, 1922, pp. 97 ff.; CXXV, i, pp. 844 ff.

⁵ IX, 8.

Macedonian liberator, figure as sovereign, allied states? Several, like Mitylene and Tenedos,¹ seem to have had a treaty with Alexander. But were these alliances made on a footing of equality? In theory, perhaps; in fact, certainly not. In our sources we find no city treated as an *ally*, as they were later under Antigonos. Several are called autonomous and free; this proves that others were not. But we have not enough evidence to determine the various degrees of their independence or subjection.

To endure and maintain a royal garrison must have been, for a city, one of the most certain signs of servitude. As a rule, except in case of strategical necessity,² Alexander seems to have abstained as much as possible from inflicting the presence of his soldiers and the duty of maintaining them on Greek cities. Only later, when conflicts began to break out between the royal power and the liberty of the cities, did the King seek the support of armed force. At the end of his reign the exiles were restored to Chios under the eye of a garrison,³ and there was a body of troops at Rhodes when Alexander died.⁴

Tribute, *phoros*, was another mark of servitude. On principle it could not be demanded of free territory, but only from that of which the King was ultimately the owner, whether he held it himself or had ceded the possession of it to others. There is an edict confirming the self-government and liberty of the "Prieniens at Nau Lochos", but the inhabitants of a portion which the King regards as his own have to pay *phoros*.⁵ Ilion, Erythræ, and the Ionian and Æolian cities in general were exempt from *phoros*.⁶ The Ephesians still paid it, but to their own Artemis, not to the King.⁷ Aspendos, as a punishment, had to pay this humiliating *phoros*, at least for a time.⁸ But the free cities were not exempt from financial burdens, for they contributed to common expense by a *syntaxis*.

This *syntaxis* showed that, even if free, they were part of a larger Empire, whose destiny always ruled their own

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, ii.1.4; 2.

² *Ibid.*, ii.1.4 (Mitylene); ix.1 (Priene).

³ X, 38. ⁴ Diod., xviii.1.

⁵ IX, 1.

⁶ X, 37; Strabo, 193.

⁷ Arr., *Anab.*, i.17.10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, i.26.2; 27.3; CXXIII, i, p. 162 n. 8; CLXIII, i, pp. 105 ff.

destinies. They had, therefore, to bow to the directing will of the sovereign, and one may ask by what means this was conveyed to them. The representatives of the King were the Satraps. Certain Greek cities were subject to their authority.¹ It is very likely that the really free and self-governing cities were not.² But all were subject to the authority of the King. Perhaps its limits were not definitely laid down. At the beginning of the reign, at least, there was hardly any occasion for conflict, and we know that "the right of peoples and that of kings never agree better than in silence". The King avoided interfering in the daily life of the cities, leaving many important decisions to them. The cities could ascertain his wishes and inform him of their own through embassies. Sometimes he sent them edicts, which had to be accepted as commands, or, at least, transformed into decrees by constitutional methods. The cities could not refuse. The King had force on his side, and he never abandoned his claim to supervise the legislation and government of every city. Chios, to reform its constitution, created *Nomographoi*, but their decisions had to be submitted to Alexander.³

The royal power could be exerted more directly on the cities which Alexander himself founded. Here, being free to fashion them to his own liking, he frankly applied his policy of the fusion of races. The programme was drawn up in the royal instructions which Perdikkas read to the Macedonians after the death of their master. These contained the plan of the future. Alexander projected "the amalgamation of several cities in a single one, and the transfer of persons from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia, in order to unite the two great continents by marriages and alliances in concord, amity, and kinship".⁴ The manner in which he peopled his new cities answers to these principles exactly. Alexandria Eschate in Sogdiana (Khujand) received as inhabitants a body of Greek mercenaries, Macedonian veterans who had been released, and all the natives who wished to settle there. The Caucasian Alexandria and, Diodorus says, the cities which the King founded in the neighbourhood, one day's march away from it, were given 7,000 barbarians, 8,000 of the Greeks who followed the army, and those Greek

¹ *E.g.*, Gambreion.

² *CLXX*, p. 112; *CCXLI*, p. 7; *X*, 88.

³ *CXXIII*, i, p. 168.

⁴ *Diod.*, xviii.4.4.

mercenaries who wished to stay.¹ The whole settlement had a decided Greek colour, and the Buddhist books call this Alexandria "the City of the Ionians".²

Unfortunately we do not know the constitution of these cities, and we do not know whether all races had the same rights in them. It is hard to think so, in view of what we note later in the cities of the Hellenistic period. The King's authority was represented by a governor, doubtless the model of the ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως, the στρατηγὸς τῆς πόλεως, whom we find later in Alexandria and elsewhere. Arrian gives the name of Hyparch to the governor of the Caucasian Alexandria; when he was deposed, Nicanor took over the administration of the city. Many foundations were military colonies, for example in Syria, at the place afterwards called Pella-Apameia.³ In Babylonia, a city was founded solely for invalided soldiers.

So, as the conquest went forward, Asia became covered with Greek cities. Hellenic expansion had never taken any other form. In the 8th and 7th centuries, when the cities of Greece and Asia were spreading their eager youth abroad, new cities rose all round the Mediterranean world. But these cities were completely independent little states. It was not so in Alexander's Empire. In the face of the royal power there could be no question of setting up the independence of a multitude of small republics. When Alexander left the Greeks their freedom and self-government, he had no intention that they should use their liberty against himself. The cities should tend to lose their character as states, and to become municipalities, managing only their internal affairs, and, when we consider the policy of Alexander towards the Greek cities, both the most ancient and those which he had just created, we seem to see the idea of a world-empire based on municipal self-government taking shape. In these terms Theodor Mommsen defined the Roman Empire. In the East, was Alexander's work a first sketch of that Empire? Beyond dispute, it prepared the ground for it. But does Mommsen's definition correspond exactly to the conception of the Macedonian conqueror? Certainly

¹ Diod., xvii.88.7.

² CLXIII, i, p. 279.

³ Also, *e.g.*, at Alexandria on Harpasos and at Alexandria on Latmos (CCXXXIX, p. 46).

not. Alexander founded many cities, and in those cities he incorporated barbarians, as if he wanted to educate them to *political* life. But he did not mean to treat all the barbarians like this. He was too jealous of his own power to sacrifice all the authority with which Asiatic tradition endowed the sovereign, and he would not have given up all the Royal Domain, over which he exercised direct authority, to cut it up into small republics. Hellenism should be a part of his Empire, and one of the most important ; but other forms of public life, inherited from the East which had fascinated him, were, in his mind, destined to counterbalance that element in the Greek spirit which was inclined to rebel against the power of a single man.

Such were the principles governing the organization of the Empire. If we do not always find them standing out as clearly as we could wish, the reason is, partly, that our sources are scanty, but also, and chiefly, that the work was left unfinished by a workman who could only do it piecemeal. The successors who took up the task, amid rivalries and wars, did not complete it either, for, in splitting up the conquered lands, they allowed much of Alexander's conception to be lost. But, if they preserved only a part, they still followed his initiative, and it is to the founder that we must go back if we would understand the action of his heirs. This will be seen better, I hope, as we advance in our study. But, to estimate the conditions and extent of the conquest more completely, we must take a general view of the immense Eastern domain in which Alexander wished to establish his Empire and which Hellenism was to transform.

CHAPTER V

THE SATRAPIES AND THE NEW DOMAINS OF HELLENISM ¹

I

THE GREAT REGIONS OF THE EMPIRE

WHEN one considers the Eastern part of Alexander's Empire, taking its future destinies into account, one can divide it into three great regions. The first comprises the lands facing the Mediterranean, which seem to turn towards Greece—Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. Hellenism had long been in constant relations with these countries, and especially with Asia Minor, which was connected with Greece Proper by a multitude of islands and had had its own coasts conquered by Greek civilization as early as the 9th century.

The second region embraces Iran, the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, and all the central provinces. When Alexander reached Thapsacos, he did not enter an unknown world, but it was a new world. The plains running parallel to the mountains which bound the Medo-Persian plateau on the south-west did not look towards Greek seas. But they would, with that plateau, form the heart of the Empire. This was a fact of great consequence, which determined the King's ideas when, at the end of his reign, he made Babylon the capital of his dominions. If events had confirmed Babylonia in this leading position, the future of Hellenism in Asia would have been compromised by the potent influence of the Eastern civilizations. But fairly soon this group of provinces broke away from the Hellenic world to form the bulk of the Parthian Kingdom. That is why I here treat these very different geographical regions as one unit. The great plain of the rivers and the mountainous plateau lean in the north-west on the great Armenian massif, itself backed by the Caucasus, which seemed to the ancients the

¹ For a geographical description, see CXXVI.

end of the world. In the north-east, the plateau connects with the Alburz region and the southern shores of the Caspian, the bounds of which were unknown. We may, therefore, include Armenia and Hyrcania among the central provinces of the Empire. In these provinces Hellenism penetrated fairly deep.

In the easternmost Satrapies, Greek influence was obviously weaker and shorter-lived. It lasted, however, and the kingdom of Bactriana, independent from the 3rd century, was a Greek state, an outpost of Hellenism on the confines of barbarism and the Far East. But these regions were to be drawn into the movement of the Asiatic peoples rather than attracted towards the peoples of the Mediterranean. Their masters looked towards India, over part of which they occasionally reigned, and towards the Northern nomads, the Scythians or Sacæ of our classical tradition, and, later, the Yue-Chi of the Asiatic chronicles, whose conquering invasion, ending in the formation, about the Christian era, of an Indo-Scythian power in the Paropamisadæ, Gedrosia, the Indus valley, and Baluchistan, was the consequence of an original upheaval the cause of which must be sought in the history of China.

Communication between these great regions of Alexander's Empire was not always very general. From the west coast of Asia Minor to Mesopotamia, there was the Royal Road. The plains of Northern Syria came in the east against a plateau which was bounded on the north by the lower ranges of the Tauros and on the south by the Arabian Desert, and was divided from north to south by the Chalos River, which loses itself in the desert. No doubt, this plateau is colder and more arid than the plain ; but it was full of life, for it was traversed by the roads which led from the valley of the Orontes, the great Syrian river, on whose shores Antioch would one day arise, to the Euphrates. But Coele-Syria and Palestine were separated from Babylonia by desert wastes which were difficult and sometimes impossible to cross.

The Medo-Persian plateau and the central provinces of the Empire had no connexion with the eastern provinces except through the region of the Hyrcanian Mountains and the steppes below them. From the south of that narrow inhabited belt to the shores of the Indian Ocean there are

the terrible Kavirs, "the Sands," which divide Persia and Carmania from Aria, Arachosia, and Drangiana. Those desolate tracts, torrid and almost inaccessible, covered over vast areas by a crust or mud of salt, which gives the appearance of great dried-up marshes, are continued in the south-east, in the region of the Indian Ocean, by the frightful wilderness of Gedrosia, the present Baluchistan, to the mountains which bound the valley of the Indus. These deserts, shutting off the living lands, which are themselves often divided by smaller deserts, brought barbarism, nomadic life, the unknown, into the very heart of the Empire, and were not calculated to lighten the task of government and civilization.

II

THE MEDITERRANEAN PROVINCES

The conquest of Asia began with that of Asia Minor. This is a great table-land, higher in the east than in the west and completely surrounded, not far from the sea, by lofty mountains. The plateau itself is an immense steppe, divided into two slopes by a slight rise running east and west. From the sea, the interior can hardly be reached but by the river-valleys, which are often difficult, and the rivers are scarcely ever navigable. The coast regions have therefore always been the most animated, for they alone are in easy communication with the Mediterranean world. Often they are nothing more than a narrow strip of river-deposit along the sea. The north coast, on the Euxine, cannot be called hospitable, although the Greeks founded colonies there. The southern shores are often steep, as in Lycia, where the mountains, descending almost sheer into the sea, afford one of the finest panoramas in the world. On this side there is only one alluvial plain of any size, at the mouths of the Saros and Pyramos. It is in the west that Asia Minor is most open to the outside world. There the mountains surrounding the plateau are further from the sea. They throw out spurs towards the coast, separating the river-valleys, which are fairly wide; in these disconnected compartments the Greeks founded their oldest and most famous colonies, and there the most important harbours were, although their prosperity was already threatened by the silting of the rivers.

Alexander, therefore, naturally turned first to this west coast. After the Granicos, he left the north coast and the independent peoples which dwelt there, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, and others. Moreover, the ancient but still powerful Greek states founded in the midst of those barbarous tribes, Pontic Heracleia, ruled by a line of tyrants, Sinope, and many others, were not subject to Persian rule. Alexander went round the enemy's Empire by the western and southern coasts.

He certainly did not mean to leave the interior of the country outside his Empire. He ordered Parmenion to reduce Phrygia, and himself opened a road over the Pisidian Mountains, wintering at Gordion, a station on the Royal Road, and returning to the sea next summer. But at his death Asia Minor was far from being completely conquered, and, even in those Satrapies which he annexed, he left it to his Satraps to finish the work. There were seven Satrapies—Hellespontine Phrygia (under Calas), Lydia (under Asandros, succeeded in 331 by Menandros), Caria (the principality of old Ada, and later the Satrapy of Asandros), Lycia (under Nearchos), Greater Phrygia (under Antigonos) Cappadocia (under Sabietas), and Cilicia (under Balacros, later Socrates).¹ In the north, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and what afterwards became Pontus remained outside the conquered territory. No doubt, some of the great Iranian lords, so numerous in Asia Minor, who held large domains, must have been dispossessed by the Macedonians; we know of the case of Mithradates, Prince of Cios.² No doubt, too, Alexander received the apparent submission of the Paphlagonians at Ancyra.³ But Calas, the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was compelled to fight them. The Bithynians, those Thracians of Asia,⁴ who were such inveterate enemies of the Greeks, led by Bas, their hereditary ruler, the grandson of the Dœdalsos who had united their nation in the second half of the 5th century, succeeded in inflicting a sanguinary defeat on the same Calas.⁵

¹ Lehmann-Haupt, in *CVII*, s.v. "Satrap," pp. 189 ff.

² Marquardt, in *LX*, 1895, p. 490; *CLXIII*, i, pp. 90, 96.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, ii.4.1; Curt., iii.1.22.

⁴ Xen., *Anab.*, vi.1.1.

⁵ Memnon, in *FHG*, iii, 586 ff.; Strabo, 563.

In Cappadocia, Alexander's power did not extend beyond the Halys, and even as it was it must have been very uncertain. Ariarathes was still master of the mountains, and had his capital at Gaziura, in the valley of the Iris.¹ Antigonos was obliged to fight the Lycaonians, who descended from their hills and occupied the plain between Cappadocia and Phrygia. The Cataonians were still independent. The Mysians, attached to the Satrapy of Lydia, were refractory. In the south, however, Alexander had made a demonstration in the Mylias and had gone through Pisidia.² Later, Balacros, the Satrap of Cilicia, was killed in an attempt to destroy the forts of the Pisidians at Laranda and Isaura.³ These expeditions at least show that Alexander would not have been such an easy master as the last of the Great Kings.

Alexander crossed Syria twice, but he does not seem to have gone far from the coast. The fall of Tyre and the submission of the other Phœnician cities resulted in the weakening of a civilization which might have made some resistance to the diffusion of Hellenism. The rest of the country seems to have accepted conquest easily.

Syria, apart from the Phœnician coast, comprised three regions. These were, starting from the south, Palestine, Cœle-Syria, and Syria "Between the Two Rivers". In these we easily recognize the natural divisions of the country. It forms, along the sea, the western end of the huge table-land, chiefly desert, which extends from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean and connects with the plateau of Arabia. Its slopes on the sea are quite sheer. On this side, a wall of mountains stops the advance of the sand, and, preserving the fertility of the soil, makes the district a living country. From the Tauros to the Gulf of Aqaba, on the Red Sea, there are two parallel chains, and the bottom of the valley sometimes rises high above sea-level, and sometimes lies far below it. The highest point is near Baalbek. From there, the valley of the Orontes descends northwards to the sea, on to which it opens in a wide plain, and the valley of the Jordan, running southwards, falls much further, down to the basin of the Dead Sea. The lower plain of the Orontes is dominated on the east by a great plateau, connecting Syria with the lands

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, ii.4.2; CXXII, i, p. 246 n. 1.

² Arr., *Anab.*, i.24.

³ Diod., xviii.22.1.

of the Euphrates. This table-land, though dry and comparatively cold, is not wholly desert, being watered by the streams descending from the Tauros, and particularly by the Chalos, the river of Berœa (Aleppo) and Chalcis. It was full of life, being crossed by the roads leading from the Orontes to the Euphrates. The chief of these started from Antioch, and ran by Chalcis to Barbalissos. There was another crossing of the river at Zeugma.

It would be tempting to suppose that there were three administrative divisions corresponding to the natural divisions. The whole of this district of Transeuphratene formed one Satrapy in Persian times, but was divided into several subsidiary governments. The information supplied by our authorities on the administration of Syria in Alexander's time is rather confused, and may be corrupt in places.¹ These three districts, together with the Phœnician cities and perhaps with Cilicia, which the ancients always attached to Syria rather than to Asia Minor, probably formed one great province. We see it entrusted to Menes, as "Hyparch of Syria, Cilicia, and Phœnicia", and later, perhaps, to Asclepiodoros, as "Hyparch of the Sea".²

Greek colonization in Syria, which was to develop especially under the Seleucids, began under Alexander. At Pella-Apameia, founded by "the first Macedonians", the Altar of Zeus Bottiæos was attributed to the Conqueror.³ But there were in Syria elements which were almost irreducible. Chief of these were the Jews. From them one must distinguish the Samaritans, whose governor Sanballat had gone over to Alexander, who is said to have allowed him to build a temple on Mount Gerizim. Jerusalem remained faithful to Darius. After the fall of Gaza, Alexander is said to have visited Jerusalem, and shown himself favourable to the Jews.⁴ The Jews were insinuating themselves everywhere, and were beginning to be an international force, on which Alexander, in his desire to mingle the nations, must naturally have thought of relying. There were Jewries in Egypt, to which he was on his way.⁵

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, ii.13; iii.6.8; iv.7.2; 13.4. For faults suspected in the names of Satraps handed down, see **CLXVII**, vol. iii, p. 338.

² Arr., *Anab.*, iii.16.9; 19.6; iv.7.2; Curt., vii.10.12.

³ Strabo, c.752; **CLXIII**, i, pp. 214 ff.

⁴ Joseph., *Ant. Jud.*, xi.340-5 (Naber).

⁵ **CLXIV**, pp. 85-6.

Egypt had an exceptional position. It did not become a Satrapy till later, and was subject to a special system. We must not conclude from this that it was destined to be of small importance. When Alexander extended his sway on those coasts, he completed the circuit of the Eastern Mediterranean. Alexandria, a military harbour as much as a commercial port, could be used as a base for further conquests in the West. It was well situated to be a capital of the world.¹ Besides, Hellenism was already acclimatized in Egypt, and only needed to reorganize its forces, increased by a plentiful influx of immigrants, to triumph all over the country.

III

THE CENTRAL PROVINCES

From Egypt and Syria, Alexander had gone to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. Part of Mesopotamia north of the Chaboras, that is, the Aramæan country, containing Carrhæ, Osrhoë, and Nisibis, which seems to have been attached to Transeuphratene under the Persians, may have come under Syria for government; but Assyria (or Mesopotamia) and Babylonia, which together formed the Ninth Satrapy under Darius, were made into two Satrapies by Alexander.² This was the very heart of the Empire, and perhaps its wealthiest province. It used to pay the Persian Kings the highest tribute (1,000 silver talents and 500 eunuchs).³ During the seven winter months, the Court resided in Babylon.⁴ That city owed its prosperity and supremacy to its position. In easy communication with the Mediterranean by the roads from the Euphrates to the Orontes, it was connected with Central Asia by a route which ran over the Zagros Mountains and the rocks of Bagistana to Ecbatana, Bactriana, and the Indian frontier.⁵ In the days of its greatness its civilization had radiated over east and west, and it was still one of the greatest commercial

¹ Van Groningen, in CCXXV, p. 208.

² Lehmann-Haupt, in CVII, s.v. "Satrap."

³ Hdt., iii.92; Cavaignac, in XCV, N.S., i, p. 195.

⁴ Xen., Cyr., viii.6.22.

⁵ CXIV, iii, p. 66 (2nd ed.).

and intellectual centres in the world. The sea which washed the swampy shores of Babylonia, one of the hottest seas on earth, and of the richest, for there the precious pearls were found, gave communication with Arabia and even India. Lastly, the soil was one of the most fertile in grain, and was compared to that of Egypt.¹

The population had not bowed easily to the Persian yoke. Yet Cyrus had not destroyed the kingdom of Babylon. His conquest merely substituted him for the former kings ; he underwent the annual ceremony of the 1st Nisam (April), which consisted in taking the head of the statue of Bel-Marduk in his temple, to receive investiture from the god. He was imitated by his successors, down to Xerxes. Nevertheless, in the time of the Magus Smerdis, Babylon revolted, and it rose again when the usurper was killed by Darius and his six companions. Xerxes was the first to break with the fiction of an independent Babylonian kingdom.² He ceased to go to the national god for investiture, and in Babylonia the title of King of Babylon appears in his official designation only by the side of that of King of the Medes and Persians, when it appears at all. Another revolt, that of Shamash-irba, was put down with bloodshed, and the city rapidly declined. Even the great sanctuary of Bel gradually fell into ruins. The golden statue of the god, which was worshipped in the chapel down below, was carried off by Xerxes,³ and the Babylonians were forbidden to bear arms.⁴

Alexander was hailed as a liberator, and even in his first visit he undertook a work of restoration, ordering the temple which Xerxes had pillaged to be rebuilt. But it was a long task, reconstructing that huge pile of terraces,⁵ and it was not finished at the end of his reign, partly, perhaps, because of the ill will of the priests. In the surrounding country, he caused big works to be executed on the Pallacopas and the other canals.⁶ The artificial cataracts which blocked the course of the Tigris north of Babylon, being intended, the Greek authors say, to delay the advance of invaders, were removed.⁷ They must have been considered useless as a

¹ Hdt., i.198 ; Strabo, 736-47.

² Hdt., i.188.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, iii.16 ; Strabo, 738.

⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, vii.21 ; Strabo, 741.

⁵ Arr., *Anab.*, vii.7.6 ; Strabo, 740.

⁶ CXIV, iii, pp. 129 ff.

⁷ Plut., *Apoph. Reg. Xerx.*, 2.

defence, and an obstacle to trade. Now, it was necessary that Babylon should recover its old glory. The voyage of Nearchos, repeating that of Scylax,¹ and those of Archias, Androsthenes, and Hieron, opened the great sea-ways to Babylonian commerce.

In Babylonia, then, Alexander pursued a very different policy from the Persians before him, and also from the Seleucids after him. He wished to revive the ancient Eastern capital; his successors neglected it deliberately and deprived it of all its vitality by founding the rival Greek cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon. Here we see the contrast between the ideas of Alexander, who respected the traditions of the great Empires which he absorbed in his own, and those of his successors, who were more narrowly attached to the interests of Hellenism. Not that Alexander had given up the intention of planting Greek culture on the banks of the Euphrates—there was an Alexandria on the Eulæos, as well as a colony for invalided soldiers and veterans—but he refused to believe that the great cities of the east, in which the fusion of races of which he dreamed might find a favourable soil, had ceased to play their part.²

Between the desert of Khorassan and the fertile plain of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Satrapies of Media and Susiana occupied the western part of the plateau of Iran, the Ariana of the ancients. It is a mountainous region, attached in the north to the massifs of the Armenian Caucasus. On this side it is bounded by the valley of the Araxes. South of that river stretches the wild, tumbled plateau which bears the salt lake of Urmiyah and the massifs of the Kara-Dagh, Takht-i-Balkis, Sahund, and Savalan. It ends north of Ecbatana (Hamadan) in a range which joins the Alburz south of the Caspian. It is disturbed by frequent earthquakes, from which the town of Tabriz has suffered greatly in our own time. It is traversed by the River Amardos (Qizil Uzain), which flows into the Caspian.

This was only a part of Media, which also covered, roughly, the present Iraq Ajami. Media, therefore, extended east to the desolate region of the Kavirs, in which it lost part of its waters, while in the south it was bounded by Susiana. Both of these provinces are traversed from north-

¹ Hdt., iv.44.

² CLXIII, i, pp. 238-57.

west to south-east by chains of mountains, separating plains in which barren tracts alternate with fertile oases. The region is continued in Persia proper (Farsistan), whose mountains rise in terraces from the edge of the Persian Gulf to an altitude of 5,000 or 6,500 feet above sea-level. Behind this is Carmania, a country of wooded, fertile valleys, just like Bactriana, it is said, but bordered by the desert.

These regions were the core of the Achæmenian Empire. Persia naturally remained the stronghold of national sentiment. Under the Great Kings, it was not a Satrapy and did not pay tribute. Under Alexander it probably did so, like the other provinces. At first the Persians were given a Satrap of their own people, but later they were governed by Peucestas, a Macedonian of Mieza. He was one of the officials who most readily entered into Alexander's ideas¹; he learned the language of his peoples and adopted their national dress.

Alexander did not make much attempt to Hellenize this region. Later, we shall hardly find any Greek cities except on the frontiers. We shall also find some Greek colonists (*κάτοικοι*), who frequently revolted. The same was doubtless the case with Susiana, including the Uxians, which was given to Abulites. But Media seems to have been treated somewhat differently. The province was inhabited by a warlike race, a great source for recruiting. It produced not only men, but excellent horses, and furnished remounts for the whole of Asia. Since it adjoined the barbarous regions of the Caspian and Caucasus, Alexander intended to sow it with Greek cities,² and his plan was carried out by the Seleucids. Of the foundations of the Conqueror, we know Heracleia (later Achaïs),³ near Rhagæ. Rhagæ itself finally became Hellenized.⁴ No doubt Ecbatana did not follow this movement. The glories of that unwallèd city were the acropolis, built by the hands of man, and at its feet the Royal Palace, the summer resort of the Great Kings, with its walls of cedar and cypress, its columns which, until the city was plundered, were coated with precious metals, and its roofs of silver. The

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, vi.30.2.

² Polyb., x.27.3; **CLXIII**, i, p. 264.

³ Pliny, *NH*, vi.48; Solinus, 48; Amm. Marcell., xxiii.6.39; **CLXIII**, i, p. 265.

⁴ Strabo, 524; **CLXIII**, *ibid.*

Temple of Æna was so wealthy that its ornaments of gold or silver fetched 4,000 talents of money in the time of Antiochos III.¹

By the mountainous plateau reaching from the north of Ecbatana to the south of the Araxes, Media was connected with Armenia, which at that time was inhabited by Iranian tribes, at least as far as the Euphrates ; west of the Euphrates, in the region later called Lesser Armenia, these were mixed with Aramæans and Assyrians. Alexander never went there. He allowed it to be governed by the Persian Mithrines.²

In Carmania, on the other hand, where he stopped on his way back from India, after the dramatic crossing of the Gedrosian desert, an Alexandria was founded (Gulashgird),³ and it may be to Alexander that the port of Harmozeia (Ormuz) owes its birth. It was well situated on the routes from India and Arabia. The Satrapy was held for a time by Aspastes, who had submitted in 330, and afterwards it was given to Sibyrtios, who only kept it a short time and was replaced by Tlepolemos, son of Pythophanes, who was governor in 323.⁴

The only easy communication between the centre of the Empire and the Far East was by the regions south of the Caspian. These were, north and south of the Alburz respectively, the Satrapies of Hyrcania and Parthia, which seem to have been combined in a single government. There is the most complete contrast between the two countries. North of the mountain range, by the sea, the country is picturesque and very rich indeed ; the landscape has an Italian air.⁵ In its deep, shady, fertile valleys, grow oaks, wheat, figs, and vines. Honey trickles from the leaves of the trees, as in Matiene in Media, Sacasene, and Araxene in Armenia. In the islands of the Caspian, it was said, there were veins of gold, and Eudoxos relates marvels about the caves and the cool cascades which fell from the mountains to the very edge of the sea.⁶ Before the Greeks came, Hyrcania already had many cities—Zadracarta, Sirynca, Tape. " It

¹ Polyb., x.27.6 ff.

² Arr., *Anab.*, iii.16.5 ; Koehler, in *LIII*, 1898, p. 839 n. 1.

³ Tomaschek, in *CVII*, s.v. " Alexandria."

⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, vi.27.1 ; *Ind.*, 86.8.

⁵ *CLXIII*, i, p. 267.

⁶ Strabo, 568.

would have been the happiest of lands if its masters, Persians, Macedonians, and Parthians, had not so neglected it, and if it had not been so exposed to the raids of the nomads." Alexander, who made an expedition against the Tapurians and the Mardians, was naturally interested in a region which supplied the Empire with excellent horsemen and excellent horses.

South of the Alburz, on the contrary, Parthia, the present Khorassan, is a poor country. It contains little but steppes, and oases in the deserts. The most fertile parts, Comisene and Choarcne, near the Caspian Gates, were only attached to it later, under the Parthians, and in Alexander's time belonged to Media.¹ But it was through Parthia that the great road ran from Ecbatana to Bactra. Hecatompylos (Semman, later Shahrud),² which stood on this road, was the meeting-point of all the routes radiating towards the surrounding countries, both those which led into Hyrcania over the Alburz and those followed by caravans making for the oases of terrible Khorassan.³ These provinces were in the end restored to Phrataphernes, Darius's Satrap, whose sons were enrolled in the *agema*. The Tapurians and Mardians seem to have had their own special governor.

IV

THE FAR EAST

From Zadracarta, Alexander did not follow the road to Bactra. By the valley of the Atrek he went across to that of the Hari Rud (Arios), to put down the revolt of Satibarzanes in Aria. It was with Aria that he commenced the subjugation and organization of the Eastern Satrapies. These consisted mainly of the great masses of mountain which run westwards from the plateau of Central Asia. The country is generally fertile in the valleys and denuded on the heights. The centre is filled by the Paropamisos, the present Hindu Kush, from which rivers flow, watering all these provinces. The Paropamisadæ formed a Satrapy, which was first given to Tyriaspes, and then to Oxyartes, Roxana's father. The essential part of it was the valley of the Cophen (Kabul),

¹ *Ibid.*, 514; Kiessling, in CVII, s.v. "Hecatompylos."

² Kiessling, *loc. cit.*

³ Polyb., x.28.7.

which leads to that of the Indus by the Khaiber Pass. In this district a number of roads met. One from Bactra in the north, one from the modern Kandahar, where Alexander founded an Alexandria, and one from the Khaiber Pass and India met to form the "three-ways of Bactra" at Ortospa (Kabul).¹ It was, therefore, necessary to hold this valley, and a city was founded here under the name of Caucasian Alexandria,² since Alexander's soldiers confused the Hindu Kush with the Caucasus.

Pliny³ mentions yet other cities, Cartana (Gariyana),⁴ Asterusia, a Cretan colony, and Cadrusi. The inhabitants of these regions, which are to-day peopled by Iranians, were of Indian race.

Out of the Paropamisos comes the Arios, which, after watering a fertile valley, rich in vineyards, goes towards Khorassan and loses itself in the sand. This valley was the centre of the Satrapy of Aria, under Satibarzanes, Arsames, and Stasanor in succession. The capital, Artacoana or Artacabene,⁵ was doubtless the modern Herat, and was the starting-point of a road to Bactra and another to the capital of Arachosia, the modern Kandahar. From there, by Quetta and the Bolan Pass, one reached India. At Herat, perhaps at the foot of the citadel Artacoana, an Alexandria was founded.⁶

To the Satrapy of Aria, Margiana was attached in the north and Drangiana in the south. The latter is the region watered by the streams which end in the basin of Sijistan, the centre of which is the Hamun Lake—the Sea, Darya, Zaraya, in Persian—which has given its name to the country. In the time of Darius it was attached to the Satrapy of Arachosia. Its capital, Phrada, received a Greek colony,⁷ and became Prophthasia. It stood on the road from Arian Alexandria to Arachosian Alexandria (Kandahar). Margiana is an oasis which can be fertile if it is carefully irrigated. But it was exposed to raids by nomads, and it would not be surprising

¹ Strabo, 514.

² Site unknown: Bamiyan (Lassen), Baghrām (Masson), Charikar (Wilson, De St.-Martin, Cunningham), Parwan (Tomaschek). CVII, p. 1427 (Kaerst); p. 1389 (Tomaschek); CXLIX, pp. 381 ff.

³ NH, vi.61.

⁴ Tomaschek, in CVII, i, p. 1389.

⁵ CLXIII, i, p. 268 n. 8.

⁶ Tomaschek, in CVII, i, p. 388.

⁷ Plut., *De Fortit. Al.*, 5; CLXIII, i, p. 270.

if Alexander had decided to provide it with defences. He is said to have sent an expedition as far as Merv and to have founded cities, including an Alexandria and a Heracleia.¹

From the chain of the Paropamisos which separates the basin of the Cophen (Kabul) from that of the Etymander (Helmand), a great number of rivers flow in valleys running south-westwards, almost all of them tributaries of the Etymander. One of them, the Arachotos (Argand-ab), from Alexander's time, gave its name to the country which forms the south of the present Afghanistan, the Satrapy of Arachosia (under Menon and then Sibyrtios). It was inhabited by a mixed population of Indians and Iranians, who were called the White Indians by the Greeks, and called themselves Pakhtum, the Pactyes of Herodotos.² The capital was Alexandria (Kandahar),³ which, as we have seen, was connected by routes with the valleys of the Cophen and the Arios. It was on one of the great roads to India.

Gedrosia was the modern Baluchistan, a desert of sand, traversed by caravan-routes, inhabitable only in a few valleys. It was almost unknown to the Greeks before Alexander. The Baluchis, an Iranian people, had not yet settled in this province, and it was inhabited by a scanty population akin to the black Dravidians of India. To it were attached, on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the country of the Arabitæ and Oreitæ and the barren sea-board of the Ichthyophagi, the present Makran. Its importance was due to its position on the Indian Ocean. So Greek cities arose on these desolate shores—Rhambacia among the Oreitæ,⁴ Alexandria at the mouth of the Arabis,⁵ and another Alexandria among the Ichthyophagi, near the Maxates (Mashkid).⁶

North of the Paropamisos, on the borders of savagery, like Gedrosia south of it on the edge of the unexplored Ocean, lay Bactriana and Sogdiana, the furthest provinces of the Empire.⁷ They were situated on the roads by which the

¹ Curt., vii.10.15 (Nuetzell, *ad loc.*); Pliny, NH, vi.16.18; Kaerst, in **CVII**, i, p. 1428.

² Hdt., vii.67; **CXIV**, iii, p. 17; **CLXIII**, i, p. 271.

³ Kaerst, in **CVII**, i, p. 1427; but *cf.* **CLXIII**, i, p. 829.

⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, vi.21.

⁵ One or two cities, **CLXIII**, i, pp. 283, 830.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 275 ff.

gold came from the Pamir and the silk came from China, just as Gedrosia and the shore of the Ichthyophagi were on the sea-way of the merchandise of India. They were inhabited by Iranians, mixed with Turanian elements and Sogdians. We know what difficulty Alexander had in reducing them. Like Atropatene, the country was a stronghold of Zoroastrianism, and certain practices of the religion had rightly revolted the Greeks. Onesicritus related with horror that the old and sick were exposed to be eaten by dogs trained for the purpose, which were called *ἐνταφιασταί*, "Buriers," so that the streets were covered with human bones. Alexander tried to abolish the repulsive custom, and so earned an ill name in the sacred books of these peoples.¹ But there were good reasons for holding on to the wealthy provinces which formed the rampart of Iran against barbarism.² Bactriana was a fertile country, in spite of some tracts of desert and the malaria which reigned in the low-lying plains. All useful trees were found there, except the olive. It was rich in rare minerals, such as the ruby and lapis-lazuli. Like Media, Hyrcania, and Parthia, it supplied the Persian Empire with its best horses and horsemen, and the horse appears in the name of the capital, Zariaspa. It was watered by the Oxus, the modern Amu Darya, which flows through desert only after leaving the hills. Its cities, such as Zariaspa (Bactra) and Adrapsa, mentioned by Strabo, were many and populous.

Bactriana was separated by the Oxus from Sogdiana. This latter province was traversed by two mountain-ranges, dividing it into three districts. One, the present Bokhara, stretched along the river, its capital being Nautaca (Karshi); one lay on the Jaxartes, on the very border of the nomad peoples; and between the two, in the valley of the Polytimetos (Zarafshan), was the district of Maracanda, which afterwards, in the days of the Moslem civilization, became delightful Samarkand.

Bactriana and Sogdiana seem to have been combined in a single government, first under Artabazus and later under Amyntas.³ In 328 it was in the hands of Philip. Alexander wished to develop the Greek colonization of the country. The Greeks were not altogether unknown there, for Xerxes is

¹ Strabo, 517.

² *Ibid.*, 516.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.17.3.

said to have transported the Branchidæ of Miletos thither when, betraying the cause of Greece, they delivered the treasures of Apollo of Didyma to him.¹ Alexander destroyed the city of the traitors, but founded others.² Alexandria Eschate on the Jaxartes (Khujand)³ was a bulwark against the Massagetæ and a centre of the silk trade. Bactriana, where Zariaspa was renamed Bactra, perhaps received three Alexandrias—Alexandria Oxiana, near the Oxus (Baykand or Nakhshab),⁴ one near Bactra,⁵ and a second Alexandria Eschate on the Upper Oxus.⁶ There were so many Greeks in Bactriana that when they revolted after Alexander's death they were able to form an army of 20,000 foot-soldiers and 3,000 horse.

When Alexander entered the valley of the Kabul, which he made into the Satrapy of the Paropamisadæ, he left the Iranian world and came into that of India. The Indus valley, which had been occupied by Darius, had very soon broken away from the Empire. The Indians who appear in the Great King's armies probably came from the valley of the Kabul. We have seen above how Alexander organized the valley of the Indus. The creation of great principalities like those of Taxiles and Porus was an important measure, but perhaps more important for the history of India than for that of Hellenism. It gave an impulse to a movement in that hitherto disunited country which ended with the formation of great kingdoms like that of Sandracottus. Nor was this the only lesson which India learned from the Greeks. Alexander seems to have established them in great numbers on these marches of his Empire, and founded several Alexandrias there. One was founded by Hephæstion on the Acesines, near Wazirabad, another rose at the confluence of that river with the Indus (Pankanada), there was a third among the Sogdians, on the Indus itself, and the fourth was at the point of the Delta, at Patala (Haidarabad).⁷ Like the colonists of Bactriana, those of India did not always

¹ Strabo, 518, 634, 818; F. Cauer, in *CVII*, s.v. "Branchidai."

² Strabo, 517; Just., xii.5.18.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.1.3; Pliny, *NH*, vi, 49; Ptol., i.11.7.

⁴ Ptol., vi.12.6; Tomaschek, in *CVII*, i, p. 1889.

⁵ Steph. Byz., s.v.

⁶ Ptol., vi.12.6; *CLXIII*, i, pp. 277 ff.

⁷ Cf. above, pp. 47-8.

endure their exile patiently, and mutinied ; but that first colonization none the less prepared the way for another, this time coming from Bactriana. They were to leave their trace in India, and memories of conquering glory in the tradition of the Greek historians.

V

ALEXANDER'S GOVERNMENT

Such is the Empire of Alexander as we find it—it was that of the Great Kings at the time of their greatest power, conquered and reconstituted. But Asia must have seen that it had changed its master. At the end of his speech, Isocrates, summarizing the programme which he was proposing to Philip, advised him to be a benefactor to the Greeks, a king to the Macedonians, and to the Barbarians not a master, but a chief. He thus contrasted the tyranny of the Asiatic despot with the thoughtful government of the Greeks.¹ If this contrast is too severe in the case of sovereigns like Darius, son of Hystaspes, it is by no means unfair to the rule of the following Great Kings and their Satraps. When Alexander took their place, he seems to have realized the concept of the orator. He could not, as we have seen, overthrow the principles of the Persian administration, but he introduced into their application quite a new spirit and more logical and human views. The care with which he inquired—one may say, scientifically—into the resources and needs of the country is very striking, in spite of the gaps in our information. With his *Bematistæ*,² who arranged and measured marching-stages, like *Bæton* and *Amyntas*,³ his *Metalleutæ* or mine-prospectors, like *Gorgos* of *Iasos*,³ and, lastly, his great admirals, his conquest became a methodical exploration, and had he lived he would no doubt have based his administration on a complete census of the resources of his Empire. His example was followed by the Seleucids and Lagids, but it is possible that these “*Epigoni*” did not inherit his spirit in its entirety. So far as our wretched

¹ *Philip.*, 65.

² Schwartz, in *CVII*, s.v. “*Bematistæ*,” “*Bæton*,” “*Amyntas*” (22).

³ Strabo, 700. Cf. *VIII*, 162, 2nd ed.

sources allow us to judge, they may, perhaps, have too often been more concerned with the interests of their treasury, which had to be filled to support their ambitions, than with the welfare of their subjects. Alexander himself certainly sought, by enriching his Empire, to sustain and increase his power, but there was in him a more generous inspiration, and one never sees in his conduct the faintest trace of the fiscal greed which is bent on filling its coffers. He must have known that the conquest would transform and increase the economic activity of the world, to the advantage of all, and, as he planned to mingle the races to establish concord and peace, so he sought to increase trade between the peoples to ensure their welfare. Nearchos sailed over the Indian Ocean, and the army made its daring and tragic march along the coasts of Baluchistan and Makran, partly in order to open a new road to trade.

In this respect, too, Alexander's attitude in Bactriana and Sogdiana seems very significant. When he undertook an expedition against the Scythians beyond the Jaxartes, when, later, he received their ambassadors in a friendly manner, when he made an alliance with Pharasmanes, Prince of the Chorasmians,¹ it was, no doubt, in order to make his frontier secure, but it was also because those northern regions were or could be traversed by great roads uniting the Mediterranean world and the Far East by trade. Bactra was on the road much used by the merchants who fetched the products of India by the Kabul valley. The Macedonians thought that this route reached the West by the Oxus and the Caspian, but it was rather by Margiana, Parthia, Hyrcania, the Caspian, the valley of the Cyros up to the pass of Sarapana, the Phasis, and the country of the Cholcians. But the valley of the Oxus was also a kind of branch, by which one reached the territory of the Chorasmians. They may even have thought the road from Asia to Europe shorter than it really was, for they did not distinguish between the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush, the Jaxartes and the Tanaïs, or the Asiatic Scythians and those of the Don.² Lastly, there was still a memory of an ancient time, that of the greatest brilliance of Ionian civilization, when Greek traders had been drawn to the centre of Asia by the gold of Tibet, the Altai, and the

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, iv.15.4; Curt., viii.118. ² CXIV, iii, p. 105.

Desert of Gobi. They did not interpret the fables of the griffins and the Arimaspians in the manner of modern criticism, but Alexander had certainly read the passage in which Herodotos describes the route, forgotten since the decline of the Greek colonies of the Euxine, by which the goods of India, Tibet, and China travelled to Olbia and Panticapæon.¹ Crossing the country of the Don Scythians, after five days' travelling among the Sauromatæ, one came to the Budini of the Volga, perhaps a Finnish stock, from whom one obtained furs and hides, and then to the Geloni, where there were settlements of Greeks, mixed with the Scythians. Thence one turned north-east, and, after travelling for seven days in the wilderness where Perm and Ekaterinburg now stand, one reached the Thyssagetæ of the Ural and the Finnish hunters called the Jyrçæ, and after them the Scythians of Asia, towards the Altai and Thian-shan. At the foot of these mountains dwelt the bald-headed Argippæi (Turks or Mongols); further east were the mysterious Issedones, probably of Tibetan stock; and lastly came the legendary Hyperboreians, who may perhaps have been the Chinese.² All these routes had to be surveyed and the traffic on them revived and regulated, and, even if it was forgotten that the Caspian was a closed lake, so that it was supposed to communicate with the Ocean which surrounded the earth in a huge circle, at any rate a beginning had to be made by exploring it. Later rhetoricians might indulge in variations on the theme of the vain ambition of the "mad Alexander", but the attentive historian will recognize, in the most spectacular enterprises of that adventurer, the acts of a true sovereign.

VI

ALEXANDER'S WORK

Those acts determined the future, and particularly the future of Greece and Hellenism. It has been said that Alexander's conquest saved them. It is certain that, towards the end of the 4th century, the Greek world was hard pressed on all sides, and its expansion seemed at a standstill. In the West, everlasting revolutions made Syracuse powerless

¹ Hdt., iv.18 ff.

² CXIV, iii, pp. 105 ff.

to fight against Carthage. In Italy, the Bruttians and Lucanians were overwhelming the cities of Great Greece, which, even in Alexander's time, appealed to Alexander of Epeiros for support. In all the Greek states, national sentiment was being exhausted in internal rivalries, and on the eastern side, "if in 336 the new King of the Persians, the valiant Darius III Codomannus, had revived the attempt of Xerxes, while the Carthaginians arranged with the Italians for a common attack, one may ask whether the Hellenic world, weakened and divided, would have found such lively energy as in 480 to resist and win."¹ The offensive of Alexander was salvation.

But it is clear that this could not be the only object of an enterprise on such a scale. To guarantee the security of Greece, it was unnecessary to carry Macedonian arms into the valley of the Indus, and, if the conquest appeared to statesmen of the school of Isocrates a remedy for the ills of the Greeks, there was no need to extend it to the furthest limits of the Persian Empire. Alexander not only saved Hellenism; he covered the East with it, and it is a commonplace, but one which must be repeated, to say that his prodigious adventure thus inaugurated a new age. Of that age, the reign of Alexander already shows all the essential features. Kingship by right divine of the Oriental kind, which was henceforward to be the very foundation of states, was made by Alexander into an institution of Hellenism, and by him, inversely, the system of the city, so essentially Greek, was introduced all over the East, to conquer it for the Hellenic culture which was to become the civilization of the world. These were not creations of Alexander's genius, and it was not even that genius which determined the mutual action and reaction of the two worlds which were blended into one. The moment the Macedonians and Greeks created great Eastern states, they could hardly be anything else than monarchies by right divine, and Hellenism could spread in the world only by means of many centres in the form of cities, the sole possible setting of truly Hellenic life. But, if Alexander could not resist the very force of things, or even imagine resistance to it, that force only imposed general

¹ A. J. Reinach, *Hellénisation du monde antique*, p. 170.

principles which he was able to apply with a decision and a clear-sightedness which we have seen.

The effects of his work were to reach far. Hellenized, the East would come more easily into the Roman Empire, whose civilization, likewise largely derived from Greek civilization, could not be hostile to Hellenism. Thus the way was prepared for the work of Rome, but it was also confined to narrow limits. In these regions Rome was unable to impose her own language, laws, and culture, and could only continue the work of Hellenism, so that the two parts of the Empire, East and West, were always distinct, until at last they separated. Nor did they separate before the East had made a deep impression on the West, giving it a large part of its own manners, its arts, its literature, its philosophy, with which Roman law was imbued, and its religions, in which the speculations of the Greek thinkers were blended with the mysticism of Oriental cults. Among these last was Christianity, which perhaps owes as much to Hellenism as to the Jews among whom it was born, and whose expansion was so much encouraged by the unity which Hellenism had imposed upon the East. But these great and complex facts, which, in the chain of events, are linked across the centuries to Alexander's conquest, are far outside the limits of this study. We must return to consequences which were closer to the time which we have described.

Not all of these consequences were happy for the Greeks. In spreading the Greeks all over the world, Alexander exhausted the nation, and it may be said that Greece was sacrificed to Hellenism. Alexander was unable to incorporate his conquests in Greece and Macedonia, and, had he been able, it may be doubted whether he would have wished to do so. This was very unlike the Roman conquest. From living, at the beginning of her history, in the Latin League, that is, in a confederation of cities which gave the citizens of all alike almost the same political rights on the territory of the cities of the League, Rome, unlike the Greek cities, conceived a law of citizenship which was not too exclusive, and she gradually prepared her subjects to be admitted to it. So she ended by absorbing the world in the City. At any rate, the City long remained the centre of the Empire. There is no suggestion of this in the Empire of Alexander. Not

only, as before in the 8th and 7th centuries, all round the Mediterranean, did the Greek cities in Asia fall away, losing all political connexion with Macedon and Greece, to which the barbarians were never anything but foreigners, but the centre of the great body came to be neither in Macedon nor in Greece. When one asks what were the capitals of the new Empire, one may mention Ecbatana, or Susa, or, above all, Babylon. The balance between the Greek world and the East was lost, and in favour of the latter. Greece and Macedonia became mere isolated parts on the edge of the whole.

Yet, through the Confederation of Corinth, Macedonia might have made the unity of Greece, within the unity of the Empire, at least if the Empire had not assumed such enormous dimensions. All that territory was not needed to satisfy the forces of expansion which were then working in Hellas. Indeed, we afterwards see all the further Eastern part of the domain which Alexander had conquered detaching itself from the rest and returning rapidly to the Orient, and we cannot say that the transitory Hellenization of these regions compensated, as an advantage for the civilization of the world, for the expenditure of force which it cost Hellenism. We may, therefore, regret that once again the opportunity to create a true Hellenic nation was lost. By concentrating its forces more, Hellenism might, perhaps, have ensured itself an equally long and more vigorous life ; more strongly constituted, it would, perhaps, have shed no less radiance over the world, and would have been better protected against all that was harmful to its true spirit in the influence of the East.

Was this felt, at least vaguely, by the Macedonians, perhaps truer to the ideas of Philip, and the Greeks, bound to the traditions of their cities, who reproached Alexander for extending his conquests ? Did they feel that the Greek ideas from which the enterprise had been born had, in the realization, been distorted by the mighty personality of the son of Amon, whose monstrous pride went beyond the measure of man ? At least, they saw clearly that, once Alexander was on the throne of the Great Kings, he ceased to behave purely as a Macedonian and a Greek. From the day when he inherited the Empire, if it is not true to say that

he no longer cares for Hellenism, Hellenism was no longer his only care. He deemed rather to be a second Darius. It was the Empire of Darius that he reconstituted by his marches and battles. Like Darius, he strove to bring the inner provinces under his strong and vigilant authority, and like Darius he sought to give them stable frontiers. From Darius, too, he inherited the claim to world-empire. One can understand that, in the midst of his Greek and Macedonian comrades, Alexander became more and more isolated in his dream, and that on the day of his death the banks of the Euphrates resounded with the lamentation of his Eastern subjects, weeping for the new Great King. Whatever one may say of national prejudice, the selfish particularism of the city, demagogic illusions, and Hellenic vanity, there may have been a deep instinct in the constant opposition of Greece to the King. But it was clearly a great danger for the Empire.

VII

ATHENS AND THE OPPOSITION

Of this opposition the centre was Athens. The politicians who led it were well aware that an open struggle against Macedonia was impossible. Since the fall of Thebes, the most influential orator and statesman had been Demades.¹ He seems to have been entrusted with the administration of the *stratotikon*, or war-chest, in 334. By his side, Phocion enjoyed the confidence of the Athenians, especially in the matter of war.

Athens was, therefore, partly governed by friends of Macedonia; but many even of the national party were for a policy of prudent neutrality, such as Demosthenes, who prevented Athens from taking part in Agis's enterprise in 331, and Lycurgos, who had been managing the finances of the city capably since 338.² But the feeling of the masses was still hostile to Macedonia. This was shown clearly enough in 330, the year of "the famous battle between the orators, in the Archonship of Aristophon".³ We know how

¹ Thalheim, in *CVII*, iv, pp. 2703 ff.

² *CLIV*.

³ Theophr., *Char.*, vii.19-20.

Æschines, reviving an accusation against Ctesiphon which had been left dormant for seven years, tried to persuade the popular jury to condemn the whole policy of his opponent. This was the celebrated case of the Crown, and Æschines lost.

The policy of neutrality and the administration of Lycurgos gave Athens peace and prosperity. The city was rich. In trade and industry, Athens held the first place in Greece. She had lost her Empire, but she still had Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and controlled the sanctuary of Delos. No doubt, Oropos, which Philip had restored to her, did not make up for the loss of the Thracian Chersonese, which now belonged to Macedonia. But Athens was still the greatest sea-power in Greece. To this time belong the completion of the arsenals of the Peiræus and the enlargement of the *neoria* or shelters for vessels. In the city, Lycurgos built the Theatre of Dionysos, the Lyceion, and the Stadium on the Ilissos. All these services did not protect the old democrat from the attacks of the anti-Macedonian hotheads. In 326 he was replaced. He was even accused of peculation, but was acquitted. He died soon after.

He was still alive when the conflict with Alexander became threatening. It was in 324, on his return from India, that Alexander, in a manner unknown to us, manifested the desire to receive divine honours.¹ This demand was not merely the effect of superhuman pride; it was the natural conclusion of the King's political meditations. His power in fact could only be legalized if it was based on a divine right in the eyes of all the peoples of the Empire. He met with little resistance. The Greek cities of Asia hastened to deify him. Opposition was almost confined to literary and philosophical circles. The peoples could not have much objection to worshipping him. Even Sparta is said to have submitted. But in Athens feeling was keener. Demades laid the proposal before the people; Lycurgos and the young democrats like Pytheas attacked it, but Demosthenes carried it. Alexander was received, in the quality of Dionysos, among the gods of the city. In honour of his father Amon, a sacred trireme was

¹ It may be doubted that there was a royal edict, but I believe that the order originated with the King. OXXV, i, pp. 488-85; Wilcken, in LIII, 1922, pp. 97-118.

named the *Ammonias*; she was intended to take the *theoroi* who went to greet the new god.

If Demosthenes yielded in the matter of divine honours, it was because another very serious problem was created for Athens by an edict which Alexander had issued at Susa. This edict ordered that all cities should open their gates to the banished.¹ This was a generous act on Alexander's part, and likely to cure one of the greatest evils of Greece. For the country was full of homeless exiles, who wandered from town to town or gathered in Tænaron, the great market for mercenaries at the time. Since Macedonia had triumphed it is evident that most of these unfortunates belonged to the anti-Macedonian party.² The King of Macedon was, therefore, restoring his enemies to their countries. There was immense joy, when Nicanor of Stageira read the King's letter at the Olympic games, where the exiles had collected in masses. But the politicians, attached to the city-state and the liberty of the Hellenes, could not help seeing that all was over with the sovereignty of the Greek cities. What became of the treaty of Corinth? The edict was read at Olympia to the Council of the Confederation, which had only to ratify it, without discussion. But in general people gave in, and the return of the exiles was accepted, with all the internal difficulties which usually result from such measures.³ The King's will met with opposition only in Athens and in Ætolia. The latter was deprived by the decree of the possession of Æniadæ, from which she had expelled the inhabitants, and the former lost the cleruchy of Samos, where the Samians should, in virtue of the decree, resume the place from which the Athenian settlers had driven them.

Demosthenes was, therefore, willing to yield in the matter of the divine honours, in order to stake everything on the question of the exiles, and he obtained the appointment of *Architheoros* for discussion with Nicanor of Stageira. But negotiations were deferred until a decision should have been requested of the King.

Now, this was not the only cause of disagreement between

¹ Plassart, in *LXXXV*, 1914, p. 101; Wilcken, in *LIII*, 1922, pp. 97-118.

² *CVI*, vol. iii, 1, p. 60.

³ Plassart, *loc. cit.*, pp. 101-88.

Macedon and Athens. When Nicanor was reading the edict at Olympia, Harpalos, the faithless treasurer of Alexander, had appeared at Sunion.¹ He was accompanied by 6,000 mercenaries, and had immense sums of money with him. These were magnificent resources for the Athenians, should they decide to go to war against the King. But neither Demades nor Demosthenes thought that they should risk it. Harpalos withdrew. He could not, however, be refused admission to Athens, of which he had in the past been made a citizen. He was allowed to enter the city, without his troops.

Alexander expected war. His treasurer Philoxenos had asked for the return of Harpalos. Antipatros and Olympias insisted. Refusal might be a *casus belli*. Hypercides was for seizing the opportunity. Demosthenes supported a more prudent proposal—they should secure the person of Harpalos and his treasures, until Alexander should have sent a plenipotentiary informing them of his wishes, and so they would at least gain time.

Before being imprisoned, Harpalos, in answer to a question of Demosthenes, stated that he had with him 700 talents. When the money was handed to the Areopagus, only half this sum was found, and shortly afterwards Harpalos, who was badly guarded, succeeded in escaping, and fled to Crete, where he was killed by Thibron, one of his officers.

The result was a great scandal in Athens. The politicians were accused of letting themselves be corrupted. An inquiry was instituted by the Areopagus, on the proposal of Demosthenes, and pursued under the pressure of public opinion. It found that several orators were compromised. Demosthenes and Demades were said to have received 20 talents. Demosthenes almost admitted it, saying that he had taken the sum in lieu of money owed to him by the Theoric fund. The case was brought before the popular jury,² and Demades and Demosthenes were condemned. Demosthenes could not pay the fine of 50 talents, and fled to Ægina, and afterwards to Trœzen; Demades lost all his political influence.

At the time of the "Harpalos case", Alexander was at Opis. As we know, he died shortly afterwards. It was clear

¹ Staehelin in **CVII**, s.v. "Harpalos"; A. Koerte, in **LVIII**, xxvii (1924), pp. 217-81.

² Dein., i, ii; Hyp., i (Jensen's ed.).

that his death would cause Athens to rise against Macedonia. Greece was ill-united with the rest of the Empire. Now, Alexander left as successors an unborn child, an imbecile brother, and a son of Barsine, whose rights might be contested. The heirs of his ideas were generals, equal in glory and ambition, so that it would be very hard to find a master for them.

PART TWO

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE EMPIRE

CHAPTER I

THE PARTITION OF THE SATRAPIES. PERDICCAS ¹

I

THE PARTITION OF BABYLON. WARS IN BACTRIANA AND GREECE. CONQUESTS IN THE EAST

THE idea of partitioning the Empire cannot have occurred to any of the great leaders who deliberated in Babylon after Alexander's death. Keen as were the ambitions of each one, they were Macedonians, and cannot have thought of undoing the work of Macedonia. Moreover, Alexander had heirs, and loyalty to the royal family was strong, if not in the generals, at least in the soldiers. Lastly, there was about the idea of a single Empire a grandeur which still exercised its attraction, and we shall see that idea holding its ground for a score of years, amidst the bitterest conflicts, against all the forces of dissolution. Even when the Empire was dismembered, the memory of it remained alive, and the feeling that every kingdom was part of a larger whole compelled the kings, through all their quarrels, to have a sense of mutual duty and to treat each other with a certain consideration.²

As far as we can judge, several tendencies showed themselves clearly in the dramatic council at which, in the midst of the conquered peoples, the fate of an edifice which might appear very weak was discussed. Some, either guided by a sense of loyalty to the royal family or having been more particularly designated for taking part in the exercise of

¹ Literary sources : Just., xiii ; xiv.1 ; Diod., xviii.1-48 ; Arr., *De Succ. Alex.*, with the fragments edited by Reitzenstein, in *Berl. Phil. Abh.*, iii. Cf. Koehler, in *LIII*, 1890, p. 557 ; 1891, p. 267 ; Dexippos, in *FHG*, iii, pp. 667 ff. ; Plut., *Eum.*, *Phoc.*, *Dem.*, *Pyrrh.* ; C. Nepos, *Eum.* ; Memnon, i-iv, in *FHG*, iii, pp. 525-9.

² Polyb., xv.20.

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the central power, were in favour of organizing it strongly. Others, more thoughtful of their own independence, would have preferred, at the centre of the Empire, an intermittent and divided authority. Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, who may already have been thinking of the distant Satrapy of Egypt, proposed that the unity of the Empire should be maintained, but that the only sovereign power should be an assembly of the chief Satraps, meeting from time to time. The contrary opinion, supported especially by Perdiccas, carried the day. It was decided that a king should be chosen, and that Philip Arrhidæos, the son of Philip II, should be excluded, since he was weak-minded. Roxana, Oxyartes' daughter, whom Alexander had married, would presently give birth to a son, for whose arrival they should wait. Crateros, who was absent at the time, for he was in Cilicia and had to conduct the disbanded veterans back to Macedon, was made general administrator (*prostates*) of the Empire. Perdiccas was given the command of the troops, and kept the title of Chiliarch. Under him, Meleagros commanded the infantry and Seleucos the cavalry of the Companions, while Cassandros, son of Antipatros, was, it is supposed, placed at the head of the hypaspists. Antipatros was left in charge of Macedonia and Greece.

When Alexander died, the conquered peoples did not move. It was, indeed, the Asiatics who showed the most violent grief, and perhaps they were right to mourn him. But division broke out in the Macedonian army. The infantry would not accept the decision of the leaders, protesting that Macedonians could not obey the son of a Persian woman. They declared for the late King's brother, the imbecile Philip Arrhidæos, the son of Philip II and a Thessalian. Meleagros, being sent with other officials to pacify the foot-soldiers, betrayed his mission and placed himself at their head. The Staff and the cavalry were compelled to leave Babylon, and threatened the city. Resort would have been had to arms, if it had not been for the conciliatory skill of Ptolemy, Eumenes, and some others. The two parties accepted a compromise; Arrhidæos was proclaimed King under the name of Philip, and the rights of Roxana's unborn son were reserved. Then they proceeded to assign the Satrapies. Many remained in the hands of

those who were directing them at the time. But high officers of the Court and army received large governments. Thus, Ptolemy, son of Lagos, obtained Egypt; Laomedon, Syria; Philotas, Cilicia; Menandros, Lydia; Leonnatos, Hellespontine Phrygia; Lysimachos, Thrace; Peithon, Greater Media (while Atropates kept Lesser Media, which was called Atropatene after him); Cœnos, Susiana; and Archon, Babylonia. The greater part of Asia Minor—that is, Greater Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia—remained under the authority of Antigonos. Paphlagonia and Cappadocia were given to Alexander's secretary, Eumenes of Cardia; but this was a province which had yet to be conquered.¹

This crisis might lead men to expect others more serious. The Greek soldiers settled in Bactriana, who regarded themselves as exiles, had already mutinied before Alexander's death, and were clamouring for their release. After the King's death, the movement seems to have grown larger and perhaps was combined with a national rising of the Bactrians. The rebels had formed an army of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Peithon, Satrap of Media, was instructed to subdue them, and succeeded with the aid of treachery. The movement was put down with great severity. When Bactriana was reconquered it was given to Stasanor, Satrap of Aria and Drangiana, and may have formed one huge government with those provinces.

But the great danger came from Greece. Athens had at first refused to believe that Alexander was dead. "The

¹ The following is a list of the Satrapies and their Satraps, based on the evidence of Hieronymos of Cardia; Diod., xviii.3; Arrian and Dexippos, ap. Photius; Just., xiii.4; Curt., x.10; Cf. Lehmann-Haupt, in *CVII*, s.v. "Satrapeia," and *CLVII*, vol. iii, 2, pp. 226-44.

Egypt, Ptolemy; Syria, Laomedon; Cilicia, Philotas; Media, Peithon; Lesser Media, Atropates; Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, Eumenes; Pamphylia, Lycia, Greater Phrygia, Antigonos; Caria, Asandros; Lydia, Menandros; Hellespontine Phrygia, Leonnatos; Thrace, Lysimachos (*CLXI*, p. 51); India I, Porus; India II, Taxiles; India III, Peithon; Paropamisadæ, Oxyartes; Arachosia and Gedrosia, Sibyrtios; Aria and Drangiana, Stasanor; Bactriana and Sogdiana, Philip; Parthia and Hyrcania, Phrataphernes; Persia, Peucestas; Carmania, Tlepolemos; Susiana, Cœnos; Babylonia, Archon; Mesopotamia, Arcesilaos.

It will be noted that Armenia, where Alexander sent Mithrines, is not mentioned. It was no longer part of the Empire. The Cœnos who received Susiana is evidently not the *taxis*-commander whose death is mentioned above, p. 47.

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world would be full of the stench of his corpse," Demades had said.¹ When the report was confirmed, the war-party won the day, in spite of the efforts of Phocion, backed by the possessing classes, which were opposed to any adventure. Demosthenes being in exile, the leader of the war-party was Hypereides. They could reckon on the money of Harpalos. Leosthenes had raised 8,000 soldiers for Athens, many of them mercenaries whom Alexander had dismissed. Finally, Ætolia made common cause with Athens.

Ætolia was, after the illustrious city, the greatest state of Greece north of the Isthmus, but not one of the most civilized.² The Ætolians are remembered as a race of pillagers; they were only half-Hellenes. They had fought against Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and in the 5th century they had annexed the cities of Locris and the coast, Molycreia, Pleuron, and Calydon. Later, Philip had allowed them to take Naupactos. After the fall of Thebes, Alexander had gone through the country. In 330, the Ætolians had seized Cœniadæ, at the mouths of the Acheloös, and had colonized it, thereby greatly irritating Alexander. Alone of all the Greeks, except the Athenians, they had refused to take back the exiles, whose return would have meant restoring Cœniadæ to those whom they had driven out. The Ætolians could place an army of 10,000 or 12,000 men on the field.

Immediately, while Bœotia and Eubœa remained faithful to the Macedonian alliance, the Cœtæans, Locris, and Phocis³ joined the Ætolians and Athenians (end of 328). The position of Antipatros was critical. He had not enough troops at his disposal for resistance. Leosthenes, having effected a junction with the Ætolians, won a first victory in Bœotia, took Thermopylæ, and again defeated the 13,000 foot-soldiers and 600 cavalry of Antipatros, who fled to Lamia.

Thus began the Lamiac War.⁴ These first successes brought others. Several states entered the alliance—Leucas, Alyzia in Acarnania, part of Epeiros, Carystos in Eubœa,⁵

¹ Plut., *Phocion*, 22.

² **CXX**, pp. 78–81; Hirschfeld, Wilcken, in **CVII**, s.v. "Aitolia."

³ **II**, ii, 182.

⁴ Diod., xvii.111; xviii.9 ff.; Plut., *Phoc.*, 28; Paus., i.25.5; Dexippos, 2.

⁵ **II**, ii, 249.

Elis, Messene, Argos, and the cities of Argolis. Sparta, Corinth, Megalopolis, and Achæa took no part.

Then Athens recalled Demosthenes from exile. He had been working for his city, trying to bring the Peloponnesian states into the league. He was still the soul of the national party. A warship fetched him from Ægina, and when he landed at the Peiræus he was received by the magistrates of the city and an enthusiastic multitude.¹

Victory might seem to be at hand. Antipatros, hard pressed in Lamia, had wished to make terms, but was unwilling to surrender unconditionally, as Leosthenes demanded. But the danger was great.² Crateros was still in Cilicia with his veterans. Lysimachos, the Satrap of Thrace, was kept back by revolts.³ But Leonnatos, the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, one of the noblest of the Companions, who had aspirations to kingship,⁴ marched to the help of his colleagues, whose defeat would have jeopardized the Empire. When he reached Macedonia, Leosthenes had been killed in battle, and the command of the allies had been given to Antiphilos, whom Leonnatos found in front of him when he tried to join Antipatros. The battle was a victory for the Greeks; the Thessalian cavalry deserted the Macedonian cause and Leonnatos was killed, but the phalanx was unbroken. Antipatros succeeded in leaving Lamia and joining it. He was, however, compelled to retire to Macedonia, avoiding the plains, where the cavalry would have pursued him.

The outcome of the war was to be decided on the sea. At the beginning, the Athenian fleet had repelled the 110 ships of Antipatros, but what had made it possible for Leonnatos to enter Greece was the fact that a squadron of 240 Phœnician and Cypriot ships, under the Macedonian Cleitos, had defeated the Athenian admiral Euetion in the Hellespont. After other successes (in Eubœa ?) Cleitos

¹ Plut., *Dem.*, 27 ; *X Orat.*, 846D ; Just., xiii.5.9-11.

² Hyper., vi.

³ *CLVI*, vol. iii, 1, p. 46 n. 8. It was probably at this time that the little-known war of Lysimachos against the Thracian King Seuthes took place. Before 315, Lysimachos seems to have reduced the Greek cities on the coast of the Euxine, south of the Danube. Cf. *CLXX*, pp. 18, 18.

⁴ Plut., *Eum.*, 8.

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inflicted a decisive defeat on Euction near Amorgos,¹ and thus deprived the coalition of the mastery of the sea. On land, the allies now had to meet greatly superior forces. Crateros had at last arrived in Macedonia with 50,000 foot and 5,000 horse, whereas the allies could only produce 25,000 foot and 3,500 horse. They managed to stand at Crannon, in August, 322, thanks to the Thessalian cavalry, but they had to yield. Since Antipatros would only treat with the cities of the coalition separately, it fell to pieces. Athens had to submit.² The democracy was overthrown, and about 12,000 citizens were deprived of political rights, which were now confined to men owning at least 2,000 drachmas. These numbered nine thousand. Many of the poor went away into exile. To those who wished, Antipatros gave lands in Thrace. Athens had to give up Oropos to Bœotia,³ and lost Samos. A Macedonian garrison was stationed at Munychia. Antipatros demanded the death of the patriotic orators, and Demades caused the necessary decree to be voted. Hyperides, caught in Ægina by the agents of Antipatros, was executed at Cleonæ, and Demosthenes, having been tracked to the Temple of Poseidon at Calauria, where he had taken refuge, poisoned himself before he was taken (322).⁴ Crateros and Antipatros then turned their attention to the Ætolians, who fled into their mountains. The Macedonians were about to pursue them, when they were recalled by events in Asia.

In the East, the young Empire had shown equal vigour. The same year of 322, which saw the end of the Lamiac War, was also marked by the submission of Cappadocia and the annexation of Cyrene.

Cappadocia had remained independent under Ariarathes, although by the partition of 324 it had been assigned to Eumenes, together with "Paphlagonia and the countries bordering on the Euxine as far as Trapezus".⁵ It had been understood that Antigonos and Leonnatos should conquer

¹ Valek, in **LXXXVI**, xlviii (1924), pp. 23-9.

² Cloché, in *Rev. Historique*, 1924, pp. 13 ff.

³ **CXVI**, vol. iii, p. 79 n. 1.

⁴ Plut., *Dem.*, 28-30.

⁵ Arr., *Succ. Alex.*, i.5.

these regions, which had not yet been brought within the Empire. But Antigonos had refused, and Leonnatos had been killed in Thessaly. The Chiliarch Perdiccas therefore himself led an expedition against Ariarathes, who was defeated, captured, and crucified with his relations (the manner in which the Great Kings used to punish rebels), and completed his conquest by taking Laranda and the capital of Isauria. No attempt, however, was made on Bithynia and the shores of the Euxine.

The annexation of Cyrene was effected by Ptolemy. He had arrived in Egypt at the end of 323 (October or November). There Cleomenes,¹ who was originally governor of the Arabian Desert, but had been entrusted by Alexander with the financial administration of the whole country, had become Satrap of the province. By the fiscal system which he instituted, and perhaps by his exactions, he had alienated the Egyptians, who had once welcomed the Macedonians with such high hopes. His speculations in corn are notorious, and we are told how he laid heavy burdens on exports in 329, when famine raged in the Ægean.² Certain taxes, like that which he laid on sacred animals, may have earned him the enmity of the priests. At last the complaints of the Egyptians reached Alexander, who pardoned Cleomenes, on condition that he built temples to his dear Hephæstion and carried on the construction of Alexandria. It was Ptolemy's interest to show himself more severe. Cleomenes, who was no doubt favoured by Perdiccas, would have been ill-content with the second place, and the Council of Babylon, which had maintained him as assistant to Ptolemy, may have regarded the inevitable conflict as a means of modifying the power which the exceptional resources of Egypt could give its master. The Satrap, therefore, listened readily to the accusations against Cleomenes who was condemned to death.

In Cyrenaïca, Ptolemy was able to take advantage of the revolutions which rent the country. A hundred and

¹ On the government of Cleomenes, there is an important treatise, very favourable to him, by Van Groningen, in *C*, 1925, pp. 101-80. He was doubtless put to death after the annexation of Cyrene (*ibid.*, p. 114).

² For details, see Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, in this series, p. 364. Trs.

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ten years before, Cyrene had overthrown the oligarchical government of the Battiads, and it was now a prey to factions, like every other Greek republic. The exiles had called upon the Spartan mercenary leader Thibron, who had been a follower of Harpalos, but had murdered him in Crete. The civil war was complicated by a quarrel between Thibron and one of his lieutenants. The people of the city were supported by Barce and Euhesperidæ. When Thibron besieged Cyrene, a democratic revolution broke out, and the rich, driven out, fled to Thibron or to Ptolemy. The latter sent his comrade Ophellas with an army against the city, the Cyrenæans, who had been reconciled with Thibron, were defeated, Thibron was killed, and Ophellas was made governor of Cyrenaica in Ptolemy's name (322).

II

THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The annexation of Cyrene by the Satrap of Egypt had very far-reaching effects. Perhaps it was not contrary to the programme drawn up by the Council of Babylon, since it was intended that Ptolemy should unite to the government of Egypt that of Libya and of all the bordering districts of Arabia. But it may not have been to the liking of Perdicas, whose unbounded ambition had already made him many enemies. That ambition was to set in motion events which would lead to the dismemberment of Alexander's Empire.

The crisis, which began in 322 and may be regarded as ending shortly after the battle of Curupedion (281), appears first of all as an armed rivalry between the great leaders who shared the administration of the Empire. So long as Alexander was alive, the energies of all were disciplined and directed to the common task by the power which he owed to his birth and genius. When he died, the kingship, represented by a weak-minded bastard or the son of a Persian woman, could not enforce obedience from the great lords of Macedon, proud of their nobility and their achievements. Some would think themselves not unworthy to succeed Alexander; even the least proud would tolerate only equals.

For all, the vast regions of the East lay open to their ambition, an unoccupied domain, where each, and especially the strongest and cleverest, might cut out a share for himself. Doubtless there were, in that immense stretch of territory, well-defined geographical regions and strongly established nationalities—Egypt, for example—which could not be split up easily. But there were others, like Syria, whose unity was less substantial, and all lent themselves to combinations which might vary according to circumstances and the power of the conquerors. The state of the world had never been more favourable to the spirit of initiative and even of adventure.

Now, twenty years of wars and victories, from the accession of Philip II to the death of Alexander, had developed powerful personalities in the armies and nobility of Macedon, and the Greek world had never lacked adventurers. This century was full of *condottieri*, like Thibron whose death has been described, all ready to win kingdoms at the point of the spear. The success of some aroused in others a boundless appetite for glory and profit, and those who were not capable of rising to the highest position managed to build up their fortunes under the protection of those greater than themselves. Others only succeeded in supplying the poets of the New Comedy, then at the height of its brilliance in Athens, with the type of the Braggart Soldier.¹ It is, therefore, a pity that, at a time when individual men had such an influence on history, we hardly know anything about them.

Of course, the dismemberment of Alexander's Empire and the foundation of the Hellenistic kingdoms were not the result solely of a conflict between rival ambitions. Other causes contributed. The Empire was composed of dissimilar parts, which were held together only by the operation of a single central authority. As soon as that authority was divided against itself, divergencies in interests, manners, and civilization inevitably led to a break-up. In countries where national traditions were strong, the nation tended to revive, independent and outside the fabric of the Empire. The policy of Hellenization, which had never been abandoned by Alexander and would have to be pursued by his successors, if they were not to be absorbed by the vanquished, provoked

¹ P. E. Legrand, *Daos*, p. 283.

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reactions which, especially on the Eastern side, ended in the loss of enormous portions of the conquered territory.

But what clearly shows the power of individual influence in the new order is the fact that the monarchies founded by Alexander's successors were at first based less on a well-defined territory than on the person of the sovereign. These rulers created dynasties rather than kingdoms; the territorial boundaries of their domains remained vague, and were not fixed by any national consideration. This characteristic is apparent not only in the short-lived creations which disappeared before the end of the 4th century, like the power which formed for a brief space, from 316 to 302, in Hither Asia, round the person of Antigonos. Those Empires which managed to survive were not different in essence—neither the immense Empire of the Seleucids, which was composed of very dissimilar parts, and frequently shifted its centre before establishing it at Antioch, nor the Lagid monarchy, which, although more intimately bound to the country and people of Egypt, overflowed the frontiers of the Nile valley in the 3rd century, and annexed quite other territories in the Ægean and Asia, connected with each other and with Egypt itself only by the power of the Kings.

On the morrow of Alexander's death, therefore, it could be foreseen that not one of the great men who had with such pains settled the constitution of the Empire in Babylon would go to his post or the seat of his Satrapy without some secret thoughts of personal ambition, and that rivalries, perhaps attended with bloodshed, must break out sooner or later. But it was only gradually that the idea of splitting up the Empire took shape in their minds. For the time being, the chief object of each leader was to make sure of a certain degree of independence and to tolerate no power greater than his own. Those who, being at the very centre of the Empire, thought that they could make use of the army, and were keenly alive to the weakness of the lawful Kings, very soon conceived the idea of taking possession of the Empire for themselves. We may suspect that such projects occurred to Leonnatos, who had hopes of marrying Cleopatra, Alexander's sister. But his dreams perished with him on the plains of Thessaly. Perdicas tried to realize them, but

as soon as his intentions became manifest a coalition was formed to bring them to nothing.

III

PERDICCAS

An attempt had been made to cement union between the great chiefs by political marriages. Of the three daughters of Antipatros, Nicæa was to marry Perdicas, Phila Crateros, and Eurydice Ptolemy. But these unions could hardly prevent conflicts. Perdicas was master of Asia, and the Kings were in his hands. First, he removed persons who might be ill-disposed to him, and had the most dangerous put to death, such as the commander of the infantry Meleagros, whose conduct in Babylon had rendered him suspect. All these measures could be explained by the need for strengthening the authority of the Kings, and Perdicas early found a valuable ally in the new Satrap of Cappadocia. Eumenes had not stayed in his Satrapy, but had entrusted its administration to his friends and followed the Chiliarch. This Greek of Cardia, whom Alexander had placed at the head of his Secretariat, had managed to retain the King's confidence, in spite of occasional clouds and the enmity of Hephæstion. Towards the end of the reign, he had taken his place among the chief officers of the army, succeeding Perdicas in the command of a hipparchy. But he was not a Macedonian, and the Macedonians did not look upon him as an equal. This may have been one reason for his tenacious loyalty to the cause of the Kings; his fortune was bound up with the Empire, and in the case of a partition he would not have received the support of the Macedonian troops in securing a portion for himself.¹ In the battle which he waged for the cause of Perdicas, we shall see him always on the point of being betrayed by his troops.

The ambition of Perdicas was at first assisted by the hatred which Olympias entertained for Antipatros. Their quarrel had poisoned Alexander's last years, and when the King died Antipatros, summoned to Asia, was perhaps already in disgrace. Now Olympias sent from Epeiros,

¹ Kaerst, in *OVII*, s.v. "Eumenes"; *CLXVIII*, pp. 12-17.

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inviting Perdiccas to appear in Macedonia, where, to obtain the right to ascend the throne in the place of the pale phantom who occupied it, he should marry Cleopatra, Alexander's own sister. It was a revival of the project of Leonnatos. The prestige of the two princesses would have removed almost all obstacles, and, since Perdiccas would have brought the mortal remains of the hero with him, to lay in the royal tomb at *Ægæ*, he could have figured as a lawful heir, designated by the dying conqueror, who was said to have given him his ring.

But, in spite of the advice of Eumenes, Perdiccas did not venture to reveal his designs too soon, or to break with Antipatros. He was, however, careful not to leave others, and especially the ambitious women of the royal family, at liberty to make use of the unfortunate King to serve their own power. Philip Arrhidæos was betrothed to his niece Eurydice, the child of Cynane, King Philip's daughter. Antipatros and Perdiccas were opposed to the marriage and doubtless for the same reasons. But Cynane succeeded in crossing to Asia with her daughter and an army. Perdiccas had in vain sent his brother Alcetas to fight them; the Macedonians refused to bear arms against a daughter of Philip. Perdiccas managed, nevertheless, to capture her, and went so far as to have her killed,¹ but he could not resist the soldiers, who demanded that Arrhidæos should marry Eurydice. So he began to make enemies for himself in the very centre of government, and he was to alienate others yet more dangerous. Not trusting Antigonos, who had refused to conquer Cappadocia for Eumenes, he asked him for an account of the administration of his Satrapy, in the hope of procuring his impeachment. Antigonos pretended to be ready to defend his case, but secretly fled to Antipatros and Crateros in Macedonia.

These two were at the time engaged in the war with the *Ætolians*. Being advised of the intentions of Perdiccas, they hastily made terms with their opponents, and opened negotiations with Ptolemy. It was important to have the Satrap of Egypt on one's side. His attitude in Babylon had left no doubts about his sentiments, and he must have felt himself threatened by the power of the Chiliarch.

So the plans of Perdiccas were doomed to failure. He had

¹ Polyæn., viii.60 ; Arr., *Succ. Alex.*, 22-3 ; Diod., xix.52.5.

lost all his chances of success in Macedonia, where Cleopatra, indignant at his delays, now refused to marry him, and Olympias would not support him. Moreover, Ptolemy had just robbed him of the prestige which he hoped to obtain in the eyes of the Macedonians from the possession of Alexander's body. Instead of going to Ægæ, it was sent to Egypt. Arrhabæos, the officer entrusted with escorting it, had been won over by the Lagid, who came with an army to meet him in Syria, and the body lay at Memphis, until a tomb should have been built for it in Alexandria, which thus seemed marked out to be the capital of the Empire. Perdiccas was furious, and at first wanted to crush Ptolemy. He decided to attack Egypt. Leaving Eumenes and Alcetas in Asia, and sending his fleet to Cyprus, where Ptolemy had allies, he set out, by Syria, for the valley of the Nile.

There he was to suffer humiliating defeat and death. The Eastern frontier of the Delta was easy to defend, and had never been violated when an energetic king ruled Egypt. Now Ptolemy, one of Alexander's best generals, was a master who was obeyed. In vain Perdiccas tried to besiege Pelusion ; in vain he tried, further south, to take the fort called the Camel's Wall, and then, still further up the valley, to convey his army across the Nile. In the attempt he lost 2,000 men and the remains of his authority, while the Satrap of Egypt covered himself with glory. The Chiliarch's haughtiness made him unpopular with officers and men ; Ptolemy by his affability made many friends. Perdiccas was murdered in his tent by Peithon and Seleucos. Ptolemy had no difficulty in clearing himself before the Macedonians of the charges which Perdiccas had brought against him. He could easily have taken the Chiliarch's place, but he was too wary to make immoderate claims, and he caused the guardianship of the Kings to be entrusted to Peithon and Arrhabæos, pending the arrival of Antigonos and Antipatros, who were then in Asia. In Asia, Eumenes had won a brilliant victory, the news of which came too late to help Perdiccas.

Antigonos had landed at Ephesos in the spring of 322. Eumenes had withdrawn into Phrygia, while Crateros and Antipatros were crossing the Hellespont. The Greek suddenly found himself almost abandoned by his supporters. The prestige of Antipatros, and, still more, the popularity

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of Crateros, were very great. The troops of Alcetas refused to fight, and retired into Pisidia with their leader. Neoptolemos, who was to have supported Eumenes, tried to betray him and to go over to Crateros with his troops. But Eumenes defeated him and kept the troops, and Neoptolemos escaped alone, or with a small escort. In the camp of Antipatros and Crateros, it was suggested that they should negotiate with Eumenes, with a view to winning him over. But there was an old feud between Eumenes and Antipatros; besides, Neoptolemos declared that Crateros had only to appear and at the sight of his *kausia* and the sound of his voice the Macedonians would come over to him with all their arms. Eumenes knew the feelings of his men; he cleverly kept them ignorant that they were marching against Crateros, and so fought a great battle, which he won. Neoptolemos and Crateros himself were killed. But, for all that, the cause of Perdiccas was lost. Antigonos had defeated his fleet in the waters of Cyprus, and Antipatros was already marching on Cilicia to take him in the rear, when he learned the outcome of the war in Egypt. He was summoned, with Antigonos, to Triparadeisos in Syria,¹ where the Satrapies were to be redistributed.

Antipatros obtained the post of Regent, through the influence of Antigonos and Seleucos, and in spite of the intrigues of Eurydice; so the centre of the Empire was transferred from Asia to Macedonia, whither Antipatros returned with the Kings. It was also necessary to find substitutes for the friends of Perdiccas in the Satrapies. These changes chiefly affected the provinces of Asia Minor and of the region of the Tigris and Euphrates. The decisions destined to have the greatest consequences were the appointment of Seleucos to the Satrapy of Babylonia and those concerning Antigonos. Not only did Antigonos remain in possession of Greater Phrygia, together with Lycaonia, Pamphylia, and Lycia, but he was made Strategos commanding all the armies in Asia. The treasures of Susa were removed to the citadel of Cyinda in Cilicia, the Satrapy assigned to Philoxenos—in other words, they were placed under the control of the powerful Strategos, who thus had the means

¹ Riblah, Perdrizet, in **LXXXIX**, 1898, p. 84; Jusiya, Dussaud, *ibid.*, p. 118.

to secure a preponderant position for himself, and even to revive the projects of Perdikkas.¹ But, for the present, Asia Minor had to be taken from Eumenes, and this was the mission of Antigonos. Once more, marriages were arranged to cement union between the great leaders. Phila, the widow of Crateros, married Demetrios, the son of Antigonos, and Nicæa, the widow of Perdikkas, became the wife of Lysimachos.²

IV

ANTIPATROS

The regency of Antipatros lasted two years. It was marked in Greece by the Ætolian War, and in Asia by the defeat of the followers of Perdikkas. In the spring of 319, Antigonos seemed to have come to the end of his opponents in Asia. Eumenes, badly supported by Alketas and Docimos, had been defeated at Oreynia in Cappadocia, and had fled with a small body to the eagle's nest of Nora.³ His fate seemed a matter of time. Alketas and Docimos were taken in their turn; the latter was captured in Pisidia, and the former fled to Termessos, the inhabitants of which gave him up.

¹ The following was the distribution of the Satrapies, according to Arr., *Succ. Alex.*, 34, and Diod., xviii.30, who clearly use the same source:—

Egypt, Ptolemy; Syria, Laomedon; *Cilicia, Philoxenos; Mesopotamia and Arbelitis, Amphilachos; Babylonia, Seleucos; Susiana, Antigenes*; Persia, Peucestas; Carmania, Tlepolemos; Media, Peithon; *Parthia, Philip; Aria and Drangiana, Stasandros; Bactriana and Sogdiana, Stasanor; Arachosia, Sibyrtios; Paropamisadæ, Oxyartes*; N. India, Peithon; India, from the Indus to Patala, Porus; India of the Hydaspes, Taxiles; *Cappadocia, Nicanor*; Greater Phrygia, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, Lycia, Antigonos; Caria, Asandros; *Lydia, Cleitos; Hellespontine Phrygia, Arrhidæos*. Italics indicate a change of Satrap since 324. Our authors or their source must have been confused about India; cf. **CXVI**, vol. iii, 2, p. 24. Peithon must have remained Satrap of the Lower Indus, while Porus and Taxiles kept their kingdoms. By the side of Taxiles, we still find Eudamos. Arr., 35, gives Amphilachos, Satrap of Mesopotamia, as the King's brother, but there is probably a confusion; he must have been the brother, not of King Arrhidæos, but of Arrhidæos, Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (*ibid.*).

² The date of the marriage of Nicæa and Lysimachos is uncertain; so is the part played by Lysimachos in the war against Perdikkas. **CLXX**, p. 18.

³ Kuja or Hassan-Dagh. **CCLXVIII**, pp. 52–68.

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The Ætolians had taken advantage of the absence of Antipatros to invade Thessaly, where, with Menon of Pharsalos, they enjoyed a brief mastery, but an invasion of Acarnanians, perhaps instigated by Antipatros, recalled them within their own borders, and Thessaly, reconquered by Polyperchon, was placed once more under the authority of the Kings.

In Attica, under the peaceful and moderate government of Phocion, the population seems to have enjoyed a revival of material prosperity. But the national sentiment was humiliated, for the Macedonian garrison was still at Munychia, and its commander, Menyllos, was a friend of Phocion. The latter had always refused to approach Antipatros with a view to the withdrawal of the troops, whose presence was a safeguard against a return of the democrats to the offensive. Another more amenable friend of Macedon was chosen to approach Antipatros; Demades was sent with his son. Unfortunately for the Athenian cause, that shady politician was pretty generally despised. He had maintained a compromising correspondence with Perdiccas. When Perdiccas had contemplated crossing into Macedonia, Demades had invited him to come and liberate Greece, which was only held by that "rotten old thread" of an Antipatros. It was, therefore, easy for a friend of Phocion, Deinarchos of Corinth, to convict him of high treason. In his fury, Cassandros, who was judging the case, caused the son's throat to be cut in the presence of his father, who, splashed with his son's blood, was himself put to death.¹

Antipatros was very ill at the time, and he died soon after, aged seventy-eight. He had been one of the best servants of Macedonia, trained in the school of Philip, like his contemporary Parmenion. Almost alone of all the great men of the day, he had taken no part in the conquest of Asia; but he had made it possible by holding a seething Greece in control. His task had not been easy, and had been still further complicated by the hostility of Olympias.

¹ Cloché, in *Rev. Historique*, *loc. cit.*

CHAPTER II

ANTIGONOS ¹

I

THE COALITION AGAINST POLYPERCHON

ANTIPATROS had had good reason to mistrust his son Cassandros, who was haughty, cruel, and violent. He thought it wise to leave him in a state of tutelage until he should have learned, with years, sufficient to take the first rank. He therefore entrusted the Regency, when he was dying, to Polyperchon, one of his old comrades, and one of the oldest officers of Alexander. Cassandros had the title of Chiliarch and the command of the cavalry. But it was inevitable that he would be content neither with the title nor with the command. Once more the Empire was to be torn by division.

In Asia, at the same time, a dangerous ambition was asserting itself. Antigonos, the vanquisher of Eumenes and Alcetas, did not feel that he was made for subordinate rôles. The master of most of Asia Minor, he did not think it beyond his powers to extend his sway over the whole continent and to make himself independent of the royal authority, which was now no more than a shadow. Already those who came into contact with him could see that, if the idea of the Empire was in danger of dissolving amid the rivalries of the Satraps and of fading away altogether with the line of Alexander, Antigonos considered himself capable of embodying it in his own person. So, after the removal of Antipatros, it is Antigonos "One-eye" whose figure dominates the history of this period, which ends, sixteen years later, with his death (301). Not that his rivals were inconspicuous characters; Cassandros, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, and Seleucos all displayed quite as much talent and energy in establishing their greatness and their glory. But their ambitions, compared with those of Antigonos, were limited.

¹ Chief literary sources: Just., xiv-xv; Diod., xviii.40-xix; Plut., *Phoc.*, *Demetr.*, *Pyrh.*, *Eum.*

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At first they seem to have aimed only at obtaining for themselves as good a share as possible in the splitting Empire, whose disintegration they furthered. It is obvious that Antigonos soon wanted to rule it all. At the very beginning, he planned to conquer at least the whole of Asia, and it was the vicissitudes of his projects which determined the reactive conduct of his adversaries. His death marks the downfall of the idea of Empire and the end of a conception which, without having the same breadth as the ideal of world-kingship which may be attributed to Alexander, at least recalls the vast projects of the Conqueror.

In Antigonos there was, certainly, less generous imagination, and also less spirit of adventure. He only exerted his power over regions which Macedonia and Hellenism had already conquered, and, whereas we see Alexander allowing his very successes to transform him, and becoming a new man to reign over his new subjects, Antigonos remains more Macedonian and phil-Hellenic. In the short time in which we can observe him at the head of his short-lived Empire, we note the wisdom and firmness of his government. Besides, he was already almost an old man. He was sixty-five, if not more, and, although he was not young even when he followed Alexander in Asia, he had never had a military position of the first rank. He had started as commander of the allies, and had been made Satrap of Phrygia. In 317, his energy was certainly not broken by years, and in his struggle with the party of Perdiccas he had just shown remarkable military talent. Lastly, he would soon be supported by his son Demetrios Poliorcetes, the "Town-taker", one of the most brilliant captains of the day.¹

Antigonos was at first served by the rivalry of Polyperchon and Cassandros. The latter, looking for allies, succeeded in bringing about a coalition of the chief Satraps, who were anxious for their own independence, and might fear the authority which Polyperchon would obtain from his position as protector of the young Kings. Cassandros had had no difficulty in gaining to his cause the Satrap of Egypt, who had just taken Syria from Laomedon. Ptolemy, therefore, in carrying this conquest through to the end, had ceased to

¹ See especially **CXVI**, vol. iii . 1, pp. 171 ff.; Willamowitz-Möllerndorff, *Hellenistische Dichtung*, p. 57.

act as the governor of a province, and had assumed the attitude of a sovereign. Just as he had annexed Cyrene in the time of Perdiccas, so he now added to his domains a region the possession of which had always appeared indispensable to the imperialist Pharaohs.¹ It was, therefore, to the advantage of the Lagid to paralyse the central power, or, at least, to divert its attention.

Cassandros was equally successful with Antigonos, who gave him troops, while himself making ready to conquer Asia. On the death of Antipatros, he had seized the first excuse to commence his encroachments, and had taken Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia from the Satraps of those provinces. Lastly, he entered into negotiations with Eumenes, in whom he hoped to find an ally, through their common friend, the historian Hieronymos of Cardia.

So the Empire was cracking on every side. No doubt, Polyperchon's courage, good humour, and affability made him popular with the Macedonians, but he had no ally. When Antipatros was made Regent, Olympias had taken refuge in Epeiros; Polyperchon invited her to come back to Macedonia, on the pretext of looking after Roxana's son, Alexander Ægos. He reckoned on her hatred of Cassandros and on the prestige which she had, as Alexander's mother, among the soldiers. Finally, he resolved to win the whole of Greece to his side by proclaiming the liberty of the Greeks.

Antipatros and Cassandros had relied upon the possessing classes. Most of the cities were held by oligarchies. Polyperchon turned resolutely towards the democracies, and his edict declared that the constitutions in force in the time of Philip and Alexander should be restored. Exiles were to be recalled, and should return before the 30th of the month of Xandikos. Oropos was left to the Oropians, but Samos was restored to the Athenians. Very skilfully, while blaming the Greeks for having resisted Macedonia, the edict admitted the evils which they had suffered, but diverted their resentment on to the "Macedonian Generals", that is, on to the friends of Antipatros and Cassandros.²

At the same time, Polyperchon hoped to secure the

¹ CLXI, i, pp. 28-33.

² Diod., xviii.56 (text of the decree).

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support of Eumenes in Asia. Eumenes had come out of Nora, by agreement with Antigonos (whose ambition, however, he had no intention of serving), and had added a clause to the treaty, promising fidelity to the Kings. After that, how could he have resisted, when he received a letter from Polyperchon, written in their name? In compensation for the hardships which he had undergone, he was granted a bonus of 500 talents, and orders were given to the Strategoi and treasurers of Cilicia to place a further 500 talents at his disposal for the levy of troops. A body of 3,000 *Argyraspides* was in the region. These were veterans of Alexander's wars, many of them quite old—between sixty and seventy years, according to Plutarch and Diodorus—but formidable on account of their experience. Their leaders, Antigenes and Teutamos, led them to Eumenes, who was appointed Strategos with full powers in Asia, and in this way soon found himself at the head of a considerable army. Ptolemy, cruising with his fleet off the promontory of Zephyrion in Cilicia, tried to tempt away the *Argyraspides* and the keeper of the treasures at Cyinda, but in vain. Eumenes was strong in the authority conferred on him by the investiture of the Kings. Thus, in Europe and Asia, the two parties seemed to have about equal forces, but in reality the royal prestige, which was one of the chief advantages of Polyperchon and Eumenes, was soon to become less than nothing.

II

THE WAR IN GREECE

Of all the revolutions which the royal edict started in the Greek cities, that of Athens is naturally the best known. Phocion's popularity seems to have declined greatly after the death of Demades. The Macedonian commandant Menyllos had been replaced by Nicanor, a friend of Cassandros, and the measure had created great ill-feeling among the people. The democratic party lifted up its head and found a leader in the person of Agnonides of Pergase. Now, the royal edict put both Phocion and Nicanor in a delicate position. The

property-minimum for citizens instituted by Antipatros was abolished ; so the banished democrats would return in great numbers, and it was also to be expected that the troops of occupation would be withdrawn. But Nicanor did not approve of this, and no doubt Phocion was quite pleased to have the arms of Macedonia behind him. Nicanor even succeeded by a ruse in taking possession of the Peiræus, and an attempt of the Athenians to recapture their port failed. Then Alexander, Polyperchon's son, arrived, and camped in Attica. The democrats must have counted on his support. But Alexander seems to have acted with more prudence than decision. Negotiations were opened between Nicanor, Alexander, and Phocion. Then, in the city, where the democrats were growing more and more numerous, Agnonides brought a charge of treason against Phocion, who avoided it by fleeing to Alexander, and was sent by him, with his friends, to Polyperchon. It seems that Alexander, who asked his father to treat Phocion and the old friends of Macedonia well, was less concerned with the aspirations of the Athenian democracy than with the advantages to be obtained by the possession of the Peiræus for the war against Cassandros, and if, as Diodorus says, Phocion advised him to seize it, it was doubtless because almost the only hope for the safety and future of his party now lay in Macedonian protection. But it could hardly be safe for Polyperchon to suspend the effects of his edict of liberation in the case of the most illustrious city of Greece. He therefore abandoned the Peiræus, and sent Phocion and his friends back for judgment by the Athenians, now restored to independence. Phocion was condemned by a tumultuous Assembly, which refused to hear his defence, and died courageously, drinking hemlock according to the Athenian law.¹

The triumph of the democracy was not to last long. Now the struggle began between Polyperchon and Cassandros. With a small army, Cassandros came and occupied the Peiræus, which Alexander had abandoned. Polyperchon could not dislodge him, and leaving his son in Attica, he went into the Peloponnese, where Megalopolis was refusing to obey the edict, and besieged the city. He counted on his

¹ Cloché, in *Rev. Historique*, 1924, pp. 33-66.

elephants, since none had yet been seen in Greece. But there was among the Megalopolitans one Damis, who had served in Asia with Alexander; although a breach had been made in the wall, he stopped the onset of the monstrous beasts by concealing doors, studded with nails, under the ground. Polyperchon lost all his elephants and had to give up the siege. His prestige further suffered from the fact that at the same time, as we shall see presently, Antigonos and Nicanor gained a great victory on the Hellespont, and effected their junction with Lysimachos, the Satrap of Thrace, who, when the danger from the barbarians was removed, had entered the coalition.¹

In Athens, Cassandros had at last persuaded the people to discuss terms. The mediator was a disciple of Theophrastos, Demetrios of Phaleron,² a supporter of moderate oligarchy who, more fortunate than Phocion, had escaped condemnation by flight. For the next ten years, in the capacity of Strategos,³ he managed the city wisely, and kept it to the alliance with Cassandros. The latter recognized its independence, but Athens accepted a system by which the income required for an active citizen was 1,000 drachmas, and only the poorest were excluded. Agnonides was condemned to death. A Macedonian garrison remained at Munychia.

The submission of Athens gave Cassandros considerable resources. He left for Macedonia, where he came to an agreement with Queen Eurydice. The army declared for her, Cassandros was proclaimed Regent, and Polyperchon, who had hardly any supporters but in the Peloponnese, was removed from that post. Leaving Eurydice in Macedonia, under the protection of his brother Nicanor, Cassandros then marched towards the Peloponnese. The whole of Northern Greece declared for him, and he was able to advance as far as Arcadia, where Megalopolis was faithful to him. Tegea held him in check.

The situation of Polyperchon was none the less very precarious, when he conceived the plan of making use of the influence of Olympias against that of Eurydice. The old Queen had not left Epeiros. With her cousin Æacides, who had just succeeded Arrhybas as King of that country, she entered Macedonia, and, wishing to decide matters in a single

¹ Below, p. 143.

² Martini, in *CVII*, s.v. "Demetrios."

³ De Sanctis, in *CIV*, ii, p. 15 n. 1.

battle, marched straight against Eurydice, who was at Euia.¹ Eurydice's Macedonians would not fight against the mother of Alexander, Philip Arrhidæos and his following at once fell into the hands of Olympias, and Eurydice was captured while fleeing to Amphipolis with one of her advisers. Olympias was able to give free rein to her fierce desire for vengeance on those whom she regarded as usurpers. After keeping them several days immured in a small dungeon, she caused Philip to be murdered by Thracian soldiers and forced Eurydice to kill herself. Nicanor was slain with about a hundred friends of Cassandros. Men began to turn away from Olympias with horror.

On hearing of these events, Cassandros raised the siege of Tegea and made for Macedon. Æacides had returned to Epeiros, Polyperchon was in Perrhæbia, and Olympias, too weak to risk a battle with Cassandros, shut herself up in Pydna with the royal family. Cassandros invested the stronghold, and sent his officers against Æacides and Polyperchon, who were almost completely deserted by their troops. Famine soon raged in Pydna. The elephants died, and the troops grew weak; some barbarian auxiliaries even ate human flesh. The siege had commenced in winter; the sufferings of the besieged only increased with the spring. An attempt of Olympias to escape failed. They had to surrender. Monimos, the commandant of Pella, who was on the side of Olympias, opened his gates when he learned of the fall of Pydna. Aristonoos, who had defeated Crateuas, Cassandros's general, held out longer in Amphipolis, and only consented to surrender on written orders of Olympias. His obstinacy cost him his life. The assembly of the Macedonians condemned Olympias to death, but in her absence. Shortly afterwards, Cassandros, who still feared her ascendancy among the Macedonians, caused her to be assassinated by soldiers. Roxana and Alexander Ægos he kept prisoners in Amphipolis.

Cassandros, who had married Thessalonice, a daughter of Philip II,² now behaved just like a king. In Pallene he founded Cassandreia on the site of Potidæa,

¹ On Euia (ἡ Εὐία, Diod., xix.11) and its position, see **CXXIII**, i, p. 250 n. 6.

² Stæhelin, in **UVII**, xx, p. 2299.

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and populated it with Potidæans, colonists from the cities of the Chersonese, and the remnant of the Olynthians. In Greece, amid universal applause, he raised Thebes from its ruins. In an expedition in the Peloponnese, which took him into Argolis and Messenia, he reduced Alexander to the possession of a few strongholds. Polyperchon had fled to the Ætolians.

III

THE WAR IN ASIA. EUMENES

The struggle in Asia was equally fierce, and the victory equally complete. It was a duel between Antigonos and Eumenes.¹ The extraordinary spirit which the latter had shown at Nora, the astonishing turn of fortune which had made the rebel besieged in a hill-fort into the Commander-in-Chief of Asia, and the respect which the Kings seemed to pay to his loyalty to the family of Alexander, at first made him the object of very great admiration. But he could hardly trust that this sentiment would be lasting. He knew from experience that in the eyes of the Macedonians he was still a Greek, a foreigner. Plutarch praises his charming and refined manners,² which were very unlike the haughty airs of the noble Macedonian officer.

In his delicate position, he had to behave with the utmost tact and caution, and to find a way of leading the troops without appearing to command them. To avoid all suspicion of personal ambition and to show that he accepted his office only in obedience to the Kings, he refused the bonus which he was offered, and, to soothe the susceptibilities of the other leaders, he skilfully effaced himself in the memory of Alexander. Being inspired, he said, by a vision, he had the royal throne set up in the tent where the General Staff met, and the diadem and sceptre were laid upon it. Perfumes were burned on an altar in front of them, and army orders were made out in the name of the heroized King. So it was plain to all that they were fighting for the cause of the monarchy; and so there started in the camps the official worship of Alexander.

¹ CLXVIII, pp. 69-154.

² Plut., *Eum.*, 11.2.

Eumenes' first thought was to go to Phœnicia, which Ptolemy abandoned to him, prudently retiring on Southern Syria. The Commander-in-Chief intended to use the ports to build himself a fleet, and to cross to Europe and rejoin Polyperchon, in the teeth of the Lagid squadron, which was cruising between Cyprus and the Egyptian coast. But he changed his mind; the important thing was to hold and to defeat, in Asia, Antigonos, who had just won a great victory.¹

Antigonos had persuaded Lysimachos to join the coalition.² The Satrap of Thrace was the energetic leader of an army hardened in war. Polyperchon had to prevent his forces from joining those of Antigonos, at all costs. Cleitos, the victor of Amorgos, was therefore sent to prevent the junction of Antigonos and Lysimachos, and he defeated them at sea, at the entrance to the Bosphorus and the Euxine. But on the very night of the battle Antigonos brought off a bold manœuvre successfully; supported by his admiral Nicanor, the friend of Cassandros, and aided by the Byzantines, he took his troops over to the European side, where, like Lysander at Ægospotami in the past, he took the enemy's camp and destroyed his fleet on the shore. Nevertheless, if he had remained in Europe, he might have feared, with some reason, that Eumenes would seize the Empire of Asia from him.

Eumenes was, indeed, marching on Babylon, where he hoped to profit by the disturbances which had broken out in the central Satrapies. These were as great a danger to unity as those which distracted the West. No doubt one could hardly hope to rule the Hellenic world from Mesopotamia and the plateau of Iran. But it was to be expected that, if a Macedonian succeeded in creating a great Asiatic Empire in those regions, he would one day send his forces to the West and come into conflict with its masters. This very nearly became the destiny of Peithon, the Satrap of Media. To his brother Eudamos he had given Parthia, taken from Philip, and was obviously trying to make an empire for himself. But he came up against the other Satraps, who were little inclined to suffer the domination of an equal. A coalition had been formed, the soul of which was Peucestas, the Satrap of Persia, and Peithon fled to Seleucos in Babylon.

¹ CLXVIII, pp. 82-3.

² CLXXI, p. 58.

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Such was the state of these regions of Asia when Eumenes came from Phœnicia to Babylonia, where he took up his winter quarters (318–317). He had naturally passed through Mesopotamia, whose governor he had attached to his cause. Now he called upon Seleucos and Peithon to join him against the rebel Antigonos. They refused to obey a man “whom the Macedonians had condemned to death”, and tried, unsuccessfully, to corrupt the Argyraspides. Eumenes then decided to go into Susiana and to join the coalition which had formed round Peucestas, and then, in the name of the Kings, to cause the treasuries of Susa to be opened to him. For that, he had to cross the Tigris. He effected this difficult operation in spite of Seleucos and Peithon, who cut the dams of an old canal, so that the royal army was surrounded by water on all sides. After two days of attempts, Eumenes was managing to divert the flood when Seleucos decided to treat with him and to allow him to go out of his Satrapy.

In Susiana, Eumenes joined the coalition of Satraps. Their army numbered 18,700 foot-soldiers, 4,600 horsemen, and 120 elephants. Altogether, Eumenes had about 40,000 men at his disposal. But there was no very profound agreement between the leaders.

Antigonos had wintered in Mesopotamia. In the spring of 317 he came to Babylonia and joined Peithon and Seleucos, and they marched on Susa. Leaving Seleucos to besiege the capital, Antigonos turned on Eumenes, who had taken refuge behind the Coprates River. Since he lost 6,000 men in a vain attempt to cross the river, and his troops were suffering from the heat of the summer, he went up towards Media, taking the road through the country of the Cossæans, to whom he refused to pay the usual toll, and his troops, harried by those wild hillmen, had to endure still further sufferings.

Eumenes had made for Persia. He would have preferred to carry the war into Hither Asia, but he could not persuade the Satraps, whose chief thought was to secure their own Satrapies. Presently it was reported that Antigonos was approaching. Eumenes' army hurried to meet him, both opponents seeking, by skilful manœuvres, to engage battle on the most favourable ground. It took place in Parætacene (the region of Ispahan) in the autumn of 317. Night put a stop to the fighting for a time, but it was resumed when the

moon rose. In the end, Eumenes was compelled to retire to his camp. Antigonos was master of the battlefield, but his losses were the heavier, and he returned to Media, where he wintered at Gadamarga. Eumenes had given up the attempt to follow him, and went to Gabiene.¹ There he was to meet his fate.

Antigonos, seeing his army grow weaker every day, conceived the daring project of surprising Eumenes in his winter quarters. By the ordinary roads, the two opponents were twenty-five days' march apart, but by tracks through desolate wastes, which might be supposed impracticable for armies, it was possible for Antigonos to fall on Eumenes' cantonments before he had time to assemble his forces. Antigonos did not hesitate to demand the effort of his men, and set forth into the desert. The fires which the troops lit at night, contrary to Antigonos's orders, were seen by the inhabitants of the mountains overlooking the desert, and Eumenes was warned of his adversary's approach. Another great battle was fought. Prodigies of valour and skill could not save Eumenes, who was undone by the treachery of his own men. A great dust having risen over the field, Antigonos, without exciting the enemy's attention, sent a troop of cavalry behind the line to seize the baggage of the royal army and the wives and children of the Argyraspides. In the meantime, battle was engaged. Nothing could withstand the charge of the Argyraspides. But on the left wing, which Eumenes had especially strengthened in order to oppose the enemy's right, where Antigonos was fighting, Eumenes was left almost alone by the desertion of Peucestas and his cavalry, who retired from the battlefield. The right wing was too weak to resist. The phalanx was victorious, but found itself isolated, without the protection of the cavalry. In vain Eumenes tried to rally his squadrons. The horsemen of Peucestas refused to obey. The army had to retire. There was division in the Staff, Eumenes wishing to resume the battle, and the Satraps to return to their Satrapies. The Argyraspides, who had just learned of the loss of the camp, made terms with Antigonos and surrendered Eumenes to him. Antigonos satisfied an old hatred by causing Teutamios, Antigenes, and

¹ The region of the upper Karun, between Dizful and Ispahan ; cf. *OLXVIII*, p. 108.

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Eudamos, Satrap of the Indus, to be put to death. Eumenes, whom he would perhaps have spared, he had to sacrifice to the anger of the Macedonians. So the defender of the Kings disappeared at the time when the monarchy was itself decaying fast. Antigonos might consider himself master of Asia.

IV

THE COALITION AND WAR AGAINST ANTIGONOS

In 317 the wars which had just ended seemed to have already set the seal on the dismemberment of the Empire. The murder of Eurydice and Arrhidæos and the condemnation and death of Olympias had made it plain to all that the Kings could not long remain an obstacle to the ambition of the great leaders. With Roxana and her son Alexander Ægos prisoners in Amphipolis, there seemed to be nothing to prevent Cassandros in Macedonia, Lysimachos in Thrace, Antigonos in Asia, and Ptolemy in Egypt from acting like sovereigns and organizing their rule, each in his own domain, so that the Empire would really be divided into five new great states. Besides, this system of states answered fairly well to the political needs of the time, and was not very different from that which was finally adopted. There was a balance of powers. The Ægean, the truly Greek sea, remained the centre of the whole, from which all civilization radiated. Greece was still a varied and living world, full of vigour, populous, and rich in overflowing activity. It was capable of spreading itself over the East, and supplying the new states with the framework of their new organization. Yet, far from subsiding, conflicts were to break out, more violent than ever. The unity of the Empire was not finally destroyed, and, although the Kings were nothing in themselves but a symbol, their mere existence was an impediment to the separatist tendencies of the most powerful Satraps. Moreover, it was not only in their own Satrapies, which they had many of them enlarged by warfare, that the Satraps regarded themselves as the absolute masters of a kingdom "conquered by the spear". There was probably not one who did not cherish the desire for unity, at least if he was to rule it. In almost all

we can point to at least one moment in their career when they had a glimpse of the realization of that magnificent dream. But in Antigonos it was a constant thought. The master of Asia now, the rough old man was to spend the last fifteen years of his life in attempting to reconstitute the Empire, and it is these fifteen years which are really decisive in the crisis which we are considering.

In 316 there came to Ptolemy in Egypt Seleucos, the Satrap of Babylon, who had fled with about fifty horsemen. He brought alarming news: Antigonos was behaving like a sovereign, and removing or putting down all the Satraps in favour of men chosen by himself. He had had Peithon put to death in Media, and had removed Peucestas, who was popular among the Persians—giving him, it was true, a high command. Going to Babylon, he had demanded an account from himself, Seleucos. Seleucos had fled, to escape certain condemnation. Ptolemy received him well. The power of Antigonos might become a danger to Egypt; he caused Cassandros and Lysimachos to be sounded, and they were already anxious. A coalition was formed, which was joined by Asandros, Satrap of Caria. They decided to send an absolute ultimatum to Antigonos, who was in Upper Syria, demanding Babylonia for Seleucos, Hellespontine Phrygia for Lysimachos, Syria for Ptolemy, and Lycia and Cappadocia for Asandros. Antigonos answered, very rudely, that he was ready to fight (315).¹

As was natural, the war took place in Greece and Asia. Antigonos tried to cross to Europe, knowing well that there only could he obtain the decision which he sought, since Macedonia was the head of the Empire. But his enemies caused him sufficient trouble in Asia to keep him there. In Greece he could only act through his generals.

There everything was complicated by the mutual enmities of cities and of parties within the cities. Cassandros had the upper hand, always supported by the oligarchies. Polyperchon and his son Alexander, with whom Antigonos allied himself, held only a few points in the Peloponnese. But the power of

¹ Diod., xix.57.1-4. Ἀσανδρος, Droysen's correction for Κάσσανδρος, which some would maintain. Cf. CXXIII, i, p. 274 n. 3; CXVI, iii, 1, p. 122 n. 2; Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Antigonos von Karyatos*, p. 198; CLXXI, p. 61 n. 1. But see CLXX, p. 27 n. 1, and CLXI, i, p. 43 n. 2.

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Cassandros was not unshakable. Advantage could be taken of the hostility of the Ætolians and of the difficulties brewing for him in Illyria and in Epeiros, where Æacides, the cousin of Olympias, was King, and the democratic parties in the cities could be reanimated by once more calling the Greeks to freedom. Accordingly, a decree¹ proclaiming liberty was published by Aristodemos of Miletos, the first general sent to Greece by Antigonos. It set up a ferment in Greece; in vain Ptolemy, to counter the blow, wrote that he was just as enthusiastic as Antigonos for the liberty of the Greeks; Aristodemos at once found supporters. The Ætolians allied themselves with him.

Cassandros, it is true, acted with energy. A successful campaign in the Peloponnese won for him the alliance of Polyperchon, who kept the title of Strategos. The democrats of Sicyon certainly murdered Alexander, but they were reduced or pacified by his widow Cratesipolis, one of the most distinguished women of the time. Aristodemos retired among the Ætolians; making an alliance with the Acarnanians, Cassandros fought them without decisive success. But in the next year (314) he had retaken Leucas, Apollonia, and Epidamnos from Glaucias of Illyria, and re-established his power on the mainland.

It was otherwise on the sea. The islands had, in part, abandoned the cause of Cassandros. Lemnos had broken loose from Athens, and so, too, perhaps, had Imbros and Delos (315). Antigonos, who was besieging Tyre, had collected a fleet to fight those of Ptolemy and Cassandros, and under the protection of these ships the ancient Confederacy of the Cyclades was revived, with Delos as centre—Delos, at long last delivered from the Athenian yoke (314).² The same vessels took to Greece his nephew Telesphoros,³ whose successes in the Peloponnese and Bœotia were nullified by the defeat of the Ætolians and Epeirots and the death of Æacides. But another nephew, Polemæos, succeeded in taking Greece from Cassandros, who lost his conquests in Illyria and was threatened by the hostility of Alcetas, the new King of Epeiros. Antigonos could have gone to Europe,

¹ Diod., xix.61.

² Dürrbach, in LXXXV, 1907, pp. 208, 227; IV, p. 19.

³ Diog. Laërt., v.79; CXVI, vol. iii, 1, np. 126 ff. n. 3.

if his son Demetrios had not then been defeated at Gaza by Ptolemy. A revolt of Telesphoros was put down by Polemæos, but the offensive against Cassandros was broken. Cassandros was, however, weakened, and, weary of the war, he arranged with Lysimachos to send proposals of peace to Antigonos (312).¹

In the East, the chief opponent of Antigonos was Ptolemy ; but he was a wary opponent, and feared to go far from Egypt. First he retired before Antigonos, who invaded Syria, where Tyre held out a long time. The Egyptian fleet, under the command of Seleucos, was content to hold the sea and to protect its Cypriot ally, Nicocreon of Salamis, against the other rulers, who were allies of Antigonos.

The year 314, which saw the revival of the Confederacy of the Cyclades, also saw the fall of Tyre ; but Antigonos, kept back by fear of Asandros, did not dare to attack Egypt. In 313 he decided to subdue Asia Minor. He had been allied since 315 with the tyrant of Heracleia, the cities of Chalcedon and Astacos, and Zipcetes, King of Bithynia, and he now succeeded in winning over Asandros and taking the cities of the coast, Miletos, Tralles, Caunos, and Iasos.

The year 313 was particularly lucky for him. The Thracians, with his support, kept Lysimachos in his Satrapy ;² Greece was slipping from Cassandros's hands ; and Cyrene revolted and drove out Ophellas, whom Ptolemy's generals were unable to reinstate. In Cyprus, the local kings betrayed Ptolemy, and Demetrios Poliorcetes was about to attack him. But Ptolemy now saw that he must act with decision. He went to Cyprus and had the local kings killed or imprisoned. Making Nicocreon governor of the whole island, he retired, laden with booty. In Syria he was served by the reckless ardour of Demetrios, who lost a great battle at Gaza (312). Syria and Phœnicia fell back into Ptolemy's hands ; he may, perhaps, have been obliged to besiege Jerusalem. Seleucos, who had taken part in the victory, obtained an escort from

¹ Diod., xix.105 ; IX, 5 (letter of Antigonos to Scepsis). For Cassandros's first attempts at peace, in 313, after the campaign of Telesphoros, see Diod., xix.75.6.

² CLXX, pp. 28 ff. ; CLXXI, pp. 62-6, 70-1. Lysimachos had also to deal with the Greek cities which had revolted, supported by the generals of Antigonos. After the peace of 311, Callatis still held out. Diod., xix. 73.

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Ptolemy and advanced boldly on Babylon with a small body of horse (312). Antigonos had to give up all idea of leaving Asia. Ptolemy, however, was unable to press his advantage, while the extent of the disaster was limited by some successes of Demetrios, and when Antigonos appeared at the head of a new army Ptolemy evacuated the conquered territory. He did not even take advantage of the dispute which arose between his opponent and the Nabatæans. But Antigonos was concerned with the return of Seleucos to Babylon, and sent Demetrios against him.

Peace was made in 311. The plenipotentiaries of Cassandros and Lysimachos had already opened negotiations in 312. They were presently joined by those of Ptolemy.¹ Seleucos alone stood outside. Each kept his own possessions. The liberty of the Greeks was proclaimed. This clause was more unfavourable to Cassandros than to anyone else. His power in Greece was now very small. In the Peloponnese he kept only those cities which had submitted to his general Polyperchon—Sicyon, Corinth, and Megalopolis. Ptolemy retained only Egypt and a kind of protectorate over Cyprus. He had to abandon Cyrene, and his attempt to recover Syria was a failure. On the whole, it was Antigonos who emerged most triumphantly from the conflict.

V

PTOLEMY IN GREECE

The Empire survived in name, but King Alexander Ægos and his mother Roxana were prisoners in Amphipolis, and the five great Satraps acted like sovereigns in their states. Seleucos, who had been victor in the war which he had to wage against the generals of Antigonos, then based his power on the central Satrapies. He embarked on a war against the Indian prince Sandracottus, to whom he finally relinquished the right bank of the Indus, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and Paropamisadæ, but he annexed Bactriana and placed the centre of his power in Babylonia. On the site of a native town, Akshak (later Upi, Opis), which is mentioned as early as the time of Hammurabi's Empire (1955–1918), not far from

¹ IX, 5.

Nebuchadnezzar's dike, the Wall of Media, he established his capital, Seleuceia on the Tigris. The materials for the Greek city were taken from Babylon, which was left to the Semites and continued to be important for two hundred years more, but was given its death-blow by its rival, and in Trajan's day was no more than a ruin.¹

Seleucos was a long way from the Greek sea, and the destinies of his line would have been very different if the domain of Antigonos, part of which he was to inherit, had always barred him from access to the Ægean. That sea was now the heart of the world. The great capitals were rising on its shores. We have seen Cassandros founding Cassandreia on the site of the ancient Potidæa; on the edge of the Thermaic Gulf, too, he built the other new city of his kingdom, Thessalonice (Therma), destined to replace Pella, which lay too far inland. Lysimachos founded Lysimacheia in the Thracian Chersonese.² Antigonos had first chosen Celænæ, in the heart of Phrygia, where the military roads intersected, one of the largest cities in Asia Minor after Sardis. He now shifted his capital to Syria, placing it on the banks of a great navigable river, at the point from which the most direct routes ran from the sea over the desert and Mesopotamia into the centre of the Asiatic continent; and here Antigoneia was to rise and die with his short-lived Empire, to be replaced later by Antioch on the Orontes. On the coast of Egypt, Alexandria would only reach its full development under the second Ptolemy, but already under the first everything foretold its enormous prosperity.

The Satrap of Egypt was the first to seize the opportunity to extend his power over the Ægean, where Antigonos was dominant, as patron of the Confederacy of the Cyclades. The moment was propitious. Polemæos, disappointed that his services were so little appreciated, had just revolted against his uncle. He was trying to make an independent principality for himself round Chalcis in Eubœa, and had won over Phœnix, who commanded Hellespontine Phrygia for him (810). This movement was to the advantage of Cassandros, who was quite pleased that the possessions conquered from him in Greece should be taken from his rival,

¹ Streck, in *GVII*, s.v. "Seleukeia", and below, pp. 371-2.

² In 309-308. Cf. *CLXX*, pp. 37-8.

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and he hastened to recognize Polemæos. In the East, Antigonos was taken up with the war against Seleucos, and his son Demetrios, who had gone to fight the Satrap of Babylon, was no longer a danger to Egypt. Lastly, since the ships of Antigonos were in Polemæos's hands, the sea was free and Ptolemy could act.

He had to act alone. Even if he had desired it, the coalition against Antigonos could not be revived, for Lysimachos was grappling with the barbarians, and Cassandros was busy supporting Audoleon, King of the Pæonians, against the Autariatæ of Illyria, who seized Mount Orbelos, and perhaps he had to deal at the same time with the Celts of Hæmos. Moreover, it is possible that the former allies would not have been prepared for a policy which chiefly advanced the greatness of the Lagid. He had his eye especially on the coasts of Asia Minor, and, at the same time as he was rousing the Greek cities by reminding them of the liberty proclaimed in the treaty, he sent his general Leonidas to dislodge Antigonos's garrisons in Cilicia Tracheia (310).

In Cyprus, Nicocreon¹ was not safe; he had negotiated with Antigonos. Two of Ptolemy's "friends" went with orders that he should kill himself. In vain the kinglet tried to justify himself. His house was watched, and he had to die. His widow, Axiothea, turned his execution into a general catastrophe; before committing suicide herself, she slew her two daughters, persuaded her brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law to kill themselves, and set the house on fire (310).

Having thus made his own position secure, in spite of the defeat of Leonidas and Phœnix by the sons of Antigonos, Ptolemy took possession of the cities of the Carian and Lydian coast—Phaselis, Xanthos, Caunos (309), Heracleion, and Persicon. But he could not take Halicarnassos.² He then transferred his headquarters to Cos, where he stayed

¹ Confusion of Nicocreon with Nicocles. Diod., xx, 21, etc. Cf. **CLXI**, i, p. 58 n. 1.

² It is probably at this time that one should place the intrigue between Ptolemy and Alexander's sister Cleopatra, then at Sardis. Marriage with this princess, to whose hand all the Diadochi aspired, would have given him some right to the Empire. Antigonos had her killed. Halicarnassos was, perhaps, taken by Philocles and lost again (**CLXI**, p. 62 n. 4).

as a deliverer, rather than as a master, and there he summoned Polemæos to him.

Macedon and Greece had also been the scene of tragic events. By the treaty, Cassandros was to keep the dignity of Strategos of Europe until Alexander Ægos should be of age—a clause which meant certain destruction for the young King. He was killed with his mother Roxana at the end of 311, or perhaps in 310–309. But, as a countermove, Polyperchon had found a new claimant, in the person of a bastard of Alexander, Heracles, the son of Barsine, who had been brought up at Pergamon, and, with an army of 20,000 men, he had taken him to Macedonia. Cassandros, who was not very popular with the Macedonians, did not dare to risk a battle, but cleverly managed to come to an agreement with Polyperchon. At the price of a division of power, he persuaded him to make away with Heracles. The murder justified the accusations and hostility of the other Satraps. It seems to have been now that Polemæos left Cassandros and allied himself with Ptolemy.

Shortly afterwards we find the Lagid accusing Polemæos of treachery and making him drink hemlock. According to many modern historians, this crime was the consequence of an alliance between Ptolemy and Antigonos.¹ It is maintained that they had resolved to share the control of the Ægean between them, Ptolemy abandoning the islands to his rival and seeking, under the pretext of liberating the Greeks, to extend his empire on the mainland. Leaving Cos, he crossed the Archipelago, delivered Andros from Polemæos's garrisons (308), and landed in the Peloponnese, where he received Sicyon from the hands of Cratesipolis. He also occupied Corinth, and Megara, which belonged to Cassandros, and, calling the Greeks to freedom, he tried to revive the Confederation of Corinth. In Athens, the government of Demetrios of Phaleron negotiated with him, and there his ambassadors may have met those of Ophellas. Ophellas, reinstated at Cyrene, had been invited by Agathocles, the Tyrant of Syracuse, who was at war with Carthage, to help him in

¹ Dürrbach, in **LXXXV**, 1907, p. 220, quoting Suidas, s.v. "Demetrios"; **CXVI**, vol. iii, 1, p. 149; W. Kolbe, in **LIX**, 1916, pp. 530 ff. Of this Greek expedition of Ptolemy little is known, and modern writers have various hypotheses about it. Bibliography: Kolbe, *loc. cit.*, p. 581 n. 2.

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Africa, on the understanding that Ophellas should receive any conquests made there, Agathocles being content to overthrow Carthage and to free Sicily (309).¹

These projects were a menace to Egypt, which could not safely allow a great power to form on its Western frontier. They must have given the Lagid cause for thought. His success in Greece did not come up to his hopes. The Hellenes refused to follow the deliverer who left garrisons in their cities, as in Corinth and Sicily. Egypt had no interest in spending troops and money in occupying the Greek mainland, where she would have had to sustain an unequal struggle with Macedonia. It was sufficient, and easier, to prevent Cassandros from commanding the Ægean, by securing the hegemony of the islands. The Egyptian Empire could hardly be anything but a thalassocracy. That being so, Antigonos was more dangerous than Cassandros. Ptolemy came to terms with the latter, abandoned Greece, and returned to Alexandria. Luckily for Ptolemy, Agathocles had quarrelled with Ophellas and had killed him. It was then, perhaps, that Ptolemy was able to send his stepson Magas to recover Cyrene.

VI

THE LAST COALITION AGAINST ANTIGONOS. IPSUS

Ptolemy's withdrawal from Greece left the field open to Antigonos. He had treated with Seleucos, after a war in which the latter was on the whole victorious. He could now turn his attention to the West. In the winter of 308-307, Demetrios Poliorcetes set out from Ephesos with 250 ships and 5,000 talents, sailed to Sunion, and, entering the Peiræus, proclaimed the independence of Athens and announced that his mission was to restore freedom to the Greeks and to drive the Macedonians back beyond Thermopylæ. He was, of course, greeted with enthusiastic flattery. Antigonos and Demetrios were treated as saviours, as gods, and, what probably pleased them more, as kings. Two tribes were named after them, and their portraits were embroidered with those of gods and heroes on the *peplos* of Athene.²

¹ 309-308, according to the Parian Marble.

² Diod., xix.45-6; Plut., *Demet.*, 8-15; II, 2, 386; Athenæus, xv, p. 697.

Demetrios of Phaleron had to retire, and Demetrios Poliorcetes courteously accompanied him as far as Thebes. Democracy being thus restored in Athens, Poliorcetes took and looted Megara, which never recovered, although at the prayer of the Athenians he declared it free. On his return, he laid siege to Munychia, and the Macedonian garrison capitulated. Athens was free. Imbros and Lemnos were given back to her. At the same time, Cassandros lost Epeiros, where Glaucias, King of Illyria, had just restored Pyrrhos, the son of Æacides, to the throne.

Ptolemy could hardly remain indifferent to these successes of Demetrios. The power of Antigonos was a menace to him. He equipped a fleet, and was perhaps preparing to attack Syria. Then Antigonos recalled Demetrios and ordered him to sail to Cyprus. Demetrios left Greece, before he was able to obtain the surrender of Corinth and Sicyon, which Leonidas held for Ptolemy, and at Salamis in Cyprus, where he blockaded the general Menelaos, he fought a great naval battle with Ptolemy, who had hurried up with his fleet. Ptolemy, completely vanquished, abandoned both Cyprus and the command of the sea (306).

Antigonos and Demetrios then officially assumed the title of King. This was fitting for the master of the Empire, which it was the ambition of Antigonos to restore. At once the other Diadochi imitated him, doubtless in protest against his pretensions to universal kingship and as an indication that each claimed sovereignty in his own domain. The dismemberment of the Empire was thus declared in theory. It had still to be brought about in practice, and it was inevitable that the coalition should once more form against Antigonos. Negotiations were opened between Ptolemy, Seleucos, Cassandros, and Lysimachos.

Antigonos, with an army of 80,000 foot and 8,000 horse and a fleet of 150 ships, advanced to attack Egypt. Thanks to the skilful measures taken by Ptolemy, the attack was a failure. But Antigonos must at least prevent for ever the Egyptian thalassocracy which the Lagid had been on the point of establishing in 308. To cut his communications with Greece, Antigonos ordered Demetrios to take Rhodes.

Then began the famous siege which was to last a year, to crown the reputation of the Town-taker and his engines, and to end in a partial success. Rhodes had been the ally of

Antigonos in 315, and had helped him to reconstruct his fleet ; but she had a very profitable trade with the growing city of Alexandria. Her people of traders naturally wanted the freedom of the seas, and preferred to keep on good terms with all the great powers. But Antigonos wished to rule everywhere. After his victory at Salamis, Demetrios had tried to draw in the Rhodians, but they had refused to bear arms against Ptolemy. Demetrios therefore laid siege to the town and harbour, with all the resources of the art of the time, to which the Rhodians opposed their ingenuity and courage. Cassandros, Lysimachos, and, above all, Ptolemy, sent provisions into the city. The Cnidians and Athenians failed in their attempts at mediation, but at last the Ætolians succeeded in bringing the two parties to treat. Ptolemy himself had advised Rhodes to yield. The city had to furnish a hundred hostages, and to become the ally of Antigonos, but never against the Lagid (305).

If Antigonos had consented to treat, it was because Cassandros had been besieging Athens since 307, and the city was ready to fall. In 306, thanks to the alliance of the Ætolians and a diversion in Ætolia conducted by the Athenian Olympiodoros, Cassandros had been compelled to loosen his hold, but he had soon recovered his footing in Bœotia, Eubœa, and Phocis ; on the Isthmus, Corinth had left Ptolemy's side to obey Cassandros ; and Polyperchon was recovering the Peloponnese ; so that in 304 the Ætolians were driven back into their mountains and the King of Macedonia was back in Attica, devastating the country. The frontier fortresses, Phyle and Panacton, fell into his hands. Salamis was inclined in his favour. Athens seemed lost, when Demetrios reappeared in Greece.

He had landed at Aulis, and Chalcis was delivered. Cassandros, in order not to be cut off from Macedonia, had had to retire on Thermopylæ. Defeated in a great battle south of the defile, he abandoned Bœotia and Phocis to Demetrios. Athens, saved, received Phyle, Panacton, and Salamis from Demetrios. Thus ended the Four Years' War, the chronology of which has been much disputed (304).¹

Demetrios was already master of Cenchreæ, and in the following year he took Sicyon, turning it into Demetrias,

¹ CLXI, i, 79 n. 1 ; Stæhelin, in CVII, xx, p. 2307.

Corinth, and then all the Peloponnese. Only Mantinea in Arcadia held out for Cassandros. In 303-302, Demetrios resuscitated the Confederation of Corinth, of which he was proclaimed President (*hegemon*).¹ The programme announced in 307 was accomplished. Demetrios was even making ready to attack Cassandros in Macedonia. He had made an alliance with Pyrrhos, the young King of Epeiros, whose sister Deidameia he had married. Cassandros, taking alarm, would have treated with Antigonos, who, however, being sure of victory, refused.

The coalition could not abandon Cassandros like this. Holding Greece and a great part of Asia, Antigonos would recreate the Empire of Alexander. They must unite against him. The alliance of the Kings was reinforced by embassies. Lysimachos, who was ready first, crossed the Straits and invaded Hellespontine Phrygia in the spring of 302; Cassandros had supplied him with a body of troops under Prepelaos.

Antigonos was in Syria, at his new capital of Antigoneia. Lysimachos captured or won over Lampsacos, Parion, and Sigeion. He failed before Abydos. At Synnada in Phrygia, the Strategos Docimos surrendered his troops to him; meanwhile, Prepelaos reduced the coast—Adramyttion, Ephesos, Colophon, Teos, and, lastly, Sardis. But Antigonos crossed the Tauros and recalled Demetrios.

Demetrios was engaged in conquering Thessaly, whither in the spring of 320, he had taken his troops by sea to avoid Thermopylæ. He hastened to treat with Cassandros, whom he recognized as King of Macedon and Greece, and landed at Ephesos in the autumn of 302. Cassandros could then re-establish his authority in Thessaly, in Epeiros, where Pyrrhos was driven out and replaced by Neoptolemos (302-301), and in Phocis, where he besieged Elateia, and he threatened Argos in the Peloponnese.

The arrival of Demetrios in Asia placed Lysimachos in a critical position. The support sent by Cassandros, under the command of his brother Pleistarchos, arrived, thanks

¹ It is perhaps to this revival of the Confederation of Corinth that the inscriptions quoted below, p. 206 n. 1, refer (*Supplementum Epigraphicum*, i, p. 75). See A. Wilhelm, in *Anz. Akad. Wien*, nos. xv-xviii; Wilcken, in *Sitzungsber. d. bayer Akad.*, 1917, 19, pp. 37 ff.; Tarn, in *LXX*, 42; Roussel, in *LXXXIX*, 1923, 1, pp. 117-40.

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to the action taken by Demetrios, in a very shattered condition. Lysimachos had had to retire to Heracleia, to await the army of Seleucos (winter, 302–301). There he married Amastris, the widow of the tyrant Dionysios, who was governing the city in the name of her sons, Clearchos and Oxathres. Meanwhile, Seleucos was coming from Mesopotamia with a great army and 480 war-elephants. In 301 he wintered in Cappadocia. Before the combined armies of Seleucos and Lysimachos, Antigonos was obliged to retire into Phrygia. There, near Ipsus, the exact site of which is not known,¹ one of the most terrible battles of the century was fought. Antigonos was defeated and killed himself, and with him perished the dream of a single Empire. The victors shared the spoils. To Thrace Lysimachos joined Asia Minor as far as the Tauros.² Cassandros kept Macedon and Greece. In the negotiations of 304, Syria had been promised to Ptolemy. He had invaded it in 301, but had evacuated it precipitately on the false report of a defeat of his allies. No doubt, it was thought that he had not done enough for the coalition, and Syria was given to Seleucos. So Egypt had lost all her outside provinces. In Cilicia a kind of buffer-state was created, which was given to Pleistarchos.

¹ Sakli, CCXXXVI, p. 140. For the events, CLXX, pp. 42–50.

² CLXXI, pp. 102–4; CLXX, p. 50.

CHAPTER III

THE END OF THE SUCCESSORS

I

DEMETRIOS, SELEUCOS, AND PTOLEMY

WITH the battle of Ipsus a new age began. It consecrated the dismemberment of the Empire. By the defeat of Antigonos, the idea of unity was condemned for ever. The dream might still haunt Demetrios, but he would pursue it as an adventurer rather than as a statesman. It may, perhaps, have crossed the minds of Lysimachos and Seleucos, but with them it was only a transient flash, followed by catastrophe.

So, in 301, there was no longer an Empire; but the Hellenistic world had not yet the appearance which it was to assume and to keep during the long age of fertile and brilliant civilization which went by in the East before the intervention of the arms of Rome, when the political system of the Greek Orient consisted in essence of three preponderant powers—the Macedonian monarchy in Europe, the Seleucid monarchy in Asia, and the Lagid monarchy in Egypt. All three, it is true, were already formed, but they had a rival in the monarchy of Lysimachos, at once European and Asiatic, and another in the sea-power of Demetrios. During the twenty years between the battle of Ipsus (301) and the battle of Curupedion (281), we see the efforts of Demetrios to make a stable Empire of a floating power, uncertain where to settle. He only succeeded in breaking it, leaving the field open to the rivalries of the other Successors, in which Lysimachos and his kingdom went under almost immediately.

The figure of Demetrios Poliorcetes therefore occupies almost the whole history of this period, at least until 285. But he occupies rather than dominates it. It was not that he was not endowed with great gifts, but his most valuable qualities were betrayed by lack of moderation and prudence. His victories were among the most brilliant of the time, but at Gaza and at Ipsus his ardour caused disasters. He was

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incredibly versatile, and took advantage of every circumstance, but he allowed circumstances to guide him, and had no very definite plan of what the Empire which he tried to found should and could be. He could attract men by all the resources of the intelligence, by the outward nobility of his manners, and also by the generosity of his heart, but he sometimes rebuffed them by an air of haughtiness and an untamable pride. His good looks were a source of admiration ; he loved women greatly, and in his dealings with them he showed an inconstancy which is not always explained by policy. His relations with courtesans created scandal. His life, which was filled with glorious deeds and sudden turns of fortune, at once heroic and romantic, ended miserably in inglorious captivity.¹

After Ipsus his power was not negligible ; he had lost Asia, but he was preponderant on the sea, being master of most of the isles and of the coast-towns of Asia Minor and Phœnicia. Moreover, he had control of almost the whole of Greece, and he was to be served by the rivalries of the victors.

After the battle he had made for Ephesos, and thence for Athens. But the defeat of Antigonos had produced consequences in Greece. The Hellenes had a strong suspicion that their " liberator " had acted less in their interest than in his own. There was already an opposition party in Athens.² The city decided to maintain her neutrality, and she was imitated by Bœotia, Phocis, and several cities of the Peloponnese. This was a severe blow for Demetrios. Athens closed her gates to him, for fear of compromising herself in the eyes of the other Kings, and refused to keep Deidameia, who had stayed in the city, but courteously escorted her to Megara. Luckily for Demetrios, the agreement between Ptolemy and Seleucos did not last. They were bound to quarrel over the question of Southern Syria. Ptolemy had occupied the country, but the treaty had assigned it to Seleucos, who claimed it and was met with a refusal. Ptolemy held fast to the promises which had been made to him before the battle. Seleucos replied that, for the moment, he would

¹ Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Hell. Dicht.*, i, pp. 7-8 ; **CXVI**, vol. iii, 1, pp. 245-6.

² Cf. **CLXX**, pp. 60-7 ; **CLXXI**, pp. 104-8 ; **II**, 2, 314 ; **4**, 2, 314.

not press the point, but that he reserved his rights, and would see later how he should deal with over-ambitious friends. So arose the Syrian question, which would always stand between the masters of Egypt and those of Asia, and would disturb the relations of the Lagids and the Seleucids down to the very end.

Ptolemy understood the threat, and naturally drew closer to Lysimachos, who married his daughter Arsinoë, then aged sixteen (299). Amastris, the Queen of Heracleia, was repudiated.¹ Both Queens were to have a tragic life.

Seleucos countered this matrimonial diplomacy with an alliance with Demetrios, likewise sealed by a marriage—that of Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrios and Phila, with Seleucos. Demetrios accordingly, left Greece, attacked certain positions of Lysimachos in the Chersonese on the way, and landed as an enemy on the coast of Cilicia. Pleistarchos, Cassandros's brother, who reigned over that state, ran and complained to Seleucos, while Demetrios laid hands on the treasures of Cyinda, and then went to Rhosos in Syria, where the wedding was celebrated (299).² Probably son-in-law and father-in-law agreed to despoil Pleistarchos, who, after a vain attempt of Lysimachos to help him, fled to Cassandros. Phila was sent to her brother Cassandros to support her husband's cause. Did he recognize Demetrios as King, or did he regard him as a vanquished man, without any rights? We do not know.³ In practice, he seems to have done nothing to support Pleistarchos, and it has been supposed that Phila had promised that on this condition Demetrios would make no further attempt against Cassandros in Greece.

At this time events occurred which are hard to interpret. Demetrios seems to have embarked upon a war with Ptolemy, from whom he took Samaria⁴ and, perhaps, the whole of Coele-Syria.⁵ It has been supposed that he did this at the

¹ Plut., *Demet.*, 81–2; *Memnon*, in FHG, 580; CLXXI, p. 111 n. 3; Wilcken, in CVII, s.v. "Amastris".

² IX, 10; Kaerst, in CVII, s.v. "Demetrios".

³ Kaerst, *ibid.*; Stæhelin, *ibid.*, s.v. "Kassandros".

⁴ Euseb., ii.118; Sync., 519, 522. Date, 296–295. Doubts raised in CXXIII, i, p. 355 n. 6.

⁵ CXXII, p. 589 (German ed.); but cf. CXXIII, i, p. 24.

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instigation of Seleucos, who dared not attack Ptolemy openly.¹ But shortly afterwards we find Seleucos stepping in and reconciling Ptolemy and Demetrios, while Pyrrhos, the dethroned King of Epeiros, remains a hostage in Alexandria (298).

It has been thought that this mediation of Seleucos is explained by the well-justified fear that Demetrios would keep his conquests for himself. Now, the treaty had given Seleucos rights over the whole of Syria. If he allowed his father-in-law to take possession of it, would he not appear to be allowing this clause in the peace-treaty to lapse? Ptolemy, who held in reserve a claimant to the throne of Epeiros, in the person of Pyrrhos, may have made a secret agreement with Demetrios, and given him money to help him to make a kingdom for himself at the expense of Lysimachos or Cassandros. Once he had established himself, Demetrios would repay his creditor with some of his Asiatic possessions. Ptolemy may have foreseen that on the death of Cassandros Demetrios would try to re-establish his Empire in Europe, and, against the powerful rulers of Europe, the prudent Lagid may have been protecting himself in advance by an alliance with Agathocles of Syracuse, who married an Egyptian princess.² Whatever truth there may be in these hypotheses, the agreement between Demetrios and Seleucos did not last. The latter is said to have wanted to buy Cilicia from the former, and then, when he refused, the cities of Phœnicia. Demetrios answered that, even if he had been beaten in ten thousand battles of Ipsus, he would not have tried to buy Seleucos as a son-in-law with money.

II

DEMETRIOS IN GREECE AND MACEDONIA

By the death of Cassandros (298–297) a new career was opened to the ambitions of Demetrios Poliorcetes.

The heir to the throne, Philip IV, disappeared after a few months, and was succeeded by his two young brothers, Antipatros and Alexander, under the guardianship of their

¹ Kaerst, *loc. cit.*, p. 2778.

² **CLXI**, i, pp. 86 ff. ; Stæhelin, in **CVII**, s.v. "Kassandros".

mother Thessalonice. The reign of these minors might seem a good opportunity for Demetrios to establish himself in Europe, and he attacked Athens. The city was governed by the demagogue Lachares, who, perhaps encouraged by Cassandros, had established a kind of tyranny (296-295).¹ Bœotia, Sparta, and Messene, which, after a first failure before Athens, Demetrios besieged without success, had declared against him. In a second attempt on Attica, however, he succeeded in taking Salamis, Ægina, Eleusis, and Rhamnus. Athens, being surrounded, had to surrender sooner or later.

The Kings became anxious. Ptolemy had obtained a support in Europe by sending young Pyrrhos, "his obedient son," to Epeiros with an army; when Pyrrhos arrived, he associated Neoptolemos on the throne with himself, and then rid himself of his rival (297). The young Kings of Macedon had also entered the coalition. Alexander had married Lysandra, Ptolemy's daughter, and Antipatros had married Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachos. An Egyptian fleet, not large enough, sailed to the assistance of the Athenians. Seleucos invaded Cilicia. Lysimachos recaptured Ephesos and other cities in Asia Minor.² Ptolemy blockaded Phila in Salamis in Cyprus, and again took possession of the island. But all these efforts did not save Athens. Round the city and the port, Demetrios had tightened the blockade. Famine was rampant; a medimnus of salt was sold for 40 drachmas, and a modius of wheat for 300. Epicuros shared his beans with his disciples. Ptolemy's ships showed themselves off Ægina, but they could not force the blockade. Then the demagogue Lachares fled to Bœotia, leaving Athens to its fate. The city opened its gates. To impress the people, Demetrios collected them in the theatre, surrounded by his troops; but his first words calmed their fears. He let them keep their constitution and their laws, and was content to place garrisons at Munychia and on the Hill of the Muses (294).³ After Athens, he tried to subdue Sparta, and the city might, perhaps, have been taken, if unforeseen events had not called Demetrios to Macedonia.

¹ Paus., i.25.17. On Lachares opinions differ. **CXXIII**, i, p. 358; **CXVI**, vol. iii, 1, p. 222 n. 8; **CLXIX**, p. 43.

² **CLXXI**, pp. 118 ff.

³ Plut., *Demet.*, 33-4.

Discord had broken out between the Kings. Thessalonice had made them share their territory, giving Alexander, her favourite, everything west of the Axios (Vardar) and Antipatros everything east of it. But Antipatros had killed his mother and fought his brother, who summoned Pyrrhos and Demetrios to his aid. Pyrrhos arrived first, and, as the price of his intervention, he made Alexander cede to him Tymphæa, Parauæa, Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphiloehia. Lysimachos tried to reconcile Antipatros, his son-in-law, and Pyrrhos, but in vain,¹ and no doubt the situation remained as it had been established by Thessalonice. This was a result which could not satisfy anybody. Alexander might think that he had paid dearly for the help of Pyrrhos. Accordingly, when Demetrios appeared at Dion, he found excuses to send him away, and accompanied him to Larissa. But there Demetrios had him killed at a banquet, and, marching into Macedonia, he defeated Antipatros, who fled to Lysimachos with his wife Eurydice and his sister-in-law Lysandra.² Lysimachos had long had designs upon the throne of Macedonia, but he may have been beaten at Amphipolis, and he was engaged in a very difficult war with the Getæ. He therefore allowed Demetrios to proclaim himself King, and was content to marry Lysandra to his son Agathocles.³

So the man who lost Ipsus now sat on the throne of the Argeads (294). He might take up the ideas of Philip, perhaps even those of Alexander, and, as a beginning, he had to subdue Greece. The fact that Lysimachos was a prisoner of the Getic King Dromichætēs⁴ seemed to make his task easier (293), and he did indeed succeed in establishing himself in Thessaly, where, on the Pagasetic Gulf, he founded the new city of Demetrias,⁵ in reducing Thebes and Bœotia, which had revolted several times, and in putting down a rising in Athens, where, resuming the policy of the Kings of Macedon and abandoning the principles which he had hitherto followed, as liberator of the Hellenes, he is said to have restored the

¹ CLXX, p. 71 ; LXXI, pp. 120 ff.

² Plut., *Demet.*, 36 ; *Pyrrh.*, 6 ; Just., xiv.1-7 ; Euseb., i.281 ; Diod., xx.7 ; Paus., xi.78.

³ CLXXI, pp. 125, 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵ On the site of Demetrias, see CLXIX, p. 38.

oligarchy.¹ But he was checked by the alliance of the Ætolians and Pyrrhos. His general Patauchos suffered a disastrous defeat (290), and Pyrrhos was able at one moment to enter Macedon as far as Edessa.

Demetrios had become very unpopular because of his haughtiness and his airs of an Oriental despot, and his vast projects disturbed the other Kings, for he hoped to reconquer the inheritance of his father Antigonos in Asia.² This common fear united Ptolemy, Seleucos, and Lysimachos, who was by this time quit of the Getic War. Pyrrhos and Lysimachos invaded Macedonia, supported by an Egyptian fleet.³ Lysimachos was, perhaps, defeated at Amphipolis,⁴ but Pyrrhos advanced victoriously, and was so well received by the Macedonians that Demetrios was obliged to flee. Macedonia was then shared between the King of Epeiros and the King of Thrace. Phila, in despair, killed herself.

III

THE END OF DEMETRIOS

Yet this sudden fall does not seem to have broken Demetrios's spirit. His possessions in Greece might serve him as a base, and now that he was so weak he had reason to hope that the coalition formed against him would turn against Lysimachos, who, holding as he did part of Europe and of Asia, had perhaps become the most powerful of all the Kings. It is true that when Demetrios again laid siege to Athens, which had again revolted under the leadership of the Strategos Olympiodoros (287), the city received help from almost every one of the sovereigns.⁵ Pyrrhos was even sent to help the city. But when Athens was saved, and Pyrrhos had recognized Demetrios in his possessions in Thessaly and Greece, including the Peiræus, Salamis, Eleusis, Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, which remained severed

¹ CXVI, vol. iii, 1, p. 234.

² It did not prevent him from intriguing with Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles and wife of Pyrrhos, and casting his eyes on the West. Kaerst, in CVII, s.v. "Demetrios"; CLXIX, p. 47; Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 10-end.

³ II, 4, 809.

⁴ Paus., i.10.2. But cf. CLXXI, p. 137; CLXX, pp. 74, 84.

⁵ Kaerst, loc. cit., p. 2790.

from Athens, they were not, perhaps, sorry to see Demetrios preparing to attack Lysimachos. Ptolemy, allied with Pyrrhos, must have thought it a clever idea, to break the power of Lysimachos with that of Pyrrhos and Demetrios.¹

Lysimachos was not easy to overcome. After his war with the Getæ, he had put down some revolts, and, after the death of Queen Amastris, formerly his wife, who was murdered by her own sons, he had taken Heracleia.² It is true that he had been unable to achieve anything against Bithynia or Pontus, but he held almost as much in Asia Minor as Antigonos had had. His weakness lay in the unpopularity which he earned in the Greek cities by his despotic government and his excessive demands of tribute.

So, leaving his son Antigonos Gonatas in Greece, Demetrios landed at Miletos, where Eurydice, the repudiated wife of Ptolemy, gave him her daughter Ptolemaïs in marriage. Many cities opened their gates. Others he took by force, in particular Sardis. But the son of Lysimachos, Agathocles, came up with a stronger army. Demetrios beat a retreat to Phrygia, suffering much from famine and sickness. Always prompt to devise new combinations, he decided to make for Media by way of Armenia. There he would have threatened the Empire of Seleucos. The condition of his troops compelled him to relinquish the adventure. He withdrew to Cilicia, the domain of Seleucos, while Agathocles occupied the passes of the Tauros to cut off his retreat. He would have avoided hostilities with Seleucos, who had at first given orders to supply his troops with food, but, growing uneasy, presently appeared with an army. Demetrios, abandoned by almost all his men, contemplated fleeing by the passes of the Amanos and making for Caunos, but he was obliged to surrender (285). Lysimachos would have had him put to death, but Seleucos was content to keep him prisoner. He died in captivity in 283.

IV

THE GREATNESS AND FALL OF LYSIMACHOS THE END OF THE SUCCESSORS

It was Lysimachos who profited most by his downfall. It could safely be prophesied that in Europe he would not

¹ CLXI, i, pp. 91-2.

² CLXX, p. 77.

long be content to share Macedonia with Pyrrhos. The latter, so long as Demetrios was active, had kept up the struggle with Antigonos Gonatas, although he had not prevented him from taking Demetrias and Thessaly, nor from defending the Peiræus against an Athenian attack (the Athenians only recovered Eleusis), nor from defeating Sparta. He now hastened to treat with him. But how could the Epeiroi Pyrrhos have held his own in Macedon against the Macedonian Lysimachos? Deserted by his troops, Pyrrhos was forced to retire to Epeiros. Lysimachos, now sole King of the country, restored the power of Macedon in Thessaly, and, on the death of Audoleon, annexed Pæonia (285). Antigonos was still preponderant south of Thermopylæ. But Lysimachos held the core of Alexander's Empire. He might be tempted to reconstruct it. Seleucos felt himself threatened. In Egypt, Ptolemy I had just abdicated in favour of the son whom he had had by his second wife, Berenice. The supplanted son of Eurydice, Ptolemy the Thunderbolt (Ceraunos), had fled to the court of Lysimachos, who promised to restore him to the throne of Alexandria. A domestic drama was to bring all these projects to nothing.

Queen Arsinoë, the sister of Ptolemy II, had acquired great influence over the aged Lysimachos, and wanted to secure the throne for her own children, at the expense of Agathocles, whose mother was Nicæa, the daughter of Antipatros. She therefore accused the young prince of a conspiracy. Pausanias declares that she was a new Phædra, whose hatred Agathocles had incurred by spurning her advances. Lysimachos was distrustful, and did not stop at crime. He delivered Agathocles to Arsinoë, who, having failed to poison him, ordered Ptolemy Ceraunos to assassinate him.¹

The murder aroused horror, at a time when tragedies were not uncommon. Agathocles was, no doubt, popular, and it seemed that at his death the whole fabric of the kingdom was shaken. Lysimachos was deserted more and more. Thus, Philetæros, the governor of Pergamon in Mysia and keeper of the treasures in that fort, delivered them to Seleucos. Seleucos had received at his court Lysandra, the widow of Agathocles, with her children and Ptolemy

¹ CLXI, i, pp. 145 n. 1, 146 n. 1.

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Ceraunos himself, who was promised the crown of Egypt. Strong in all these supports, Seleucos entered Asia Minor with an army. Almost every city went over to him. Sardis was surrendered by the governor Theodotos. The decisive battle was fought in a plain north of Magnesia on Sipylos, the Plain of Cyrus, Curupedion (281).¹ It was disaster for Lysimachos, who was killed in the defeat.

Seleucos was, therefore, master of Macedonian Asia Minor. Heracleia, it is true, being allied to Byzantion and Chalcedon, and supported by Mithradates of Pontus, proclaimed its independence. But Seleucos only saw that the throne of Macedon was vacant and that the great Empire of 324 might be built up anew. He forgot the promises which he had made to Lysandra and Ceraunos. Ceraunos did not. He stabbed Seleucos on the road to Lysimacheia,² and the assassin became King of Macedon. The reign which began thus in crime was not to last long, and Macedon would get a stable dynasty only amid terrible trials. But the year 281 is none the less a turning-point. The three great powers which were to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean until about 150 were formed. Ptolemy I had died in 283. Among the Kings, not one representative of Alexander's generation remained. The Diadochi, the Successors, had gone, leaving the world to the Epigoni, the Afterborn. A new age was commencing.

¹ On the site, see **CLXXIII**, i, p. 323 ; B. Keil, in **LXXXVI**, 1902, p. 257 ; **CLXI**, i, p. 148 n. 1.

² Memnon, 12, in **FHG**, 533-4 ; Trog., *Prol.*, xvii ; Just., xvii.2.4-5 ; Paus., i.16.2.

PART THREE
THE RIVALRY OF THE POWERS
CHAPTER I
THE PREPONDERANCE OF EGYPT

I

WESTERN HELLENISM IN THE THIRD CENTURY

WHILE in the East the Empire of Alexander was falling to pieces, the decline of Western Hellenism gained speed.¹ In Sicily, it had had to maintain an age-long struggle against Carthage, and Agathocles had for long been its champion. He was the son of an exile of Rhegion, and had come to Syracuse in Timoleon's time (about 343). Having distinguished himself by his bravery in the wars with the Bruttians, and having afterwards been exiled with the democratic party, raised to the tyranny with the title of Strategos (319), and finally made King (306), he, too, belonged to the race of ambitious adventurers who were so abundant in that age and by their energy contributed so much to the making of the new world. But he was not one of those military leaders—Macedonian nobles or Hellenic *condottieri*—attached to no country, who sought to cut out a kingdom for themselves in the regions left vacant by the collapse of the Empire. He fought for his city as well as for his own glory. He was animated by Syracusan patriotism, and, as always in Hellenic lands, he had to wage war not only on the enemies of his race, but also on rival Greek cities and on the opponents of his party. These last even compelled him to treat with Carthage, although he had shaken her foundations in Africa itself. He was preparing to take up the interrupted struggle, when he died, in 289, bequeathing his city to liberty—that is, as was very soon seen, to anarchy. Blood-stained quarrels between citizens and mercenaries rent the weakened Syracusan state, and no Greek city, in spite of the transient brilliance of Acragas under the tyrant Phintias,

¹ L. Homo, *Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*, translation in this series, pp. 160 ff. (reference to the chief works).

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was capable of maintaining resistance against the Semites or of asserting its hegemony. Carthage now had the upper hand in Sicily, the Eastern part of which was the prey of factions, armed bands, and fratricidal rivalries. A number of Italian mercenaries, during the troubles which followed the death of Agathocles, even established themselves as brigands at Messana, and became a power in the island. It was they who were to give the Romans occasion to cross the straits, thus commencing the great conflict known as the Punic Wars.

In Great Greece, Taras stood on the frontier of Hellenism. She had in the past tried to constitute a domain for herself in the south of the peninsula, from the Ionian Sea to Mount Gargaro, but the Italians had made her existence difficult. Now she might foresee a more serious danger. Rome ruled in Campania in 343, and had been undisputed sovereign in Latium since 338 (the Latin War). She had commenced the terrible Samnite Wars, which were to take her to the shores of the Ionian Sea. In 326, for the first time, a Greek city, Naples, had come under her sway. Naples was attached, it is true, in the capacity of an ally, by one of those treaties which were called *fœdus æquum*, but this alliance was really a protectorate. In the coalition with which Rome had to deal during the third and last Samnite War, the prime mover was Taras. It was a long, hard struggle, and victory was dearly bought at Sentinum (295). When the war ended, in 290, just before Agathocles died, Rome faced Taras as Carthage faced Syracuse. It is true that she had treated with the Greek city in 303, recognizing her supremacy on the Ionian Sea by agreeing that no Roman vessel should pass the Lacinian Promontory. Naturally the promise would not be kept.

So Hellenism was to go under in the West, and there, as everywhere else, its downfall was brought about not only by the power of its adversaries but also by internal division. The Sicilian tyrants, in the days of their power, had vainly tried, by persuasion or force, to unite the cities of the island and Great Greece in a single empire. Agathocles had attempted it after Dionysios, and, at the appeal of Taras, he had defeated the Bruttians. But death had put a stop to his victories. In the face of the growing dominion of Rome and of the

Carthaginian power, the Greek cities remained isolated. Already they had often turned for help to the mother-country. But not all who came to restore order and security were Timoleons. In Great Greece, in the course of the 4th century, Bruttians, Lucanians, or Messapians had managed to bring the adventures of Archidamos (340-338) or Alexander the Molossian (320) to a disastrous end, and, no more fortunate than his brother Acrotatos, who had tried to meddle in the struggles of the Greek cities of Sicily, against Agathocles, the Spartan prince Cleonymos had finally made an abject return to his own country (302). Against Rome in Italy, against Carthage in Sicily, we shall now see the Epeirot Pyrrhos coming up at the call of Taras and Syracuse. But, although his expedition was on a larger scale, it was no more successful. When he left the peninsula, defeated, he left Rome and Carthage ready to collide in Sicily. All through the 3rd century, the West would be the scene and the stake of their conflict, just as the East would be the scene of the competition of the great Hellenistic monarchies for the domination of the Ægean. Certainly, there were connexions between the two halves of the Mediterranean world, but, on the whole, events at first proceeded in each theatre almost independently. Only towards the end of the century there comes the moment of which Polybius speaks, "when history has, so to speak, only one body, the affairs of Italy and Libya being intermingled with those of Greece, and all events leading towards one same end."¹

II

THE GRÆCO-ORIENTAL KINGDOMS. CAUSES AND NATURE OF THEIR CONFLICTS

The East was greatly changed since the day when Alexander first landed in Asia. The domain of Hellenic influence reached to the Indus; its limits were still those of Alexander's Empire. Forty years of intestine war had dismembered it, but not diminished it. The Macedonian Satraps who had become Kings, and regarded themselves as the Conqueror's successors, remained true to his policy of Hellenization. It could not be otherwise. In the midst of

¹ *Proœm*, i.3.4.

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Oriental populations, their authority was based solely on the superiority of the Macedonian armies and the resources of Hellenic civilization. The monarchies which they founded were all military states, in which Greek culture played a preponderant part and was responsible for organization. But that which made the common character of these states was also the cause of their rivalry. Needing Greece, they naturally sought to extend their influence over the Greek world as much as possible. For long the Greeks, driven by the spirit of adventure, and cramped in their over-populated country, had been accustomed to seek their fortunes in the East. Since the East had belonged to the Macedonians, it had welcomed them in even greater numbers. The rulers of Egypt or Asia sought to attract the Greeks by all kinds of promises, and obviously those promises which offered most hope of fulfilment would come from the Kings whose empire, protectorate, or alliance was recognized. The origin of the currents of emigration which led the Greeks into Asia, Syria, and Egypt must have varied with political vicissitudes. Beyond all doubt, it is no mere chance that, at the end of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphos, when the Egyptian sea-power extended to the coasts of Asia Minor, we find a whole colony of Carians in the Fayum. So we shall see, in the course of the 3rd century, the great Eastern powers fighting with each other and with Macedonia for hegemony over the coasts and islands of the Ægean, and even for influence over Greece Proper.

The dominion of the sea was valuable for yet other reasons. The Hellenic Mediterranean and the Eastern world, which had never been separate, now formed a more complete unity, since the same civilization covered the whole, if unequally. This intellectual and moral unity was reinforced by economic ties. Between Asia and Eastern Europe trade had always been considerable, and this was what had, for example, made the prosperity of the old Greek cities of Asia Minor. It now enjoyed greater facilities than ever. Warlike expeditions and geographical exploration had brought a better knowledge of the great trade-routes which crossed the heart of the Asiatic world to the Far East, they had opened new routes, and, above all, they had revived traffic on roads which were forgotten or partially abandoned.

This is true of the voyage of Nearchos in the Indian Ocean. What was especially important, was that a great part of these roads, and, in particular, their outlets on the Mediterranean, were in the power of Hellenized states. The Greeks applied a more methodical spirit and a greater technical knowledge to the engineering of these roads than had hitherto been shown. Alexander had set the example, and the Diadochi and their successors copied him zealously. But the Empire was divided up, and the rival kingdoms, quarrelling for the leadership, were naturally inclined to quarrel for the control of the trade-routes, and especially for the ports at which they ended on Hellenic waters, for these were a great source of wealth, and wealth was necessary for the conquest of power.

The importance which the states attached to the increase of wealth gave birth to what has been called their mercantile policy.¹ This ancient mercantilism has been compared to that which developed in Europe at the beginning of modern times, and just parallels have been drawn between the causes which produced both. The opening of the countries of the East to Greek trade corresponds to the discovery of America and India. Just as the division of the new lands led to the colonial rivalries of modern nations, so Alexander's successors fought for a share in the immense territories conquered and for the development of their own domains. In the Hellenistic states we shall see wealth becoming concentrated and a proletariat forming, as in the 16th century. By bringing into general circulation the precious metals which lay dormant in the treasuries of Persian Asia, Alexander caused coin to prevail over sums in kind; this fact is comparable to the flow of gold and silver into Europe after the conquest of the Eldorados. Lastly, states had broken loose from the narrow framework of the city, which could only inspire a limited outlook and supply modest resources. They were now absolute monarchies, like those of modern Europe. But there is one essential difference. Except the Macedonian kingdom, the Hellenistic monarchies were not national.

So, in the wars which were coming, the economic conflict sometimes accompanied and sometimes directed the political conflict. According to the inner tendencies of each state,

¹ U. Wilcken, in **LXIV**, xlv (1921), pp. 68 ff.

or even according to the character of each sovereign, we see, now an attempt at sole dominion, which we call imperialism, and now a more moderate ambition, chiefly concerned to secure the political and economic independence necessary for the prosperity of the State.

There were other causes of conflict, secondary or transitory, which will be revealed, at least in part, in the course of this narrative. But there was one which must be mentioned now, for it determined the relations of the Lagids and the Seleucids in the 3rd and 2nd centuries. Between these two powers there lay the Syrian question. It had always lain between the masters of Egypt and the masters of Asia. Since the days when the Eastern Empires were born, since the days of Thothmes, Seti, and Rameses, Syria had been a bone of contention between Pharaoh and the rulers of Babylon, and, later, the Hittite Kings of Boghaz-Keui. It had sent the Egyptian armies to the Euphrates, and, later, the Assyrian armies to the valley of the Nile. It would be much the same in the Hellenistic age; the Ptolemies and Antiochoses would repeat, in their own fashion, the campaigns of Rameses and Esarhaddon.¹ This time, the conflict would hardly be concerned with Northern Syria, Seleucid Syria, as it is called, which was definitely assigned to Seleucos Nicator after Ipsus, and only attracted the desire of the Lagid in the rare moments when a spirit of conquest reigned at the Court of Alexandria. But it was not so with the Phœnician coast, Southern Syria, and Palestine. The Ptolemies naturally regarded these as a dependency of their Empire. For them, as for their rivals, the coast was as important as all the sea-board of the Ægean, and the roads which ended in the Phœnician ports competed with the great trade-route of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Syria produced timber in the forests of Lebanon and metals in its mountains. Both were lacking in Egypt, and the Ptolemies needed them for various purposes, and especially for ship-building.² So one Syrian war followed another till the end of the period, and a new page was turned in the year 200, when Antiochos III finally annexed Palestine and Coele-Syria, which, at least since the beginning of the reign

¹ CLXI, i, pp. 28-31.

² Below, p. 242.

of Philadelphos, had always belonged to the Egyptian Empire.

These rivalries for the dominion of the *Ægean* and the possession of its coasts inspired the whole policy of the time, but they do not explain all its features. Each great state had its own problems to solve. The Seleucid, whose programme was the Empire of all Asia, had much difficulty in keeping within that Empire the Satrapies of the Far East, which would break away very soon, while, even west of the Euphrates, in Asia Minor, many dynasties and many peoples retained or won their independence. The Lagid had an easier task ; yet, though the Nile valley was a clearly defined unit, which seemed to be self-sufficing, it was nevertheless in close relations with the neighbouring regions, which it tended to attach to itself as its natural appendages. Such, for example, was Cyrenaïca, which was connected with the Delta by Marmarica, and could give the sovereign of Alexandria a new outlet on the Mediterranean. Moreover, Egypt did not look only on that sea. She had to organize the line of coasts which, on the Red Sea and along the African continent, placed her in communication with the routes to Arabia and India and with the primitive peoples who lived in the countries of ivory and spice. The road by the Upper Nile, which led through Nubia to distant, mysterious regions, was held by other nations, who had once received something of Egyptian civilization, and it was important to the security of the Southern frontiers and to the prosperity of Alexandria that they should recognize the Lagid's influence.

Macedonia, while her relations with the Greeks were still her gravest concern, was also in contact with the peoples of the North—Illyrians, Dardanians, and Thracians—and, on this side, the country was a kind of bulwark against barbarism.¹ Moreover, just as she had in the past opened a road for herself to the *Ægean*, so now she tended to obtain a sea-board on the Adriatic ; therefore she had to have, not only a Greek and Mediterranean policy, but an Epeiriot policy and an Illyrian policy. So she would come into contact with the great powers of the West. It was through the Macedonian Wars that the Romans first came to intervene decisively in the Eastern world.

¹ On Macedonia and the barbarians, see **CLXIX**, pp. 200 ff.

III

THE CELTIC INVASION OF GREECE.¹ THE RESTORATION
OF THE MACEDONIAN KINGSHIP

On the morrow of the fall of Lysimachos and the murder of Seleucos, therefore, new conflicts might be expected, and they broke out amid the horrors of the Celtic invasion, which fell on the East like a sudden catastrophe.

The Gallic expansion, one of the great events of the 4th century, had begun in the 5th.² Tradition placed its origin in the time of Ambigatus, King of the Bituriges, a people which then dominated in the country of the Celts and gave it its King. His two nephews, Bellovesus and Sigovesus, raised bands among the superabundant population of Gaul and set forth to conquer new lands. They drew lots, and Bellovesus took the road to Italy. This was the beginning of the emigration which, crossing the huge barrier of the Alps, created a new Gaul in the valley of the Po, beat down the Umbrian and Etruscan powers, and collided with Rome itself, which was stormed and burned about 390.³

The bands of Sigovesus had taken another route, through the formidable Hercynian Forest, and so the Celts advanced down the valley of the Danube. The Helvetii halted in Switzerland, the Volcæ in Bavaria, the Boii in Bohemia, and the Taurisci, following the Sigynnes, in Serbia. Driven by them, the Thracians and Illyrians began to press on the frontiers of Macedon and Epeiros and to threaten the Greek towns of the coast. At the beginning of his reign, when he was on the Danube, Alexander received an embassy from the Celts of the Adriatic (335).⁴ Cassandros had come into contact with Celts in Hæmos,⁵ and Lysimachos had fought them. In the time of the Successors, a band led by one Cambaules had invaded Thrace.⁶ The disorders ensuing

¹ C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, i, pp. 281-305.

² Livy, v.34; Just., xx.5.7-8; Homo, *Primitive Italy*, p. 156.

³ The date in the chronology of the *Annals*; by Hellenistic dating, 387-386. Homo, p. 168.

⁴ Strabo, 201; Arr., *Anab.*, 1.4.7.

⁵ Pliny, NH, xxxi.53; Sen., *Quæst. Nat.*, iii.11.8.

⁶ Paus., x.19.15.

on the death of Lysimachos and that of Seleucos in 281 gave the barbarians a favourable opportunity to force the barriers of the civilized world once more.

Ptolemy Ceraunos, the murderer of Seleucos, had been proclaimed King (281-280) by the army and the fleet of Lysimachos, but his position was contested. He was opposed by his victim's son, Antiochos I. It might well be foreseen that Antiochos would in the end abandon his father's claim to the kingship of Macedon, but he could not do so at once, or shirk the duty of punishing the murderer. However, Antiochos was not an immediate danger, since he had to take up a difficult inheritance in Asia.¹ Pyrrhos might be more dangerous. He had already reigned over Macedon, and he was master of a kingdom which had great military power. The Molossians, Chaonians, and Thesprotians, autonomous tribes, but all recognizing the overlordship of the same King, were bound to Pyrrhos, "their Eagle," by a sentiment of loyal admiration, and Epeiros was now a great state. Pyrrhos had acquired Macedonian provinces, such as Tymphæa and Parauæa. Since 294 Acarnania had been subject to him, its capital, Ambracia, becoming the royal city, and he was extending his influence in Illyria by alliances. In the Ionian Sea, he had recovered Corcyra. But he was dreaming of other conquests, and in 280 he set out for Italy.²

The other claimant, Antigonos Gonatas, was powerful in Greece. In the North, he held Demetrias, Magnesia, and Eubœa, and also dominated the Bœotian League.³ Almost all the cities of the Peloponnese recognized his power, although Sparta remained hostile. Lastly, he was on good terms with the Ætolians, who now had control of the Delphic sanctuary. But Greece was never certain, and Ptolemy Ceraunos, since he had become King, had been reconciled, with his brother Ptolemy II Philadelphos, who was pleased to see a Lagid on the throne of Macedon. The Greeks were not indifferent to the gold and power of Egypt. Antigonos Gonatas was subsequently defeated by Ceraunos. Shortly afterwards, we find him engaged in a war against

¹ CLXI, i, p. 150; CLXII, pp. 52 ff.

² OXXIII, ii, p. 5; CLXXXIII, pp. 151-223; Homo, *op. cit.*, pp. 205 ff.

³ CLXIX, pp. 110-83.

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Sparta and a coalition of Greek cities, and still later in a war with Antiochos I.

Against Ceraunos, an immediate menace might come from the sons of Lysimachos and Arsinoë. That Queen held some positions in Macedonia, and particularly the great city of Cassandreia. The eldest of the young princes had gone to Illyria to seek the alliance of Monunius. Ceraunos entered into negotiations with Arsinoë, his half-sister, and proposed marriage to her. Greek morals were not shocked by unions of the kind, and Ceraunos promised to treat the sons of Lysimachos as his heirs to the crown of Macedon. The wedding was celebrated at Cassandreia, of which Arsinoë opened the gates, but the same evening Ceraunos killed his nephews in their mother's arms, and she fled to Samothrace.¹ Common as these crimes of princes had become, they still shook thrones. This one was peculiarly odious, and cannot have increased the prestige of the crowned assassin.

It was at this moment that the Gauls burst into the Hellenic world.² Already Cerethrius was in Thrace, ravaging the country of the Triballians, Brennus was devastating Pæonia, and Belgius was falling upon Illyria and Macedon. The panic and horror inspired by the barbarians are revealed in the scanty evidence of contemporary inscriptions and in the feeble accounts which later authors have left. The Celtic army, charging in a solid mass, seemed like a multitude. Brennus's foot-soldiers are said to have numbered 150,000, but fear has no doubt conspired with rhetoric to swell the number. His cavalry, less numerous, but always charging in fine style, carried everything before it. The squadrons seemed unbreakable. Every horseman was followed by two mounted squires, ready to take his place if he were wounded or killed. Hellenistic art would afterwards immortalize the Galatian warrior, with his great height, the broad surfaces of his muscles, the "snowy"³ whiteness of his complexion, and his proud, wild head, made wilder still by a dense mass of hair, in locks stiffened with a wash

¹ Just., xxiv.3.

² Paus., i.4; x.19.4-23; Diod., xxii.9.11; Just., xxiv.4-8; xxv.1-2. Bibliography: CCXLII, p. 2 n. 1. Chronology: CXVI, vol. iii, 2, p. 410; CLXIX, pp. 160 ff.

³ Flor., i.20.2; Amm. Marc., xv.12.1; cf. Callim., iv.184.



WOUNDED GAUL
(Capitoline Museum)

of lime. Ceraunos was defeated and captured with the elephant which he rode, and his head was carried on a pike as a trophy (May, 279). His brother Meleagros was overthrown in two months, Antipatros, the nephew of Cassandros, in forty-five days, and Macedon was without a King. The barbarians ranged over the country, massacring and looting. Only the towns were protected by their ramparts. Then a Macedonian noble, Sosthenes, took command of the resistance. He was harrying the bands of Belgius when those of Brennus appeared. Sosthenes managed to drive him from Macedon, and Brennus threw himself upon Greece.

After crossing the Spercheios and ravaging the territory of Heracleia, which he could not take, he marched on Thermopylæ. The pass was defended. The peoples of Northern Greece—Locrians, Phocians, Megarians, Bœotians, Athenians—had sent their contingents, the largest being that of the Ætolians. Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochos had furnished 500 hoplites each. The pillage of Callion in Ætolia had no effect upon the defenders of the pass. But, as in the time of Xerxes, the position was turned (October, 274), and Brennus marched on Delphi, attracted by its treasures. The God, it was said, stopped the barbarians, who fled in terror before the storm which he loosed upon them, and succumbed to the rigour of the winter. Delphi was not taken. The priests were able to announce that Apollo had saved his temple and had adorned it with the arms won from his enemies.¹ The feast of the Soteria,² founded by the Ætolians, perpetuated the memory of the miraculous defeat of the Celts. Brennus retired northwards. His bands went back through the country of the Malians, Thessalians, and Dardanians. Many returned towards Gaul, and the state of the Scordisci on the Save is said to have been founded by remnants of Brennus's army. Others remained in Thrace, from where they pillaged the Greek cities of Propontis and held them to ransom. Byzantion had to pay them tribute, and they founded the Celtic state of Tylis, which was to last seventy years.

¹ CCXLII, p. 8 n. 4; *Delphic Hymn*, v, 9, 88, 5; Inscr., in LXXXIV, 1904, p. 166 (Herzog); p. 161 (S. Reinach).

² See P. Roussel, in LXXXVIII, 1924, pp. 97–111, for the date of the Soteria.

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Unfortunately for Macedonia, Sosthenes was killed. The country fell into anarchy. Cassandreia had detached itself, under its tyrant Apollodoros, who drew towards Antiochos. Antigonos was at war with the Seleucid and allied to his enemies, Nicomedes of Bithynia, Heracleia, and Byzantion. He was preparing to cross into Asia, when the two sovereigns realized that their dispute benefited no one but their opponents. Peace was signed between them and confirmed by the marriage of Antigonos and Phila, the daughter of Seleucos I. Antiochos kept his possessions in Thrace, but gave up Macedonia. Thereby Antigonos was recognized as possessing it, but he had to conquer it first. A band of 15,000 Gauls, who were ravaging Thrace, threatened Macedonia itself, and had taken Lysimacheia.¹ Antigonos, cruising in the Hellespont at the time, landed his army and defeated the barbarians near the city (spring, 277).² Thereby he greatly increased his prestige, and the barbarians, who had no objection to enlisting as mercenaries, helped him to triumph over the other claimants. Antipatros was killed in a battle in which Gauls took part.³ Ptolemy, the son of Arsinoë and Lysimachos, fled to Asia. Antigonos was proclaimed King in 276. In the following year he took Cassandreia. So the hurricane of the Celtic invasion led to the reconstitution of the Macedonian monarchy.

That monarchy revived under an energetic and serious sovereign, matured by misfortune.⁴ Antigonos Gonatas had not the brilliant qualities of his father, Demetrios Poliorcetes. He rather resembled his grandfathers, Antigonos One-eye and Antipatros. He was a cultivated prince; he had grown up in Athens, where he had attached himself to the teaching and person of Zeno, and all his life he made a profession of Stoicism. The discipline of the Porch is regarded, and no doubt justly, as the source of the reserve and restraint which seem to have been characteristics of Antigonos, distinguishing him from the other rulers of the time, who were often so immoderate in their pride. That education also left its

¹ Livy, xxxviii.16.

² Just., xxv.1 and Prol.; Diog. Laërt., ii.141.

³ Polyæn., iv.6.17; Just., xxv.4; Cf. A. J. Reinach, in **LXXXVIII**, 1911, p. 34; **XCI**, 1910, pp. 10-12.

⁴ Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Hell. Dicht.*, i, 586 ff.; **CLXIX**, pp. 15-86, 223-56.

mark on his policy. Stoicism was a cosmopolitan philosophy, calling to wisdom all who were worthy of it, and scornful of all national or social distinctions, such as the notion of the superiority of the free Hellene to the enslaved Barbarian. This may have been the cause of Antigonos's indifference to Hellenic liberties; we find him governing cities through tyrants. Many of these, too, were philosophers, such as his friend Menedemos of Eretria, and many ruled their cities well, but their government was none the less hateful to the republican spirit of Greece. This hostility could be serviceable to the enemies of Antigonos, and almost from his accession he had a rival who might have become formidable, if his death had not made the King of Macedon more secure and powerful than ever.

Pyrrhos, returning from Italy, where he had failed to realize any of his dreams of conquest, had every reason for fearing the union of Greece and Macedonia. It would have relegated Epeiros altogether to the second place. He remembered that he had, in his time, reigned in Macedon, and he invaded the country. In spite of his Gallic mercenaries, Antigonos was defeated twice. Then Greece became disorderly. The cities of the Achæan League, which had been formed in 280, and others as well, drove out the Macedonian garrisons. Eubœa broke loose from Antigonos. Pyrrhos hastened to the Peloponnese, where he was hailed as a liberator. Achæa, Elis, and Megalopolis declared for him. To make sure of Sparta he wanted to replace the King, Areus, by Cleonymos, and invaded Laconia, but he could not take the city. Antigonos had arrived at Corinth with an army. In the presence of that danger, Pyrrhos abandoned Sparta, suffering great losses on his retreat. In Argolis, where he came into contact with Antigonos, a party opened the gates of Argos to him, but he was killed in a street-battle.¹

His death delivered Antigonos from a great danger. He readily recognized Alexander, Pyrrhos's son, as King of Epeiros. He remained master of Macedon and Greece (272). He placed garrisons in Corinth, the Peiræus, and Chalcis, and tyrants in many cities, such as Argos, Elis, and Sicyon. So, about 270, a great power was constituted,

¹ CLXXIII, pp. 224-66; CLXIX, pp. 257-74.

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which had all the resources of Macedon and Greece at its disposal, but had a weakness in the impatience with which the Hellenes supported the yoke.

IV

THE CELTIC INVASION OF ASIA

In Asia, the Seleucid had still greater trouble to establish his power. At the very beginning of his reign, a revolt in Syria prevented him from taking vengeance on Ceraunos, who was then King of Macedon and had vanquished Antigonos Gonatas. Seleucos had not transmitted to his son all the domain conquered by Alexander, for he had given up Paropamisadæ, Gedrosia, and Arachosia after the war with Sandracottus. Even in Asia Minor several regions stood outside his dominion. The hereditary ruler of Pontus, Mithradates, had taken the title of King. Cappadocia had been regarded as independent since Ipsus. Philetæros, the governor of Pergamon, was faithful to Antiochos, but only at the price of the treasures accumulated in the fortress. The Greek cities of the coast, Heracleia in Asia, Chalcedon, Byzantion, were hostile. Bithynia refused to recognize him, and Zipœtes I had defeated his generals. He had found the Greek cities hostile in the war which he undertook to maintain his claim to the Macedonian throne against Antigonos Gonatas. Peace, as we have seen, was made in 277. But in the same year, on the death of Zipœtes I, the question of the Bithynian succession was opened by the rivalry of the two heirs. It brought down on Asia the disaster of the Celtic invasion.¹

Zipœtes the younger fled and received the support of the Thyni, a Thracian people on the shore of the Bosphorus; his brother Nicomedes² conceived the plan of calling upon the bands of Leonnorius, which, after taking Lysimacheia and holding it to ransom and pillaging the Chersonese, had descended on the Hellespont, and were casting greedy eyes on the rich regions of Asia Minor beyond the strait. The bands of Lutarius had already crossed on stolen ships.

¹ CLXII, pp. 58 ff.

² *Ibid.*; CCXLII, pp. 6-14; A. J. Reinach, in CIX, 1909, pp. 47-72.

Nicomedes took Leonnori¹us's Gauls into his service. They undertook by treaty, in return for the country of the Thyni, which was given to them, to fight Zipocetes, and Nicomedes may even have thought of using them against Antiochos. For the treaty was signed also by Heracleia, Byzantion, Chalcedon, and his allies in the war against the Seleucid. In combination with Lutarius's men, Leonnori²us and his Gauls helped Nicomedes to defeat Zipocetes, but, having fulfilled their contract, they took to pillaging on their own account and threw themselves upon Asia Minor.

Perhaps already divided into three clans, they advanced in a mass, followed by their wives and children, 20,000 men in all, of whom only 10,000 were armed. The Tolistobogii or Tolistoagii took Æolis and Ionia; the Tectosages, the interior; the Trocmi, the shores of the Hellespont. About their ravages we have only a few scanty documents—passing allusions mingled with legends in the authors, and some more certain information in the inscriptions. We see the Gauls occupying Ili³on for a moment and attacking Cyzicos, which received provisions, and perhaps military support, from Philetæros of Pergamon (about 276–275).⁴ We have evidence of their passage at Celænæ in Phrygia,⁵ at Themisonion,⁶ at Erythræ, which Ptolemy Philadelphos, then at war with Antiochos, had doubtless occupied,⁷ at Smyrna,⁸ at Ephesos,⁹ and at Miletos.¹⁰ “When the Gauls were ravaging the country, burning farms and houses, and slaying a multitude of Hellenes, no one dared fight them. Sotas rose against these men, who dishonoured us, outraged the gods, and ill-treated the Hellenes. First he harried them with a body formed of mercenaries and slaves. Then he formed a body of volunteers among the citizens.” So the Greek cities were paralysed with terror, and the population shut themselves up inside their walls, gazing at their devastated fields. The lead of a daring chief was needed to animate resistance. It is not surprising that the cities

¹ CCXLII, p. 7 n. 1.

² CCXLII, p. 8.

³ IX, 748, 18 ff.

⁴ Paus., x.80.9.

⁵ Paus., x.82.4.

⁶ VIII, 2nd ed., 210; X, 508; CCXLI, p. 68.

⁷ Zolotas, in XCVIII, 1908, nos. 5–7.

⁸ Plut., *Parall. Min.*, 15; A. J. Reinach, in XCI, 1909, p. 51 n. 1.

⁹ *Palatine Anthol.*, vii.492.

¹⁰ IX, 765.

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turned to kings and other rulers. These could not demonstrate their phil-Hellenism more gloriously than by vanquishing the barbarians, like Philetæros of Pergamon, who "carried impetuous Ares among the terrible Galatian warriors, and drove them back, far from the frontiers of his country."¹ Nor could the Seleucid evade the duty of succouring his peoples, and a little before 270 he won a great battle at Sardis, which earned him the surname of *Soter*, the Saviour.²

In spite of these successes, pompously celebrated by artists and poets, the Kings resorted to less dignified methods to ward off the pest. Later, Attalos I, the successor of Philetæros, was the first to refuse tribute to the barbarians. The Seleucid probably continued to pay it longer. In the reign of the first or second Antiochos, the city of Erythræ was exempted by the King from contributing to the *Galatika*, "Gaul-geld." We cannot estimate the sums which thus left the royal treasuries,³ but they must have been considerable.⁴ In return, the Kings may have received permission to engage Celtic mercenaries. These are found even in the armies of the Ptolemies. The victories of Philetæros and Antiochos probably helped to remove the Gauls from the coast and to drive them into the centre of Phrygia, which became Galatia, and there they continued to be a menace. But, to complete the picture of the evils which assailed the Seleucid monarchy at the beginning of the 3rd century, we must remember that it had at the same time to maintain a war with Egypt.

V

LAGIDS AND SELEUCIDS. THE PREPONDERANCE OF EGYPT

Egypt was, without doubt, the most prosperous and powerful country of the time.⁵ Secure from the disasters

¹ IV, 31.

² Lucian, *De Lapsu in Salut.*, 9; *Zeuxis*, ii; *Dial. Meretr.*, xiii; P. E. Legrand, in **LXXXVII**, 1908, p. 94; but cf. A. J. Reinach, in **XCI**, 1902, pp. 50 ff.

³ IX, 223, 28; **CLXII**, p. 65.

⁴ Memn., 24.19; Polyb., iv.46; A. J. Reinach, in **XCI**, 1900, p. 55.

⁵ **CLXI**, i, pp. 141 ff.; **CLXII**, pp. 66-75.

of the Celtic invasion, it was now ruled by Ptolemy II Philadelphos, the son of Ptolemy I Soter and his second wife, Queen Berenice. Magas, a son of Berenice by another husband, reigned at Cyrene as viceroy, and his loyalty was sometimes uncertain. But the possible defection of Cyrene was a very much less serious menace for Egypt than the obstinate hostility of Greece was for Antigonos, or the dislocation which was always to be feared in the heterogeneous Empire of Antiochos. Philadelphos ruled a homogeneous country, long accustomed to foreign domination, where Ptolemy Soter seems to have established his line firmly from the beginning.

Having peace at home, the new King had hastened to profit by the disorders which weakened the other monarchies to secure and extend his own Empire. It was probably after Curupedion that he laid hands on Cœle-Syria¹ and Palestine, unless he had received them in the inheritance of his father. He had even annexed certain Phœnician cities, such as Tyre, and, still more important, Sidon, whose King, the successor of Eshmunazar II, had become his admiral under the Greek name of Philocles.² On the East and West, to control the nomads of the deserts and the Marmaridæ of Libya, a good police was sufficient. In the South, above the first Cataracts, the populations of Nubia and Ethiopia, whose civilization was akin to that of Egypt, formed a more redoubtable state, under the King of Meroë. Diodorus speaks of an expedition of Philadelphos in these parts. Nubia, from Philæ to Wady Halfa, was ruled by a protected and Hellenized King. With his frontiers thus safe-guarded, the Lagid had succeeded in maintaining and strengthening his power abroad, and particularly on the Ægean. There, since 286, Egypt controlled the Confederacy of the Cyclades, which owed its revival to Antigonos One-eye, but remembered the short protectorate of Ptolemy Soter in 308.³ Lastly, Cyprus also had remained under the sway of the Lagids, who had secured a footing on the coast of Asia Minor, if it is true that, about 286, Philocles had already taken Caunos.⁴

¹ Kept by Soter after Ipsus (Polyb., v.67.8 ; Diod., xxi.5), conquered by Demetrios in 296 (?) (CLXI, i, p. 86) and later by Seleucos (*ibid.*, p. 88 n. 4), and recovered by Philadelphos about 280 (*ibid.*, pp. 250-4).

² IV, pp. 26 ff.

³ IV, p. 24.

⁴ IV, p. 33.

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In 277 Philadelphos had repudiated his first wife, Arsinoë, the daughter of Lysimachos, banishing her to Coptos in Upper Egypt, and had married his own sister (on both sides), Arsinoë II, the widow of the same Lysimachos and of Ptolemy Ceraunos. She had left Samothrace and taken refuge at the Court of Alexandria, where her sinister reputation had preceded her. Nevertheless, she assumed a great and unceasing ascendancy over her brother, who was younger than herself. Both at home and abroad, she seems to have inspired the King to energetic undertakings, and particularly to a war with Antiochos. Unfortunately, little is known of the events of this period. No doubt, the favour shown to Arsinoë had created discontent in the kingdom. It is natural to suppose that Antiochos entered into relations with the dissatisfied party, among whom was Magas, who caused Cyrene to revolt. It is surprising that the revolt broke out before Antiochos had taken the field. Magas did not go far. He stopped at the "Chi", a road-crossing a little beyond Parætonion, and was recalled by a rising of the Marmaridæ, which may have been cleverly engineered.¹ But Philadelphos was unable to pursue him, being detained by a mutiny of his Gallic mercenaries,² and came to terms with his half-brother, who kept the title of Viceroy of Cyrene.³

Of the Syrian war we know hardly anything. It seems that about 273⁴ an Egyptian army had invaded the Seleucid dominions and was marching towards the Euphrates. But it is probable that the most effective action was taken by the fleet. The peace of 272 consecrated the Egyptian command of the sea. Arsinoë, who had inspired this policy, died in 270.

So the ten years following the battle of Curupedion saw the formation of the three Hellenistic monarchies completed. That of Antigonos was born painfully amid the disasters of the Celtic invasion and the struggles with the Greek republics. That of Antiochos, although it covered such vast territories, seemed fragile and ready to fall to pieces. The Ptolemaic Empire, on the contrary, solidly established

¹ Polyæn., ii.28.2; Sethe, in CVII, ii, p. 2274 (site of the Chi); Paus., i.7.2.

² Paus., *loc. cit.*; Callim., iv.171 ff.

³ CLXI, i, p. 67, no. 2.

⁴ LXIX, 1892, pp. 226 ff.; CLXI, i, p. 172.

on the resources of a homogeneous and wealthy country, dominated almost the whole Ægean. Alexandria attained a size and prosperity unknown to any city before it. It was truly the capital of the world.

VI

WAR IN GREECE AND SYRIA. EXHAUSTION OF THE LAGID EMPIRE

Egypt was mistress of the seas, and a conflict between Athens and Antigonos gave her an opportunity to intervene in Greece itself. Arsinoë probably still had hopes of obtaining for the sons of Lysimachos the rights to the throne of Macedon which their father had claimed. This ambition also served the interests of Egyptian policy. It would be of great advantage to the Lagid dynasty if an allied prince reigned over the great European monarchy. This magnificent plan had been on the point of succeeding in the time of Ptolemy Ceraunos. It could be resumed.¹ All that was necessary was to seize the right moment. Now, Athens bore the Macedonian rule unwillingly. Yet she had not moved during the war between Antigonos and Antiochos, not when Areus, the King of Sparta, on the pretext of a sacred war, had made an unsuccessful expedition against Macedonia (280).² But patriotism was at boiling-point, especially among the young men, the disciples of the philosophers, and it was a young man, Chremonides, who was the soul of the rising. In the teachings of Zeno (who was, however, the master and friend of the King of Macedon), he had acquired a love of country and freedom which was ready for every sacrifice. An Athenian decree,³ voted at his instigation (266–265 or 265–264), declared an agreement between Athens and Sparta, “always united against the enemies of the Hellenes,” and secured the support of Ptolemy, who, “following the example of his ancestors and the intentions of his sister, showed his

¹ CLXI, i, p. 182.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³ II, 2, p. 382; CXVII, vol. iii, 2, p. 424 (chronology); Kolbe, in LIX, 1916, pp. 542 ff.; Lehmann-Haupt, in LVII, 1903, pp. 170–1; CLXI, i, p. 185 n. 2; CLXIX, pp. 218 ff., 275–310.

zeal for the common liberties of the Hellenes". Here we have proof of active diplomatic intervention on the part of the Alexandrian Court. The decree declared alliance with several cities of the Peloponnese—the Achæan cities, which had formed a confederation since 280, the Eleians, and the Arcadians of Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Phigaleia, and Caphyæ—and with the Cretans.

Unfortunately for the coalition, Arsinoë, who had encouraged it, was dead (270).¹ Philadelphos was unwilling to repeat the expedition of 308, which was costly, dangerous, and of no use to the Egyptian sea-power, and was content to send a squadron under the admiral Patrocles to Athens, which Antigonos was blockading (265). For Athens had commenced hostilities by driving out the Macedonian garrisons. The Egyptian fleet, moored near a small island, which was given the name of Patrocles, does not seem to have been a great help to the besieged.

Areus marched towards Attica, but was stopped at Corinth and Megara, which were held by the Macedonians. Antigonos was in great danger for a moment at Megara, for his Gallic mercenaries mutinied (265); but Areus had to return to Sparta. Next summer (264) he made another still more unsuccessful attempt, and suffered a decisive defeat at Corinth. Then Athens was lost. She had to capitulate (263-2). She was treated hardly; an Epistates was appointed by the King to govern the city, and garrisons were stationed in Athens and at the Peiræus, Rhamnus, Sunion, and Eleusis. Most of the magistrates were deposed and replaced. Henceforward, they were appointed by the King, and the people had merely to ratify his choice by its vote.²

Nevertheless, if Justin is correct,³ Macedonia was on the point of collapsing, being invaded and almost conquered by Alexander of Epeiros. But the hold on Athens was not relaxed, and the King's son Demetrios drove the invader back to Epeiros. If this is really the date of the expedition of the Epeirots, we may take it that it was inspired by Ptolemy, who was more inclined to make his friends act than to

¹ Below, p. 246. See, in general, **CLXIX**, pp. 275-310.

² Chapouthier, in **LXXXV**, 1924, pp. 264 ff.

³ Just., xxvi.49; **CLXI**, i, p. 191.

engage all the forces of Egypt. But, if the Lagid Empire was not damaged by the fall of Athens, it lost much of its prestige, and events would soon show that a strong Macedonia could be a danger to its hegemony over the Ægean.

In this struggle between Antigonos and Ptolemy, one might be surprised at the inactivity of the Seleucid. But Antiochos had many difficulties to overcome at home. A palace tragedy, about which we know little, ended in the execution of Seleucos, the eldest son and heir to the throne (about 267).¹ Philetæros, the ruler of Pergamon, was not at all certain. No doubt, he was still on good terms with Antiochos, and one of his nephews, Attalos, had married a princess of the Seleucid family, Antiochis, the daughter of Achæos; but he had sought the friendship of Egypt.² On his death, in 263-262,³ hostilities at once broke out. Eumenes, his nephew and successor, won a great victory over Antiochos at Sardis in 262. Are we to seek the cause of this war, as has been suggested, in the intrigues of Antiochos himself, who may have supported the claims of a first cousin of Eumenes? ⁴ The text on which this hypothesis is based can be interpreted in other ways.⁵ However it may be, Antiochos I died in the year of the defeat, perhaps in the actual battle,⁶ leaving the throne to his younger son Antiochos II.

The reign of this King, who took the surname of God (Theos), was destined to be unhappy. With him begins the dislocation of the Empire, from which we shall presently see Parthia (248) and Bactriana (under Diodotos, 250) detaching themselves. On ascending the throne Antiochos II tried to reconquer the cities of the Asiatic coast, and, if possible, Cœle-Syria, Palestine, and Phœnicia, where he hardly held anything but Arados. War with Egypt was, therefore, inevitable. In this conflict Pergamon did not play the active part expected of her, being, perhaps, held back by Cyzicos, with which she had friendly relations (Cyzicos being jealous of Byzantion, which Ptolemy supported against Antiochos, as he supported Heracleia, Bithynia, and Pontus).⁷

¹ GLXII, p. 72.

² IV, 81.

³ A. J. Reinach, in LXXXIX, 1908, 2, p. 182.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 185 ff.

⁵ CCXLIII, p. 15 n. 1.

⁶ Reinach, *loc. cit.*, pp. 182 ff.

⁷ LXXXV, 1902, 2, pp. 183 ff.

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Antiochos could count on the sympathy of Antigonos, and also on Rhodes, which was becoming uneasy at the progress of the Egyptian navy. This was the origin of the second Syrian War, the history of which is very uncertain.

Macedonia did not enter the conflict at once. Antigonos may have been held by movements in the Peloponnese and the menace of the King of Sparta, Acrotatos. Moreover, some modern historians place the expedition of the Epeirots, mentioned above, at this date.¹ But Antiochos was aided by the defection of Miletos and Ephesos. At Miletos, Timarchos, who commanded the Ptolemaic garrison, assumed the power, and seized Samos from the Egyptian Empire.² At Ephesos, a prince of the Lagid family was governor. Who he was, is doubtful; some make him a son of Lysimachos and Arsinoë II, adopted and associated in the kingship by Philadelphos from 267 to 259,³ while others regard this adopted and associated prince as a bastard of the King.⁴ When the future Euergetes was declared heir to the throne Ptolemy of Ephesos revolted and made an agreement with Timarchos. But the rebellious prince was killed in a mutiny of his troops, and Timarchos became a hateful tyrant to the Milesians. Antiochos seized the opportunity to "deliver" Miletos and to take Ephesos.⁵ But the decisive events of the war seem to have been two sea-battles, in which the Egyptians were beaten—the victory of Antigonos at Cos,⁶ and that of the Rhodian admiral Agathostratos over the Ptolemaic fleet commanded by Chremonides at Ephesos. The exact date is uncertain, but we find the foundations of Antigonos, the feasts of the Antigoneia and the Stratoniceia, at Delos in 253, and about 250 the Confederation of the Isles raised a statue to Agathostratos. Egypt had, there-

¹ *E.g.*, **CLXIX**, p. 319.

² It is to be supposed that the victor of Samos is the man mentioned in Polyæn., v.35, and Front., *Strat.*, iii.2.11, and not an Ætolian Strategos of the time of Ptolemy III. **CXXIII**, ii, p. 184 n. 6; **CLXI**, i, p. 207 n. 2.

³ Von Stern, in **LIX**, 1905, pp. 427 ff. But see V. Groot, in **LXI**, lxii, pp. 446 ff.; Holleaux, in **LXXX**, 1921, pp. 183 ff.

⁴ **CLXII**, p. 642; *cf.* pp. 549 ff.

⁵ App., *Syr.*, 65; **CXXLII**, p. 72.

⁶ Date much disputed. *Cf.* **IV**, pp. 41, 56 n. 1, 59 n. 1, 277; *contra* **CCXXXIII**, iii, ad. no. 139 (262–260). *Cf.* Wilcken, in **CCXXV**, pp. 98 ff.

fore, lost the protectorate of the Cyclades.¹ Ptolemy was the first to ask for peace, and it was guaranteed by a marriage. Berenice, a daughter whom Philadelphos had had by the first Arsinoë, married Antiochos II, who repudiated his wife and half-sister Laodice. The old King of Egypt himself conducted his daughter as far as Pelusion, and Apollonios the Diocetes accompanied her to the frontier, which was then at Sidon (about 252).²

This "strange pact"³ would be hard to understand except on the supposition that both contracting parties had ulterior motives. Berenice Phernephoros, the Dowry-bringer, indeed brought Antiochos a wealthy portion—perhaps the revenues of Cœle-Syria—and this may have been what tempted Antiochos. Philadelphos must have been very desirous of the marriage, for he gave up enormous sums and ceded the Ionian cities and his possessions in Lycia and Cilicia. But he demanded the divorce of Antiochos and Laodice, and the children whom Berenice should bear were to succeed to the throne. No doubt, he hoped to bring about the union of the two monarchies. In this way Egyptian diplomacy tried to make good the losses caused by the naval defeats.

Cyrene was the scene of a series of tragic events which, however, did not turn out to the disadvantage of the Lagid dynasty, and, on the contrary, were to unite Cyrene to Egypt. Magas probably died in 251.⁴ His daughter Berenice was betrothed to the heir apparent of Egypt, the prince who afterwards became King Ptolemy III Euergetes. Under the influence of Apama, Magas's widow and the sister of Antiochos II Theos, the engagement was broken off, and Berenice was promised to a brother of Antigonos, Demetrios the Fair. So Cyrene was escaping from the control of Egypt. The project broke down through the folly of Demetrios, who made himself hated by his haughty manners and by the scandal of an affair with his future mother-in-law. Young Berenice, who may have been about fifteen at the time, caused Demetrios to be killed in the Queen's

¹ IV, 38.

² Edgar, in **LXXXII**, xlii, p. 93.

³ **CLXI**, i, p. 210.

⁴ **CLVI**, vol. iii, 2, pp. 133 ff.; **CLXI**, i, p. 200 n. 2; S. Ferri, in *Abh. Berlin*, 1926, 5, p. 9. Some place Magas's death in 259-258 (e.g., **CLXIX**, p. 449).

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own bedroom—*bonum facinus*, as Catullus says, translating Callimachos (248–247). This palace tragedy doubtless had some connexion with the party-struggles which divided Cyrene. It has been supposed that Demetrios and Apama were supported by the republicans, while the “military party” was more attached to Egypt. Demetrios is said to have been the man who sent for Ecdelos and Demophanes, disciples, like himself, of Arcesilas, and entrusted them with the task of providing Cyrene with a constitution.

About the same time, Aratos of Sicyon, having overthrown the tyranny in his city (251–250), brought it into the Achæan League, which at once gained in importance and power. The tyrants of Megalopolis had, perhaps, already been overthrown by Ecdelos and Demophanes, who were later to give laws to Cyrene, and the cities of Arcadia had combined in a confederation which was strong enough to defeat the Spartans at Mantinea (249). These federal states which were now developing, the Arcadian, Bœotian, Ætolian, and Achæan Leagues, would become redoubtable enemies for Macedon, especially the last two. Now, by the revolt of Alexander, the son of his brother Crateros, Antigonos had lost Corinth, the key of Greece. Philadelphos did not fail to form a connexion with Aratos, who went to Alexandria and was given 150 talents; and it may have been at this time that the Egyptians occupied the town of Methana in Argolis, giving it the name of Arsinoë.¹ We see some remains of Egyptian influence reviving in the Cyclades, but Egypt only recovered fragments of her island possessions.² It was left to the successor of Philadelphos to reconstitute the Empire.

VII

THE REVIVAL OF THE LAGID EMPIRE

Ptolemy Philadelphos died at the beginning of the thirtieth year of his reign, in 246 B.C., almost at the same time as Antiochos II.³ But, whereas in Egypt the transition

¹ **CXVI**, vol. iii, 2, § 121; but see **CLXI**, i, p. 340 n. 5.

² Glotz, in **LXXXVII**, 1916, p. 816.

³ According to E. Meyer, in **LXV**, Beiheft 2, Philadelphos abdicated in 247, and died in 245.

from one reign to the next took place smoothly, in Asia the situation created by the marriage of Antiochos and Berenice led to disorders and conflicts. Laodice had not resigned herself to her position as repudiated wife. She eventually resumed her ascendancy over her husband, who went to her at Ephesos, and there, it is said, she poisoned him and had her son Seleucos proclaimed King.¹ This meant breaking the treaty with Egypt, but Berenice and her son had supporters. Euergetes armed to maintain their cause. The incidents of this third Syrian war, or War of Laodice,² are very little known. It began with decisive victories for the Lagid, who wrote an account of them himself; some fragments of it on papyrus have come down to us (Pl. IV).³ It has been supposed that Euergetes, like his ancestor Ptolemy I, composed Memoirs. But the fragments preserved may equally well come from a letter of the King, written for example, to the Queen, a kind of *communiqué* of the victory. We see that the Egyptian troops had conquered Seleucid Syria. After speaking of the storming of a town, the King describes a *coup de main* on the Cilician coast and his triumphal entry into Seleuceia:

“ At the same time, Pythagoras and Aristocles,⁴ at the head of fifteen (?) ships, in obedience to a message from ‘ our sister ’, begging them to come to her help, sailed for Soli, and, taking the treasures laid up there, conveyed them to Seleuceia (on the Orontes). It was a sum of 1,500 talents of silver. Aribazus, Satrap of Cilicia, intended to send them to the supporters of Laodice at Ephesos. But the people of Soli and the soldiers of the garrison helped Pythagoras and Aristocles with vigour, and, thanks to the bravery of all, the treasures were seized and the town and citadel were captured. Aribazus escaped, but, while he was trying to cross the Tauros, some people of the country cut off his head and took it to Antioch. We, having made the fleet ready (perhaps in Cyprus), embarked on as many ships as the harbour of Seleuceia could hold, and sailed to the fort named Poseidion, where we cast anchor at the eighth hour of the day. Starting thence early in the morning, we reached Seleuceia, where priests, magistrates, citizens, officers, and soldiers came down to the harbour to meet us, carrying wreaths.”

A similar reception awaited Euergetes at Antioch, where he was welcomed by “ the Satraps, magistrates, priests,

¹ Pliny, NH, vii.53; Val. Max., ix.4, Ext. 1. ² I, 2905.

³ XXXV, ii, 45; iii, 144; CLXXX, n. 1; Croenert, in CCXXV, pp. 441 ff.; Holleaux, in LXXXVIII, 1916, pp. 153 ff.

⁴ Officers of the Ptolemaic army or Syrian supporters of Berenice.

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young men of the Gymnasium, and whole people, amid acclamations and plaudits". After libations and sacrifices :

"when the sun was setting, we went directly to 'our sister', and then dealt with business, giving audience to officers, soldiers, and people of the country and deliberating on the situation."

We see that the King speaks of Berenice as if she were still alive. It is, however, possible that she had already been killed with her child in a riot in Antioch,¹ and Polyænos declares that her women, "to allow Ptolemy to arrive and to send letters in the name of the young prince and Berenice," gave it out that she was only wounded. It was thanks to this stratagem, he adds, that Ptolemy was able to take possession of the whole country, from the Tauros to India, without fighting.²

From Antioch, Euergetes directed his troops towards the Euphrates. A celebrated epigraphic monument, erected to his glory by some unknown person and copied at Adulis by Cosmas Indicopleustes in the 6th century of our era, proclaims that "he made himself master of all the country west of the Euphrates . . . then crossed the Euphrates, and subdued Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Media, and all the rest as far as Bactriana".³ When he retired, being recalled to Egypt by disorders (*domestica seditio*),⁴ he left a governor over the central provinces, as he had left one in Cilicia to administer the territories conquered in Asia Minor.⁵

These conquests were, no doubt, due to the fleet. It had forced or received the submission of several cities of the coast, particularly in Ionia. It was perhaps at this time that Sophron, an old friend of Laodice, surrendered Ephesos.⁶ Miletos,⁷ Priene,⁸ and Smyrna⁹ remained loyal to Seleucos, but we know that Magnesia on Sipylus, for example, adopted Ptolemy's cause,¹⁰ and the King of Egypt was to acquire more possessions in Asia Minor, on the Hellespont, and in

¹ Val. Max., ix.14.

² Polyæn., viii.50 ff. ; LXXXVIII, 1916, pp. 160 ff.

³ IX, 54.

⁴ Just., xxvii.1.9.

⁵ Jerome, *In Dan.*, xi ; cf. CLXI, i, p. 259 ; CXVI, i, p. 259 n. 2 ; CLXIII, p. 189 n. 5, etc.

⁶ Athen., xiii.596c.

⁷ CCXLI, p. 114.

⁸ *Inscr. Brit. Mus.*, 403, l. 135.

⁹ X, 19.

¹⁰ CLXI, i, p. 252.

Thrace than his father had had. There is, however, reason for thinking that it was at this time that Macedonia intervened successfully in the war. Antigonos's fleet is said to have defeated the Ptolemaic fleet, under Sophron,¹ at Andros. This deprived the Lagid of the protectorate of the Cyclades, and a new series of Macedonian foundations begins at Delos about 245. This battle, followed by Ptolemy's retreat, was doubtless the signal for another turn of fortune.

Seleucos was still master of Asia Minor; political marriages secured the alliance of Mithradates of Pontus and Ariaramnes of Cappadocia. The Greek cities began to come back to him. On the Euphrates, at the place where Callinicon would afterwards stand, he defeated Ptolemy's generals, who abandoned these distant provinces as quickly as they had conquered them. Then he recovered Seleucid Syria, except Seleucia on the Orontes, which was to remain in the hands of the Lagids until the reign of Antiochos III (until 209). But Seleucos did not succeed in recovering Southern Syria. Presently an armistice was concluded. With her possessions in Syria, Phœnicia, Asia Minor, and Thrace, Egypt had an immense Empire, even greater than in the time of Philadelphos.² She was preponderant in the East, while Macedonia was losing Greece and the Empire of the Seleucids was beginning to fall asunder.

VIII

THE DECLINE OF MACEDONIAN POWER IN GREECE

Since Macedonia had lost Corinth, the power of the Leagues in Greece had grown continually. After the battle of Mantinea the Arcadian League was dissolved; Megalopolis and Orchomenos fell once more into the power of tyrants; but the Ætolians and Achæans profited by the circumstances to strengthen their own position. The Ætolian League, which was at war with the Bœotian League, won a battle at Chæroneia (245), annexed Phocis and Locris, and forced

¹ Trog., Prol., 27; CLXI, i, p. 256 n. 4; see IV, pp. 42, 56 n. For the much disputed chronology of the second and third Syrian Wars, and particularly for the dates of the battles of Cos, Ephesos, and Andros, I have followed IV. On the text of Trogus, see E. Pozzi, in *Memorie della Reale Accad. d. Scienze di Torino*, lxiii (1913), pp. 352-5.

² Below, pp. 248-50.

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its enemies to accept its alliance. These latter had been vainly supported by the Achæans. But this failure Aratos was able to wipe out. Corinth, which Nicæa, Alexander's widow, had restored to Antigonos, was once more snatched from Macedonia by the capture of Acrocorinthos (243), followed by that of the town itself, and it entered the Achæan League. Megara, Epidauros, and Trœzen left Macedonia and joined the Achæans.

Antigonos tried to set the Greeks one against another, and made an alliance with the Ætolians. Aratos naturally turned to Egypt, but Ptolemy was at the time taken up with his war on Seleucos, and Aratos only obtained an annual subsidy of six talents. Looking for other allies in Greece, he bethought himself of Sparta, the irreconcilable enemy of Macedonia.

Sparta was at this time suffering from a grave social disorder,¹ and the revolutions which were intended to remedy it make her history one of the most dramatic of the 3rd century. Dearth of men, *ὀλιγανθρωπία*, the plague of which Greece was to die in the 2nd century, had been sapping Sparta ever since the time following the Persian Wars.² For, in the midst of the peoples of Laconia, the Spartiates formed a closed class, which could not make legal unions with the others; it is not surprising that this class was exhausted. Whereas the original number of citizens, in the legendary period of Lycurgos, had been 9,000, and in the 5th century Herodotos gives the figure at 8,000,³ there were now barely more than 700.⁴ They had been further decimated by continual wars, and even by voluntary exile, for life was hard in Sparta, and people left it when they could. The world was full of Spartan *condottieri*. Lastly, the system of ownership and inheritance had contributed to the voluntary reduction of the number of births, or at least to the diminution of the number of citizens. The allotment of land, the *kleros*, cultivated by Helots, which was supposed to supply the Spartiate with the revenue needed for the obligations of his public life, was originally indivisible and inalienable. On the death of the father, it went in its entirety

¹ Fustel de Coulanges (ed. C. Jullian), *Nouvelles Recherches sur quelques problèmes d'histoire*, pp. 52-99.

² *CXX*, p. 155.

³ *Hdt.*, vii, 234.

⁴ *Plut.*, *Agis*, 5.

to the eldest son. Younger sons were in danger of being reduced to penury, and so excluded from the citizen body. Nothing was more dreadful to the Spartiate than poverty and it may have been this dread which maintained a primitive custom, which Polybius describes as usual and traditional, by which three brothers could marry one and the same woman.¹

Yet, in the 3rd century, most Spartiates were poor. Not only had the national territory been greatly reduced in consequence of the unsuccessful wars of the 4th century, but the few had grown rich at the expense of the many. This was, first of all, the result of the development of movable property. No Hellenic people loved money more. *Χρήματ' ἀνὴρ*, "Money is the man," was a Spartan saying,² and it was perhaps in Lacedæmon that the contrast between the luxury of the rich and the distress of others was greatest. True to the conservative spirit which was a feature of her institutions, Sparta had kept her iron money down to Alexander's time, but there were ways of evading the law, and the rich had deposits of foreign coin in the Arcadian cities, such as Tegea.³ Equality of landed property had ceased to be anything but a pure ideal. For a long time, a law attributed to the Ephor Epitadeus, of unknown date, had made it possible to give away the *kleros* or to bequeath it by testament.⁴ In this disguise a sale could be effected, and men who had not succeeded in making themselves wealthy often mortgaged their *kleros*, in the form of a donation or will. Thus the majority of the *kleroi* came into the same hands, and very often into the hands of women. For a curious feature of this Spartan society was the importance of the women, who came to own two-fifths of the soil. The wars, which consumed so many warriors, and the law of Epitadeus, which made it possible to give big dowries to daughters, resulted in an increase in the number of heiresses (*epikleroi*), who, whereas their marriages had originally been arranged by the King, could now be married by the testamentary dispositions of their parents.

In no city, perhaps, would there be a more bitter struggle

¹ Polyb., xii.6.8.

² Alceos, 49; cf. E. Meyer, in *LXI*, 1886, p. 586.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 586-7.

⁴ Plut., *Agis*, 5.

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between the rich creditors and the poor debtors. For a long time the programme of the popular party had included the abolition of debts, the distribution of lands, and the naturalization of Periœci and foreigners in the Spartiate class, and a Lysander, who was Ephor at the time of the fall of Corinth (243), had laid these proposals before the Gerusia. In 242, Agesilaos, the uncle of the young King Agis, prosecuted the other King, Leonidas, to whom the failure of the democratic projects was due, secured his condemnation, and caused him to be replaced by Cleombrotos. In the following year, Agesilaos and Agis effected a revolutionary *coup d'Etat*, deposing the Ephors, who were then of the opposition party, after which they burned all creditors' bonds.

Such was the state of Sparta when she joined forces with the Achæans. There was something awkward in the alliance, for Aratos and the Achæans relied on the possessing classes, and the democratic spirit animating the Spartan army disturbed them. Meanwhile, the Ætolians threatened the Peloponnese and were marching on the Isthmus. Agis and Aratos met at Corinth. But, while Agis was for fighting, Aratos wanted to temporize. No doubt, he was trying to remove the Spartan army, which seemed a danger to his own troops. Agis returned to Sparta. The people were murmuring, waiting in vain for the distribution of land, and their discontent had given the opposition new strength. Presently Leonidas returned from exile, and the friends of Agis were banished, while Agis himself, his mother, and his grandmother, were condemned and executed (autumn, 241).

In the meantime, the Ætolians were beaten by Aratos in the Peloponnese, near Pellene. When they returned, in the following year, with the Spartan exiles, they pillaged Laconia, but could not take Sparta. Aratos, for his part, failed in an attempt to liberate Argos and Athens, the only two cities still ruled by Macedonia.

Antigonos Gonatas died in 239, when his work in Greece was collapsing. His son Demetrios II, who succeeded him, had, on the death of Alexander of Epeiros, about 250, married Phthias, the daughter of the Regent Olympias.¹ Thereby

¹ He repudiated Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochos I.

Macedonian influence in that country was reinforced. But he had hardly become King, when the Ætolians and Achæans united against him. A victorious campaign, in which Aratos finally defeated the tyrant of Argos, made such an impression on the Peloponnese that Lydiades in Megalopolis ¹ and Nearchos in Orchomenos overthrew the tyranny and made their cities enter the Achæan League. Tegea and Mantinea joined the Ætolians. The war against Macedonia was not so successful. Demetrios re-established his authority in Boeotia, Phocis, and Epeiros, the last of which he had lost for a moment. But the Ætolians kept Ambracia and Amphilochia, and the Achæan League kept Corinth. When Demetrios fell, in an expedition against the Dardanians, he left as his successor a child of nine, his son Philip, under the guardianship of Antigonos Doson, the son of Demetrios the Fair, and Antigonos presently took the title of King. But Greece was altogether out of his hands. Even Argos had joined the Achæan League.

IX

THE DISLOCATION OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE

In Asia, the Seleucid Empire had emerged from its struggle with the Lagid diminished, and there were many other causes of weakness. The Eastern provinces were gradually falling off. Diodotos, Satrap of Bactriana, made himself independent, and Andragoras, Satrap of Parthia, struck coins in his own name. Finally (perhaps not before the reign of Seleucos II), the Aparni, a tribe of the Dahæ established in Astavene, under Arsaces and Tiridates, were to take the north of Parthia from the Seleucid, so founding the power of the Parthians.

In Asia Minor, the domain of the Seleucids was greatly reduced. To fight Ptolemy Euergetes, Seleucos II had recognized the independence of Cappadocia, since his sister married Ariaramnes, afterwards King under the name of Ariarathes III, and it has been conjectured that the Seleucid princess received as dowry Cataonia and Melitene, which

¹ Plut., *Arat.*, 24, 30, 35 ; **CXVI**, vol. iii, 2, p. 176 ff.

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formed one of the *Strategiai* of Cappadocia.¹ To Mithradates of Pontus, who had married Laodice, another sister of Seleucos, the rights over Greater Phrygia had been ceded. That province was, in any case, occupied in great part by the Galatians. Lastly, the rulers of Pergamon remained quite independent. At the death of Eumenes, the territory of the principality extended, on the west, from the Bay of Adramyttion to that of Elæa; on the north, from Ida, where the Attalids had estates, to Mount Pelecas and the Apian Plain; and, on the south-west, to the neighbourhood of Thyateira and the valley of the Lycos. On this side was the fortress of Attaleia; Philetæreia was at the foot of Ida. Eumenes had died in 241, and had been succeeded by his cousin Attalos, who refused to pay tribute to the Galatians. The result was a war, regarding which an inscription on his great triumphal monument tells us of the victory won over the Tolistoagii at the sources of the Caïcos.²

While its neighbours were thus increasing their power, the Seleucid dynasty was weakened by division.³ Discord within the royal household is an ordinary evil of Eastern monarchies; but nowhere did it break out so prematurely as in the Seleucid Empire, which it finally destroyed. The King's mother, Laodice, greedy for power like so many princesses of her time, thought that it would be easy for her to rule in the name of her youngest son, Antiochos Hierax, aged fourteen. Seleucos was a grown man, with the prestige of success. With the support of her brother Alexander, who was Satrap of Sardis, the Queen Mother managed to compel her eldest son to divide the Empire, and Seleucos abandoned all the provinces west of the Tauros to Antiochos. The partition was effected before the conclusion of the armistice with Ptolemy (242).

In a situation of the kind, internal war was almost inevitable. It is known as the War of the Two Brothers, and the chief result was the aggrandizement of the kingdom of Pergamon. Hierax, supported by the natural enemies of his house—Bithynia, Pontus, Pergamon, and Ptolemy—ended by imposing peace on Seleucos, who was defeated, in particular, at Ancyra, thanks to the Galatians. The partition of the Empire was maintained (237).

¹ CXVI, iii, 1, p. 698.

² IX, 276.

³ CLXII, p. 106 ff.

In the same year, a treaty brought hostilities between Euergetes and Seleucos to an end.¹ Seleucos was summoned to the East, where the Parthians, in alliance with Diodotos II of Bactriana, inflicted a serious defeat on him. During his absence, he nearly lost his throne, for Stratonice, the repudiated wife of the Macedonian King Demetrios, had taken refuge in Syria, where she had recruited supporters. She was arrested at Seleuceia and put to death (236).

In Asia Minor, Hierax defended the realm of the Seleucids no better. By marrying the daughter of Ziælas, who had made himself King of Bithynia after forcibly removing his brother Zipætēs, he fell foul of Mithradates of Pontus and Attalos. In alliance with the Gauls, he rashly attacked the territory of Pergamon, and was defeated at the Temple of Aphrodite. Abandoned by his allies, he suffered three great defeats, one in Hellespontine Phrygia, one in Lydia, at Coloë (229–228), and one in Caria, near the River Harpasos. He had lost his kingdom, and he fled to Mesopotamia, where, with the aid of Cappadocia and the ruler of Sophene, he tried to win himself a new one. But two princes of the Seleucid family, Andromachos and his son Achæos, who had remained faithful to Seleucos, reduced his projects to nothing. Hierax fled to Egypt, to Euergetes, who had supported him in the past; but Euergetes, thinking that nothing more was to be expected from the hot-headed youth, had him interned. The “Hawk” succeeded in “escaping from his cage”, and met his death in Thrace as an adventurer, fighting against Galatians.

What Antiochos Hierax had lost in Asia Minor did not go back to Seleucos, but fell to Attalos, who now called himself King. His kingdom was already a great state. His influence extended over many Greek cities. Myrina, Gryneia, Elæa, Pitane, and Nacrassa had been part of the Pergamene state since the time of Eumenes; and now Attalos had allies or subjects in Temnos, Smyrna, Teos, Colophon, Alexandria Troas, Lampsacos, and, in the south, Magnesia on the Mæander. If many other cities did not belong to him, it was because they belonged to the Lagid Empire or to Macedonia. The Seleucid had hardly anything north of the Tauros.²

¹ **CXVI**, iii, 2, pp. 452 ff.

² **CXXLIII**, p. 25.

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Seleucos II died in 226. The first concern of Seleucos III (Ceraunos Soter) must have been to reconquer Asia Minor, and he sent armies beyond the Tauros. The inscriptions on the great monument of Pergamon have immortalized the defeat of his generals and his vassal Lysias, the son of Philomelos, governor of the cities of Lysias and Philomelion, in the heart of Phrygia. The King's uncle, Andromachos, was taken prisoner by Attalos, who gave him to Ptolemy Euergetes to guard.

Seleucos then prepared to act in person. He had made the Carian Hermias his chief minister, and, with his cousin Achæos, he crossed the Tauros, only to fall victim to a plot made by one of his officers, Nicanor, and a Galatian mercenary leader named Apaturius (223).¹

So, hard pressed on all sides, the Seleucid Empire was ready to fall asunder. It was indeed a contrast to the Lagid Empire. Since the end of the third Syrian War, the latter had lived in prosperity and peace, profiting by the weakness of its rivals, intriguing in Greece against the house of Antigonos, supporting the enemies of Seleucos in Asia, but never committing its vital forces, proud of the glory which its capital Alexandria shed over the whole world. But the moment was coming when the situation would be changed. The end of the 3rd century, in which we see the struggle of Rome and Carthage in the West, shows us in the East, also, a succession of changes preparing for the new times. First, there is the revival of Macedon under Antigonos Doson, followed by the reconstitution of the Seleucid Empire under Antiochos III and the consequent diminution of the Lagid Empire. But Rome has now come into contact with the East. Released from the Punic Wars, she breaks Macedonia, and checks the rise of Antiochos. At the beginning of the 2nd century, the menace and the action of Rome impose a kind of servile equilibrium on the great powers of the Orient, which are destined to fall, one by one, and to be absorbed, each in turn, in the Roman Empire.

¹ CLXII, pp. 118-82.

CHAPTER II

THE RESTORATION AND FALL OF MACEDON AND OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE

I

THE REVIVAL OF MACEDONIAN POWER ¹

BARELY two years after the death of Seleucos III, Antigonos Doson, taking advantage of the inevitable dissensions, had regained his preponderance in Greece.

For the Ætolians were naturally jealous of the growing power of the Achæan League. But there was a yet deeper hostility between that League, in which landowners predominated, and Sparta, where the party of the poor, who had hoped to triumph with Agis, were to find an other and more redoubtable champion in King Cleomenes.

Cleomenes' father was King Leonidas, the opponent of social reforms, his mother was Cratesicleia, who supported him and finally died with him, and his wife was the rich and beautiful Agiatis, King Agis's widow, whom Leonidas had feared to give to anyone but his own son; lastly, he was a pupil of the Stoic Sphæros of Panticapæon. Far from following in his father's footsteps, he meditated revolutionary projects, but put them off until by victories he should have restored the power of Sparta and the prestige of the kingship. He must, therefore, have war with the Achæans, and nothing was easier than to provoke it. Already, out of jealousy of the Achæans, the Ætolians had allowed the Arcadian cities of Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyæ to leave their own League, and these had joined Sparta. A frontier dispute with Megalopolis brought on the conflict. Aratos had entered Arcadia, and had failed in an attempt on Tegea and Orchomenos, and, when the army of the League met that of Sparta, near Pallantion, he had made it refuse battle (228). Some time later, he was defeated near the Lyceion; all that he achieved was to take Mantinea and to make it enter the Achæan League again.

Recalled to Sparta by distrustful Ephors, Cleomenes,

¹ Chief sources : Plut., *Cleom.* and *Arat.*

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to conciliate the party of Agis, caused the young King Eudamidas, who had just died, to be succeeded by Agis's own brother, Archidamos. Then he could recommence the war. He was successful, for he won a great victory over the Achæan army, commanded by Aratos and Lydiades, near Leuctra, Lydiades being slain, while Aratos only partially redeemed the disaster by some successes in Arcadia.

Strong in the prestige of victory, Cleomenes thought the moment ripe, and, leaving part of his army in Arcadia, returned to Sparta. Arriving when the Ephors were at their dinner, he caused them to be massacred, and then overturned their seats on the Agora, leaving only his own standing. Archidamos fled, and Cleomenes justified his conduct to the Assembly of the people, proclaimed the restoration of the constitution of Lycurgos, proposed the abolition of debts, and declared a distribution of land. Eighty suspect Spartiates were banished, 4,000 Pericæci were introduced into the Spartiate class, and Archidamos, having been recalled, was subsequently assassinated.¹ The whole power was then in the hands of Cleomenes, who took his own brother to be the second King. The old way of life was revived—the meals in common, the black broth and barley bread, in one word, the ἀγωγή of Lycurgos, which Sparta had ceased to observe. But, at the same time, the army discarded its archaic aspect, and received the Macedonian sarissa. Then the war was resumed with the Achæans, who lost Mantinea in Arcadia and were defeated, in their own country, at Hecatombeon, in the territory of Dyme.

In spite of the opposition of Aratos, the Achæans had to make peace (226). It was disastrous for them; they could only recover their lost strongholds and prisoners on condition that they gave Cleomenes the presidency of the League. Thus almost the whole Peloponnese was under the power of Sparta. But, on the very day that Cleomenes was to receive the investiture in a general assembly, he was stopped on the way by a sudden hæmorrhage. Aratos, who had not taken part in the negotiations for peace, was thus able to gain time, and he made use of it to hasten his conversations with Macedonia.

¹ For divergencies in tradition on the date and circumstances, see **CXVI**, vol. iii, 1, p. 71.

Negotiations had already been commenced immediately after the reforms of Cleomenes. These reforms alarmed Aratos and the possessing classes in the Achæan cities, where the poor were becoming restive, and Cleomenes had supporters. Now that the independence of his country was threatened as well as its institutions, there was no other country to which Aratos could turn. Ptolemy, the old friend of the League, was a still greater friend of Cleomenes. What he wanted in Greece was a strong and irreconcilable adversary of Macedonia; and Sparta, under Cleomenes, seemed much better fitted for the rôle than the Achæans. Aratos, had, therefore, to choose between the hegemony of the revolutionary King and that of Antigonos. Many a battle had been fought to throw off the domination of Macedonia. All that was to be forgotten. Macedonia demanded that Corinth should be delivered to her, and this caused Aratos to hesitate. Could he make up his mind to destroy all his work with his own hands?

In the meantime, Cleomenes, having recovered, demanded that a new assembly should meet at Argos, to confer the presidency on him. But the Achæans, who had got back their prisoners, were now very unwilling to do so, and, as Cleomenes approached, Aratos informed him that he must not come into the city with his troops; if he did not wish to be separated from them, the Assembly would move to the Cyllaribion, a gymnasium outside the walls. Cleomenes took this mark of distrust very ill, since it portended refusal to observe the treaty. A breach ensued. The Spartan won a series of decisive victories. Pellene, Pheneos, and Caphyæ in Arcadia were taken, Argos was delivered to him by Aristomachos, and Ptolemy concluded a formal alliance with Sparta. A popular revolution broke out in Sicyon itself; Aratos caused the democratic supporters of Cleomenes to be massacred, but only just escaped with his life. After vainly attempting to come to terms, the King of Sparta laid siege to Sicyon.

Then the Achæans had to resign themselves to the alliance of Macedonia, and at once fortune changed sides. The Ætolians remained neutral and allowed the Macedonians to go through Thermopylæ. Cleomenes intended to defend the Isthmus, and established himself on the ridge of Oneion.

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But the Achæans had taken Argos in his rear and Cleomenes, fearing to be cut off from Sparta, abandoned his positions. Corinth gave itself up to Macedonia. At Ægion there was a meeting of the deputies of the Achæans and all their allies, Thessalians, Epeirots, Acarnanians, Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians, and Orientals. A Council was instituted, and the presidency of the alliance was given to Antigonos. It was a revival of the Confederation of Corinth, as in the days of Philip, Alexander, and Demetrios Poliorcetes.¹

The empire of Cleomenes was about to collapse. His prestige was already damaged. One after another, the cities fell off from Sparta. Arcadia returned to the Achæans. Mantinea was punished for her treachery; her citizens were sold, and the city received a colony and was renamed Antigoneia. Being reduced to Laconia, Cleomenes tried to build up his army again. He succeeded in pillaging Megalopolis, but failed against Argos, where Antigonos had his winter quarters. To crown his misfortunes, Ptolemy abandoned him. Egypt was now alarmed by the attitude of the Seleucid. She needed the neutrality of Macedonia, and had to promise that she herself would also remain neutral. Moreover, Cleomenes was at the end of his resources, and had no alternative but a decisive battle. It was fought in Laconian territory, at Sellasia,² and was a terrible defeat for Sparta. Cleomenes was obliged to flee with his friends. In the city, he persuaded his people to receive Antigonos, and hardly took time to rest a few moments in his own house, without taking off his armour. With a few companions, he hastened down to Gytheion, where he embarked. He sailed to Cythera, Ægialia, and Cyrene, and finally took refuge in Alexandria, in the hope of obtaining further subsidies and ships with which to resume the struggle in his country. In Sparta, the old order of things was restored. Antigonos was master of Greece. Soon afterwards, he was obliged to hasten to his frontier, against the Illyrians, whom he defeated.

¹ This is the time to which some scholars refer the inscriptions of Epidauros. See Kougéas, in **XCIX**, 1921, pp. 12 ff.; Swoboda, in **LIX**, lvii (1922), pp. 518-84.

² Polyb., ii.65-9; Plut., *Cleom.*, 88; Liv., xxxiv.28.1. Date: summer, 222 (Holleaux, Sokolov; cf. **IV**, 51, p. 67); June, 221 (**CXVI**, vol. iii, 2, p. 169). Place: Soteriades, in **LXXXV**, 1910, pp. 1-57; 1911, pp. 87-107, 241-2; Kromayer, *ibid.*, 1910, pp. 508-37.

At the end of the campaign he died of phthisis. He was about forty-two years old, and left the throne to his ward, Philip, the son of Demetrios, then aged seventeen, him who was afterwards beaten by the Roman (222 or 221).

II

THE BEGINNINGS OF ANTIOCHOS III. RAPHIA ¹

The restoration of the Seleucid Empire was the achievement of Antiochos III. When he succeeded his brother Seleucos III, he was barely twenty years old (223), and was under the influence of his chief minister, the Carian Hermias. The Empire, as we have seen, appeared ready to fall to pieces. The provinces west of the Tauros were in the hands of Attalos, who had donned the crown and shown that he meant to make Pergamon the capital of Asia Minor.² The provinces of the Far East no longer belonged to the Seleucid, and the fidelity of even Media and Persia might one day be shaken. In Syria itself, Seleuceia was in the hands of Ptolemy.

To secure peace in this badly weakened Empire, it had been divided in two ! Achæos had kept the government of Asia Minor, which entailed the duty of driving Attalos back within the limits of his principality. He was fairly successful, for he was able to send part of his troops back to the King, with Epigenes, the experienced leader who had commanded them (222). The central Satrapies had been entrusted to Molon, the Strategos of Media, and his brother Alexander, Strategos of Persia. The King was in Syria, where he proposed to await a favourable opportunity to attack the possessions of Egypt, when news was brought to Antioch of the defection of Molon and Alexander (222). The East was "the crumbling side of the Empire",³ and the example of Bactriana and Parthia was contagious. Molon might reasonably expect the support of Achæos, who, like himself, resented the influence of Hermias ; it was hardly likely that the prince of the royal house, victorious in Asia Minor, would consent to remain an obedient governor. In the Council which the King called at Antioch, Epigenes

¹ Chief source : Polyb., v.81-71, 74-87. See CLXI, i, pp. 298-314 ; CLXII, pp. 122-57 ; CLXIII, i, pp. 300-20.

² CCLXII, p. 22.

³ CXCII, p. 127.

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was in favour of swift action, and advised that the King should march against the rebels in person, since their troops would doubtless yield to the prestige of their lawful sovereign. But Hermias thought differently. He feared that the war would prove too hard an undertaking, and proceeded to accuse Epigenes of treacherously wishing to expose the King's life. In his opinion, Egypt was the danger. Alleged letters of Achæos gave rise to a suspicion that there was an understanding between the governor of Asia Minor and the Court of Alexandria. The Council fell in with the opinion of Hermias, and they only sent two generals against Molon—Xenon and Theodotos, surnamed Hemiolios, "One-and-a-half," doubtless on account of his tallness. They marched to disaster.

Hermias had reasons for thinking war against the Lagid less dangerous than the expedition against Molon. Young Ptolemy Philopator must soon succeed his father Ptolemy Euergetes, who had been ill a long time, and little good was said of the future King. He was supposed to be heedless, and more interested in his debauches than in the greatness of his dynasty; he must already have been the plaything of his mistress Agathocleia and his minion Agathocles, a sister and brother to whom Polybius gives a black reputation. The voluptuary was, as so often happens, a mystic as well, greatly attached to orgiastic, ecstatic cults like that of the Great Mother,¹ and, more especially, that of Dionysos.² Now, in these religions there were many rites which appeared extravagant, shameful, and unworthy of a king to Hellenes of the old stamp, and Philopator's practice of them has greatly contributed to his unpopularity with the historians. It is, at least, certain that he was not a great king.

He had for a counsellor an able minister who, like Hermias, seems to have grown old in harness. Polybius speaks of him as a "crafty old instrument",³ and Sosibios certainly does not seem to have been much hampered by virtuous scruples; but the historian's account allows one to guess that his talents as an organizer and a diplomat at least

¹ Plut., *Cleom.*, 36.3.

² Perdrizet, in *LXXXVIII*, 1910, pp. 218 ff.

³ Polyb., xv.25.

greatly contributed to saving Egypt.¹ It is true that, thanks to him, the new reign began in crime. He is said to have egged Philopator on to resort to murder in order to remove his brother Magas, who was popular with the mercenaries, and his mother Berenice, who was suspected of favouring Magas. He, too, is said to have been responsible, perhaps in the time of Euergetes, for the death of Lysimachos, the son of the first Arsinoë and grandson of the King of Thrace. Lastly, it was he who caused Cleomenes to be interned.

This was a consequence of the complete reversal, under the inspiration of Sosibios, of the policy of Alexandria. In the time of Philadelphos, Egypt had fought both with the Seleucid and with Macedonia. Euergetes had at first adhered to the example of his predecessor, and had supported Aratos, the Achæans, and Cleomenes. But some time before the battle of Sellasia he had informed the King of Sparta that he would send him no more subsidies, and told him to come to terms with Antigonos. For Euergetes and his minister had seen that the real danger for Egypt would now come from the West, and that, failing the support of Macedonia, they must obtain its neutrality.

Cleomenes was, therefore, an obstacle to the projects of the Alexandrian Court. He had, moreover, been so rash as to allow himself to be considered dangerous. At the time when the murder of Magas and Berenice was being contemplated, it was thought necessary to buy the complicity or silence of the courtiers by flattering the hopes of all. Sosibios accordingly made promises to Cleomenes, who was asking for troops and ships, with which to return to Greece when "circumstances seemed to call him by his name"—that is when the Achæans were warring on the Ætolians, who were united to the Lacedæmonians in common hatred of Macedonia. Having been let into the secret of the plot and told of the fears inspired by the attitude of the mercenaries, the conceited Lacedæmonian foolishly tried to reassure the minister by boasting of his reputation among those warlike bands. It is to be supposed that the downfall of Cleomenes was envisaged from that moment. Only an occasion was wanted, and it was furnished by the arrival of Nicagoras of Messene,

¹ Holleaux, in *LXXXVIII*, 1912, pp. 372 ff.; Collart-Jouguet, in *CXXV*, pp. 129 ff.

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a paternal guest-friend of Archidamos, the King of Sparta, whom Cleomenes had recalled from exile only to murder him. Nicagoras, who had been the intermediary in the negotiations leading to the fatal return of Archidamos, and had been present at the murder, harboured a secret desire for revenge on Cleomenes.

Like many others, Nicagoras came to Alexandria to trade, and he brought with him a cargo of war-horses. On landing, he met Cleomenes and his friends, Panteus and Hippitas, on the quay. Cleomenes greeted him courteously, and asked him why he had come. Nicagoras answered that he was bringing horses to the King. "It would be much better for you if you had brought catamites and harp-girls." Nicagoras smiled and said nothing, but he reported the remark to Sosibios, who persuaded him to write to the King, denouncing an alleged conspiracy of Cleomenes. It was then easy for Sosibios to obtain the internment of Cleomenes and his people, in a house lent by a courtier, "where Cleomenes differed from an ordinary prisoner only in that his prison was larger".¹

When he was certain that he would not be allowed to go, and that he was in danger of being quietly put away by the executioner like a criminal, the Spartan resolved upon a desperate attempt by which he would at least die gloriously and worthily of his country and his name. That death has been described by Polybius and Plutarch in a manner which cannot be bettered.² In their pages one can read how Cleomenes and his friends, eluding the vigilance of their guards, came out of their prison, fully armed, in broad daylight, and, running through the streets of Alexandria, tried to seize the Acropolis and to raise the people with the cry of "Liberty". But this was a word which had no longer the same meaning for Spartans and for Hellenes who obeyed kings. Not a soul moved. Cleomenes and his friends died, killing one another. This tragedy, followed by the execution of Cratesicleia and the Spartan women and children, relieved Sosibios of an inconvenient individual, but nothing had really been done for the defence of Egypt. And in the quarter of Syria the storm seemed to be nearer.

¹ Polyb., v.38.7.

² Polyb., v.39 ; Plut., *Cleom.*, 36-9.

Euergetes was, perhaps, still alive, when Xenon and Theodotos set out to put down Molon's rebellion, and Antiochos III, after celebrating his marriage with Laodice, the daughter of Mithradates of Pontus, at Seleuceia by the Ford, came to Antioch, where his new wife had been proclaimed Queen, to prepare for war against Egypt. There he learned that Molon had defeated Theodotos and Xenon, and conquered all Apolloniatis, the region lying on the left bank of the Tigris, south of its tributary the Dialas. Molon had even wished to besiege Seleuceia, the largest city in the Empire and its second capital, on the other side of the Tigris. But Zeuxis, one of the governors of the country, had prevented his crossing, and he had gone into winter quarters at Ctesiphon. The military resources of Media made him formidable. Antiochos, therefore, wished to march against him, but in the Council Hermias obtained a decision that the Achæan Xenœtas should be sent to Mesopotamia, as Strategos with full powers, while the King at last attacked Cœle-Syria.

The army was concentrated at Apameia in Syria, one of the military capitals of the Empire, and thence, by Laodiceia on the Orontes and the desert, it entered the valley of the Marsyas, and advanced between Lebanon and Antilebanon to the swamps and passes where the two forts of Brochi and Gerrha marked the Egyptian frontier. These were held by the Ætolian Theodotos, a *condottiere* in Ptolemy's service, and the Syrian attack failed. Almost at the same time, news came of the disastrous defeat of Xenœtas. He had been even more unfortunate than his predecessors. After succeeding in crossing the Tigris and driving back the enemy, whose camp he had pillaged, his army, surprised by the sudden return of Molon, had been wiped out, and he himself had been killed. Seleuceia had fallen into the hands of the rebel, who subdued Babylonia and the country by the Persian Gulf, captured Susa, of which the citadel alone held out, and made himself master "of Parapotamia to Europos and of Mesopotamia to Dura" (221).

Antiochos felt that if he delayed any longer he was likely to lose half his Empire. But the sitting of the Council was stormy, Hermias and Epigenes quarrelling violently. Hermias was obliged to give in. He was, however, clever

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enough to have Epigenes set aside, and even executed for high treason, on the strength of alleged letters from Molon.

In the middle of winter, Antiochos arrived at Antioch in Mygdonia, where he stayed forty days. From there he went to Libba, on the road to Nineveh, where a council was held. Against the advice of Hermias, who wanted them to remain on the right bank of the Tigris, where, after marching through a country without resources, they would have come to the obstacle of the royal canal, Zeuxis made them cross the river, and they came to Apollonia. Molon, fearing to be cut off from Media, likewise crossed the river, and the battle was fought in Apolloniatis. It was a disaster for Molon, whose troops deserted in great numbers, as Epigenes had foreseen. The plight of the rebel was so desperate that he killed himself on the evening of the defeat, and his brother Neolaos hastened to Persia, where he slew Molon's mother and children and himself as well. Alexander, the governor of Persia, followed the example. So great was the fear of falling into the victor's hands alive. Molon's body was crucified, according to custom.

The sojourn of Antiochos at Seleuceia on the Tigris was marked by the cruelties and exactions of Hermias. The King tried to soften his minister, whom he dared not yet resist openly, although he must have been growing impatient of his control. In spite of his objections, Antiochos wanted to make his power felt by the neighbouring rulers. He marched against Artabazanes, the old King of Atropatene, which had long fallen away from the Empire, and compelled him to recognize his distant overlordship. On the return from this expedition, he rid himself of the oppressive influence of Hermias, who was detested by the whole Court, and especially by Apollophanes, the King's physician. The plot was prepared secretly by Apollophanes and the King himself; in the course of a morning constitutional which the physician prescribed for the King, Hermias was isolated and murdered.

Antiochos was still in Atropatene, when, in Asia Minor, Achæos judged the moment come to declare himself King. Fortunately for Antiochos, Achæos had to reckon with the hostility of Attalos. Every division in the Seleucid Empire was naturally favoured by Egypt. But between Achæos,

the opponent of Antiochos, and Attalos, the enemy of the Empire, the Court of Alexandria must have been puzzled which to choose. The situation was further complicated by a war between Rhodes and Byzantion, over the tolls levied by the Byzantines on ships going through the straits. Prusias, the King of Bithynia, supported Byzantion. The Rhodians, to please Achæos, had obtained from Egypt the release of his father Andromachos, who had been a prisoner since 225, but they failed in their endeavours to reconcile Achæos and Attalos. Achæos's ardour was balked by his own troops, who mutinied in Lycaonia and refused to march against Antiochos. Achæos had to give up any further advance, and, to keep his men quiet, he led them into Pisidia, where he gave them their fill of booty.

Antiochos was, therefore, able to attend to the war with Egypt. In the spring of 219, the army concentrated at Apameia in Syria, and, on the advice of Apollophanes, its first act was to take Seleuceia, which thus, after more than twenty years, was restored to the dynasty of its founder (219).

At Seleuceia, Antiochos received a letter from Theodotos the Ætolian. The Court of Alexandria had not sufficiently recognized the services of the mercenary captain, who even had reason for thinking that his life was threatened. He now promised Antiochos to give him Ptolemaïs, which he had just occupied, while his colleague Panætolos surrendered Tyre. Once more, Antiochos hastened up the valley of the Marsyas, and, going through the pass of Berytos, in spite of the resistance of the enemy posts, he received the submission of the two cities.

So the situation was serious for Egypt, where nothing was ready. Ptolemy had gone to Memphis and was collecting all his available troops at Pelusion. But Sosibios and Agathocles could not hope to embark on the campaign so soon, and they succeeded in keeping the enemy amused by negotiations, soliciting the intervention of Rhodes, Byzantion, Cyzicos, and the Ætolians. The embassies were received at Memphis. In the meantime, military preparations were being hastened forward in Alexandria. The recruiting and training of the troops had been entrusted to the most celebrated *condottieri*.

Antiochos allowed himself to be caught by these devices ;

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he had just failed in the siege of Dora, and, asking for a four months' truce, he returned to Seleuceia for the winter. He hoped to obtain Cœle-Syria over the conference-table, and, moreover, he was disturbed by the attitude of Achæos, who can hardly have concealed his relations with Egypt. Negotiations were continued at Seleuceia. The Egyptians only wanted to gain time, and, to make agreement more difficult, they claimed that Achæos should be included in the peace.

In the spring of 218 conversations were broken off, and the war began again. Ptolemy's troops were concentrated at Gaza, under Nicolaos, supported by the fleet of the admiral Perigenes. From Gaza, Nicolaos had gone to occupy the pass of the Platanos, near Porphyryon (north of Sidon). Antiochos was advancing along the Phœnician coast. By Marathos, Arados, Theuprosopon, and Botrys, he came to Berytos, and from there to the Damuras, which falls into the sea near Porphyryon. His fleet, under Diognetes, followed the advance of the army. Nicolaos, defeated in the pass, retired on Sidon, suffering heavy losses; there he was joined by the Egyptian fleet, which had retired with less difficulty. Antiochos left the enemy in Sidon, which seemed too strong to take, but conquered almost all Cœle-Syria, part of Phœnicia, and Northern Palestine. All this time, Egypt had not brought out her whole forces, and the King's army, the great army prepared secretly in Alexandria, had not yet acted. It was to take the field at the end of the spring of 217.

It was now concentrated at Pelusion, and consisted of 70,000 foot, 7,000 horse, and 73 African elephants, the hunting of which had been organized in the Troglodyte country and Ethiopia, at any rate since the reign of Philadelphos. Egypt had not only called upon her ordinary forces—permanent corps of the Guard reinforced by Libyan cavalry, and regular troops settled about the country in colonies, who in this campaign were chiefly Thracians and Galatians, according to Polybius—but, by an innovation which was to have important consequences, a Macedonian phalanx had been made up of Libyan and, above all, Egyptian subjects, largely recruited from the mass of the natives outside the warrior class. This Egyptian phalanx of 20,000

men was commanded by Sosibios. They took the usual route, by Mount Casion, the Barathra, and the waterless desert, and on the fifth day, the 17th June, they camped 50 stades (five or six miles) from Raphia.

Antiochos, who had doubtless followed up his successes of the previous year in the spring, since he seems to have concentrated his troops at Gaza, advanced slowly from that city to within ten stades of the enemy. His army was less numerous than his opponent's; while, against the 73 African elephants, defeated in advance, he could produce his 102 Indian elephants, he had only 62,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 cavalry. Among them we find the same elements as in his opponent's army, and in all Hellenistic armies—heavy infantry of the phalanx armed in the Macedonian fashion, Greek mercenaries, and barbarians of all kinds—and he, too, had formed a phalanx of 10,000 men recruited in his kingdom, by the side of his 20,000 Macedonians or Greeks. Lastly, among his light troops were the famous Agrianians, as in the army of Alexander. But there was also a variety of corps raised among the Asiatics, perhaps wearing the arms of their nations, who remind one of the armies of the Achæmenids—5,000 Dahæ, Carmanians, and Cilicians; Persian bowmen and slingers forming, with the Agrianians, a body of 2,000 men; 5,000 Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians; 500 Lydian javelin-men; and even 1,000 Arabs under their national chief Zabdbibel, and others. There seems, therefore, to have been less unity in the Syrian army than in Ptolemy's, but the spirit of men and leaders must have been raised by the victories of the previous campaigns.

The battle took place on the 22nd June, the 10th Pachon. As always, the front line was formed of the infantry of the phalangites in the centre and the light troops and cavalry on the two wings. The two Kings were in command, Antiochos on his right and Ptolemy on his left, so that they were opposite each other. The battle began with a combat between the elephants, which were placed, as usual, on the right and left, in front of the line of battle. The African elephants, being smaller, had never been able to resist the Indian, and this time, too, although they made a fine stand, they had to yield. As those on the Egyptian left fell back,

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they threw the Guard, stationed behind them, into disorder, while the Greek mercenaries of the Syrian army drove back Ptolemy's peltasts. Antiochos then charged at the head of his squadrons, routing the opposing cavalry. On the left, therefore, the battle was lost for Ptolemy. In vain, aided by his sister, Queen Arsinoë, riding about with hair flying, he tried to stop or bring back the fugitives; he could only rally a few fragments, and took refuge behind the phalanx. Luckily for him, the right wing was commanded by an able leader, the Thessalian Echecrates. From the cloud of dust which rose on the left, Echecrates gathered what was happening on that side, and manœuvred so as to avoid the same disaster. Phoxidas and his Greek mercenaries joined the centre, which was formed by the phalanx, and so they became the extreme left of the right wing. They were ordered to resist the enemy's attack. Echecrates drew his cavalry and the Cretan corps, which were behind the elephants, to the right, to allow the fleeing beasts to go through the gap, and vigorously charged the enemy's cavalry, outflanking and routing them. In the meantime, Phoxidas was beating back the Arabs and Medes who were opposite him. The two phalanxes were thus isolated, both being uncovered on the flanks. After a furious struggle, the Syrian phalanx began to give ground. Antiochos might have recovered his advantage by returning against the Egyptian army as fast as he could, but in his inexperience and ardour he went too far in pursuit of those who were fleeing before him. He had to retreat to Gaza, whence he sent a request for leave to bury his dead. He left 10,000 foot soldiers, 300 horsemen, and six elephants on the field of battle, and 4,000 prisoners in the enemy's hands. Ptolemy had only lost 1,500 foot, 700 cavalry, and 16 elephants.

This victory was decisive. Ptolemy stayed three months in Phœnicia and Syria, receiving the submission of the cities, which welcomed him joyfully, for the Syrians had always preferred the rule of the Lagids to that of the Seleucids. It was in the course of this tour that he was received in Jerusalem. The Third Book of the Maccabees relates that he insisted on visiting the Temple, and, in spite of the protests of the Jews, on going into the Holy of Holies.

"But God chastised him, shaking him as a leaf in the wind, so that, falling to the ground and paralysed, he could not speak a word . . . His friends and body-guards took him away as quickly as possible, fearing that he would lose his life and being stricken with great terror." The Third Book of the Maccabees is probably a pious romance, composed in the reign of Caligula, and most critics doubt its evidence in this case. One may, however, hesitate to reject it. Philopator was a mystic, and there is nothing inconceivable either in his desire to enter the Holy of Holies or in the terror which seized him, in the midst of the excitement, prayers, and threats of the Jews, "at the sight of the *maleak* of Jehovah, that is, of Jehovah Himself".¹ A decree of the Egyptian priests, who met at Memphis to bestow divine honours on Philopator and his sister, gives an account of the battle of Raphia and the Syrian campaign, confirming that of Polybius. This document tells us that the King had to put down a rising, perhaps in Palestine, for it mentions a rebel chief, whose name seems to have been Eleazar.²

Antiochos had returned to Antioch, disheartened by his defeat and very uneasy about the activities of Achæos, who was fortunately kept in check by the hostility of Attalos. He hastened to negotiate with Ptolemy, to whom he had sent his nephew Antipatros and Theodotos Hemiolios. Ptolemy, impatient to return to his life of pleasure and mystical orgies, made little difficulty about granting a one year's truce, and Sosibios went to Antioch to complete the negotiations. Egypt recovered Cœle-Syria. Of the conquests of her former Kings, she lost only Seleuceia, which naturally belonged to the master of Antioch. Egyptian diplomacy abandoned Achæos, who was not included in the peace.

Such was the "paradoxical" battle of Raphia. Everything seemed to portend the defeat of Egypt, and Egypt was saved. She kept her Empire almost intact, and yet Polybius makes no mistake in regarding Philopator's reign as the beginning of her decline. While the loser of Raphia, by his energetic action, was to restore the power of the

¹ Perdrizet, in **LXXXVIII**, 1910, p. 235.

² **CXC**. The reading "Eleazar" is doubtful and contested.

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Seleucids in Asia, Ptolemy, after a triumphal reception in Egypt, would have to cope with the most terrible difficulties. Almost immediately after his victory, he was faced with an unexpected consequence of it :

“ In arming the Egyptians for the war against Antiochos, Ptolemy had taken a step suited to the needs of the moment, but unfortunate for the future. Elated by the success of Raphia, the natives could no longer endure to obey, and proceeded to look for a man who could act as a leader, being convinced that they were capable of helping themselves.” ¹

The reigns of Philopator and his successor Epiphanes were almost entirely taken up by civil war, and, weakened by these internal disorders, Egypt was not long in losing Cœle-Syria and her possessions on the Ægean.

Raphia may be regarded as marking an epoch in the history of the Hellenistic monarchies. The three great powers, Macedonia, the Seleucids, and Egypt, were almost equally balanced. When, after the conquests of Antiochos, this equilibrium was broken, the appearance of the Roman power in the East would overturn everything. In 217 the second Punic War began, which kept Rome in the Western basin of the Mediterranean. But before the end of that war she would be in conflict with Macedonia.

III

RESTORATION AND FALL OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE

If Antiochos abandoned Cœle-Syria to Ptolemy for the time being, it was because he had to remove a more serious menace. Achæos was now King, and master of Asia Minor, with which he would clearly not rest content. But he had a rival and enemy in the person of Attalos of Pergamon. In 218, when Antiochos was leading his victorious armies into Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, and even Palestine, Achæos had thought it advantageous, in a dispute between the Pisidian cities of Pednelissos and Selge, to take sides against Selge, which he reduced. Attalos at once seized the occasion. Summoning a band of Gauls called Ægosages from Thrace, he recovered the cities of the Æolian coast. Cyme, Phocæa, and Smyrna surrendered to him voluntarily,

¹ Polyb., v.107.2-4.

Ægæ and Temnos yielded to threats, and Teos and Colophon sent ambassadors, who renewed the old treaties with Attalos. Then the King of Pergamon turned against the Mysians and attacked their settlements (κατοικίαι) dotted about the mountainous region between the upper valley of the Caïcos and that of its tributary the Mysos. He crossed the Lycos (?), doubtless the river of Thyateira, and reached the valley of the Macestos, taking the strongholds of Carseæ and Didyma. An eclipse of the moon created panic among his Galatians, who followed him as a tribe, with their women and children on waggons. Deeming it unsafe to keep them with him, Attalos went and settled them on the Hellespont, and then, having received embassies from Lampsacos, Alexandria Troas, and Ilion, which had remained faithful to him, he returned to Pergamon (218). All through 217 Achæos made war on him without success.¹

Such was the state of Asia Minor when Antiochos returned from Raphia. It was time for him to intervene. The Court of Alexandria must have been secretly egging on Achæos. Antiochos was obliged to ally himself with Attalos. Achæos was soon defeated, and shut up in Sardis. Sosibios tried to come to his help, perhaps by supplying him with Ætolian mercenaries. Finally he sent the Cretan Bolis, a man who could be used for any purpose, to effect Achæos's escape. But Bolis betrayed both Sosibios and Achæos, delivering the latter to Antiochos, who had him put to death (218).²

Antiochos had thus recovered Asia Minor, doubtless not without agreeing to certain sacrifices to his ally Attalos. It is probable that the latter kept the territories which he had had before his war with Antiochos Hierax—that is, southwards to Colophon, and northwards perhaps as far as the Hellespont. We may suppose that Antiochos also let him have Olympean Mysia.

Having thus restored order in the west of the Empire, Antiochos now had to make his royal authority felt in the Eastern provinces which had fallen off. From 212 to 204,

¹ Polyb., v.72-8. On the expedition of Attalos, see Radet, in **LXXXVIII**, 1896, pp. 1-18; Holleaux, *ibid.*, 1897, p. 409; **CCLIII**, pp. 47-8; **CXLII**, p. 34; A. J. Reinach, in **LXXXIX**, 1908, p. 334 n.1.

² Polyb., v.107; vii.15-18; xviii.15-23.

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he made the "armed tour" which took him to the frontiers of India.¹ He marched in the footsteps of Alexander, and even of Darius. He came back from it with the surname of "the Great"² and immense prestige.

He had strengthened his kingship by the admiration which his daring and endurance inspired in his subjects. It was by this expedition that he showed himself worthy of the kingship, not only to the peoples of Asia, but to those of Europe.³

His first concern must have been to find a favourable moment to revive the Syrian question, which had been decided against him thirteen years before. Philopator, after a troublous reign, died in the following year, leaving an heir aged five. The early years of this royal child seem to have been difficult.⁴ Agathocles and Agathocleia had, to the very end, dominated the late King, whose last years had been spent in debauchery. In agreement with old Sosibios, they are said to have concealed his death until they had had time to forge a will appointing them the guardians of the young prince. They had also taken the precaution of removing Arsinoë, whom they caused to be murdered secretly. Then they proceeded to proclaim the King.

They built a dais in the great peristyle of the Palace, and convoked the hypaspists, the personnel of the royal household, and the officers of the infantry and cavalry. When all were assembled, Agathocles and Sosibios, standing on the dais, admitted the death of the King and Queen, and ordered public mourning, according to the custom of the country. After this, they placed the crown on the boy's head and proclaimed him King. They then proceeded to read a forged will of the late King, appointing Agathocles and Sosibios the child's guardians. Next, they exhorted the officers to remain loyal and to guard the Empire of the little King. After that, they brought out two silver urns, one of which, they said, contained the bones of the late King, and the other, those of Arsinoë. The first really contained the King's bones, but the second was filled with spices. Then they went on with the funeral immediately.⁵

This performance deceived nobody; the people saw that Arsinoë had been killed. Great excitement spread among the populace, "less an evidence of affection for the Queen than one of hatred for Agathocles." The latter

¹ CCXLIII, pp. 82 ff.

² Holleaux, in LXXXV, 1908, pp. 266 ff. ; IV, p. 76.

³ Polyb., xi.39.14-16.

⁴ Chief source : Polyb., xv.25-37. ⁵ Polyb., xv.25.8-7.

caused the troops to receive two months' pay and to take the usual oath.

It would be very surprising if the rivals of Egypt had not arranged between themselves to profit by the weakness of such an unpopular and corrupt government. They did so, in a thoroughly cynical fashion. Between Antiochos and Philip V, King of Macedon, a pact was concluded which must have disgusted contemporaries as it does Polybius.¹

Philip V of Macedon dominated Greece. He was supported by the party of the rich, and he had alliances with the Bœotians in the North and with the Achæans in the Peloponnese. But at the beginning of his reign he had been compelled, with his allies, to conduct a war against his unconquerable enemies, the Ætolians. These had allied themselves with Lycurgos, King of Sparta, which had returned to democracy. Hostilities commenced in 219 with Ætolian successes, continued in 218 and 217 with successes for Philip, and ended in 217 with the peace of Naupactos. But hegemony over Greece was not the sole object of the Antigonids. Macedonia was striving to establish her preponderance on the sea-coasts, east and west. So she was bound to come into conflict with Rome. Rome, becoming mistress of Italy, had been concerned for her security on the Adriatic side since the beginning of the 3rd century, and had occupied the sea-board. She also required free use of the sea, and had been gradually led to take action against the Illyrian pirates. She disposed of them in two short wars. The first of these (229–228) had been terminated by a treaty which forbade Illyrian ships to sail south of Lissos and established a Roman protectorate over the Greek cities of the Dalmatian coast (Epidamnos, Apollonia, Oricon), Corcyra, and certain barbarian peoples, such as the Parthinians and Atintanes. The second war (219) was directed against Demetrios of Pharos, a former protégé of Rome, now allied to Macedonia. The Romans took the small island of Pharos, and Demetrios fled to Philip (219). The conflict between Rome and Macedonia might have broken out earlier, had it not been for Carthage. The year 219 was the date of the fall of Saguntum in Spain and the Roman ultimatum which opened the second Punic War.

¹ Polyb., xv.20.

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The breach between Rome and Carthage was, therefore, favourable to the designs of Philip, who, pursuing his policy in Illyria, even went to the length of attacking the Greek city of Apollonia. He was frustrated by the intervention of the Roman fleet. Macedonia being almost without ships, his efforts were paralysed by a squadron of M. Valerius Lævinus, who cruised in the Adriatic from 215 onwards. But in 216 he became the ally of Hannibal. The Romans then had to pay more active attention to events in Greece, and they took advantage of another war between Philip and the Ætolians to ally themselves with the latter. In 206 Philip dictated peace to the defeated Ætolians, and in 205 he signed a treaty with the Romans which was on the whole advantageous to himself (the peace of Phœnice).¹

It was natural that he should now look eastwards. The moment was as favourable to his ambitions as to those of Antiochos. Not that the Court of Alexandria was blind to the danger. Agathocles had sent ambassadors to Philip, to Antiochos, and even to Rome.² Scopas had been sent to raise mercenaries in Greece.³ Scopas was an Ætolian statesman, who, having been made Nomographos during the social troubles which agitated his country after the peace of Phœnice, had proposed the abolition of debts and tried to foment a revolution. Failing, he had placed his military talents at the service of Egypt, where he hoped to be able to satisfy his greed.⁴ Agathocles, having taken these measures, had returned to his life of pleasure, respecting nothing in his debauches, and giving the office of "Friend" to his vilest boon-companions. His unpopularity increased, while a party formed round Tlepolemos, who had perhaps been disgraced and set aside in Philopator's lifetime, but was now once more Strategos of Pelusion and was determined to obtain the guardianship of the little King. He gathered his supporters about him at banquets, where talk grew more and more unrestrained and derisive about "the wall-painter and the harp-girl and the hair-dressing woman and the brat who was so obliging when he was the King's cup-bearer in his young days".⁵

¹ Holleaux, **CLXVII**, pp. 173 ff. ² Polyb., xv.25.13-14.

³ *Ibid.*, 15. ⁴ Polyb., xiii.1-3 ; **CLXVII**, p. 189 n. 2.

⁵ Polyb., xv.25.32.

Agathocles felt the danger rising round him. He tried to defend himself, and accused Tlepolemos of having an understanding with Antiochos. He caused unpopular persons who might be dangerous to be executed. Finally, he attempted to rouse the anger of the troops stationed at the Court against Tlepolemos, by exciting their pity for the King.

He stood up before the Macedonians with the King and Agathocleia, and first of all he acted as one prevented from speaking by copious and violent weeping. Then, after wiping his eyes several times with his cloak, as if he had mastered his floods of tears, he held up the young King and said, "Take this child! His dying father placed him in the arms of this woman" (pointing to his sister) "and entrusted him, Macedonians, to your loyalty . . . Tlepolemos, in the eyes of all who can see, has already aspired far above his position, and now he has determined on the very hour and moment when he will take the crown."¹

Then Agathocles produced one of his informers, who said that he had seen with his own eyes the preparations for the coronation of Tlepolemos. The whole scene was considered ridiculous, and Agathocles withdrew among hisses; he was equally unsuccessful with the other troops. In the meantime, from the provincial garrisons, the soldiers were pouring into Alexandria, rousing "relations and friends" to act. Tlepolemos seems to have marched on the capital, and already commanded its food supplies. Agathocles chose this moment to arrest Danaë, Tlepolemos's mother-in-law, who, to the great indignation of the crowd, was dragged to the prison through the streets of Alexandria, without even being allowed time to put on her veil. The ferment increased, expressing itself, as usual, in insulting remarks written on the walls at night, while hostile gatherings were seen everywhere in the day-time. Agathocles was frantic; he thought of taking flight, but, since he had made no preparation, he set himself to making out lists of prescriptions and planning executions and tortures.

He was engaged in these projects, when Mœragenes, a bodyguard, was accused of revealing everything to Tlepolemos, with whom he had made common cause out of friendship for Adæos, the governor of Bubastis. The inquiry was entrusted to Nicostratos, the chief of the Secretariat, and, since Mœragenes protested his innocence, he was stripped for torture. The executioners were already preparing their instruments of torture, and the scourgers had taken

¹ *Ibid.*, 26.1-5.

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off their cloaks, when a servant ran in, whispered some words in the ear of Nicostratos, and hurriedly withdrew. Nicostratos at once followed him, without saying a word, but slapping his thigh repeatedly.¹

In the general confusion created by the departure of Nicostratos, Moeragenes escaped, stark naked, and took refuge in the tents of the Macedonians, who had their camp in the Palace. He found them at their morning meal; he told them of his adventure and implored them to help him and to save the King and their own lives from the fury of Agathocles. This incident let loose the revolution. The smouldering fire suddenly burst out. In less than four hours, the whole population, civil and military, had risen in revolt. The wild conduct of Cœnanthe, Agathocles' mother, drove the women of the Court into the movement, while her son, undecided what to do, had returned to his debauches.

Cœnanthe went to the Thesmophoreion, the temple being open for some yearly festival. She first made frantic supplications to the Goddesses, and then sat quietly by the altar. Most of the women, noting her distress and despair with pleasure, said nothing; but the kinswomen of Polycrates and some other noble ladies, not yet knowing their situation, went up and consoled her. But Cœnanthe shouted at the top of her voice, "Do not come near me! Beasts! I know you—you wish us ill, and you pray the Goddesses to do their worst to us! But I am sure, with the will of the Gods, that you will eat your own children!" Then she ordered her women to drive them away, and to strike them with their rods if they refused to go. The ladies seized the excuse and all withdrew, raising their hands to the gods and praying them to visit Cœnanthe with the horrors which she had called down upon others. . . .

When night fell, the whole town was full of din and lights and running about. Some crowded yelling into the Stadium, men shouted encouragement at each other, some scurried about and disappeared into houses and places not likely to be suspected. The open spaces round the Palace, the Stadium, the main street, and the portico of the Theatre of Dionysos were already packed with all sorts and conditions of men. When Agathocles learned what was happening, he roused himself, drunk as he was, having just come from a carouse, and, taking his kinsmen with him, went to the King. Addressing a few piteous words to him, he took his hand and went up to the passage between the Mæander and the Palæstra, which led to the entrance of the Theatre. Then he barricaded the first two doors and went inside the third, with two or three bodyguards, the King, and his own family. The doors were open grills, with double bolts. Meanwhile, the mob was gathering from all over the city, so that not only the ground-level but roofs and terraces were overflowing with people, and there was a mixed uproar and yelling of men,

¹ *Ibid.*, 27.6-11.

women, and children ; for in Alexandria, as in Carthage, children join in these riots as much as grown-up persons.

When day broke, amid the indistinguishable hubbub shouts for the King made themselves heard. At first the Macedonians rose and seized the Gate of Audience of the Palace, but soon after, when they learned where the King was, they went round, broke in the first door of the passage, and, going up to the second, clamoured loudly for the boy. The party of Agathocles begged the bodyguards to speak to the Macedonians for them, undertaking to give up the guardianship of the King and all powers and honours, if they might be granted their bare lives and enough to sustain them. Aristomenes alone, who afterwards became minister and had started as a hanger-on of Agathocles, undertook the service. . . . He went out through a wicket-gate and, at the risk of his life, spoke with the Macedonians. . . . They sent him back, telling him to bring the King with him or not to come at all. Then they broke in the second door, and came up to the third. From their actions and their reply the people with Agathocles saw how violent they were, and begged for their mere lives with all the strength of their voice, stretching their hands out through the grill, while Agathocleia put her breasts through as well, saying that with these she had suckled the King. When they found that their lamentations over their fate were of no avail, they at last sent the boy out with the bodyguards. Taking the King, the Macedonians quickly put him on a horse and led him to the Stadium. As soon as he appeared, there was great cheering and clapping, and the Macedonians stopped his horse, took him down, and placed him in the Royal Box.

(The people had their King, but they had not got the people whom they regarded as the culprits. The shouting continued, as the hours went by.) Then Sosibios, the son of Sosibios, one of the Bodyguard, who was chiefly devoted to the King's person and to public affairs, seeing that there was no turning the crowd from their fury and that the little boy was unhappy among the unfamiliar faces and in all the tumult, asked him if he would give up to the populace those who had done any injury to himself or his mother. The boy nodding his head, Sosibios told some of the Bodyguard to make the King's decision known, and carried him off to the people of the royal household, who were in his own house, near at hand. When the King's consent was made known, the whole place burst into applause and cheering.

(Soldiers were sent to look for Agathocles and Agathocleia, who had separated and taken refuge in their respective homes.) The bloodshed and murders started thus. A servant and toady of Agathocles, named Philon, came into the Stadium, drunk. Seeing the excitement, he said that if Agathocles came out they would be sorry for it. Those who heard abused him, jostled him, tore off his cloak, stabbed him with spears, and dragged him, still breathing, on to the track. Shortly afterwards, Agathocles was brought on in chains. Hardly had he entered, when some men ran up and stabbed him, a friendly rather than a hostile act, for they saved him from the fate which he deserved. Then Nikon was brought out, and then Agathocleia, stripped naked, with her sisters, and then all their kinsfolk. Last of all, Cœnanthe, dragged from the Thesmophoreion, was brought into the Stadium, sitting naked on

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a horse. They were given to the mob, who bit them, stabbed them, and gouged out their eyes. Whenever one fell, the body was rent limb from limb, until all were torn to pieces. When the Egyptians are angry they are horribly cruel. At the same time, some girls who had been brought up in Arsinoë's household, learning that Philammon, who had directed the Queen's murder, had arrived from Cyrene two days before, rushed to his house and, forcing the doors, killed Philammon with sticks and stones, strangled his stripling son, and, dragging his wife naked into the street, slew her.¹

In the meantime, Philip was busy.² He had fallen on Thrace and, without declaring war, although he was officially the ally of the Ætolian League, he took Lysimacheia, Sestos, Perinthus, and Chalcedon, which were held by Ætolian leaders, while his brother-in-law, Prusias, helped him to take Cios on the Asiatic side of the Propontis. He seized Thasos in 202, and in the following year he occupied Samos and laid siege to Chios.

But these conquests alarmed and united Attalos and the Rhodians, whose land in Caria had been ravaged by a *condottiere* of the King.³ Off Chios, the combined fleets of Pergamon and Rhodes defeated Philip in a great battle, but their own losses were very great; Attalos lost his royal ship, and only just escaped with his life. Soon afterwards, Philip defeated the Rhodians near the island of Lade. Thence, instead of making for Alexandria, he threw himself on Asia Minor, where he took Miletos and Myus, and invaded the kingdom of Pergamon, the Rhodian Peræa, and Caria (201).

Meanwhile Antiochos had entered Cœle-Syria⁴ and was besieging Gaza. It now fell on Tlepolemos, who had become Regent, to defend Egypt. But Tlepolemos hardly fulfilled the hopes which had been placed in him. He had military talent, but he had little mind for business, and spent the greater parts of his days in playing at ball, fencing, and feasting. He was absurdly prodigal of the treasures of the

¹ Polyb., xv.29.8-33.12.

² Holleaux, in **LXXXVIII**, 1920, pp. 237 ff.; 1921, pp. 181 ff. Some historians (e.g., **CLXI**, i, p. 352) place the piracies of the Ætolian Dicæarchos, a *condottiere* of Philip in the Cyclades, at this time (Polyb., xviii.54.8; Diod., xxviii.1), but Holleaux has shown that they were in 205, when the Rhodians were fighting the Cretan pirates secretly backed by Philip (**LXXXVII**, 1920, pp. 223-47).

³ Holleaux, in **LXXXVII**, 1899, pp. 20 ff.

⁴ Holleaux, in **LVII**, 1908, pp. 267 ff.; **LXXXVII**, 1917, pp. 88 ff.

State, and lavished gifts on "ambassadors from Greece, theatrical performers, and officers and soldiers of the Court . . . So he made himself friends who were very ready to give him the praise which delighted his vanity, and all through the city there were toasts in his honour at banquets, laudatory inscriptions, and songs about him at concerts". Gradually an opposition party had formed at Court round the younger Sosibios, the Keeper of the Royal Seal, who discharged his office very ably. Tlepolemos dismissed him from his post,¹ but in the end he was beaten by the coalition of his opponents. He was replaced by the Acarnanian Body-guard Aristomenes, while Scopas was given command of the army.² This revolution must have taken place about the time when Gaza fell, after a long resistance, and in 200 Scopas was able to lead a counter-offensive against Syria, which he recovered to the north of the Jordan. But in the summer of the same year Antiochos defeated him badly at the Paneion,³ and compelled him to flee to Sidon with the remnants of his army.

The Seleucid was in Phœnicia, when he received an embassy from Rome. At the beginning of the year 200, Rome, victorious in the Punic War, was beginning to feel serious concern about the East. The alliance between Antiochos and Philip V had seemed full of danger for the Republic. But, to defeat them, it was necessary to divide them; and Rome had decided first to attack Philip, the old ally of Hannibal, who seemed to present the more imminent menace. Against him, she constituted herself the champion of Hellenic liberties. Since his hard campaign in Asia, Philip had returned to Europe. He had made an enemy of Attalos, and now he had quarrelled with the Ætolians and Athenians. But he did not relinquish his projects of conquests on the Hellespont at the expense of the Egyptian possessions. His enemies, Attalos, Rhodes, Egypt, Athens, appealed to the Romans. The Senate had therefore sent C. Claudius Nero, M. Æmilius Lepidus, and C. Sempronius Tuditanus, with the ostensible mission of reconciling Antiochos and Ptolemy, but with the real object of checking Philip and watching the East. Before

¹ Polyb., xvi.21-2.

² Polyb., xv.31.7-8; xviii.58.

³ Holleaux, in LVII, *loc. cit.*

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Abydos, which he had just taken after a terrible siege, Philip received the Roman ultimatum from M. Æmilius (September, 200). So began the second Macedonian War, which was to end with the Roman victory of Cynoscephalæ (197). In Phœnicia, the ambassadors cannot have been very energetic in their attempt to reconcile the Lagid and Seleucid. It was too much in the interest of Rome that Antiochos should have his hands full elsewhere during her struggle with Philip, and as long as that lasted the Seleucid King might continue with the subjugation of Syria. Scopas was besieged in Sidon and obliged to surrender (200–199), and Antiochos completed the conquest of Southern Syria by the capture of Batanæa, Abila, Gadara, and Jerusalem. Thereby the country was taken from the dominion of the Ptolemies for ever, and Egypt would soon lose almost all her overseas Empire. Antiochos naturally thought of reviving the claims of his house in Asia Minor and Europe. But he was to find the Romans in the way.

He was in Cilicia, where he had snatched Mallos, Zephyrion, Soli, Aphrodisias, and Selinus from the Lagid Empire, and was besieging Coracesion, when a Rhodian embassy appeared, talking about the Roman menace and claiming the “liberty of the Greeks” (197). At the same time news was brought of the victory of Flamininus at Cynoscephalæ. The intervention and the news between them probably saved Myndos, Halicarnassos, and Samos, which retained their liberty, but Antiochos still pursued his projects in Lycia, where he added Limyra, Patara, and Xanthos to his Empire. Ephesos, which had belonged to the Lagid since 247, passed over to the Seleucid, who from there sent troops to Smyrna and to Alexandria Troas and Lampsacos beyond it. But these last two cities resisted. Lampsacos even seems to have sent ambassadors to Rome.¹ Meanwhile, Antiochos reached Abydos, and then Madytos, and took possession of Lysimacheia. That city had been destroyed by the Thracians, and Antiochos ordered that it should be rebuilt. This measure was humiliating for Philip V, who was already indignant at being deserted by his ally of 203 in his war with Rome, and now saw Antiochos, like his ancestor Seleucos I, laying claim to the inheritance of

¹ Holleaux, **LXXXVIII**, 1916, pp. 1 ff.

Lysimachos. Could Philip forget that that inheritance had included the kingship of Macedon ?

So, even in the East, Antiochos was making enemies. He was presently to encounter the unsurmountable obstacle. His agents, Hegesianax and Lysias, who had carried to the Senate his reply to the Roman embassy of 200, had also represented him at the Congress of the Isthmus,¹ under the presidency of Flamininus, at which the famous proclamation of the liberty of the Greeks was issued in 196. They were able to warn their master that he would not be allowed to tamper with the independence of the Greek cities of Asia, and presently there came to Lysimacheia L. Cornelius (Lentulus ?), accompanied by several Senators, members of the Commission of Ten who, with T. Quinctius Flamininus, were engaged in settling Hellenic affairs. The wishes of Rome were quite clearly expressed. In Asia, as in Europe, the liberty of the Greeks must be respected. Antiochos must restore everything that he had taken from Philip V, who had been defeated by Roman arms, and from Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was the ward of the Roman people. The stormy discussions which ensued were interrupted by a false report of the death of Epiphanes.² Antiochos thought that there was still something to take from Egypt, thanks to the troubles which would inevitably attend the succession, and set all sail for Alexandria. But at Patara in Lycia he learned that Ptolemy was alive. Off Pamphylia, a mutiny of his crews and a storm which destroyed part of his fleet at the mouths of the Saros might make him foresee a change in his fortunes.

War with Rome was now certain. Flamininus had sent Antiochos's ambassadors to the Senate ; they may not have reached Rome before hostilities commenced. In Greece, all the enemies of Rome, the Ætolians and Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, appealed to Antiochos and compromised him as deeply as they could. Thoas, the Strategos of the Ætolian League, had come to Asia. Antiochos, who had doubtless long made up his mind not to humble his pride at the threats of the Republic, sought to make the succession sure by

¹ *Ibid.*, 1918, pp. 1 ff.

² For the conspiracy of Scopas at Alexandria and his execution by Aristomenes, see *ibid.*, p. 9.

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marrying his son Antiochos to his daughter Laodice, and to secure alliances by the union of another daughter, Cleopatra, with Ptolemy Epiphanes and of a third, Antiochis, with Ariarathes IV. But Eumenes, who succeeded Attalos in 195, refused the princess who was offered to him, a sign that war was coming. In the same year, 195, Hannibal came to Ephesos. In the following years Antiochos was still on the Hellespont, but our sources tell us little of his activities. In 193–192, the conference of Ephesos and Apameia led to the outbreak of the conflict. It ended in 188 with the treaty of Apameia, which set the seal on the defeat of Antiochos.

The second Macedonian War and the battle of Cynoscephalæ (197), which marked the decisive intervention of Rome in the East, the battle of the Paneion (200) and the conquest of Asia Minor by Antiochos, which destroyed the Lagid Empire, and the battle of Magnesia and the treaty of Apameia (188), which, setting the seal on the fall of the Seleucid, drove him out of Asia Minor, where the power of the Attalids now rose under Roman protection—these may be regarded as the great events which, at the beginning of the 2nd century, laid down the foundations of a new period of history. By this time the Macedonian conquest had long been completed; the Græco-Oriental states to which it gave birth, after succeeding, one after another, in seizing the empire of the Mediterranean, were now weakened by the wars which they had waged with one another, and were maintained in a kind of equilibrium by fear of the power of Rome. The expansive force of Hellenism was arrested. Greece had emptied herself of her men in favour of the East, and had exhausted herself in revolutions and internal strife no less than in her resistance to the monarchy of the Antigonids. In the East, little by little, by a reactionary movement which we saw commencing on the very morrow of Alexander's death, the nations which were subdued for a moment tore away from Hellenism the vast regions of the interior of Asia, carrying away or absorbing the ephemeral foreign dynasties which had ruled them for a time, until at last the Euphrates became the extreme limit of Hellenism on that side. In the West, the states whose history we have

traced for a century were one by one absorbed in the Empire of Rome.

The advance of the Roman dominion in the Eastern Mediterranean has been admirably described by M. Homo in another volume in this series. Other volumes will relate the ebb and the influence of Greek civilization in the Far East. It was to leave inspirations rather than vestiges. But in all that part of Alexander's Empire which was annexed to the Empire of the Cæsars Hellenism lived on under the protection of the Strength of Rome. For there Hellenism was deeply rooted; this Eastern portion of the Roman Empire comprised both the country of its origin and its most solid conquests. Thanks to the support of the Kings, and thanks to institutions which, at the epoch to which we have now come, were already fully developed, it had established itself in its new domains, and had penetrated, to a varying depth, the ancient civilizations of the East. How, and to what extent, it had done this, is what remains to be told in the fourth part of this study, at least so far as our too scanty sources permit.

PART FOUR

THE HELLENIZATION OF THE EAST. THE ORGANIZATION OF HELLENISM IN THE GRÆCO-ORIENTAL KINGDOMS

CHAPTER I

EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIAN EMPIRE

I

THE EVIDENCE OF THE PAPYRI¹

THE original character of the people and country of Egypt had already struck the Greeks, as it strikes ourselves. To quote only one instance, the second book of Herodotos is full of wonder and admiration. Sometimes he takes delight in noting, not without a touch of humour, the contrasts reigning between the manners of the Egyptians and those of other peoples, and in such chapters of the old writer Montaigne has not failed to dip, in order to show the strange diversity of human customs.² Nor does a wider and deeper knowledge of Egyptian history belie the notion that that people held a place in the Eastern world which was most important, but somewhat singular. Its civilization was, if not the most ancient, one of the most ancient. It was incontestably one of the most beautiful. It radiated far outside the valley of the Nile, for its influence is found as far as Etruria. In any case, it often inspired the nearer peoples of Asia and the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean. But it must be said that it never had such complete sway over other peoples as over the Egyptians themselves. It

¹ **CLXXX** and **CLXXXI** are the principal handbooks. Chief bibliographies: S. de Ricci, in **LXXXVII**, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1914, 1921-3, 1924, etc. Viereck, in *Bursians Jahresbericht*, xcvi, cii, cxxxi. H. I. Bell, in **LXXI**, 1915, 1916, 1920 (and yearly afterwards).

² *Hdt.*, ii.85-6.

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was imitated, but not adopted. On the whole, it remained confined to the valley of the Nile.

Herein it was very different from the Asiatic civilizations which we find, if not at their furthest origin, at least at their first appearance in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, as in the land of Elam. The Sumerian civilization, which was known earliest, seems to have spread over all the peoples of Hither Asia; if we go back far enough, this was the civilization which, through Elam and Babylon, came down to the Assyrians and even to the Persians. But Egyptian civilization, even if we suppose, with certain scholars, that it, too, originally came from Asia to the Nile valley, was so soon transformed and developed that it seems quite unlike the civilizations of Asia.

Moreover, Egypt never definitely linked her destinies with those of Asia. When she was attached to an Asiatic empire, as under the Hyksos and the Assyrian Empire, it was for a fairly short time, and these foreign dominations did not make any permanent impression on the land of Egypt. In the centuries immediately preceding the period which concerns us, when the whole Orient was comprised in the Empire founded by Cyrus, Egypt belonged to it for little more than a hundred years. It was conquered by Cambyzes in 525, liberated itself about 410, and did not fall under the yoke again until the end of the 4th century. The Persian domination left no profound traces. It was the westernmost Satrapy of the Empire. It could easily become detached. When Alexander ascended the throne of the Great Kings, he never thought of making Alexandria his capital. It seems, therefore, that if one looks among the sovereigns of the Hellenized East for his true successors, one should not point to the Ptolemies, but, much rather, to those to whose portion the Asiatic continent fell. The Ptolemies were not situated as the others were to found a dominion covering the whole East.

Why, then, in studying the Hellenization of the East, do we commence with Egypt and the Lagid monarchy? Because the historian depends on his sources, and Egypt is the country which has preserved the most evidence, and the most precise, about its past. Regarding Hellenic expansion in Asia, we have indications rather than

testimonies. It is true that there is a fair number of monuments revealing the presence or influence of Greek art as far as India, and the coins tell us of Hellenic dynasties in Bactriana and the valley of the Indus; so we perceive some of the results of Hellenization, but there is nothing to enlighten us on the organization of that conquering Hellenism, and on its methods of conquest. Only a few Greek cities, generally on the edge of the Mediterranean, in Syria, and, still more, in Asia Minor, have left us a fair number of inscriptions. Royal letters to cities, decrees of the cities themselves, dedications to gods, to sovereigns who are also gods, and to the great men of the day, sometimes, too, treaties, contracts, and judgments—these texts, engraved on stone, are what remains to us of the official records of antiquity, and we have seen above that they sometimes partly make up for the irreparable loss of the historical works; but almost all their information is about the cities, and we have nothing, or next to nothing, about the vast territories which lay outside the Greek cities, and even for the cities these archives in stone are not so varied or so rich as they might be.

The fact is, that almost the only documents engraved were those of which a permanent record was wanted; no doubt these were often the most important documents, but more often they were those which seemed such, and it is not always these which we should most like to have. Ordinarily, a lighter and more perishable material was used—parchment or paper. Recent finds—Greek deeds on parchment, of the 1st century of our era, from Assyria, which was then under Parthia,¹ and fragments of a law,² contract, or account of the Hellenistic period, found at Dura on the Euphrates³—justify great hopes, and the systematic exploration of Assyria has hardly begun. But at present Egypt is the only country which, thanks to its dry climate and its clear sky, the *εὐδία* which the ancients so extolled, has preserved on papyrus (the paper made of the fibrous pith of *Cyperus papyracea*) long portions of its writings of all kinds. So Egypt is the

¹ H. Minns, in **LXXX**, 1915, pp. 22 ff.

² Haussoullier, in **XCII**, 1923, pp. 515 ff.

³ F. Cumont, in **LXXXVI**, 1924, pp. 40, 97–111, and *Monument Piot*, 1928, p. 40.

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only country of Hellenistic antiquity of whose inside life we have a glimpse. It is, therefore, in Egypt alone that we obtain a definite idea of the principles of the government, and of the rules by which Hellenism was organized so as to impregnate the country. Here, at least, the problem presents itself most clearly, and, since things were not essentially different in the other Hellenistic monarchies, Egypt suggests the questions which our researches should be able to answer in all. That answer must too often be left in suspense, and it would be rash to apply all that we learn about Egypt to the other Greek states of the East ; but at least it is sometimes possible to determine what elements in Ptolemaic Egypt are too special to be ascribed to other countries.

There are, therefore, advantages in commencing the study of the Hellenization of the East with Egypt. This is not, however, the order followed by the earlier historians of Hellenism, and, while giving a place to the evidence of the papyri, they did not give it the high place which it deserves. For, from 1778, the date of the discovery of the famous *Charta Borgiana*,¹ the first papyrus yielded to us by the soil of Egypt, down to the last quarter of the 19th century, the texts, which were usually picked up by ignorant fellahs, only threw light on particular points, and hardly made a general view possible. Those earlier than the Christian era all belonged to the 2nd century B.C. ; there were none of the 3rd century, and a very few of the 1st, which is still very little known.

First, there was the series from the Serapeion at Memphis, the great sanctuary adjoining the burial-place of the Apis Bulls, which Mariette afterwards discovered (1850).² The great black bull with the white mark on his forehead, who was honoured in his life as a divine manifestation, was worshipped after his death, when, in accordance with the destiny common to gods and men, he was identified with Osiris. He was laid, with his forerunners, in a huge underground place, at which worship was naturally paid to the soul of the dead Apises (Osor-Api), a kind of collective soul,

¹ Nicolas Schow, *Charta papyracea Græce scripta Musei Borgiani*, Rome, 1788. The document is now at Naples.

² **XXIV**, 1 ff.

now merged in the divine essence of the Lord of the Underworld. The Greeks adopted this cult and Hellenized it, giving the dead Apis the form of a Pluto, who took the name of Serapis, and the Serapeion of Memphis contained a whole motley world of priests, pilgrims, and worshippers, some Egyptian, some Greek. Each nation worshipped its own special idol, but without losing the sentiment that the idols were simply two different forms of the same god.¹ This is what we learn, with many other details, from the discovery of the papers of the Macedonian Ptolemy, son of Glaucias, who, after domestic misfortunes, at the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor, had dedicated himself to the god in the temple at Memphis. Here, then, we have light on a corner, certainly very interesting, but only a corner, of Greek Egypt. These documents are, however, rich in information of every kind, going beyond the confines of the sanctuary in which Ptolemy, son of Glaucias, was shut up. Government officials, and the King himself, appear in these fragments of records, and, by a happy chance, they have furnished us with important texts which give a glimpse of some of the principles which ruled financial administration.

At the time of the Ptolemies, Memphis was certainly the most important of the native capitals. Thebes had declined greatly since the fall of the Ramessids. But Thebes has contributed its share of papyri. These, too, date from the 2nd century, and almost all deal with the associations of a religious, but not priestly, character, which were occupied with the service of the dead in the immense necropolises—the *Paraschistai* who cut open the side of the corpse with a flint, the *Taricheutai*, or embalmers, the *Choachytai* who poured libations on the tomb. Here, again, we are on purely Egyptian ground, which seems to interest the historian of Hellenism only indirectly. But the many contracts which appear among these papyri, sometimes Greek, sometimes Egyptian, reveal the simultaneous existence of two codes of law, and certain influences of one on the other. Lastly, since the *Choachytai* had a law-suit with a Greek cavalry officer named Hermias, which lasted many years, we obtain some notion of the organization of justice.²

¹ XXIV, p. 18.

² All these texts from Thebes and Memphis have been or will be republished in XXIV.

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For all that, these papyri from Thebes and Memphis, being, moreover, scattered about various European collections and only published slowly and incompletely,¹ were not sufficient to win for the records of Greek Egypt a position of importance. When, about 1877, the Fayum, the ancient Arsinoïte Nome, began to give up its riches, the documents found almost all dated from Imperial times. Thereby the attention of a wider public, the Roman historians, was attracted to papyrology, but the knowledge of Lagid Egypt was not advanced.

Everything changed in 1890. The excavations of Flinders Petrie at Gurob,² at the entrance to the Fayum, inaugurated a new and fruitful period, filled almost entirely by the astonishing campaigns of Grenfell and Hunt in the Fayum and Central Egypt.³ Their example has been followed by the archæologists of other nations.⁴ A multitude of sites has been, or is still being, explored; and, since interest grows in proportion to the richness of the finds, it may be hoped that every day the resources of the excavators and the precision and efficacy of their methods of research will be augmented.⁵ But even now we have, for Græco-Roman Egypt, a mass of varied documents, the like of which is nowhere else found for antiquity.

If we consider those documents referring to Ptolemaic Egypt, we shall note, first of all, that the 3rd century is beginning to be known. A happy discovery at Elephantine has furnished a set of documents—contracts and administrative papers—some of which go back to the reign of Ptolemy Soter, while one, a marriage-contract, is of the time when the Empire was at least nominally united, when Ptolemy was still only a Satrap, under King Alexander Ægos (311).⁶

The end of Philadelphos's reign and the reigns of Euergetes and Philopator are illustrated by the texts which can be extracted from the gaudy cardboard cases in which the mummies of the Greek period were enclosed, so that they look like large painted dolls. The cardboard was made of waste paper, glued together in a thick sheet, which was

¹ **XXXVIII, XLIII, XLIV, XLV**, etc.; see Viereck, in *Bursians Jahresbericht*, 1899, pp. 185–86.

² **XXXV**.

³ **XXVI–XXXIV**.


⁴ Cf. **CLXXX**, i, pp. xvi–xxiii; **CLXXXI**, p. 13.

⁵ **CCXII**, i, 1, p. vii.

⁶ **XX**, i.



PAPYRUS OF THE SYRIAN WAR

PLAN AND ESTIMATE OF WORK ON THE
ESTATE OF APOLLONIOS

modelled into a mask, pectoral, and leg-coverings. The whole was covered with painted stucco. The cemeteries of Gurob,¹ Ghoran, Magdola,² and Tebtynis in the Fayum³ and Hibeh⁴ and Aphroditopolis in Central Egypt⁵ have yielded them in hundreds. The papers extracted from the cardboard are sometimes in a surprising state of preservation; more often they are fragmentary, but they rarely fail to give some valuable piece of information. We find on them almost everything that can be written on paper, and, since most come from Government offices, they give us, by the side of scraps of private correspondence and classical authors, administrative documents of all kinds—letters, regulations, accounts, receipts, circulars, and even fragments of laws and royal ordinances. No less than the cemeteries, the villages of the Fayum have preserved the remains of their public and private records, especially those which lay on the edge of the desert, and were at an early date deserted and covered by the protecting mantle of the sand. At Philadelphia, in the last few years, clandestine excavators have discovered an “enormous block of papyri”, which has been dispersed by dealers.⁶ In the scattered sheets of this voluminous correspondence, which is chiefly addressed to Zenon, an agent of the financial minister Apollonios, the Egypt of the last years of Philadelphos lives again. Of the same date is the great “volume” preserved in London, which gives us the financial laws of the same King, during the office of the same minister—general regulations for the farming of taxes, instructions for the assessment and levy of the tax of a sixth on vines, a special regulation for the oil monopoly.⁷ Lastly, Halle possesses a long manuscript of the same period, in which a lawyer has collected, perhaps as documents for a litigant to quote, long extracts from the laws of Alexandria, together with two royal ordinances on military cantonments.⁸

Our knowledge of Ptolemaic Egypt in the 2nd century, too, has benefited by these methodical excavations. As early as about 1890, the anonymous find of Gebelein (Croco-

¹ XXXV.

² XLI.

³ XXXI.

⁴ XXXIII.

⁵ J. D. M. Johnson, in *Egypt Exploration Fund, Archæol. Report*, 1910–11, 1911–12.

⁶ XLVI, iv, pp. 54 ff.; v, pp. 63 ff.; vi and vii; Edgar, in LXXXII, vols. xviii ff., and *Zenon Papyri*.

⁷ XXVIII.

⁸ XXI.

dilopolis and Pathyris) had told us of a colony of "Persians" in Upper Egypt, and yielded, with many contracts, letters giving information about revolts in the Thebaïd.¹ But the most fruitful and surprising discovery was that of Grenfell and Hunt at Tutun, the ancient Tebtynis, in the south-west of the Arsinoïte Nome.² Under the wrappings of the mummies of the sacred crocodiles, they found, creased but admirably preserved, several papers of Menches, the Comogrammateus of the neighbouring village of Cerceosiris—official and private letters, circulars, accounts of taxation and other business, and reports on the condition of the land and crops. Thanks to them, we now have information on administrative and agrarian policy in the time of Philometor and Euergetes II, and we can read a series of ordinances of the latter King,³ which, with the famous inscriptions of Rosetta and Canopos,⁴ the financial laws of Philadelphos, and the legal papyrus of Halle, are the most extensive, and perhaps the richest, Greek documents preserved from that period.

We have, unfortunately, less information about the Egypt of the 1st century, of which period only a few texts survive, except for the end of Egyptian independence and the beginning of Roman rule. The cardboard mummy-cases of Abusir el-Melaq, the cemetery of the ancient Heracleopolis in the Heptanomis, have, by a miraculous chance, given us remains of Alexandrian archives.⁵ Lastly, with the papyri, the soil of Egypt has yielded thousands of the fragments of common pottery which the ancients called ostraca, which they used as a cheap writing-material for short notes, especially receipts.⁶ The Nile valley is, moreover, as rich in inscriptions cut on limestone and granite as Asia Minor is in inscriptions cut on marble.⁷

¹ P. Collart, in *Recueil à la mémoire de J. F. Champollion*, Paris, 1924, pp. 272–82; **XLII**.

² **XXXI**.

³ **XXXI**, vol. i, 5.

⁴ Two trilingual decrees (hieroglyphic, demotic, and Greek) issued by the synod of Egyptian priests, meeting at Memphis (Rosetta Stone) and Canopos (Canopos Decree). The latter is in honour of Ptolemy III and Berenice II; the former, of Ptolemy V.

⁵ **XV**, vol. iv. Cf. Schubart, in **LXV**, v, pp. 35 ff.

⁶ **XLIX**, **L**, **LI**, **LII**.

⁷ **I**, **XII**, **XIII**, **XIV**, and the epigraphical reports in **LXV** and **LXXXVII**.

In these circumstances, it is surely plain that the more definite idea which Egypt can give us of a Hellenistic monarchy will guide us amid the uncertainty in which we are left by our lack of evidence about the internal life of the other Græco-Oriental kingdoms. Obviously, this is not the order which should be followed by a historian who had equal information about every domain of Hellenism, but we are compelled to accept it by the very character of our evidence.

II

THE LAGID EMPIRE (323-200)

It must not, however, be supposed that, even with this evidence, one can draw a picture of Greek Egypt which is sure and precise in every detail. There are many uncertainties, and there will be for a long time ; and, for the very first question which rises, the papyri are hardly any help.

To appreciate the home policy of the Lagids, one should know the aims of their foreign policy. The way in which they conceived the government and administration of Egypt depends in great part on the idea which they had formed of their position in the world, and on this idea we have no direct testimony ; we can only hope to divine it by examining the facts.

They are so little known that they have been interpreted in different ways. According to Herr U. Wilcken,

The object of Ptolemaic rule in Egypt was to extract all the wealth possible from the country, in order to be in a position, with these resources and a strong fleet and army, to play the chief part in Mediterranean international politics. We should never lose sight of the fact that, inside that mighty Empire, Egypt was regarded by the Ptolemies merely as the chief source of their revenues ; the object of their policy was wholly outside Egypt.¹

Mr. Rostovtzev maintains a point of view "diametrically opposed" to Wilcken's :—

Their (the Ptolemies') leading idea was to create a powerful Egyptian state, rich and strong enough to be independent and secure from every attempt to conquer it from the outside. In order to guarantee the safety of Egypt the first condition was to hold the sea, to command the sea-routes approaching Egypt. The task was complicated and difficult. In the times of the Old, Middle, and New Empire in Egypt the possession of the Syrian coast was enough to give the needed guarantees. But beginning with the first

¹ *CLXXX*, i, p. 4 ; *LXIV*, 1921, p. 61.

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millennium B.C., the growth of Asia Minor and the steadily developing sea-power of the Greeks induced the rulers of Egypt to extend the sphere of their political influence to the whole Mediterranean region, not in order to conquer and rule Greece and Asia Minor, but with the object of watching carefully the rival sea-powers and checking their efforts to cut Egypt off from the main sea-routes leading to her north and east coasts. This command of the sea-routes was unobtainable without a strong fleet, and a strong fleet could not be built and maintained by the natural resources of Egypt. Wood and metals had to be imported from outside, and the best way to secure a safe supply of these was to hold some countries which were rich in forests and mines. That is why Egypt held firmly on to Sinai (a mine country), Syria, and Cyprus, and tried to occupy some districts in Asia Minor, chiefly in Lycia. On the other hand the strength and wealth of the Egyptian state depended entirely upon regular foreign commerce. To hire armies and to maintain a strong fleet great stores of money were needed. The only way to obtain large quantities of gold and silver was through an extensive foreign trade. And to carry on this trade it was necessary to command the trade-routes.¹

So, then, in the eyes of Herr Wilcken, the Lagids practised an offensive imperialism, Macedonian and Hellenic in character, for which the Empire was the end and Egypt the means. Their policy was a *Weltmachtpolitik*. According to Mr. Rostovtzev, their imperialism was purely defensive and economic in character, the safety and prosperity of the Egyptian State being the end and the Empire only the means. In addition to these two contradictory theories, there is a third, which credits the first Ptolemies with the ambition of extending their power to the confines of the inhabited world. Like Alexander, they are supposed to have aspired to universal empire.²

But what we know of Ptolemy Soter hardly justifies us in ascribing this dream to him. The predominant feature of his character seems really to have been, beneath his disarming affability and tact, a sturdy good sense, which gave him a clear and sometimes rather timid view of what was possible. He did not lack royal ambition, any more than the other Successors, and to the service of that ambition he brought a quiet, tenacious will. The son of Lagos and Arsinoë was a Macedonian of old stock, if not of great nobility. He must have been brought up among the Royal Pages, and he had shown himself a loyal friend of Alexander at the time of the quarrel with Philip. In Asia he had been entrusted

¹ LXXI, 1920, p. 172.

² Kornemann, in LVII, 1916, p. 229.

with responsible missions which required decision, cool-headedness, and tact rather than temerity, such as the capture of Bessus in 329. His courage was great, and he had shown it in several fairly ugly situations—for example, at the siege of the Rock of Chorienes, the battle among the Aspasians, and the captures of Aornos and Sangala. When he was Satrap of Egypt, at the battle of the Camel's Wall, he was seen piercing Perdiccas's elephants with his javelins.¹ He was almost indifferent to the seductions of Oriental magnificence, and on the throne of Egypt he remained a Macedonian in spirit. He was true to Alexander, but seems to have felt that he owed less loyalty to an imbecile or the son of a Persian woman. He was one of the first to abandon the idea of the unity of the Empire, and spent his life fighting those who wished to restore it.

That was to be the first principle of his policy. But when the independence of Egypt is assured, and even while he is busy defending it, we see him trying to establish his rule or influence over the neighbouring countries, which are like natural appendages of the Nile valley. Hardly had he arrived in his Satrapy, when he took Cyrene. When he was master of Egypt, all his efforts were directed to bringing and keeping under his sway Palestine, Coele-Syria, and Phœnicia, and extending his influence over Cyprus.

This was a natural desire in the master of Egypt, and does not go beyond the programme set forth by Rostovtzev. His hegemony over the Cyclades and control of the coasts of Asia Minor, either in Cilicia or on the Lydian and Carian coasts, may likewise be explained by the very principles of that programme. But what are we to say when, in 309–308, we see the King of Egypt hastening to the aid of the liberty of the Greeks and establishing himself in the Peloponnese, at Corinth and Sicyon, after commencing a matrimonial intrigue with Cleopatra, as if he intended to acquire a right to the throne of the Empire, or at least to that of Macedon, although the latter was occupied by Cassandros, his natural ally against the menacing power of Antigonos? If we cannot ascribe these distant, hazardous expeditions to the dream of a world-wide empire, yet it is very difficult to admit that they do not reveal an ambition to rule the whole Ægean.

¹ CLXI, i, pp. 2–5.

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But that ambition was only an episode in his long career. When real difficulties began, Ptolemy stopped; when more immediate cares (the need for retaking Cyrene) recalled him to Alexandria, he readily abandoned all these vast projects. For him, Egypt was always the heart of his kingdom.

The policy of the founder seems to give an outline of what the Lagid Empire will be. But it was in the time of his successor that an Egyptian Empire was first constituted. What was its character then?

Philadelphos is a figure as little known to us as Soter. The books in which ancient authors related the history of his reign are lost, and the poets of his Court, Theocritos and Callimachos, are more anxious to praise him than to depict him. By his birth he did not seem destined for the throne, for he was the son of Berenice, his father's second wife, and Eurydice, the daughter of Antipatros, had borne Soter three other sons, the eldest of whom was Ptolemy Ceraunos. But the old King very soon bestowed his favour on the child of the wife whom he preferred. Born at Cos in 309, when Ptolemy I, in preparation for his Greek expedition, had transported his Court and headquarters to the island, the young prince had had the most renowned teachers—the poet Philetas of Cos, the grammarian Zenodotos, and the Stoic Straton of Lampsacos. He had grown up in an atmosphere of flattery, and it is not surprising that he was rather vain. Certainly he was a cultivated man, a friend of literature, *μουσικώτατος*.¹ We are told of his love of the natural sciences. The Syrian Sheikhs under his protectorate sent him animals of their country,² and his agents brought them from Ethiopia and the Upper Nile.³ This curiosity went with a taste for magnificence and splendid entertainments. We can still read in Athenæos a description of the sumptuous procession which was held in the Stadium at the second of the five-yearly festivals instituted in 279 in honour of the Saviour (Soter) Gods.⁴ The account of

¹ CLXI, i, p. 61.

² Edgar, in LXXXII, xviii, no. 13, pp. 231 ff.; *Zenon Papyri*, 59075-6.

³ CLXI, i, pp. 220-1, n.

⁴ Callixenos, in Athen., pp. 196A-203B. Cf. II, 12, 7, 706; XLVI, 864, 409; CC, i, pp. 145 ff.; ii, 267, 320; Plaumann, in LV, 1914, *Abh.*, 5, no. 6 (1).

the Feast of Adonis in the 15th Idyll of Theocritus will occur to every reader. Lastly, the papyri have left us direct and really delightful testimonies to the importance which the King attached to these shows. There is a letter of Apollonios, urgently exhorting Zenon to send to the capital the presents due from Philadelphieia for the Stephane-phoriæ and the King's Birthday.¹ One feels that these are matters which it would have been a mistake to treat too lightly.

Unlike his father, Philadelphos did not appear much on the battle-field, and he was fonder of diplomacy than of arms. His policy was at first inspired by his second wife, his sister on both sides, the formidable Arsinoë II Philadelphos,² who was seven years older than the King. She was an energetic woman, if not amiable, whereas Philadelphos, the Apollo of the blond curls,³ is represented as a voluptuary, delicate in health and always in search of new pleasures.⁴ But the Queen died in July, 270,⁵ and thenceforth Ptolemy reigned alone. He was surrounded by courtesans, like Belistiche, who in 268 won the prize for the two-horsed chariot-race at Olympia,⁶ and we cannot say whether these ladies or his ministers, of whom we know nothing, took a great part in the direction of affairs. But we know that Philadelphos did not neglect business. An ordinance on the quartering of soldiers was conceived and dictated by him, and reveals, for all its faults of style, an imperious temper and an attention to practical details.⁷ Fragments of papyrus from the Fayum show him on a tour of the Nome of the Lake, afterwards called the Arsinoite Nome; he inspects the drainage works and other improvements of the new province, and in the letters of the son and wife of the engineer Cleon we catch a faint echo of the royal wrath which was to end in the disgrace of that official.⁸

The second Ptolemy was the wealthiest and perhaps the most powerful ruler of his day.⁹ The greatness and prosperity of Egypt were favoured by circumstances, and Philadelphos,

¹ XLVI, 514.

² Theocr., xvii.103.

³ CLXI, i, p. 180 n. 1.

⁴ Schubart, in LKV, vi, pp. 324-30.

⁵ CXVI, vol. iii, 2, pp. 248-86.

⁶ II, 12, 7, 506.

⁷ Strabo, 789.

⁸ Paus., v.8.11.

⁹ XLVIII, xxx, 6-10.

unembarrassed by the difficulties amid which rival sovereigns struggled, could quietly consolidate his frontiers towards Nubia, reimpose his dominion on Southern Syria and certain Phœnician cities, such as Tyre and Sidon, and establish his hegemony over the Confederacy of the Isles. The King of Sidon, Philocles, who was originally in the service of Demetrios Poliorcetes, had been compelled to go over to the Lagid in Soter's reign (294). We find him, in the capacity of admiral, entrusted with the work of policing and the levy of financial contributions in the islands of the Confederacy. These were the Cyclades—Cythnos, Naxos, Andros, Myconos, Amorgos, Ceos, Paros, Astypalæa, perhaps Thera, and even Samos. The affairs of the Confederacy were debated in a Council, composed of the representatives of each state belonging to the league, and presided over by the Nesiarch, who was doubtless a governor in the name of the King.¹

But it was mainly after the first Syrian War, at the peace of 272, that the Lagid Empire was constituted. Theocritus wrote his *Praise of Ptolemy* about this date, and certainly before 270, for in his poem the King is the "brother and husband dear" to Arsinoë, and in Pachon (July) 270 that Goddess "returned to the limbs of Ra" (or Harmachis).² Now, among the subject countries and peoples, in addition to Phœnicia, Syria, the swarthy Ethiopians, and the Cyclades, the poet mentions Arabia, Libya, the Pamphylians, the valiant Cilicians, the Lycians, and the Carians who love war. In Libya one must include not only the Marmarid tribes of the coast, but, above all, Cyrene, where Magas reigned. By Arabia we must not, of course, understand the Arabs of Petra, who were free, but the tribes of Idumæa, the Dead Sea, and the East of the Jordan. In Cœle-Syria the frontier must have been at the Pass of Brochi, in the valley of the Marsyas. In Phœnicia it was north of Sidon. Cyprus was certainly under Lagid domination. Lastly, Ptolemy's influence certainly extended also to Crete, for, at the time of the war of Chremonides, the admiral Patrocles is mentioned as being there as the King's Strategos.

On the coast of Asia Minor, the cities conquered by Soter in Cilicia Tracheia had been lost in 306, after the battle of Salamis. But Philadelphos had certainly regained a

¹ IV, 17, 18, 19.

² Stele of Mendes, **CLXI**, i, p. 180.

footing in this region at the time of the first Syrian War, and from Coracesion to Zephyrion, near Soli, there were Ptolemaic establishments. One city was named Arsinoë. In Pamphylia Philocles recaptured Phaselis in 285 or during the second Syrian War, and the Empire must have had other possessions there. In Lycia, we find no trace of Seleucid domination before the reign of Antiochos III; Ptolemy doubtless held the coast, but nothing else. The sea-board of Caria, lost in 306, was recovered at least in part before the end of Soter's reign—Caunos, whence Zenon and his "clique" were to come, Halicarnassos, Myndos, Telmissos, Caryanda, Calynda, very probably Cnidos, perhaps Ceramos and Bagasa, and the islands of Cos, Calymna, and Nisyros. In Ionia, Samos joined the Confederacy of the Cyclades, and so, perhaps, did Icaros. Ephesos and Miletos came under Egypt, doubtless at the time of the battle of Sardis (261), with Myus and Priene. Samothrace had belonged to her since the marriage of Philadelphos and Arsinoë.

The battles of Cos and Ephesos robbed Egypt of a great part of this Empire, and of the hegemony of the seas. The shores of Asia Minor went almost entirely out of Philadelphos's hands. It was left to Euergetes to reconstitute and increase the Egyptian Empire.

The son of Philadelphos and the first Arsinoë, Euergetes was adopted by Arsinoë II, and he calls himself her son in official documents.¹ The poets have given him a reputation for gentleness, which his surname of Euergetes seems to confirm. We may see in this divine epithet, which designates him as the Benefactor of his subjects, the expression of an ideal of kingship strongly influenced by Stoic or Cynic philosophy. Yet he is suspected by modern historians of having had Apollonios, the last Diocetes of Philadelphos, executed,² and of having ordered or permitted the murder of his brother Lysimachos, who is seen for a time as Strategos of Coptos, and then vanishes obscurely from history.³ He, too, was a cultivated sovereign. He had been the pupil of Apollonios of Rhodes, who succeeded Callimachos as director of the Library at Alexandria.⁴ His friendship for

¹ **CLXI**, i, pp. 245, 288.

² **CCXII**, p. 20.

³ Holleaux, in **LXXXVIII**, 1912, p. 372.

⁴ **XXIX**, no. 1241, ii, l.1; cf. p. 101; Rostagni, in **CII**, vol. 1 (1914-15), pp. 241-65.

Eratosthenes and the reform of the calendar, which he seems to have forced the Egyptian priesthood to accept, and which was imitated by Cæsar,¹ reveal a certain taste for the exact sciences. He was certainly a lettered man; we have no ordinance dictated by him, as in the case of Philadelphos, in which we might catch an echo of his living voice, but the report on operations in Syria, a fragment of which has been quoted above, may perhaps come from his hand.²

This not very warlike sovereign was the great conqueror of his line. The distant conquests in the heart of Asia, if they ever existed, were at once relinquished. But he reigned over an immense, scattered Empire.³ Cyrene fell directly under his power through his marriage with Berenice, the daughter of Magas. In Syria and Phœnicia, the frontier was, no doubt, where it had been before—on the coast, north of Sidon, towards Tripolis, although the Seleucids must have kept some cities south of that town; in the interior, at the Pass of Brochi, although the Seleucids held Damascus and Orthosia. On the other hand, the Egyptians had established themselves at Seleucia, the port of Antioch. Their Cilician and Pamphylian possessions were enlarged. In Caria, it has been supposed that, to the cities already taken by Philadelphos, Euergetes added Euromos, Pedasos, and Bargylia. In Ionia, he had Ephesos, Miletos, the island of Samos, Lebedos, Colophon-by-the-Sea, and Heracleia on Latmos. In Æolis, he had the island of Lesbos; on the Hellespont, Abydos; in Thrace, Lysimacheia, Ænos, Maroneia, possessions in the Chersonese, and the islands of Thasos and Samothrace. But the defeat off Andros about 245 deprived the Lagids of the protectorate of the Cyclades.

Such was the Lagid Empire at the height of its power. It went far beyond the limits of a normal Egyptian Empire, and, if it owed its origin to the necessity of giving Egypt security and economic superiority over her rivals, it appears that, as it gradually developed, it attained unexpected dimensions. One cannot help thinking, with Wilcken, that in establishing themselves on the coasts of Asia Minor from

¹ IX, 56 (Canopus).

² Holleaux, in LXXXVIII, 1916, pp. 153 ff.; Croenert, in CCXXV, pp. 44 ff.

³ CXVI, vol. iii, 2, pp. 248 ff.

Cilicia to the Hellespont, and in the Chersonese, and in Thrace, the Lagids wanted more than to control the trade-routes leading to Alexandria. That desire to dominate the whole *Ægean*, with a view to obtaining hegemony in the world, which seems to have been behind all the rivalry of the powers since the beginning of the 3rd century, was certainly not unknown to the first two Ptolemies. It is clear that, to reach this aim, they employed all the wonderful resources of the valley of the Nile. But a mere glance at the map which has just been drawn shows that in that Empire some parts were more intimately bound to the centre, while others were far away and scattered. Now, the history of the first Ptolemies shows that, while they made every effort to keep the former (Cyrene, Syria, Cyprus), they readily accepted the loss of the others, when circumstances were too strong for them. About 253, Philadelphos had almost nothing left of his *Ægean* possessions; yet the end of his reign was peaceful. Euergetes saw the dynastic conflicts which rent the Seleucid Empire, and the dissolution of that Empire, before the restoration attempted by Antiochos III. He was aware of the danger to himself which might come from the rival dynasty, for he saw it drawing towards Macedonia. Yet he never took advantage of the disorders which ravaged the state of his neighbours to increase his possessions abroad. The fact is that, after all, Egypt was the basis of the Lagid's power. He could use the country, but he could not exhaust it; it contributed to his conquest with all its forces, but those conquests must be turned to its profit. It was the chief source of the Ptolemies' revenues, but it was also the chief part of their Empire.

That is why, if they ever thought of the adventure, the Lagids dreamed of world-empire only for a space.¹ Such an idea might have occurred to the masters of Macedon

¹ It is true that we have from the pen of Ptolemy, son of Glaucias, this prayer for the reigning King: "May Isis and Serapis, greatest of the Gods, give you the empire of the whole earth, which Helios embraces with his gaze, to you and to your children for ever!" **XXIV**, i, p. 31 and nos. 15, 16, 20. But I believe, with Wilcken, that this is a theological formula, corresponding to the essence of Serapis, Lord of the World, like Osor-Api, whose heir he is. The idea which it expresses perhaps comes from the distant days of the Ramessids. It is contradictory to the usual tendencies of Lagid policy. See, on the other hand, Kornemann, in **CCXXV**, p. 241; Lehmann-Haupt, in **LVII**, xix, p. 229.

and Greece, which were so rich in military resources and technical intelligence, and yet it never seems to have occurred to the Kings of Macedon, after Demetrios Poliorcetes. It might also occur to the true successors of the Great Kings and of Alexander, the rulers of Asia, which was as rich in warlike populations as in precious metals, Asia, which was half of the known world, and it did appear, at least theoretically, in the programme of the Seleucids. But Egypt, with her unwarlike fellahs, Egypt, owing her prosperity not only to her soil but to her trade, and therefore preferring peace, Egypt, so situated that she could only communicate with Asia by the Syrian corridor, and with Europe by the sea, would never have been the centre of a world-empire. To subjugate the world, a strong army, easily renewed, was needed. Egypt had a strong army, but it was chiefly strong from recruiting abroad, which, if her ambition became excessive, might be hampered and almost run dry. No doubt, she was almost invulnerable, if she kept the mastery of the seas, and could defend her Eastern frontier; she could, therefore, place a formidable power in the hands of wise rulers, but one which might be dissipated in mainland expeditions too far away. Her Empire was bound to be chiefly a thalassocracy.

That thalassocracy Egypt still had under Philopator. In Syria, it is true, Seleuceia on the Orontes, at least, returned permanently to the Seleucid. Later, Achæos was allowed to recover part of Pamphylia. But on the whole the Empire remained. It still existed at the beginning of Epiphanes' reign, but collapse came almost immediately. Weakened by internal strife, Egypt was not longer capable of struggling against her rivals. In 200 Philip V robbed her of her possessions in Thrace and on the Hellespont, and Antiochos took Cœle-Syria, Palestine, and then every single place which she held in Asia Minor. At the beginning of the 2nd century, of all the foreign provinces of the Lagids, only Cyrene and Cyprus were left.

III

EGYPT WITHOUT THE EMPIRE

Egypt had no longer an Empire. She was still a powerful state, and, what was more, a wealthy one, and she would be

wealthy to the end. Under Ptolemy Auletes, at the close of the 1st century, at a time when she had declined greatly, the Kings still obtained 12,500 talents of silver from her, according to Cicero.¹ What prevented her from trying to recover her old importance was, above all, the power of Rome.

The relations of Egypt with Rome were of long standing. Directly after the war with Pyrrhos, there was an interchange of embassies between Philadelphos and the Senate. But, down to the end of the 3rd century, these diplomatic relations, "the initiation of which was, without any doubt, due to the Court of Alexandria," were probably of no political consequence. In spite of "reciprocal marks of respect, and intercourse, probably fairly intermittent, in the form of courteous embassies," there was no treaty between Rome and Egypt, and the policy of the Lagids was quite independent. Indeed, it was not always advantageous to Rome. Philopator intervened as a mediator in the war of the allies against Philip V, and in the first Macedonian War, in such a way as to serve the interests of Philip rather than those of the Romans. Even at the beginning of the reign of Epiphanes, when Agathocles sent Ptolemy of Megalopolis to Rome to ask for the support of the Senate against Antiochos III, the minister attached far more importance to the alliance of the King of Macedon, then the enemy of the Romans, for he negotiated (vainly it is true) for a marriage between Epiphanes and a daughter of Philip V. Only in 196 did Rome assume, against the Seleucid King, the rôle of protectress of Greek liberty, and of the despoiled King of Egypt.²

But everything changed after the treaty of Apameia (188). Rome was now a power in the East, by sheer force of a masterful will. It is true that she did not decide on annexations until later—Greece and Macedonia in 146, the kingdom of Pergamon in 133–129, and Cilicia in 102. For a long time yet the enfeebled kingdoms of the Seleucids and Lagids would carry on the shadow of an independent life under her hegemony or her threats. Until the beginning of the 1st century, she was kept busy and held back by difficult wars and internal crises. The Kings continued to reign and

¹ Strabo, 798 ; CLXI, iv, p. 402 n.1.

² CLXVII, pp. 60–96. See the controversy between Valeck, in LXXXVI, 1925, pp. 28–54, 118–42, and Holleaux, *ibid.*, 1926, pp. 46–66.

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to intrigue, soliciting the intervention of the Senate when they were not trembling before it.

The foreign policy of Egypt was then practically confined to her vain rivalry with the Seleucid power, which presently became a purely Syrian kingdom. Her history is complicated by dynastic competitions, which were sometimes fostered by the Romans. This is an evil inherent in Oriental monarchies, and it is a wonder that the Lagid dynasty succeeded in escaping it until its sixth King. In Egypt, which was so hard to disunite, the evil was less dangerous than in Asia, and we may pass rapidly over these fierce, bloody disputes, which would only be interesting if the chief actors were better known to us. Through information of a disheartening aridity we can only catch glimpses of atrocious deeds and guess a madness of passion which cannot be judged by ordinary rules. These princely families, heirs of the proud and stubborn genius of the great ancestors who had founded them, but corrupted by the servility of their subjects, rotten with every vice which can be born of unbridled power in the midst of a voluptuous court, and degenerate from many marriages between brothers and sisters, produced frightful monsters, who would have left a memory as living as that of Tiberius and Nero, if there had been a Tacitus to depict them. The Queens, above all, the Cleopatras descended from the daughter of Antiochos the Great, were worthy of their terrible renown.

With the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor,¹ the son of Epiphanes, who became King in 181 and attained his majority in 173, these conflicts broke out. Rome had, indeed, prevented the Seleucid Antiochos IV from laying hands on Egypt (see below) but, if she could not suffer a too-powerful Seleucid, it was without distress that she saw division in the royal family of Egypt. When Philometor, having been dethroned by the Alexandrians in favour of his brother Euergetes II, presented himself before the Senate as a humble suppliant, Rome brought about an agreement between the brothers, by which Philometor was recalled by his subjects and kept Egypt, while Euergetes got Cyrenaica and henceforth enjoyed her protection. He hardly deserved it; he is the most odious figure of his line, and our tradition charges him with countless crimes. He would have liked,

¹ CLXI, ii, ch. x.

with the help of the Romans, to annex Cyprus to Cyrenaïca. Philometor succeeded in overcoming the hostility of the Senate, before which he was defended by Cato, and finally triumphed (153), but negotiations were continued for eight years, sometimes amid the most dramatic events, such as the rebellion of one Ptolemy Sympetesis at Cyrene, and the imaginary ambush staged by Euergetes, in order to make his brother be taken for a murderer.

Cyrenaïca was once more united to Egypt when, after the very short reign of Eupator, Euergetes succeeded Philometor, who fell on the battle-field in Syria.¹ There, under an energetic sovereign, the Seleucid kingdom was being reconstituted. Rome did not wish it to be confronted with a too divided Egypt, and reconciled Euergetes and Cleopatra II, Philometor's sister and widow, who became the wife of the new King, likewise her brother. But Rome was soon served, better than by the docility of the rulers, by the divisions which rent both kingdoms, Lagid and Seleucid. *Euergetes*, the Benefactor—Physeon, Paunch, as the Alexandrians dubbed him—had become *Kakergetes*, the Malefactor. His cruelties drew general hatred upon him. The terrible measures of repression which followed his installation in Alexandria, the executions of high personages, the massacres of the Jews, who had supported Cleopatra II, the expulsion of the scholars of the Museum, including the celebrated Aristarchos, the King's former tutor, and his conflict with Cleopatra, whose daughter, the horrible Cleopatra III, he first violated and then married, all led to conspiracies, military mutinies, and the revolt of Alexandria, ending with the King's flight in 181. Cleopatra II reigned alone for a short time. But Euergetes presently returned to Alexandria, not without murdering a child whom he had had by Cleopatra II. The Queen fled to her son-in-law Demetrios II in Syria.

Euergetes died in 116, after taking some action, like Philometor, to forward the dissolution of the Syrian monarchy, and, by his testament, preparing that of his own dynasty. He bequeathed Cyrenaïca to his bastard Ptolemy Apion, who would leave it to the Romans twenty years later, and he instructed his wife Cleopatra III to choose the King from her two sons.

¹ CLXI, ii, ch. xi.

"Red-face," as the Alexandrians called her, was compelled by them to give the crown to the eldest son, Ptolemy Lathyros (Chick-pea), whom she hated. She made him divorce his sister Cleopatra IV, whom he loved but she distrusted, and marry another sister, Cleopatra Selene. A situation like this was bound to create trouble. Disorders continued until the death of Cleopatra III (101-100), and the King's younger brother, Alexander I. Lathyros was driven out by the Alexandrians and went to reign in Cyprus, while Alexander reigned in Alexandria, until, after incessant wars, Lathyros returned to the throne of Egypt (88-80). These wars were waged chiefly in Syria, where the Lagids mixed themselves up in the troubles which were ravaging that kingdom, for, in the midst of her own divisions, Egypt never abandoned her pretensions to Southern Syria; there was still a Syrian question.¹

In 200, the battle of the Paneion had decided matters in the Seleucid's favour. But the Court of Alexandria had, no doubt, hoped for some advantage from the marriage of Epiphanes with the daughter of Antiochos the Great. It was to be disappointed. On the contrary, Antiochos IV,² like his father Antiochos III in the time of Philopator and Epiphanes, attempted to profit by the King's minority to attack the Lagid kingdom. He took Pelusion, captured the young Philometor, who was badly guided by unworthy ministers, Lenæos and the eunuch Eulæos, and then marched on Alexandria. But the Alexandrians had proclaimed Euergetes II King, and his able advisers, Cineas and Comanos, had placed the city in a state of defence. Antiochos, who had no war-engines, thought that he was doing a master-stroke in leaving the two brothers face to face, and, counting on their rivalry, he returned to his kingdom. The two Lagids were reconciled, and the war began again. Antiochos again invaded Egypt, and arrived before Alexandria. He was preparing to deliver the assault, when Popilius Lænas, the envoy of the Senate, appeared. Rome had not crushed Antiochos III in order to allow his successors to absorb the kingdom of the Ptolemies. If she had not intervened earlier, it was because she had the third Macedonian War

¹ *Ibid.*, ch. xii.

² *Ibid.*, ch. x.

on her hands ; but Æmilius Paullus had defeated Perseus at Pydna in 168, and Popilius Lænas was able to present Antiochos IV with "the most brutal of ultimatums",¹ enclosing him in the famous circle which he was not allowed to leave until he had chosen between the possession of Egypt and the friendship of the Roman people.

The war of Antiochos IV was the last attempt of the Seleucids against Egypt. It was now left to the Ptolemies to meddle in the quarrels which were dragging the Syrian monarchy to destruction. So, when the King of Syria, Demetrios I, attracted the suspicion of the Senate by intervening in the dynastic disputes of Cappadocia, and Attalos II of Pergamon, ever ready to please the Romans, set up a pretender, Alexander Balas, against him, Philometor did not hesitate to support the adventurer, and gave him his daughter, Cleopatra Thea, in marriage. Demetrios I was killed in a battle ; but Balas was not fitted for his rôle, and must have displeased Philometor, who then turned to the son of Demetrios I, Demetrios II. This Demetrios married Cleopatra Thea. Balas was defeated and slain in the battle of the River Cénoparas, but the victorious Ptolemy was carried dying from the field. Egypt had gained nothing by the war.²

It was much the same at the end of the reigns of Euergetes II in Egypt and of Demetrios II in Syria. At the appeal of the Syrians, who hated Demetrios, Euergetes sent them as King an alleged son of Balas, Alexander Zabinas, and, after a war of three years, Demetrios was killed and Zabinas ascended the throne of Antioch. But very soon Euergetes quarrelled with him. Deprived of the support of Egypt, the adventurer was overthrown, and was killed in a riot. Antiochos VIII Grypos, a genuine Seleucid, who succeeded him, married the Lagid's daughter Cleopatra Tryphœna.³

Egypt, however, could extract no profit from these intrigues. Rome would not have allowed her to increase her power, and it was probably from fear of Rome that Philometor and Euergetes put forward only doubtful pretenders. With Lathyros, we find the Lagids transporting their own quarrels to Syria, rather than trying to increase

¹ Homo, *Primitive Italy*, pp. 308-9.

² CLXI, ii, ch.x. § 3.

³ *Ibid.*, ch. xi, § 2.

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their power in the country. Lathyros, then King of Egypt, had wanted to support Antiochos IX against the Jews of Palestine, who were always in revolt and formed a state within the State. He thereby broke with Cleopatra III, who relied for support on the Jewish party in Alexandria. Dethroned and replaced by Alexander I, he established himself in Cyprus, in spite of the efforts of his mother, who was betrayed by all her generals except the Jews Chelcias and Ananias. From Cyprus, Lathyros was summoned by the city of Ptolemaïs to help it against the Jews, and saw in this war an opportunity to return victoriously to Egypt by way of Syria. Cleopatra went there, to fight him. But in the end Lathyros returned to Cyprus, from where he once more tried to interfere in the conflicts which divided the Seleucids. All these were vain, unprofitable undertakings. In Alexandria, Alexander I undid himself by his atrocities, being overthrown by the indignation of the Alexandrians (89). He was dethroned and cut down, after assassinating his abominable mother (101), who, however, had committed almost all her crimes for his sake, and allowing Rome to take Cyrenaïca, as the inheritance of Apion.¹ Lathyros was recalled to Alexandria, and reigned in peace after putting down a revolt in the Thebaïd. Henceforward, Egypt would no longer have a Syrian policy.

IV

THE INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT IN DANGER (80-51)

Indeed, Egypt would have no policy at all, for one can hardly give this name to the base intrigues to which she was reduced, to defend her independence against Rome. After the very short reign of Berenice III, Lathyros's daughter, who was killed by her cousin and husband, Alexander II, the son of Alexander I, and after Alexander II had himself perished in the revolt of his outraged capital, the legitimate line of the Lagids was extinct (80).² Alexander II had become King only by the favour of Sulla, who was then Dictator and all-powerful. What would happen if Rome

¹ Paus., i.9.3.; Just., xxxix.4; App., xii, p. 55; Jerome, *Eus.*, ii, p. 188 (Schoene). But see CLXI, ii, pp. 105-6, n., p. 108.

² CLXI, ii, chaps. xiii-xiv.

cast her eyes on the vacant throne? The Alexandrians hastened to set up a bastard of Lathyros, Ptolemy Auletes, so called from his gifts as a flute-player, which were considered unworthy of a king. But in Rome there was presently talk of a will of Alexander II, who, like Attalos III of Pergamon, and like Ptolemy Apion of Cyrene, and like Nicomedes of Bithynia shortly afterwards, was said to have bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. Rome was growing used to being mentioned in the wills of kings. The story of the will of Alexander II may, perhaps, have been a complete fabrication, but, none the less, the question rose among the parties which divided the Republic: were they to take up this inheritance? The history of Egypt became bound up with the internal history of Rome.

The leaders of the popular party pressed for the annexation of Egypt. This policy attracted the plebs, for the wealth of Egypt in corn raised hopes of more abundant corn-distributions, there might be allotments of land, and the leaders thought that the organization of the new province would give them resources which would help them to seize power. This was exactly what the nobility did not want. By keeping the question in suspense, they had the further advantage of making the sovereign concerned pay them for their protection. It had been easy to set aside the claim of Cleopatra Selene, the sister and widow of Lathyros, who had married three Seleucids in succession and demanded for her sons Syria (then in the hands of Tigranes, King of Armenia, Mithradates' son-in-law and one of the great potentates of the East) and also Egypt. But in 65, when Pompey was busy rounding up the pirates and defeating Mithradates, the wealthy Licinius Crassus, another leader of the popular party, proposed that Egypt should be made to pay tribute, as a province of the Roman people, and Cæsar was to be entrusted with the operation. In 64, a similar danger appeared in the agrarian bill of P. Servilius Rullus, who proposed that all public domains outside Italy should be distributed among the poor citizens. The nobility defeated both projects; against the agrarian bill Cicero uttered one of his ablest speeches.¹

¹ *De Lege Agraria*.

The Egyptian question was now simply one among the many questions which aroused men's passions in the Republic. The year 68 was the year of Catiline and the Consulship of Cicero. Then Pompey returned from the East. He had defeated Mithradates and organized the new provinces. The circle round Egypt was drawing in. The Seleucids had fallen, and Syria was a Roman province. By the side of the Province of Asia, once the kingdom of Pergamon, there were now Bithynia and Pontus, combined in a single government, Cilicia enlarged, and a whole series of protected states—the kingdoms of Cappadocia, Galatia, and the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Tigranes was reduced to Armenia. In Rome, the first Triumvirate was formed (60), and Cæsar obtained the Consulship (59). He would naturally revive the projects of Rullus. Auletes saw the danger, and bought Cæsar for 6,000 talents. Egypt was left outside the agrarian schemes. By a law *De Rege Alexandrino* Ptolemy was recognized as the friend and ally of the Roman people.

Auletes had achieved his object, but he had reckoned without the people of his capital. They may have been a mixed rabble in Alexandria, but they had a kind of patriotism born of a natural pride in the greatest city in the world and of hatred of Rome, whose triumph they foresaw—a hard-dying hatred, which lasted long after the conquest. In 58 the notorious Clodius persuaded the Republic to decide to annex Cyprus. The "friend and ally" naturally did not move a finger, but Alexandria was sick at the humiliation. Ptolemy was driven out, and fled with all speed to Rome.

Would the Romans reinstate Ptolemy? The mission promised to be so lucrative that all the great men, openly or secretly, contemplated getting it for themselves. Even without that, the Republic was torn with the intrigues and hatreds of parties as it had never been before. The Forum was the scene of veritable battles every day. Cæsar had gone to seek in the conquest of Gaul the prestige and resources which he had formerly thought of obtaining from Egypt. Meanwhile the mad conduct of Clodius, whom he had left on the Forum, ended by bringing Pompey and the Senate together, and Cicero, recalled from exile in 57, was trying—unsuccessfully, because of the uncompromising attitude of Cato—to bring about an agreement between the Senate and the Equites for the defence of order.

Cast into the midst of these inflamed passions, the Egyptian question instilled more poison into them. It gave rise to scenes of bloodshed. Ptolemy's hired assassins killed the hundred ambassadors whom the Alexandrians had sent to plead their cause against the King, and the leader of the mission, Dion of the Academy, was murdered shortly after the rest. This crime created a scandal, which was discussed before the law-courts.¹ Yet, as early as 57, the Senate, corrupted by Ptolemy's gold, had decided that the King should be restored by P. Cornelius Spinther, the governor of Cilicia. But the aristocratic party, who naturally opposed the project, and Pompey, who wanted the mission for himself, paralysed the decision of the Conscript Fathers, and it remained a dead letter. Ptolemy took refuge in the Temple of Ephesos, where he found a bank which could give him the gold which he needed. So he was able to influence Gabinius, the governor of Syria, a friend of Cæsar and Pompey. Gabinius asked nothing better than to earn the 10,000 talents promised him. In the meantime, the Alexandrians had placed Berenice, a daughter of Auletes, on the throne. But they felt the danger, and looked for a husband for their Queen. They had thought of a descendant of the Seleucids, who lived in Syria; but Gabinius had forbidden him to leave the province. They found an adventurer, one Seleucos, whose surname of Fishmonger gives us an idea of his manners; the disgusted Berenice had him killed. Lastly, Archelaos, the son of a general of Mithradates, was accepted, but he was unable to defend Egypt against the Roman legions of Gabinius. Ptolemy was restored, and died in 51.

V

ANTONY AND THE LAST ATTEMPTS AT AN EGYPTIAN
EMPIRE (51-30) *

Egypt had fallen low indeed. Yet one cannot help admiring the vitality of the country, the only one of the great Mediterranean states which Rome had not yet subdued. We even see, in the midst of the supreme crisis which was to

¹ Cic., *Pro Cælio*, 10.

* **CLXI**, ii, chaps. xv-xvi; T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. v, ch. x; G. Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, English ed., vol. iv, ch. iii, "Antony and Cleopatra."

destroy the Republic, the menace of an Egyptian Empire rising. No doubt, that Empire was based on Roman arms, and it was a Roman who founded it. But the desire for rebirth none the less showed what a real leader might have done with the resources of Egypt, and we must not forget that, when the empire of the world lay between Octavian and Antony, it also lay between Rome and Alexandria.

About two years after the death of Ptolemy Auletes, Cæsar crossed the Rubicon (49). Egypt was then drawn into the Civil Wars. But she did not make a very dignified entrance. Before Pharsalos, she had been unable to refuse ships to Sextus, the son of Pompey the Great, the benefactor of the ruling house. What would she do after the defeat? The royal pair, Auletes' two children, Cleopatra, aged seventeen, and Ptolemy XIV, her brother and husband, seven years younger, were divided. It was in order to fight Cleopatra, who had taken refuge among the Arab tribes, that Ptolemy had collected his army at Pelusion, when he received the fugitive Pompey and murdered him (48). When Cæsar arrived, he summoned the brother and sister and reconciled them.

From that moment, Cleopatra takes front place. Could she choose resistance, as her brother, her sister, and the people of her capital would do? She doubtless thought this a desperate course. Her whole policy consisted in fascinating the man who seemed likely to be the future master of the world. After the famous Alexandrian War (48-47), which was born of a fever of patriotism among the townspeople, and caused both Cæsar and the Queen to run into such danger, she reigned in association with her younger brother, the elder having been killed in the last fight with the Romans. At one moment she seemed to be at the summit; when, after the African War, Cæsar allowed her to come to Rome, she might believe herself Queen of the world. The Ides of March were a catastrophe for her. It was almost impossible for her not to show herself a "Cæsarian", but she tried not to compromise herself. While she sent troops—Roman troops, the former soldiers of Gabinius—to the Cæsarian Dolabella, to aid him in his unsuccessful attempt to take Syria from the Republican Crassus, she may, perhaps, also have arranged that the

ships for which Antony and Octavian asked her should not reach their destination. The day of Philippi (September, 42) decided the fate of the world. The East was entrusted to Antony. His mission was to pacify it and to avenge the defeat of Crassus of 53 on the Parthians, who were, in any case, menacing. At Tarsos, whither Antony had summoned her, the "new Aphrodite" had no difficulty in justifying herself and carrying the Roman off to Alexandria and the delights of the "Inimitable Life" (41). She must have perceived that this soldier might be the instrument which would make a new Empire for her dynasty.

Antony did not allow Alexandria to seduce him at once and for ever. His wife, Fulvia, after the failure of the Perusian War, which she had herself instigated against Octavian, pursued her husband to the East, to take him back to Italy; but Fulvia died, and Antony was reconciled with Octavian, whose sister he married (treaties of Brundisium and Misenum, 40-39). He still behaved as a Roman Emperor, and in Athens, where he stayed with his young wife, he made ready for war with the Parthians, who had invaded Asia Minor and Syria. L. Ventidius, his lieutenant, had saved the new provinces (38). But a defensive attitude was not sufficient, and, in order to make preparations for the campaign in the enemy's country, Antony sent his wife home and went to Antioch, where he found the Queen of Egypt and her children.

From that time onwards we see him gradually falling away from Roman ideas, doubtless under the influence of Cleopatra. First of all, she tried to use him to recover portions of the old Lagid Empire. She made him give her parts of Coele-Syria and Cyprus, and domains in Cilicia, in Crete, and even in Judea, which was ruled by Herod, whom she could not dispossess. But the plans of the royal courtesan and her lover took more definite shape when Antony undertook the conquest of the East. This enterprise might in itself be regarded as part of his duty as a *Duumvir*; but it soon became clear that the Roman magistrate was not thinking chiefly of Rome. He was not aiming at creating provinces or protected kingdoms; he was dreaming of a federation of Eastern kingdoms, forming a single power, and Alexandria was to be the capital.

This is not the place to describe Antony's campaign against the Parthians (37) and his disastrous retreat, nor his subsequent war with Armenia (34-33), which took him into the heart of the country and ended with the capture of the King and his family. The splendid festivities with which the victory was celebrated in Alexandria clearly reveal the ambitions of Cleopatra and Antony. Cleopatra, in association with Antony, King and God, was proclaimed Queen of Queens, and it was no empty title, for she would have the overlordship of the kingdoms apportioned to the children whom she had borne to Antony—Armenia and the regions to be conquered from the Parthians to Alexander Helios, who had married Iotape, the King of Media's daughter; Syria to Ptolemy Philadelphos; and Cyprus and Cyrenaïca to Cleopatra Selene. Actium sent the edifice toppling before it was completed; if it had been, it might have been a serious danger to Rome (30).

So, from the death of Alexander to the battle of Actium, as was natural in four hundred years, the policy of the Lagids varied. Their history contains clearly-marked epochs, the most decisive of which is probably that which saw the downfall of their Empire, at the end of the 3rd century and the beginning of the 2nd. The decline began under Philopator, and became more acute under Epiphanes; about 200, it was rapid. But, whether the realm of the Lagids was a kingdom confined to the valley of the Nile, or an empire covering almost the whole Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt itself remained an essential part of the system and the chief concern of its sovereigns. Even when their ambition seems to have aimed chiefly at hegemony in the Mediterranean, they could not neglect the interests of the country of Egypt, the organization of which was one of the most serious tasks of their policy.

CHAPTER II

LIFE IN EGYPT UNDER THE LAGIDS

I

THE COUNTRY AND ITS RESOURCES

THERE has already appeared, in the *History of Civilization*, a masterly description of Egypt, which clearly shows the place of the Nile valley among the historical regions of the East.¹ It will be sufficient here to call attention to those features which are important for the Hellenistic period.

It will be noticed, first of all, that in size Egypt, properly so called, is a small country. It is true that, from Cape Burlus to the island of Philæ, it measures 492 miles as the crow flies, and 750 by the winding river, but, except in the Delta, the coast-line of which is 375 miles long, it is only a thin ribbon. Its total surface is not greater than that of modern Belgium. Egypt is an elongated oasis between two deserts.

These deserts are wide mountainous plateaux. On the East, the Arabian Desert rises gently towards the Red Sea, but it is traversed by long grooves connecting Egypt with the coast of that sea. The other desert, the Libyan, in the West, falls rapidly away from the Nile, and presents the same aspect as the Sahara, with sandy basins and a tangle of small limestone hills. M. Moret has shown the important part played by these plateaux in prehistoric times. In historical times, while they expose the cultivated lands to the menace of their pillaging nomads (a small matter for a well-organized government), they enclose the valley and protect it against foreign attack, and, in a measure, they complement it. The Eastern Desert, by its caravan-roads, makes the Red Sea an Egyptian water. The Western Desert, having undergone the great upheaval which, in the Tertiary period, dislocated the whole Eastern basin of

¹ **CLXXIV**, pp. 115 ff., 158 ff., 187 ff; [Moret, *The Nile*, also in this series, pp. 1 ff. Trs.] See also **CXXVI**, pp. 77-85 and *passim*; Bénédict, *Introduction au guide d'Égypte* (Hachette).

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the Mediterranean from north to south, presents a series of depressions, roughly parallel to the Nile, and some of these contain oases. The three most famous are the Great Theban Oasis, the Lesser Oasis, and the Oasis of Amon, Quite near the Delta is the Natron Valley, the Nitriæ of the ancients. and about sixty miles south of Memphis is the circular basin of the Fayum, partly filled by Lake Moëris.¹

If one excepts the oases, which, after all, are only unimportant appendages, Egypt is wholly tied to the Nile. The Nile makes the country; it is alive only in the area covered by the annual inundation, where the water deposits the fertile alluvium. The Fayum is connected with it by the Bahr Yusuf, a branch of the river. The narrow valley which the Nile follows and moulds from Meroë to Memphis often played the chief part, for historical reasons which have been set forth elsewhere. But from the Saïte period onwards, as the movement of the world set more and more towards the Ægean, the centre of the country shifted towards the Delta, and in the time of the Ptolemies geography and history conspired to bring to the fore those regions where the cultivable land extended over a wider area—the Delta, cut up by the branches of the seven-mouthed river, and the Fayum, where the activity of the Greek Kings was to conquer a whole rich province from the waters of the lake.

Certainly, there were still important towns along the narrow artery which brought life to the Northern nomes. Some owed their greatness to religion and memories, others to their position—Syene and Elephantine at the entrance of the kingdom, Apollinopolis (Edfu), with its old sanctuary of the Falcon Horus, Thebes, the ancient seat of Amon, spread over the two banks of the river, Coptos, where the routes of the Eastern Desert came in, Tentyris and its Temple of Hathor, busy Panopolis, where the Greeks thought that they found traces of their own Perseus,² and, lastly, further north, the three great cities of Central Egypt, learned Hermopolis,³ where Thoth-Hermes reigned, Heracleopolis, protected

¹ Major Brown, *The Fayum and Lake Moëris*; C. Wessely, "Topographie des Fayyums," in *Denkschr. Akad. Wien*, i (1904); **XXX**, Introd.; **XXXI**, ii, App. ii.

² Hdt., ii.91.

³ Méautis, *Hermoupolis la Grande*, Lausanne, 1918.

by its warrior god, and Oxyrrhynchos, perhaps one of the most Hellenized cities in the kingdom. But it is in the Fayum, rather than in Upper Egypt, that we find the wealthy villages with the Greek names, crowded round the capital Crocodilopolis, afterwards called Arsinoë. In the Delta, less well-known because our papyri came from the Fayum or Upper Egypt, huge, opulent cities lie, as it were, in heaps—Athribis, Bubastis, Pharbæthos, Tanis, Mendes and Thmuis, Sebennytos, Saïs, another Hermopolis, the old Greek city of Naucratis, and, at the three corners of the triangle, as at the vital points, Memphis, the great native city, Pelusion, the gate of Egypt on the Asiatic side, and the royal capital, the most illustrious of all the Alexandrias.

Egypt, the daughter of the fertilizing waters, is above all things an agricultural country ;¹ the land is the Black Land, and it chiefly produces cereals. The reports of the scribe Menches, in the time of Philometor and Euergetes II, include under the head of cereals (*sitos*), wheat, barley, sorghum or durra, and lentils. In the Fayum (as, probably, everywhere else), wheat was the chief produce ; in the reign of Euergetes I, 184,815½ *arourai* were given to it, while only 26,260 were under barley. The kingdom of the Ptolemies was one of the great producers and suppliers of corn in the Hellenistic world.

After *sitos*, Menches names the less remunerative crops—fenugreek, fennel-flower, beans, garlic, vetch, and various fodders. But there were many other kinds of produce, and, first and foremost, the oleaginous plants, the cultivation and treatment of which were often State monopolies—sesame, castor-oil or *kiki*, safflower, colocynth, and linseed.² To these one must add olives. It is, no doubt, a mistake to suppose that the Greeks introduced the olive into Egypt ;³ but they very probably developed and improved the cultivation of that tree, which was a national tree to them. Strabo saw olive-trees,⁴ but observes that they grew only in the gardens of Alexandria and in the Fayum, where they are

¹ CLXXX, i (Wilcken), pp. 270 ff. ; CLXXXIV ; XXXI, App.i ; CCX ; CCXI ; CCXII ; Rostovtzev, in LXXI, 1920, pp. 161 ff. ; M. Schnebel, *Die Landwirtschaft im hellenistischen Ägypten*, Munich, 1925.

² XXVIII ; CLXI, iii, pp. 287 ff. ; CLXXXI (Wilcken), i, pp. 289 ff.

³ For oil, see Dubois, in LXXXVI, 1925, pp. 60–88.

⁴ Strabo, 809.

mentioned by the documents. Nor were the Greeks the first to plant the vine in Egypt,¹ for it appears on monuments of the early dynasties, and Sappho, in the 7th century, speaks of the wine of Egypt, giving it its Egyptian name of *herpi*.² But it is certain that, in Egypt as elsewhere, vine-growing was greatly extended by the Greeks; there are abundant proofs, not the least interesting of which is the spread of the worship of Dionysos. The wine of Mareotis was famous. The orchards and the "Paradises", as they were called, contained many other fruit-trees, the most frequent of which were palms of all kinds. These yielded dates, palm-wine, and a light timber for construction, which was also obtained from acacias and sycamores. One must also include among the useful plants of Egypt the textile plants, especially flax,³ and the aromatic plants—laudanum, cinnamon, myrobalan, and the *cyprus*, the best quality of which came from Canopos.⁴ Lastly, reeds were gathered in the pools left by the ebbing inundation, where they formed brakes (*δρυμοί*) full of game till about the end of the hot weather. The most precious of these reeds was the *byblos*, which was manufactured into a paper which Egypt sold to the whole world.⁵

Agriculture was conducted scientifically. Rotation of crops was practised. Excellent manures were known—the dung of pigeons, which were bred extensively, and the acrid dust, full of phosphates, which the modern fellah calls *sebakh*; like him, his forefathers used to collect it in the ruins of villages abandoned centuries before.⁶ Irrigation was effected by a well-planned system of channels, and machines were used—the shadoof, the *sakiya* or chain of buckets, and the Archimedean screw.⁷ The *sakiyas* were driven by oxen and donkeys. The camel was coming into use. The horse had been in Egypt since the time of the Hyksos. Sheep yielded various kinds of wool, the most famous being those of Xoïs. Goats were kept for their leather and their milk, geese for their fat meat, and bees for their honey.

¹ Clotilde Ricci, in *CVI*, iv, 1.

² *CCVII*.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 267 ff.

⁴ Calderini, in *CIII*, i, pp. 37–62, 189–216, 309–17.

⁵ Athen., 39A.

⁶ *CLXI*, iii, pp. 242 ff.

⁷ Wilcken, in *LXV*, iii, pp. 308 ff.

The Hellene, who knew only the barren soil of Greece Proper and the marble islands, must have been surprised when he landed in the Delta and saw the green plain of the Nile and the busy life of the Egyptian countryside. If it was the time of the inundation, he would see the valley covered as by one great sea, with the villages emerging like so many islands. When the floods retreated, they left a layer of wet mud, from which little field-beasts sometimes appeared, especially rats, which seemed to be born from the miraculous deposit. Then the fellah followed the ebbing water over the soft ground, sometimes sinking in it almost to his middle, and scattered the seed which was to feed him. The soil hardly needed to be turned over; the seed sank in of its own weight, and sometimes it was enough to let a herd of pigs tread it down. Four months later the fields began to be covered in rich harvests. How could one refrain from wonder at that easy abundance and the bountiful river which seemed to make the heart of Egypt beat to the rhythm of its own life? Alone of all rivers, it rose in the dry season! Certainly, learned men had long ago given materialistic explanations of the strange phenomenon, which were not so very far off the truth as we know it to-day;¹ but there were always mystical souls who rejected them as inadequate and blasphemous. The Nile must be a god. Lucan, Ælius Aristides, and, at the end of Paganism, Claudian, in his short poem on the Nile, echo these pious doctrines.²

Such a singular and happy country naturally impressed men's imaginations, and artists delighted in calling it to memory. Sculpture represented the Nile as an old man, reclining majestically among water-plants and surrounded by sixteen little geniuses, who symbolized the sixteen cubits of the inundation.³ Tapestry, painting, and mosaic reproduced Nile landscapes, with the plants and animals characteristic of the country—palms, ibises, hippopotamuses, and crocodiles.⁴

¹ Hdt., ii.19-26; Strabo, 789.

² Luc., *Phars.*, x.194-331; Æl. Arist., xxxvi, ed. Keil, *Αἰθέρσιος*; Claudian, ed. Jeep, xxvii.

³ The statue in the Vatican.

⁴ CLXXXIII.

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But not all the riches of Egypt came from the Nile. The barren desert contributed its share.¹ There were its beautiful stones, which served Egyptian architecture as well—limestones, like those of Troja (Tura), opposite Memphis, and of the Gebel Tukh, not far from the Greek city of Ptolemaïs, in the Thebaïd; sandstones like those of Silsilis; granite of Syene and Myos Hormos; porphyry and green breccia of the deserts of the Red Sea; alabasters, and semi-precious stones. There were salt-deposits at Memphis and Pelusion, nitre in the Natron Valley, and some metal—gold in Gebel Fawahir and a little copper in the Fayum.

A people whose civilization was thousands of years old, and whose land was so productive, could not fail to be an industrial people.² In that domain, since the 6th century, Egypt had suffered from the victorious competition of Greece. But in the 3rd century the Macedonian conquest led to a displacement of the "economic centre of gravity". The opening up of the East and the creation of the great Hellenistic states of Macedon, Asia, and Egypt robbed Greece of the central position which had stood the intelligence and activity of its population in such good stead. It was, moreover, to those racial qualities much more than to the wealth of her products that Greece had owed her supremacy in the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries. The Hellenes were more and more attracted to the new countries. It was not that their own land was poor and deserted in the 3rd century; only in the 2nd century, when it had been gradually exhausted by internal strife, emptied by emigration, and weakened by deliberate birth-control, did Greece begin to sicken and die of the "dearth of men" of which Polybius speaks. But at the beginning of the Hellenistic period it shared in the general "boom".³ Athens was very prosperous, especially in the time of Demetrios of Phaleron, and Thebes, rebuilt by Cassandros, Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Eubœa, and Sicyon in the Peloponnese were very large cities. But the great cities of Europe were chiefly in Macedonia—

¹ CCIX.

² CCVI; CCVII; CXLI, pp. 237 ff.; CLXXX (Wilcken), i, pp. 258 ff.; Wilcken, in LXIV, 1921, pp. 60 ff.

³ CXVI, iii, 1, pp. 279-81.

Cassandraia, Thessalonice, Uranopolis, Antigoneia—and there were nowhere as many as in Asia Minor. Egypt had the greatest city in the world, ancient traditions of craftsmanship, and a hard-working population, and, together with the Greeks of Greece and Asia, she welcomed other races, which contributed their own special qualities. Chief among these were the Jews.¹

The Jews had long ago discovered the way to the Nile valley. The story of Joseph is not wholly mythical. In the time of the Middle Kingdom, the Egyptian monuments show us entire clans of Asiatics settling in the country. Not to go back to those distant times, it is certain that the Dispersion began as early as the Saïte period. Deuteronomy (xvii.16) suggests that in the 7th century the Kings of Israel were exchanging soldiers for horses with Pharaoh. A passage in Isaiah (xix.18–25; it is, however, disputed) mentions five cities in the land of Egypt which shall speak the language of Canaan and swear by Jehovah Sabaoth. There were probably Jewish soldiers in the army which Psammetichus II (594–589) led into Ethiopia. A mass of Jews had emigrated into Egypt at the time of the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar in 586² and after the Persian conquest of 525.³ In the Aramaic papyri found at Elephantine,⁴ we find, between 494 and 400, a military colony of Jews established round a temple of Jehovah, which was founded in the time of the “King of Egypt” and was respected by Cambyses. According to Josephus,⁵ Alexander established soldiers of Sanballat, the governor of Samaria, in the Thebaïd, and a village of Samaria will be found in the Fayum.⁶ When Soter took Jerusalem in his campaign of 312, he transported a multitude of Jewish and Samaritan prisoners, and settled them in Egypt.⁷ It is an established fact that, in the Jewish

¹ Neppi Modona, in CIII, ii, pp. 253 ff.; iii, pp. 19–43; M. Le Fuchs, *Die Juden Ägyptens in ptolemäischer u. römischer Zeit*, Vienna, 1924; Bacchisio Motzo, in CII, 1912–18, 577 ff.; and an unpublished memoir by W. Lods.

² Jer., xxiv.8; xlii–xliv; Isaiah, xi.11.

³ Pseudo-Aristæos, 18.

⁴ A. H. Sayce and A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri discovered at Assuan*, London, 1906; E. Sachau, *Aramäische Papyri u. Ostraca aus einer jüdischen Militär-Kolonie zu Elephantine*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1911.

⁵ Joseph, *Antiq.*, ix.345.

⁶ XXXI, ii, p. 388; Wessely, *Topogr. d. Fayyums*, pp. 133–6.

⁷ Joseph, *Antiq.*, xii.4.5; C. Apion., i.209–12.

cemetery at Ibrahimiyyeh near Alexandria, tombs have been found dating from the first Ptolemies.¹ In Philometor's time (160), the High Priest Onias, the son of Onias III, was driven out by the Maccabees and received by the King, who gave him land near Leontopolis ; there he built a temple,² "a little copy of that in Jerusalem."³ The documents show us Jews all over the country, established in communities round their oratories (*proseuchai*), with their Councils of Elders, Archons, and Rabbis (*didaskaloi*). They made their way into every kind of business, and almost every Government office, and readily accepted financial posts. All the Jewries of Egypt seem to have been under the Ethnarch or Genarch, resident in Alexandria. In the capital itself, the Jews (who came at length to occupy a whole quarter) formed a privileged *politeuma*. It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of the part which they played.

These busy populations were concentrated in cities which grew ever larger, and the development of city life encouraged that of industry. There is no doubt that several of the old Egyptian cities were greatly increased in the time of the Ptolemies. We have the proof in the names of their quarters, which in some—for example, Arsinoë, in the Fayum,⁴ Hermopolis,⁵ Oxyrrhynchos⁶—reveal the presence of foreign populations. Memphis was always enormous. The Greek city of Naukratis in the Delta, which was embellished under Philadelphos, may, perhaps, have enjoyed a further development at one time, in spite of the preponderance of Alexandria. Of recent foundations, we know little of Ptolemaïs, which must have been a big town. But Alexandria, with its area of over 2,000 acres, its 300,000 free men, and its total of half a million souls, including slaves, exceeded all dimensions hitherto known.⁷ "It was a revolution similar to that which occurred in the 17th century, when London and Paris began to grow perceptibly larger than the great cities of earlier

¹ E. Breccia, in **LXXXIII**, ix (1907), pp. 35 ff.

² Joseph., *Antiq.*, xii.9.7 ; xiii.3 ; *Jewish War*, i.1.1 ; vii.10.2-3 ; **CLXI**, ii, pp. 40 ff.

³ Renan, *Hist. du peuple d'Israël*, iv, p. 400.

⁴ C. Wessely, in **LXXV**, 1902, 4.

⁵ Méautis, *op. cit.*, chaps. ii, iii.

⁶ H. Rink, *Strassen- u. Viertelnamen von Oxyrrhynchos*, Giessen, 1924.

⁷ **CXCVII**.

times—Venice, Milan, Lisbon.”¹ Lastly, industry was encouraged by the increased activity of trade, the development of coinage, and the progress of science and engineering, which must have been greatly promoted by an institution like the Museum. When Euergetes II later drove the learned men out of Alexandria, they would communicate the subtleties of Egyptian mechanical processes to the rest of the world.*

The art of the weavers was famous.² Egypt is said to have invented the horizontal loom, and to have passed it on to Greece. In the Ptolemaic period, imported cotton and silk and the linen of the country were spun and woven. The finest flax, the *byssos*, was used for making light materials, which were especially wanted for the gods and priests, who could only wear linen. Wool was used for the clothing of laymen, hangings, carpets, etc.—wools of Xoïs, Cyrenaïca, Cyprus, and even Miletos. These materials were, of course, dyed, with Phœnician purple and a thousand other colours. Thebes, Memphis, Tanis, Buto, Tentyris, Canopus, Casion, Arsinoë in the Fayum, and Pelusion were the centres of textile manufacture.

The Egyptian was always renowned—and still is—for his skill in working wood.³ He made use of thuja of Cyrenaïca, ebony of Ethiopia, and pine of Cyprus. The only native woods which could really be used by the joiner were the acacia and sycamore. The joiner’s work of Casion was long celebrated.

The metals⁴ worked by the Egyptians, like the woods, were generally imported; but the gold and silver work of the country had a deserved reputation. The famous Boscoreale treasure in the Louvre gives a notion of Alexandrian silverware. Metal-chasing was an Alexandrian art. Glassware,⁵ especially luxurious glassware, crystals, amber, onyx, ivory, precious stones, and leather goods,⁶ made Egypt, and more particularly her capital, the purveyor of elegant luxury to the whole world. The manufacture of perfumes was very highly developed; Egypt imported

¹ CLXXXIV, p. 100. *For industry in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, in this series, pp. 349 ff. TRS.

² CCVII; CCVI, pp. 98 ff.

³ CLXXXIV, pp. 100–87; CCVI, pp. 72 ff.

⁴ CCVI, pp. 50 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 132 ff.

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myrrh and frankincense and sophisticated them for exportation and for the home market.¹ Even the supply of foodstuffs occupied a great number of workers. We are told of the crayfish of Alexandria, the pepper of Libya, the vinegar of Egypt, the salt fish of Mendes and Lake Mœris, the wine of Mareotis, the hams and mustard of Cyrene, the oil-pastries of Alexandria and Arsinoë, the bakeries, the breweries, etc. Lastly, the manufacture of paper was an Egyptian monopoly.

The necessity for importing certain raw materials, such as woods and metals, and for finding markets for products which daily grew more abundant, must have given Egyptian trade an unprecedented development.² * But, no less than industry, trade was affected by the great political, economic, and social changes which accompanied the Macedonian conquest. No country, perhaps, was so well situated as Egypt for developing the mercantilism which, as we have seen, was a characteristic of the policy of the time. The great port which she needed on the Mediterranean, Alexander had given her. The Nile was the easiest road of penetration into Central Africa, and the valleys which crossed the Arabian Desert connected the river with the Red Sea, and, by the Red Sea, with the Indian Ocean. The Greek Kings—especially the earlier—displayed intelligent activity in opening up the South and the East to their merchants and their influence. On the Upper Nile, their sway did not extend very far. There they encountered wild nomads, probably of Hamitic race, like the Egyptians—the Blemyes and Megabari, who must have dwelt chiefly in the wadys of the Erythræan Desert, like the Abadis and Bisharis of to-day. The valley was occupied by sedentary negroes, the Nobads. These peoples, Eratosthenes tells us, obeyed the Ethiopians.

The whole country was Egyptianized. In former times it had been conquered by the Pharaohs of the first Theban Empire or Middle Kingdom (12th Dynasty) up to Semneh. The Kings of the 18th and 19th Dynasties went as far as Napata. It was then the land of Kush, governed, at least in name, by the Prince of Kush, the heir apparent to the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 244 ff.; Collart-Jouguet, in CCXXV, pp. 109 ff.

² CCVIII; Rostovtzeff, in LXV, iv, pp. 298 ff.; [*Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, pp. 362 ff. Trs.].

Egyptian throne. Napata had remained Egyptian under the priest-kings who succeeded the Ramessids, but when they were overthrown by the Bubastite Dynasty (22nd) they founded an independent kingdom there. The Ethiopians contested Egypt with the Assyrians and the Saïtes, and after the triumph of the Saïtes they maintained their independence. In the Ptolemaic period,¹ it is believed that the various peoples of the Upper Nile down to Philæ recognized the overlordship of Meroë. But it was a distant overlordship. The most important ruler was the King of Napata, where the crown was hereditary on the distaff side, and finally fell into the hands of the Queens, the Candaces, who are known in the time of Augustus.² In the days of the first Ptolemies the country was under a king, who bore the Greek name of Ergamenes. Possibly he had been educated in Alexandria, at the Court of Philadelphos. On returning to his own country, he shook off the oppressive tutelage of the priests, who had hitherto maintained the right of determining the hour of the King's abdication and that of his death. If, as is likely, the Ethiopian priests of Amon, perhaps working in conjunction with the priesthood of Amon at Thebes, were the soul of the resistance to the new influences, this *coup d'État* was favourable to Hellenism. The respectful friendship which Ergamenes showed towards the King of Egypt does not seem to have been belied during the reigns of the first three Ptolemies. His cartouche is associated with Philopator's in the temple at Dakkeh. The Nubian King doubtless governed Dodekaschœnos, that is, Lower Nubia from Philæ to the island of Tachompso (Derar), opposite Hierasycaminos (Maharraqa), as the Lagid's protégé. Later, at the time of the revolts in the Thebaïd, under Epiphanes, relations became unfriendly, and the cartouche of Ergamenes was obliterated. Nubian princes even held the Thebaïd. This was doubtless what afterwards gave Philometor the idea of colonizing the country; an inscription mentions towns named Cleopatra and Philoteris in Triacostaschœnos, the part of Nubia between Philæ and Wady Halfa. We do not know the situation of these colonies, nor what afterwards happened in the district.³

¹ CCXV, p. 461; Jouguet, in LXXIX, 1928, pp. 487 ff.

² Wilcken, in CLXXX, ii, n. 4.

³ IX, 111.

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The Upper Nile brought to Egypt the products of Nubia—ivory, skins of crocodile and hippopotamus, black slaves, so often represented in the minor arts of Alexandria, and ostrich feathers. But these did not come only by river. In modern times there were caravan-routes in the Western Desert, ending at Siut, and these may have existed in antiquity. Lastly, by the plateau of Axum, the inhabitants of which were partly Hellenized, goods from Nubia could reach the port of Adulis on the Red Sea.

That sea connected Egypt with Arabia and opened on to the Indian Ocean, the Erythræan Sea of the ancients, which washed India and the countries of the Far East. An active trade was established between Egypt and those distant shores. But the Lagids had to reckon with the Seleucids; the latter naturally kept a fleet in the Persian Gulf, and tried to divert traffic on to the routes which led by the Euphrates into the central provinces or Syria. At the port of Adana (Aden), in the south of Arabia, other roads started, which ran through Leuce Come to Petra, whence Gaza could be reached. That was one reason why the Seleucids and Lagids, in their efforts to extend their influence over the Nabatæans, fought for Southern Syria. It has been supposed that it was the Lagids who compelled the Nabatæans to set up a custom-house at Leuce Come. But the sea-route naturally went on beyond Adana, into the Arabian Gulf, our Red Sea. Taking up traditions which went back to the Senuserts and Amenemhats of the Middle Kingdom (2000–1788 B.C.), and, though sometimes interrupted, had been revived in Saïte times, under Necho, Apries, and Amasis,¹ and even under the dominion of Darius, the Ptolemies encouraged navigation on the Red Sea, and made ports on the Troglodyte coast.

Artemidoros, a geographer of the 2nd century² mentioned Heroöpolis, at the north end of the Bitter Lakes, Arsinoë, near the modern Suez, Philotera, founded by Satyros under Philadelphos, Myos Hormos, with its two islands planted

¹ CLXXVII, pp. 188 ff.

² In Strabo, 769. See Couyat-Barthou, in LXXXIV, 1910, pp. 525–42; G. W. Murray, in LXXI, 1925, pp. 138–50. In reality, Myos Hormos (Abu Shaar el-Gubli) is north of Philotera (near Safaga). The trees of which Artemidoros speaks are not true olives (Murray, *loc. cit.*, pp. 141–2).

with olives and the third full of guinea-fowl, and Berenice, at the head of Foul Bay. To these one should perhaps add Leucos Limen, probably the modern Kosseir. An island near Berenice served as a station for elephant-hunters and emerald-seekers, and the Kings had it cleared of the reptiles which infested it. All this coast was inhabited by a primitive people, which practised community of wives and obeyed a king who was subject to a rule of life and even a diet different from his subjects.¹ Simmias, an officer of Euergetes I, explored the region and brought back very detailed information about the inhabitants.²

Traffic was very active in the 3rd century; but ships could not sail direct from India to the Egyptian ports. Only at the end of the 1st century B.C. did the pilot Hippalos discover the periodicity of the monsoons, which made it possible to sail without putting into harbour. In the time of the Ptolemies, goods were warehoused in Dioscoridis (Socotra) and the other islands south of Arabia.

When goods reached the coast ports, they had to be transported to the Nile valley. For this purpose Necho, in the Saïte period, had caused a canal to be dug from the Nile to Heroöpolis and the Bitter Lakes. It must have followed the Wady Tumilat. Darius I had restored it, and his fleets had sailed from the Nile to the Persian Gulf.^{3*} Philadelphos made it fit for use again, but it was allowed to become blocked up at the end of the dynasty. In addition to this canal, there were the caravan-routes. The road system is chiefly known to us in Imperial times, when it had been completed and improved. But the chief tracks existed already. One must have run by the Wady Hammamat and the gold-mines of Fawahir, where the remains of workings have been found,⁴ to Leucos Limen. Myos Hormos was the terminus of a road which came from Coptos and Cænopolis on the Nile over the Porphyry Mountain. Cænopolis was doubtless connected with Philotera, for this was the shortest crossing from the Nile to the sea. The road from Coptos to Berenice certainly existed already,

¹ Agatharchos, ed. Mueller, 31 ff.; Diod., iii.15 ff.

² Diod., iii.18.4.

³ CLXXVII, pp. 184 ff. *[See also Moret, *The Nile*, p. 346 n.2. Trs.]

⁴ And a temple of Ptolemy III (Murray, *loc. cit.*), p. 146.

for Philadelphos repaired it, and so did the branch to Contrapollinopolis. The ways forked at the station of Phalacron, 163 Roman miles from Coptos. Going towards Berenice, one passed near the emerald-mines of Zubana and Sekat, where a Ptolemaic temple can still be seen. The caravans travelled at night, guiding themselves by the stars. Stations were arranged at every stage. Water-tanks (*hydreumata*) were beginning to be dug, but there were not many before Imperial times, and caravans had to take their water with them.¹

Berenice and Foul Bay are about the latitude of Syene (24° N.). The Ptolemies extended their influence on the African coast far south of that, to the headland of Deire. They went to these distant regions for spices, and particularly for frankincense and myrrh. Those precious gums were also gathered in Arabia Felix, especially in the south, in Cattabania and Chatramotitis.² But the Ptolemies were not always masters of the Arabian roads, and a great part of these products, in spite of the toll at Leuce Come, went to Petra and Syria. In Africa, too, they obtained the elephants which they needed for their armies. Elephant-hunting was organized, at least until the reign of Epiphanes.³ The beasts captured were embarked on special ships, called *elephantegoi*, and taken to the Red Sea ports. But it had, of course, been necessary to dig shelters and establish ports along this inhospitable coast, which was inhabited by a fish-eating population.⁴ There were Soteiras Limen, where the sea becomes narrower and shallows covered with moss and seaweed make navigation difficult for transports, Ptolemaïs of the Beasts (Theron), founded by Eumedes, an officer of Philadelphos, Demetrios's Look-out, Conon's Altars, Melinos Limen, Antiphilos's Port, another Berenice, the Grove of Eumenes and Darada, an important point for the elephant-hunting, Philip's Island, Pythangelos's Hunting-post, the town and lake of Arsinoë, and, lastly Cape Deire. South of Deire, in the spice country, Greek officers had still left abundant trace of their presence—Lichas's Hunting-post, Pytholaos's Promontory, Leon's Look-out, Pythangelos's Harbour.

¹ Lesquier, in CCXV, pp. 433–58.

² Rostovtzev, in LXV, iv, pp. 301–4.

³ Strabo, 768 (4).

⁴ Strabo, 770 ff.

These were lonely establishments in the midst of savage populations, whose habits and food astonished the Greeks. There were root-eaters and seed-eaters in the lion-infested country of Tenessis, between the coastal region, where the Lake of Elæa and Straton's Island could be seen, and Meroë on the Nile, fifteen days' march away. Further south, in the country of Coracion, were the circumcized meat-eaters, naked bowmen whose capital was Endera; the hairy and bearded tribe who milked bitches and hunted buffalo; south of Berenice, the elephant-eaters and ostrich-eaters, who, to catch the ostrich dressed themselves up in its skin and imitated its movements; and tortoise-eaters who threw their dead to the fish. Strabo, following Artemidoros, and Diodorus and Photius, summarizing Agatharchides and his *Periplus of the Erythræan Sea*, have transmitted to us observations about these peoples which can only be confirmed by modern ethnology, and do the greatest honour to the intelligent curiosity of the explorers and officials of the Ptolemies.¹

All the commodities which trade with regions near and far brought into Egypt were not accumulated there uselessly. Some were consumed in the country, but the rest either went through to be distributed to the world, or were transformed by industry before being exported, thus creating new profits. The countries of the Ægean were the chief market for the products of Egypt. Not only was the Ægean the most active centre in the world, but, whereas the system of barter still prevailed in the countries communicating with Egypt by the Red Sea, the use of coin was predominant and universal in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.² * Now, it was money that was wanted to maintain a fleet, an army, and a civil service; it was money that came, more and more, to constitute the wealth which was now so much sought by

¹ E.g., compare Strabo, 722 (11) and Cte. de Begouën, in LXXXIV, 1920, p. 309.

² It is said that Ptolemy I introduced the use of money into Egypt, striking gold and silver coins, first on the Rhodian standard, and later on the Phœnician. In this absolute form, the statement must be untrue; Egypt used the precious metals as an instrument of exchange very early, and under the last national dynasties she probably had a true coinage for use abroad (Chassinat, in XCVI, 1928, pp. 181 ff. But see E. Naville, in LXXXIV, 1925, pp. 278-86). * [For the spread of the use of money, see also Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, pp. 325 ff. Trs.]

sovereigns. All the activity of the ports and tracks of the Arabian Desert, of the river, of the towns, and of the fields was, therefore, bound to converge on the huge capital, marvellous Alexandria.

Set aside, as it were, on the long strip of sand dividing Lake Mareotis from the sea, the glorious city seems to have been attached to Egypt rather than incorporated in it. *Alexandrea ad Ægyptum*, the Romans said,¹ and it has been compared to a tassel (κράσπεδον) adorning the western corner of the Delta,² which is like an outspread cloak. It hardly formed part of the valley of the Nile, and it had to be connected with the Canopic Arm by an artificial canal (perhaps the Agathodæmon of the ancients). What certainly attracted Alexander was the presence of the island of Pharos and of Lake Mareotis. The latter offered a vast basin in which river-boats could be berthed in quantities; the former, when joined to the shore by a dam, the Heptastadion, formed two well-sheltered harbours.

The city, which was immense for its time, and may have had a perimeter of eight or ten miles, was built on the plans of the engineer Deinocrates, who followed the principles which Hippodamos of Miletos had applied to the Peiræus. It was laid out in a chess-board pattern; a big, straight street, lined with porticoes, the Canopic Way, ran from the East or Canopos Gate (later the Sun Gate) to the West Gate (later the Moon Gate). Another broad street crossed it at right angles, probably about the centre of the town, forming a monumental square at that point [*Meson Pedion*].* The other streets generally ran parallel to these main thoroughfares, so that the whole city was easily divided into quarters, designated by the first five letters of the

¹ CXCIV.

² Cf. Dio Chrys., xxxii. 36; Plut., *Alex.*, 26. 5; Strabo, 793; Pliny, *N.H.*, v. 62.

* Names in square brackets refer to the Plan of Alexandria. Other indications in the Plan are as follows: *Apostases*: Warehouses.—*Copron*: hill of rubbish, latrines, etc.—*Eleusis*: a suburb (Hadra).—*Eleusis les Bains*: Eleusis on Sea.—*Mare eleusinium*: Eleusinian Sea.—*Murs d'enceinte de l'ancienne ville d'Alexandrie*: Ptolemaic city-wall, ascribed to Soter I. The black circuit in Neapolis represents the so-called Arabian Wall.—*Phiale*: a harbour, fortified by Justinian.—*Pi. Drakon*: the R. Drakon, an outlet from Mareotis to the sea, possibly the end of the Nile canal.—*Port des Pirates*: Pirates' Harbour.—*Temple*: the Thesmophoreion? Tns.

alphabet [$\mu\omicron\iota\rho\alpha$ A, B, Γ, Δ, E]. The blocks of houses or *plintheia* formed subdivisions of these quarters. In the south-west, Alexandria embraced a small Egyptian town, Rhacotis, built round a hill which was to become the Acropolis and bear the Serapeion. There "Pompey's Pillar" stands to-day, and at the foot of this hill lay the Stadium, in which we have already witnessed the bloody scenes which attended the fall of Agathocles. To the East, in Neapolis, the New Town, the finest monuments of the city were collected. Along the Canopic Way stood the Gymnasium, the Park of the Paneion, the Sema or tomb of Alexander, the Law-courts [*Dicastère*], and the Museum and Library, adjoining the Royal Palaces, which spread down to the sea. This quarter of the Palaces was called Brucheion [*Broucheion*].

It looked on the Great Harbour, that on the east [*Magnus Portus*]. The entrance of the harbour was narrow, between the mole of Cape Lochias and the eastern end of Pharos. Lochias bore a palace and a temple [*Cap et palais de Lochias*]; on the island stood the famous lighthouse, built by Sostratos of Cnidos, and dedicated to the Saviour Gods. The palace on the islet of Antirrhodos, the pier on which Antony later built the Timoneion, the small private harbour of the Kings in the eastern corner, and the edifices of the Brucheion, which almost came down to the quays, formed a unique frame to this illustrious anchorage. Two passages at the ends of the Heptastadion [*Heptastade*], crossed by bridges, connected it with the other harbour, which was called the Eunostos, or Good Home-coming, perhaps in allusion to the name of a King of Soli allied to the Lagids [*Port d' Eunoste*]. Inside the Eunostos was an enclosed dock known as the Box [*Kibôtos*], which is sometimes supposed to have been the mouth of the canal which ran from Schedia on the Nile (Kom el-Gizeh) by Chæreon (el-Keriun) and Petræ (Hagar el-Nawatiyeh), whence a branch ran to Canopos and entered Alexandria after turning it to the south [*Canal d' Alexandrie*]. This hypothesis has been contested, and it seems probable that the canal crossed Neapolis into the Great Harbour. But another canal certainly connected the Eunostos with Lake Mareotis, which must have communicated with the Nile, so that boats could go between the river, the lake, and the two sea-harbours. In this way the fruits of Egyptian

industry could be concentrated on Alexandria, to be redistributed within the country itself, and, what was more, over the rest of the world.

II

THE CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT

This organization of the Nile valley, which was certainly beneficial to the country, but was chiefly intended to bring wealth and power to the Lagids, had not been effected with the resources of the native population alone. The Egyptian people was, without doubt, one of the most gifted of antiquity, and in many things it was the teacher of other nations. The Greeks of the classical period would have acknowledged it readily, and they often expressed great admiration for Egyptian wisdom, without, however, knowing much about it. But, at least since the 5th century, Egypt had fallen behind in the race. One should remember the miseries through which she had gone since the Persian conquest, her revolts and her unceasing struggles for independence, too often useless. The culture of a people can rarely stand up against political degradation and the poverty which generally ensues from it. Moreover, in a despotic State, when the royal power, which is everything, goes, nothing is left but a confused mass of people, without initiative, and the noble or self-seeking patriots who try to revive the forces of the nation are likely to figure as adventurers rather than as leaders. This was surely, to some extent, the case with the last Pharaohs of the last national dynasties. Then, with the barren inertia of the Oriental multitude, contrast the ebullition of individual energies developed in the basin of the Hellenic Mediterranean by the city system. It is true that the time had come in Greece when, through the weakening of old restraints and the exaltation of selfish passions, that system seemed to be devouring itself, and the race was dissolving in the anarchy of intestine strife. Amid the rivalry of cities, the rivalry of parties, and the rivalry of men, Greece was about to die. But the fall or effacement of the cities did not bring about the immediate annihilation of the talents which had been formed in fighting for liberty. All the resources of those

scattered activities were now to pass to the new monarchies, which might find in Greece, and did find, a veritable nursery of leaders.

But it must not be denied that the Egyptian people, too, was a wonderful resource for the new Kings. Egypt was one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Life was so easy that the population was bound to be prolific. Diodorus reckons the cost of keeping a child, from birth to puberty, at 20 drachmas.¹ Egypt was unacquainted with the barbarous practice of exposing new-born infants, which was so common in Greece and was defended by Aristotle. Strabo notes the fact with envy. "I have not taken the milk from the mouth of the suckling," says an old Egyptian text, well known under the name of the *Negative Confession*.² One may estimate that in the time of the Lagids the country contained between five and seven million souls. Now, the fellah was a hard worker, and a cheerful one, while the handicraftsman had ancient professional traditions behind him. But to put vitality into their labour and to organize it according to the needs of the time, it was necessary to have capital in money and the methodical spirit and technical talents which Hellenism alone could offer.

Now, Hellenism had long ago penetrated into Egypt. M. Jardé has told the readers of this series³ of the arrival of the Milesians in the Delta in the middle of the 8th century, of the help which Psammetichus I got from Greek mercenaries in liberating the country from the Assyrian yoke and restoring its unity, of the settlement of those mercenaries at Daphnæ, in the Eastern Delta, of the foundation of the Greek colony of Naucratis on the Canopic Arm, of the development of that city under Amasis, and of the transference of the mercenaries to Memphis. The Persian conquest (525) was no doubt not favourable to Egyptian Hellenism, but the Greeks remained in the country, and Greek states often sent armies to aid the Egyptians in rebellion against Persia. We know how the Athenians came to the help of the rebel Inaros and suffered a terrible disaster in the Delta (460-455). But these wars did not prevent Greek travellers from going all over the country, and it was about 454 that Herodotos visited the Nile. When Amyrtæus, the one Pharaoh of

¹ Diod., i.80.6.

² *CCXX*, pp. xvi ff.

³ *CCX*, pp. 207 ff.

the 28th Dynasty, wrested the independence of Egypt from Darius II or Artaxerxes II, there were Greek mercenaries in his army.¹ From then to the day when she was reconquered by Ochus (342), Egypt relied on the help of the Greek cities hostile to the Great King, whether she obtained their official backing or the assistance of *condottieri*. So we find in Egypt, in succession, the Athenian Chabrias under King Acoris, the same Chabrias and Agesilaos, King of Sparta, under Tachos and Nectanebo II (360–358), and the Athenian Diophantos and the Spartan Lamios at the time of Ochus's first attempt to subdue Egypt (351). Lastly, in 342, in the decisive expedition against Nectanebo, although Thebes sent troops to the Great King, being his ally, there were Greek mercenaries in the Egyptian army.²

Such frequent intercourse could not fail to leave its mark, and at the time of the Macedonian conquest there were Greek centres in the valley of the Nile. Naucratis was still flourishing, and Philadelphos afterwards embellished it. But from Naucratis the Greeks had sent out swarms into the Delta and even to Upper Egypt. Stephanus of Byzantium mentions a Hellenic colony at Abydos. At an early date there was one at Elephantine,³ and we have seen Alexander banishing his enemies there. He would have found Greeks even in the Oasis.⁴

In Memphis, as in the big towns of the modern East, foreigners were collected in "nations", probably in different quarters. Our authors and documents speak of the presence in the city of Tyrians, Caromemphites, Phœnico-Egyptians, and also Hellenomemphites,⁵ and we have reason for believing that this last community still existed in the 2nd century. Two very different archæological discoveries prove how deeply Hellenism was rooted in the country. Quite close to Memphis, on the edge of the desert, stood the village of Busiris. By the end of the 4th century it was already occupied, at least in part, by Greeks, who buried their dead

¹ CCXX, pp. ix ff.

² CLXXVI; CLXXVII; Cloché, in XCV, N.S., i, pp. 20 ff.; ii, pp. 82–127.

³ Cf. XX.

⁴ Steph. Byz., s.v.; Hdt., iii.26.

⁵ Hdt., ii.112; Polyæn., vii.3; Steph. Byz., s.v. *Καρομεμφ.*; Aristagoras, FHG, ii, p. 98; XLVI, 5, 531; CLXXX (Wilcken), 2, 30.

in an old cemetery of the 4th Dynasty, near a ruined pyramid. In one of these tombs Messrs. Borchardt and O. Rubensohn found the most ancient Greek manuscript known, a papyrus containing a long fragment of the *Persians*, a lyrical work of the poet and musician Timotheos, who enjoyed a great reputation in the 4th century.¹ Secondly, not far from Minyeh, up in Central Egypt, M. G. Lefebvre cleared the tomb, or rather the *heroon*, of a family of priests of Hermopolis, which may also be placed in the 4th century, and the reliefs adorning its walls leave no doubt of Greek influence.²

The ground was, therefore, prepared for Hellenic colonization. But it is plain that this could not be continued and completed with the Greek elements in Egypt alone. Resort must be had to immigration. We have already seen how general this was in the 3rd century. It was natural that it should be especially attracted by the singular prosperity of Egypt under the first three Kings. There is abundant testimony in the literature and documents of the time. One has only to remember the comic, but significant, catalogue which Herondas puts in the mouth of the procuress Gyllis, when, in order to corrupt young Metriche, she tries to convince her that her lover, who has gone to Egypt, cannot tear himself away from the joys of Alexandria and is lost to her for ever.³

Since Mandris went to Egypt, it is ten months, and he has not sent you a word. He has forgotten you, and drunk at a new spring. There is the abode of the Goddess; for all that is or grows anywhere is in Egypt—wealth, athletics, the army, a fine climate, glory, shows, philosophers, gold, boys, the Temple of the Brother and Sister, the good King, the Museum, wine, and every good thing that you can want—and women, by the Lass of Hades! as many as the sky boasts stars, with faces as fair as the goddesses who went to Paris for judgment (may they not hear what I say!).

The influx and settlement of foreigners in a country always raises grave problems, and the Lagids of the 3rd century had many difficulties to solve. These immigrants, accustomed to the free life of the little Greek commonwealth, had to be brought under the laws of a monarchy. The

¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Timotheos, die Perser*, Leipzig, 1908.

² CLXXIX. But for the date see Montet, in LXXXVIII, 1926, p. 62, and LXXXIX, 1926, pp. 161–81.

³ i.28 ff.

Egyptians, too, had to be made to accept not merely the presence, but the preponderance of the new-comers. Only a strong power could enforce effective measures. To rule and to Hellenize—that was the double task of the Lagids. The evidence of the papyri gives us a glimpse of the manner in which they performed it.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATION OF POWER IN PTOLEMAIC EGYPT

I

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL POWER

BEING the masters of Egypt by conquest, the Ptolemies looked to the doctrine of divine right for a legitimate foundation of their power. So they entered on the road opened by Alexander, and followed the traditions of the country quite naturally. For, since the earliest days of her history, Egypt had worshipped her Kings. In the Middle Kingdom (2160–1660 B.C.), the dogmas of the royal religion, probably formed chiefly under the preponderant influence of the priests of Heliopolis, were established, and were handed down from generation to generation almost unchanged, to the very end of Paganism. These dogmas have already been set forth and analysed in this series with perfect precision and clarity.¹ Here it will be sufficient to show to what extent they were adopted by the Lagids.

In Egypt, Pharaoh was King because he was a god, the son of a god, “established heir” by “his father”. According to the Heliopolitan teaching, this father of Pharaoh was naturally Ra, the Sun God of Heliopolis, who, so tradition said, was the first of all the Kings and their ancestor. But the solar religion of Ra was in the course of time amalgamated with that of other gods, who likewise conquered the whole of Egypt, some for political reasons, like Amon of Thebes, who became Amon-Ra, and others by the attraction of their divine personality, like Osiris of Mendes, with whom all the dead gods and lords of the next life came in the end to be identified. Moreover, the Egyptian kingship had a complex origin, and was born in regions and times when the worship of Ra was not preponderant. We shall not

¹ CLXXIV, pp. 131 ff. ; [Moret, *The Nile, passim.* Trs] ; CLXXV.

be surprised, therefore, to find various influences in the five names which express the divine descent of the Pharaohs.*

These five names, or, as the Egyptians called them, "the great name," were taken by the Macedonian Kings. Take the case of Philadelphos.¹ First he was a Horus, that is, the Divine Son *par excellence*, and, like all Pharaohs, he was assimilated to the Falcon Horus, as worshipped at Edfu. In this quality he called himself the *Valiant Youth*. As King of Upper and Lower Egypt, invested by Nekhebt, the Vulture Goddess of El-Kab, and Wazet, the Asp Goddess of Buto, he was *Great in Glory*. In his capacity of Horus victorious over his enemies, that is, as avenger of his father Osiris on Seth and his followers, he was *Enthroned by his Father*. Then came the two chief appellations, the forename, which Pharaoh took at his accession, in his capacity of *Nsut* and *Bit*, that is, King of the South and North, and the name which he bore as son of Ra (*sa Râ*), both surrounded by a cartouche. The name of every Lagid was Ptolemy, either alone, as with Soter I and Philadelphos, or with an accompanying epithet, as with their successors—for example, Euergetes I was *Ptolemy, Living ever Beloved of Ptah*. The forename varied. That of Philadelphos may be translated *Mighty Ka of Ra, Beloved of Amon*; and that of Euergetes, *Son of the Brother Gods, Chosen of Ra, Living Image of Amon*.²

The same doctrine of the divinity of kings is expressed in the texts and scenes sculptured on the walls of temples, and especially in those which allude to the King's birth. Nothing could be clearer than the theogamies of Amenophis III at Luxor and of Hatshepsut at Der el-Bahari (18th Dynasty). The drama of the nativity is shown in fifteen scenes, divided, as it were, into three acts—the union of the God and the Queen Mother, the Queen's childbed, and the recognition of the new God-king by the gods. We have no such representation of the Ptolemies; but that these ideas or analogous ones survived in the Greek period is proved by the Mammisis. These are small chapels built beside the big temples and consecrated to the celebration of the birth of the divine son of the Triad worshipped in the principal

* Cf. the titles of the Memphite Kings, in Moret, *The Nile*, p. 151.
 TRS.

¹ CLXXVIII, iv, p. 223.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.


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sanctuary. So completely is the King identified with the divine son that we see the two being born together. For example, Nectanebo is born with Horus in a scene in the Mammisi of Tentyris. In that of Hermonthis, before it was destroyed, one saw the Goddess giving birth to Cæsarion, the son of Cæsar and Cleopatra.

So, in the eyes of the Egyptians, the Ptolemies were Pharaohs. They had to be, if they were to be accepted as sovereigns, and, inversely, once they were accepted, they were naturally regarded as gods. In the Oasis, Alexander, having made himself master of Egypt, was readily recognized by the priest as the son of Amon, and Egypt never made any difficulty about thus legalizing the foreign dynasties which reigned over her. These theological theories did not remain confined to the temples; they penetrated the literature of the day and we find an echo of them in the popular tales. As late as the 3rd century of our era, a Greek romance about Alexander, certainly written in Egypt, connects its hero with the national dynasties by describing how Nectanebo, the last native King, having been driven from the country by the barbarian conquerors, goes to Macedonia, and seduces Olympias by magically assuming the form of the god Amon.¹

It is possible that the Ptolemies only took on this rôle of god-kings gradually. The first was a Macedonian of the old type, and seems to have had little liking for the mystical despotism of the Orient. The Lagids were fond of boasting of their Macedonian blood, and this feeling must have been mingled with some contempt for the native. They may, therefore, have accepted rather than sought this profitable assimilation to the gods of Egypt. It is generally supposed that Epiphanes was the first to submit to the Egyptian rites and ceremonies of the consecration of the King. When, on the 27th March, 196, the priests met in synod at Memphis, to renew these ceremonies and to vote religious honours for the King, they were careful to order that the *naos*, or portable shrine, which was to contain the God-king's statue, should have a decoration recalling the consecration of the previous year.

¹ Pseudo-Callisthenes, i.1 ff.



PTOLEMY EUGERGES II AND THE TWO CLEOPATRAS BEFORE THE GOD HAROERIS
(Temple of Kom-Ombo)

In order that his shrine may be distinguished from the others now and in future times, it shall be surmounted by the ten golden head-dresses of the King, in front of which an asp shall be set, as with all the asp-shaped head-dresses on shrines ; in the midst of them shall be placed the head-dress called the *Pskhent*, which the King donned when he entered the Temple at Memphis to perform the ceremonies ordained in the taking of the throne.¹

It is quite true that neither the Decree of Canopus² in honour of Euergetes I nor that of Memphis in honour of Philopator contains a similar allusion ;³ but it is hardly to be expected in the latter, which was issued on the occasion of the victory of Raphia, and not, like that of Epiphanes, at one of the festivals of the "Diadem", at which the coronation rites were renewed. It would, however, have been natural in the Canopus Decree in honour of Euergetes I. On that occasion the priests met "for the 5th Dios, the day on which the King's birth is celebrated, and for the 25th of the same month, the day on which he received the crown from his father". The circumstances are almost the same as in the case of Epiphanes, and, if the consecration is not mentioned under Euergetes, it may be that a change was made between the two reigns. Other indications lead one to think that that change took place in the reign of Philopator.

For the beginning of the Decree of Canopus is in marked contrast to that of other decrees. While Philopator and Epiphanes take the whole Egyptian royal title, literally translated in the Greek version, the opening formula of the Decree of Canopus is the same as that of the Greek documents, which give the King no name but Ptolemy, and allude only to the Greek cult of the Kings, by mentioning the eponymous priesthoods, and this formula is translated, and clumsily translated, in the Egyptian versions of the Decree. Here the Greek wording governs the Egyptian wording, and this preponderance of the Greek, remarkable in a decree of the Egyptian priesthood, also appears in the almost exclusive use of the Macedonian calendar. There is, therefore, a great difference between the reign of Euergetes and those of his successors ; and if one recalls the crisis which attended the beginning of Philopator's reign, the appeal which he had to make to Egyptian recruiting for his war against

¹ IX, 90, ll. 42 ff.

² IX, 56.

³ CXC.

Antiochos III, the native revolts, and the concessions which were the result, one cannot help thinking that the changes of which the texts give an inkling must have taken place in the reign of the fourth Lagid.

But what exactly these changes were, it is very hard to say, and it is perhaps going beyond our data to conclude, as has been done, that the first Ptolemies avoided the ceremony of consecration. It was in the course of this ceremony that the edict was composed which announced the five names, and the Macedonian Kings bore those names from Philadelphos onwards. If we do not find them in the Decree of Canopus, it may be that Euergetes and his predecessors were reluctant to assume them in the eyes of their Greek subjects, in a document which, although of an ecclesiastical character, was written in Greek and was intended to be read by all. But of course this hypothesis, though more moderate than its rival, is no less uncertain. What is certain is that, in spite of the obvious advantage of passing themselves off as sons of Ra from the very beginning of their rule, the Ptolemies took some time to adopt, everywhere and always, all the characteristics of the true Pharaohs.

It is easier to indicate the general stages of this development than to define its exact progress. So far, the monuments have only given us the name and fore-name (Chosen of Ra) of Soter.¹ Perhaps, like Philip Arrhidæos and Alexander Ægos, who were never consecrated, because they never came to Egypt, he did not receive the full royal title. Philadelphos made a great advance; not only did he take the five names, but he married his sister on both sides, a union quite contrary to Greek custom but conforming to the laws of Egypt, and one which may even be regarded as the perfect royal marriage, the image of that of Osiris and Isis, and the most capable of ensuring the purity of the blood of Ra.² It was a big concession to native ideas. When Philopator likewise married his sister (Arsinoë III), as almost all the Lagids did after him, and openly adopted the royal title of the Pharaohs, the native Egyptian found every characteristic of his national sovereigns in the Macedonian King.

¹ But cf. CLXXVIII, iv, p. 218, no. xi.

² CLXI, iii, pp. 27 ff.

The position of the Ptolemies was certainly more delicate in respect of their Greek subjects. The Hellene, accustomed to live in a small republic, disliked Oriental ideas of absolute monarchy, and, rationalist that he was, he had some difficulty in submitting to the will of a mortal god. But one must not exaggerate either his dislike or his rationalism.

The Greeks made their illustrious dead into heroes, who, as such, were the object of worship.¹ Heroization may not have been apotheosis, but it might lead to it. The practice originated in Northern Greece, and spread widely. In addition, cities, especially in Ionia, had often decreed divine honours to living men.² Even if this was not complete deification, and the homage paid was merely *similar* to that paid to the gods (*isotheoi*), and the persons thus honoured received them only, as it were, under the wing of real deities in the capacity of associates (*parhedroi* and *synthronoi*), none the less they were raised above man and very near to the gods. These customs and beliefs were not unfavourable to the establishment of a worship of kings, and the Hellenic worship of kings existed in most of the Hellenistic monarchies. What, exactly, were its origin and character? It is a grave and much-disputed question. Some hold that it owed much to the political initiative of the sovereigns themselves. The divinity of kings was at the heart of the conception which they had formed of monarchy. This is supposed to have been the belief of the great founder, Alexander himself. Others, on the contrary, consider that the cult sprang up spontaneously in the cities; that the Kings merely accepted a homage which was so profitable; and that it was not until later that they thought of transforming it into a State religion.³

In attempting to describe the character and work of Alexander, I committed myself to a certain view. To the service of the lofty conceptions of his genius, he seems to me to have brought both a sincere mysticism and a wise political sense. Such mixtures of sentiments, contradictory only in appearance, are not without example in the great

¹ CCH.

² Kornemann, in LVII, 1901, p. 515.

³ Kaerst, LXI, 1897, pp. 142 ff.; CXXIV, ii, pp. 374 ff.; CXVI, vol. iii, 1, pp. 369 ff. But cf. Kornemann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 51 ff.

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creators. No one can deny that Alexander at an early date believed himself the descendant and perhaps the son of a god. From that to believing himself a god was not a long step for a spirit so daring in the exaltation of his own glory. Egypt revealed to him the divine majesty of the Oriental King. No doubt, he could not apply the dogmas of that unique country to the rest of the world, and he did not think of doing so ; but, in whatever form it might present itself to him, he was disposed to accept the monarchical mysticism of the East. In Babylon he took the hand of Bel. Later, he sat as Great King, animated by the Mazdean *hvarēno*, on the throne of Darius. He even wished to be worshipped by his Macedonians. Can one believe that, when the Greek cities of Asia had decreed divine honours to him, it did not occur to him that he might be a god for all Hellenes ? It is possible that the famous decree in which he ordered the Greeks to treat him as a god was never published, as many hold, and that one should not trust the anecdotes of Plutarch and Ælian,¹ but the desire to be a god seems to me to be the necessary conclusion of Alexander's political meditations, and it is unlikely that he did not manifest it one way or another.²

The spirit of his first successors was certainly quite different. In Macedonia, first of all, the Kings never thought of demanding worship, and we are told that, of all the Diadochi, Antipatros alone refused to recognize Alexander's divinity.³ That tradition was bound to be maintained, among a nobility who were accustomed to treat their kings as the first of the Companions. Besides, to establish itself securely, the Macedonian monarchy had no need of a religious character ; it was enough that it was national. But it was not so in the East.

Antigonos One-eye had a divine statue (*ἄγαλμα*), a sanctuary, and an altar at Scepsis,⁴ and a sacred gathering, a sacrifice, and Stephanephorix were held in his honour. We hear of festivals to Antigonos and his son Demetrios

¹ See Hogarth, in *English Historical Review*, 1887, pp. 317 ff. ; B. Niese, in *LVI*, 1897, pp. 1 ff.

² Kaerst, *loc. cit.* ; Radet, in *LXXXVIII*, 1895, pp. 129 ff. ; etc.

³ Suidas, *s.v.* "Antipatros".

⁴ *IX*, 6.

at Delos,¹ Chalcis,² and Samos.³ Honours were decreed to Lysimachos at Priene,⁴ and the same Lysimachos had an altar at Samothrace.⁵ This royal cult was very natural in cities which the Kings had founded ; thus, Demetrios was worshipped at Demetrias (Sicyon), and at Cassandreia there was an eponymous priest of Cassandros, and later of Lysimachos.⁶ Yet the Diadochi accepted rather than provoked these outbursts of monarchical piety. We find them in cities which had reason to be submissive or grateful to them. Thus, the Cyclades, after the campaign in which Ptolemy I had liberated them in 308, and Rhodes, after the siege of 305, worshipped him under the name of Soter, Saviour. But these were the special cults of cities, and in no way a State religion. Yet the establishment of Græco-Macedonian monarchies in the East, the land of the divine right, where the foreign conquerors might create kingdoms, but not true nations, was bound to bring the consequences which Alexander had foreseen and desired, although they were not accepted until the second generation of the Hellenistic dynasties. In the case of the Lagids, the moment when they perceived them coincides with that in which they began to conduct themselves, in respect of the natives, as true Pharaohs.

The royal cult of the Ptolemies ⁷ was grafted on to the worship of Alexander. Alexander had died before he could establish his divinity, at any rate in the form in which he seems to have conceived it. But, once he had left the world of the living, it was easy for him to become immortal. For all, his passing was merely a change of life. This belief can have arisen without the least influence of any political idea. It was the natural consequence of the religious conceptions of the Macedonians and Greeks. It may be said, justly, that there was still a world of difference between that heroization and the deification which Alexander himself had imagined, the deification of the Oriental Kings, who had no need of apotheosis to become gods, and especially that of the Pharaohs, who were detached from the divine essence on

¹ IV, xv, pp. 17 ff.

² Schede, in LXVI, 1919, 7.

³ X, 350.

⁷ CLXI, iii, pp. 81 ff.

⁵ Vollgraff, in C, 1919, no. xv.

⁶ IX, 11 and 12.

⁷ VIII, 196.

to the earth, and simply "returned to the limbs of Ra-Harmachis". But it must be owned that Alexander was no ordinary hero. In his life, he was the soul of the Empire; dead, he became, as it were, its genius, and in the army Eumenes made his worship the symbol of unity.¹ This thought was doubtless in the mind of the first Ptolemy, when he had the hero's body transported to Egypt, and ordered that a tomb should be built for it, not in the Oasis, as Alexander had desired, but in Alexandria, his new capital.

Little is known of the beginnings of the worship of Alexander in Egypt.² According to the evidence of a contract of the year 285, there existed in 289 an eponymous priest who, on the most likely hypothesis, must almost certainly have been a priest of Alexander, whereas there is no such indication in the earliest of our Ptolemaic contracts, which dates from 311.³ But Alexander must have been worshipped before the institution of this eponymous priesthood. As early as 322, when his body was laid in Memphis, until the Sema which was to receive it in Alexandria should be completed, he must have been the object of worship in the old native city, and there is little doubt that at the same time, according to the custom, the infant Alexandria worshipped its founder. When Philadelphos transferred Alexander and his eponymous priest to the Greek capital, it is possible that the worship of the founder of the city was amalgamated with that of which the Sema was the seat, but it is also possible that the two cults remained distinct.⁴ But, although it was established in the Greek city, the worship of Alexander, that, at least, which had its centre in the Sema, was not a municipal cult, but a true State religion. The Sema was part of the Royal Palaces, and the eponymous priest appears not only in Alexandrian documents, but in those written, in Greek or in Egyptian, by every notary in Egypt.⁵

Of the god Alexander, therefore, who would have been the god of the Empire if it had remained united, Ptolemy I made the god of the Egyptian State. The institution of the eponymous priesthood, between 311 and 289, proves

¹ CXXV, pp. 381 ff.

² CC, i, pp. 138 ff.; CLXXX (Wileken), i, pp. 97 ff.

³ XX, 2; xxxiii, 34A, 97.

⁴ Plummer, in LXV, vi, pp. 77 ff.

⁵ List of these priests in CC, i, p. 175, 2, 322; OVII, s.v. "Hieros".

that it is to the first Lagid that this decisive step must be attributed. That long-sighted sovereign, who was the promoter of the religion of Serapis, knew how powerful religious sentiment was for cementing political constructions ; but did he think of deifying himself and the other Kings of his line ? We have nothing to justify the supposition. In any case, he left that task to his successors, and the worship of the King was created by Philadelphos. He began by proclaiming the apotheosis of his father under the name of Soter, which the Islanders had given him, and in 279 he instituted games on the Olympic model in his honour, a quinquennial festival which is described by Callixenos and frequently mentioned in the papyri.¹ He went much further when he made himself a god. His sister and wife, Arsinoë II, died in 270, and became a goddess under the title of Philadelphos. A *kanephoros* or Basket-bearer, an eponymous priestess like the priest of Alexander, was attached to her worship, and, at the same time, the living King was associated with the divinity of the Queen, thus forming a new divine pair, which was served by the same priest as Alexander and was called the Brother Gods (*θεοὶ ἀδελφοί*). Thenceforth, on the accession, every King and royal pair received a cult-name, under which they were worshipped and associated with the god Alexander. Ptolemy III and Berenice II became the Benefactor Gods (*Euergetai*) ; Ptolemy IV and Arsinoë III, the Father-loving Gods (*Philopatores*) ; Ptolemy V and Cleopatra I, the Manifest Gracious Gods (*Epiphaneis Eucharistoi*) ; and so on. Ptolemy I and Berenice I were missing from the series, so Philopator added them, under the name of the Saviour Gods (*Soteres*), and after that they always appear next to Alexander. With every new reign, the royal title grew longer and longer, especially as many queens had their own particular cult and priesthood, like Arsinoë Philadelphos-Athlophoros of Berenice Euergetis, Priestess of Arsinoë Philopator, Sacred Youth (?) (*ἱερὸς πῶλος*) of Isis, Great Mother of the Gods (Cleopatra II had had the audacity to assimilate herself to the great Mother Goddess). In the end, the lawyers grew weary of enumerating all these eponyms,

¹ Above, p. 244.

and their contracts give us (unfortunately) only meagre abridgments.

The bias of our modern mind might incline us to believe that this Hellenic cult of the Kings inspired only a cold official religion, but we should very probably be wrong. No doubt, the educated classes were sufficiently imbued with rationalism to justify the suspicion that many dedications to the Kings were acts of flattery or gratitude rather than of genuine piety. But the cult was practised in all circles, including the humblest, and even in the privacy of the home.

One is compelled to believe that it was justified by a deep and instinctive sentiment. Besides, the policy of the Kings and priests, especially from Philadelphos onwards, did much to ensure its success. The worship of the King was mingled with that of the gods, Egyptian and Greek, who had most devotees. Thus, the Queen was associated with the Ram of Mendes, "the Great God, Life of Ra, Ram who begets, Prince of young women, Friend of the Royal Daughter and Sister, the Queen and Lady of the country, Arsinoë, living for ever."¹ In Thebes she was the associate of Mut;² in Pithom, of Tum,³ with the Brother Gods; in the Fayum, of the Crocodile Suchos.⁴ Under Euergetes, the synod of Canopos deified a Berenice, who had died in infancy, and decreed that the temples should have rites and images in which Greek and Egyptian ideas were mingled. Nor was her divinity confined to the temples; not only the daughters of the priests, but other maidens could sing hymns to her.⁵ By the Decree of Memphis, private individuals were allowed to set up a *naos* to Epiphanes in their homes, and this was no novelty. A soldier settled in the Fayum set up a private sanctuary of Aphrodite Arsinoë in his yard.⁶ For the Queens especially were often assimilated to the great deities.⁷ Later, the Kings may have been, too; Auletes called himself Neos Dionysos, "New" (*neos*), no

¹ Mendes Stele; Brugsch, in **LXVIII**, 1875, pp. 37 ff.; V. Prott, in **LXI**, 1898, p. 464.

² Wilcken, in **CVII**, s.v. "Arsinoë" (pp. 1284 ff.).

³ Pithom Stele, translated by Mahaffy, in **CLXIV**, p. 138.

⁴ **XXXV**, 1, 25 (2).

⁵ **IX**, 56, ll. 46 ff.

⁶ **XLI**, 2, 2.

⁷ Glotz, in **LXXXVII**, 1920, pp. 169 ff.

doubt, in allusion to Philopator, the first King Bacchus. The worship of the King was certainly very popular and official in the army, and a governor of Cyprus in the 2nd century was High Priest as well as Strategos.¹ There were also, at least in the 2nd century, civil and military associations for the worship of the King, called Basilistæ and Philobasilistæ.²

We see how deeply this dynastic religion had penetrated Egypt. There is no doubt of the influence of the East, for it was in proportion as the Greeks were conquered by it that they were attracted by the worship of kings; but the East acted on them chiefly by enveloping their minds, as it were, in a mystical atmosphere. It is a remarkable thing, that Egyptian rites seem to have been hardly introduced into the Hellenic cult at all, whereas the latter made its influence felt inside the temples and even in the Solar name of the Kings. In this domain Greek and Egyptian ideas seem to have been intermingled without blending. Both contributed to creating the loyalty to the King which was so unlike the city patriotism of classical Greece, and asserted itself even in the Greek cities of Egypt, and in Alexandria itself. The Alexandrians held tight to their privileges, but they were a long way from anything like a republican spirit. They often revolted against the Kings; they even deposed some of them; but they never dreamed of overthrowing the reigning house. As early as Philopator's reign, when the Lacedæmonian Cleomenes ran through the streets, calling the citizens to liberty, he committed an absurd blunder.

The divinity of the Kings had many consequences for the government of Egypt, but we must admit that it never resulted, as has sometimes happened in Oriental monarchies, in the King living remote from his subjects, in the depths of a mysterious palace. The Kings gave audience to all, as we can see Philometor doing in the papyri of the Serapeion. It is true that he appeared on the top of a platform or under a canopy, and that petitions were passed to him through a kind of window.³ In the Palace of Alexandria there may have been a special door made for the purpose (*χρημα-*

¹ IX, 140.

² IX, 180; CXCIX, i, p. 26; XLVIII, 57.

³ Otto, in LXV, vi, pp. 308 ff.

τιστικὸς πυλῶν).¹ But there is no lack of anecdotes which show the King living familiarly with his friends.

The royal family was constituted like a human family, and succession to the throne was treated much like a private inheritance, on principles which on the whole agree with those of Greek law. The crown passed from male to male by order of primogeniture. Women inherited only in default of a male, and the first time that this case arose it was decided according to the Greek rules of inheritance; Berenice, the daughter and sole heiress of Soter II, married Alexander II, her nearest kinsman. The only striking peculiarity in the royal family is the marriage of brothers and sisters, and the title of Sister borne by the Queens. But unions between brothers and sisters became more and more frequent among their subjects.²

The official language of the Court for a long time preserved simple forms, and even in the 2nd century, in documents issued by the Kings, neither the King nor the Queen, who was regularly associated with him from this time onwards, is described as a god. The King is *Basileus* and the Queen *Basilissa*; the title of *Basilissa* was even borne by princesses who never reigned. The King's name is always Ptolemy. After the marriage of Epiphanes with the daughter of Antiochos III, the Queens are always called Cleopatra.

The Court was a world of which we know little. With ministers, officers, guards, courtiers, slaves, and eunuchs, it was an immense crowd.³ We have some titles of officials of the King's household—the Usher (εἰσαγγελεύς), the Chief Huntsman (ἀρχικυνηγός), the Equerry (ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡνίαις), the Chief Pantler (ἀρχιδέατρος), the Chief Cup-bearer (ἀρχιοινοχόος), the Physician-in-Chief and ordinary physicians, tutors and foster-fathers of the Kings (τροφεὺς καὶ τιθηνός), and servants of the Bed-chamber (κατευνασταί), to say nothing of the swarms of attendants (ἀρχιυπηρέται, ὑπηρέται). Then there were the nurseries of courtiers and high officials—the Royal Pages (βασιλικοὶ παῖδες), the young prince's companions (σύντροφοι βασιλέως), and the μέλλακες who may have had a military character.

¹ Otto, in *LIX*, 1920; *LXV*, vi, p. 318.

² *CLXI*, iii, p. 69 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 101 ff.

The courtiers were divided into classes—Kinsmen and assimilated persons, First Friends and assimilated persons, Captains of Body-guards (*Archisomatophylakes*),¹ Friends, and Diadochi. This scale of dignities is known in the 2nd century, but it originated in the 3rd. At that time titles of honour were reserved for the people of the Court ; in the 2nd century they were also given to officials of the provinces.²

In all this organization, it is easy to divine the complex, and sometimes concordant, influences of the Courts of Macedon, Persia, and Egypt. The Royal Pages are known in the time of Philip and Alexander, like the Staff of the Body-guards. The Kinsmen are a Persian institution, and recall the Egyptian *nsut-rekh*. The Friends bore the name of *smeru* at the Court of the Pharaohs.*

Among these people of the Court the King recruited his Council, of which we know little, and his high officials, and among his officials he recruited his ministers. We catch a glimpse of some of the ministers of the Ptolemies. First, there was the chief minister, who had charge of the Seal. We do not know his title ; it is probable that, as at the Seleucid Court, he was called "the Man over Business", *ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*. Then came the Secretariat, with the Epistolographos, who dealt with the King's correspondence, and the Hypomnematographos, who was in charge of petitions and the issue of the Royal Ephemerides.³

The Diœcetes, one of the most important men in the State, was in charge of finance, being assisted, at any rate from the 2nd century (we hear of him in 162) by the Director of Accounts of Extraordinary Receipts (*ἴδιος λόγος*)⁴ and the Director of Accounts.

The Chief Justice of Alexandria, the Archidicast,⁵ may be regarded as a Minister of Justice, since he exercised supervision over the Chrematistæ and other law-courts. There

¹ XXIV, i, p. 161 n. 43.

² CLXXX (Wilcken), i, p. 7.

* For these titles in ancient Egypt, see Moret, *The Nile*, p. 159.

TRS.

³ CCXVIII, pp. 9 ff.

⁴ Plaumann, in *Abh. d. Preuss. Akad. Berlin*, 1919, 17.

⁵ Koschaker, in LXIII, 1907, pp. 254 ff. ; Jœrs, in LXIII, 1915, 107 ff., 280 ff.

was no Minister of State for religion. The King was the religious head, and every year, at least down to the time of Epiphanes, the synod of the priesthood met under his presidency. He was also the chief of the army. It was in his relations with the army that he preserved most of his Macedonian origin. The army played a part something like that of the Companions, and it is possible that at every accession the King was presented to the officers and troops of the Court, whose acclamations gave him a kind of investiture. In short, the King was the centre of the whole system, and, when he was an active ruler, the soul of it. We shall see, when we study the organization of local authority, that his will could be conveyed to and imposed on the furthestmost hamlet of the valley of the Nile.

II

THE ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY¹

The Ptolemies naturally preserved the traditional division of the country into Upper and Lower Egypt and its further division into nomes.* The nome had a definite unity, which was chiefly expressed in the worship of a principal god or triad. The Egyptian seems to have been attached to his nome by birth, as the citizen was to his city. It has, therefore, been suggested that the nome may have kept something of its original character, and have been, in theory, a community of persons of the same blood.² But we see it chiefly as an administrative district.

At the time of the conquest, the nome was managed by the Nomarch,³ and Alexander kept the native Nomarchs in their posts. It is probable that when Ptolemy came to govern as Satrap he instituted a military occupation of the whole country. Each nome formed a military district, and by the side of the Nomarch a Greek Strategos was placed. Gradually, the Nomarch fell into the second place, his duties being mainly financial, and the Strategos became the civil

¹ **CLXXX** (Wilcken), i, pp. 8 ff.

* For the nome in ancient Egypt, see Moret, *The Nile*, pp. 40 ff.

TRS.

² **CXCV**, pp. 44 ff.

³ Engers, in **C**, xlvii, 2.

and military governor. In the 2nd century, the Nomarch seems to disappear altogether, while the Strategos very soon appears as a chiefly civil officer; however, he still has command of the armed force, which is usually a police, and complete control of the colonies of soldiers.

The whole valley, except, perhaps, the domains set apart for the Greek cities—Ptolemaïs, Naucratis, Alexandria—was divided into nomes. Those of Upper Egypt constituted a separate region, the Thebaïd, bounded on the north by the southern border of the Hermopolite Nome and ending in the south at the First Cataract, at Philæ or Syene. Beyond the Thebaïd lay Dodecaschoënos. The Thebaïd is distinguished from the rest of the country in the list of nomes given in the law of Philadelphos on the oil monopoly, but it was probably after the native revolts of Epiphanes' time that it was given a special governor.¹ He is sometimes called Epistrategos and sometimes Strategos, and his duties included the supervision of the Arabian Desert.

The nome was divided into smaller districts called toparchies (τοπαρχία), usually under a Toparch. The small chequer-pattern, which serves as "determinative" to the hieroglyphic group signifying the Egyptian word *spt*, "Nome," is a simplified figure of the nome divided into toparchies.² In the valley, these were distinguished as up-stream toparchies (ἀνω) and down-stream toparchies (κάτω). Lastly, the smallest administrative unit was the village (κώμη) with its land (πεδῖον) under the Comarch.³

Egypt, as we shall see, was administered as an estate, the revenues of which must be ensured for the King. So, by the side of each governor of a district, there was an agent of the Diœcetes, a scribe, who acted, roughly speaking, as a controller. With the Strategos there was the Royal Scribe, or Basilicogrammateus (who was subordinate to him),⁴ and beneath him were the Topogrammateus and the Comogrammateus. It was they, on principle, who made out all the documents—tax-rolls, reports on crops, etc.—which were used to establish the survey and to govern the exploitation of the country. The Comarch gives the

¹ CXCIV, pp. 5 ff.

² CLXXX (Wilcken), i, p. 9. * [See also Moret, *The Nile*, p. 41. Trs.]

³ See CXCI.

⁴ See CXIII.

impression of representing the interests of the village population with the Comogrammateus, or, at least, of the agricultural population, which was chiefly composed of tenant-farmers of the King. So the importance of the scribes steadily increased, from the 3rd century to the 2nd. Bodies of police, and particularly a gendarmerie, called Phylacitæ, who in theory had an Archiphylacites in every village, were under the Epistates of the village, and, for the nome as a whole, under the Epistates of the nome, whom we find in the Thebaid in the 2nd century. These corps saw to the general security and discipline.

The officials of special services, and, in particular, those of the financial administration—the Hypodiœcetæ for large financial districts, probably wider than the nome, who, from the 2nd century, were in charge of the revenues of every nome, the crowd of royal stewards with their agents, the Trapezitæ or managers of public funds, the Sitologi or managers of granaries—were mingled with the district officials and made use of their assistance.

This uniform system could be modified to suit different conditions. In the Fayum, the old Nome of the Lake, which Philadelphos made into the Arsinoite Nome, we do not find the division into toparchies; but at the beginning it seems to have been divided into seven nomarchies, and, perhaps later, into three big *merides*, each with its Strategos. Libya seems to have had a Libyarch. Lastly, we have no clear information about the administration of the capitals of the nomes, or metropolises. They may have had governors delegated by the central power. Thebes, in the 2nd century, had a Thebarch, and the function was often performed by the Epistrategos-Strategos. But the great Egyptian city was doubtless an exception; it appears to have been separate from the nome, which was called Perithebes (Round Thebes).

In spite of all the gaps in our information, we can say that Egypt had an intelligently designed administration, and when it is added that the whole country must have been covered by a well-organized postal service, it will be understood that the desires of Alexandria could be expressed and enforced throughout its length.

To obtain an exact idea of the value and character of the administrative personnel, we should know how it was

recruited.¹ The Comogrammateus was nominated by the Diocetes, for certain, and was probably put up for the appointment by the people of the village. The candidate, at least in the 2nd century, made certain undertakings. Thus, Menches, the Comogrammateus of Cerceosiris under Euergetes II, proposes to reclaim an unproductive piece of Domain land, 10 *arourai* in area (nearly seven acres), for which he will pay a rent of 50 *artabai*. He also promises to distribute 50 *artabai* of barley and 50 of vegetables in the village, perhaps as a kind of *congiarium*. And we see that he gets his letter of nomination. It is probable that the Strategos, the Royal Scribe, the Topogrammateus, and perhaps many others, were appointed in the same way. The posts were, then, considered lucrative; we know that the officials drew a salary. They remained in the same post a long time. We know nothing of the rules of promotion, but we see officials gradually rising in the service. There was, therefore, nothing like the unpaid, temporary magistracies which the citizen undertook as a duty in the Greek city. The Ptolemies aimed at creating a body of professional officials, living by their office. There is no doubt that they were following the example of ancient Egypt, and most offices (those of the scribes, for example) were a legacy from the remote past.* But the system was clearly not perfect. It had, first of all, the fault which spoils all despotic governments, where all authority assumes an arbitrary and personal character. Every official obeyed his seniors slavishly and commanded his subordinates tyrannically. We often find the central power calling attention to the established rules, which it considers beneficial; but that is because those rules were easily adapted at the caprice of powerful men, and often the very humblest servant of the State was skilful at twisting them. The stronger encroached on the competence of the weaker, and that is perhaps what makes it so difficult for the modern historian to determine the boundaries between the various offices.

Favouritism and the abuse of office sometimes weighed heavily on the masses. Posts were regarded as lucrative,

¹ See CLXXXV.

* For ancient Egyptian administration and officials, see Moret, *The Nile, passim*. Tas.

as we have seen, and their holders lived by them ; but there must have been a strong temptation to live by them more lavishly than was legitimate, and many, from the top of the ladder to the bottom, certainly expected to be paid for their services. The private individual, unable to trust to the law, sought the protection of a powerful personage. Every official had his *clientes* about him, and was himself the *cliens* of a greater than he. That is an endemic evil of Oriental empires. Under strong and able rulers, like the first Kings of the line, it must have been partly counter-balanced by general prosperity, and, for all its vices, the system placed in the hands of the masters of Egypt an instrument, so adaptable and so powerful that in many points the administration of the Ptolemies was taken as a model by the Roman Emperors.

III

THE ADMINISTRATION OF PTOLEMAIC EGYPT

The principles which the Lagids applied to the internal government of Egypt were derived both from ancient traditions and from new circumstances. Tradition made the King a god, the master and even the owner of the country. But the conquest had brought into Egypt a mass of Macedonians, and, still more, of Greeks, who were incapable of adapting themselves completely to these Oriental ideas. It was possible to make them respect the royal authority, and even, in the end, recognize its divine character, but not to change their laws, their habits, their spirit, and their moral outlook.

Now, how could the Hellenic way of life be preserved, except in a city, where the citizen, taking part in the debates of the Agora, remained sovereign in his own home and on his own field, a parcel of the fatherland ? So, of necessity, by the side of the native country, the Chora, there would be Greek cities ; ¹ by the side of the natives who tilled the land which was Pharaoh's property, as serfs, there would be bodies of citizens (*συστήματα πολιτικά*). While the subject population would have nothing to do but to obey the direct orders of the supreme power, some device must be found to reconcile monarchical right and the autonomy of the cities.

¹ CXCIV, pp. 4 ff. ; CXCVI.

The Ptolemies had incorporated several Greek cities in their Empire, but in Egypt itself there were only three, or perhaps four. One was the old Ionian city of Naucratis. The others were new foundations. There was Alexandria, the capital. There was Ptolemaïs (Menshiyeh), built by the first Ptolemy in the heart of the Thebaïd. A document of the 2nd century after Christ has suggested the hypothesis that Parætonion was also a city.¹ It was supposed to have been founded by Alexander; but really we know almost nothing about it.² But, whether we add Parætonion or not, if we compare the Lagid kingdom with Seleucid Syria we may be surprised at the brevity of this list. The fact is, that the situation of the two dynasties was not the same. While the first Seleucids reigned over immense territories, the total area of Egypt was not greater than that of Belgium, and the unity of the country would have been dangerously weakened if the narrow strip of habitable land along the two sides of the river had been too often cut up by small autonomous states and the Royal Domain had been too much reduced. At least, to these few cities the Kings allowed the institutions of genuine independent *poleis*. Naucratis perhaps kept its old constitution, similar to that of Massalia, with its aristocratic Council of *Timouchoi*.³ In any case, we know that it struck coins. In the time of Philadelphos and Euergetes, Ptolemaïs,⁴ and probably Alexandria⁵ as well, had an Assembly of the people, a Council, and a board of six executive magistrates, called Prytanes.

These were not, of course, the only magistrates. In Alexandria we hear of the Treasurer, the Astynomi, or police, and the Nomophylax and Thesmophylax, who played some part in legal proceedings and were connected with the law-courts. For the Greek cities had a certain autonomy in matters of justice. Alexandria had its juries (dicasts), with their *eisagogeus* who brought cases into court, its public arbiters (*diakitetai*), under the Nomophylax,

¹ T. Reinach, *Un Code fiscal de l'Égypte romaine*, Paris, 1920-1, p. 88 (reprint from *Revue historique du Droit*, 1920-1).

² **XXIX**, 1, 12 (col. 5); Pseudo-Callisth., i.81.

³ **CXCV**, p. 87.

⁴ **IX**, 47-9.

⁵ Jouguet, in **XC**, 1925, p. 12.

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and its law-courts with their clerks.¹ We also hear of Dicasteries at Ptolemaïs.²

Citizens,³ or, at least, those with full rights, were divided into tribes and demes, and the latter appear to have been territorial divisions. But it seems that there were also citizens outside the demes, and, since the women of Alexandria did not belong to them, it has been supposed that, like the women, these citizens had only the private rights and not the political rights enjoyed by full citizens. The local government of Alexandria has been described as a tempered aristocracy, and the definition perhaps applies to Ptolemaïs as well. The Royal authority was certainly exercised over these cities, but it usually seems to have resorted to constitutional forms. These were determined in laws relative to each magistracy, which were presumably first submitted to the King for approval. We find Euergetes sending a kind of ambassador to Ptolemaïs, which honours him "with maintenance in the Prytaneion for his whole life, a front seat at the Games, and the citizenship". But the cities betray their position of dependence by dating documents by the King's years, celebrating his anniversaries, and stamping his image on their coins. It is certain that the orders or desires of the central power met with no difficulty in being transformed into laws or decrees of the city by the vote of the Council and popular Assembly. Moreover, the King had a more direct means of action, for his officials took part in the administration of the city.

There can be no doubt of this in the case of Alexandria, which was not only a Greek city, but the capital of the kingdom and the residence of the Court. When the King went away, at least, he left a governor to take his place and to see that order and security were maintained.⁴ This official may have become permanent, with the title of Strategos of the City; there was also a Strategos of the City at Ptolemaïs.⁵ The cities of Egypt cannot have been

¹ **XXI**, *passim*.

² **IX**, 48.

³ **CXCV**, 4 ff.; **XXI**, p. 92; **CXCVI**, pp. 20 ff.; Glotz, in **XC**, 1916, pp. 23 ff.; **LXXXIX**, N.S., viii, pp. 256 ff.; Plaumann, in **LXV**, vi, pp. 176 ff.

⁴ Plut., *Cleom.*, 37.15.

⁵ De Ricci, in **CCXXV**, p. 299.

treated differently from those held by the Ptolemies in Asia Minor; and we know that at Calynda in Caria the King's Strategos and Steward took part in the local administration.¹

This system of government, which on the whole was fairly liberal, was doubtless not maintained down to the end of the dynasty. Alexandria lost its Council, and there is reason to think that this happened during the 3rd century. Strabo,² writing in the time of Augustus, mentions among the magistrates of Alexandria "the Exegetes, clad in purple and invested with traditional honours, who looks after the interests of the city, the Hypomnematographos, the Archidicast, and, fourthly, the Night Strategos". The Exegetes was the director of the municipality of Alexandria, but it is possible that the others were royal rather than municipal officials, as is certainly true of the Archidicast. The history of Naucratis and Ptolemais is hidden from us. In any case, the cities certainly kept their "liberties" and remained the essentially Greek territory of Egypt. In Alexandria and Ptolemais the Hellenic worship of the Kings had its seat; in the capital, it centred on the Sema, while in the city of the Thebaïd, at least from Philopator's reign (215-214), it was connected with the worship of Ptolemy Soter, the founder of the city.

The Chora was a different world. The countryside was literally the King's inheritance, and this character is apparent in the system of ownership of the soil.³ * The Domain, properly so called, the "Royal Land" (γῆ βασιλική), was very extensive. In the 2nd century, at a time when one would rather have supposed that principles were relaxed, for the one village of Cerceosiris, whose land covered 4,700 *arourai* (about 3,200 acres), there were 2,427½ *arourai* (about 1,650 acres) of Royal Land. All that was not Royal Land was the object of concessions in various forms, the King maintaining an eminent right of ownership. First, there was the Sacred Land, which was held by the gods; the revenues went to the temples and priests, but they were administered by royal officials. One must distinguish

¹ Edgar, in LXXXII, 20, 54.

² Strabo, 797 (12).

³ CLXXX (Wilcken), i, pp. 270 ff.; CCXI, pp. 1-84. * [See also Moret, *The Nile, passim*. Trs.]

the land dedicated by private individuals (*ἀνιερωμένη*); this was managed by the priests, but in almost all cases it had already been concession land when it was in the donor's hands, and did not lose this character when he made it over to the gods. Then there were the great estates, which might include whole villages and their land, ceded to high officials or favourites.¹ They worked them for their own profit and managed them as the King's representatives. One must add the holdings given to soldiers and officials, and even land belonging to private persons, the possession of which was precarious, at least at the beginning of the dynasty.

The King owned not only the soil, but everything that it contained and everything that it bore. He received a portion of its produce, either as rent from the Royal Domains leased out to farmers, or as dues from the holders of concessions. The rest was under his control. Detailed reports on crops were made out, chiefly by the Comarch in the 3rd century and by the Comogrammateus in the 2nd. The State reserved the right of buying corn for its purposes at prices fixed in advance, doubtless much in its favour (*ἀγοραστός σίτος*). Tree plantations were strictly supervised. The King owned an enormous quantity of livestock, which grazed on the royal pastures, and he levied a pasture-duty on other flocks and herds. He could requisition cattle and pack-animals for transport. Whether the fellah was a farmer of the King's Domain or held his land privately, he could not do what he liked with it. Breeders of geese and pigs (*χηνοβοσκοί*, *ὕφορβοί*) were strictly dependent on the State; we often find them providing the meat of their beasts, which was in great demand for the feeding of the Court and officials. The breeding of horses and calves was also very much supervised. The production of honey was partly monopolized by the State, like all industries. We find, or suspect, monopolies, complete or partial, in the case of mines, salt, natron, alum, fisheries, pigeon-breeding, tow, leather, paper, perfumes, dyeing, fulling, baths, and banks.

It is certain that such a system could never be applied to the Greek cities. The law of every Greek city includes the right to own the soil, and certain indications permit us

to guess that, like all Greek citizens, the Alexandrian and the Ptolemaïte were complete owners of their fields. The piece of Egypt originally assigned to each city had, no doubt, been conceded by the King, for it had been detached from his Domain; but, once it was divided among the citizens, they must have managed their allotments as they pleased. In the year 68 of our era, in the territory of Alexandria (ἡ 'Αλεξανδρέων χώρα) and in the Menelaïte Nome, there was an "old land" (ἀρχαία γῆ) which did not pay land-tax.¹ This was probably a survival from the Ptolemaic period; it was on this land, no doubt, that the citizens' properties lay. Nor can the Greek cities have been so restricted in the exercise of trade and industry as the rest of the country. It will be noted that olive oil, the especially Greek oil, was not included in the monopoly.

But for the native of the Chora there was no economic liberty; he was bound to the soil and to the labour which was imposed on him for the exploitation of the country. The poll-tax, *syntaxis*, seems to have been one of the signs of his servitude. His person was catalogued on the registers of that tax, which were called *laographiai*; he was an item in the mass of the *laoi*. He was bound to his nome and his own village, his *idia*, as it was called, by a tie which he could not break at his wish. But this was not his only chain. If he was one of the royal tenants to whom the King leased portions of the Royal Land, by a system of auctioning well known to us, he was attached to his farm and to the conditions of his lease. The lease could be cancelled at any moment, if it suited the State, and, if no offer was made for it, the King did not hesitate to force the lease on someone on terms laid down by himself. Men employed in the service of the complete or partial monopolies were, as has been said, the serfs of their employment, unable to leave it. Even officials were tied to their offices, and we have sometimes seen them burdened with extra obligations, such as the reclamation of an uncultivated part of the Domain. But they made their profits, and, in particular, they drew a salary; nor should we paint the lot of the others in too gloomy colours. In happy periods, as under the reigns of the first three Kings, everybody benefited by the general prosperity,

¹ IX, 669, § 13.

and the restrictions had their corresponding advantages—pay and protection for the serfs of the monopolies, and protection for the royal tenants, who, once they had paid their rent, enjoyed the produce of the land which they cultivated, and were, moreover, assisted with loans of seed and advances for the cost of labour.¹

Above the *laoi*, there were classes of natives who were treated better. The old Egyptian class of the *machimoi* or Warriors was now enrolled in the King's army (where they served, it is true, in inferior units), and, like all men of the regular army, received a holding, but only of between five and seven *arourai*. Above all, there were the priests, who owed a privileged position to the prestige of religion and to the political interests of the ruling house.

For it went without saying that the God-king was the master not only of persons and goods, but of souls.² Pharaoh, not the priests, was the intermediary between the gods and his people, and in ritual the priest was, in theory, simply the substitute of the King. The King, then, was the head of religion, and the Ptolemies took up this rôle at once. It is very likely that the first of them assumed it from policy rather than from conviction. When the Court poets, Theocritos and Callimachos, sing the divine origin of their master, they make him a descendant of Heracles and Dionysos,³ and so it is in a document like the Adulis inscription. Later, perhaps following their subjects' example, the Ptolemies succumbed to the attraction of the Egyptian religion. But at the very beginning, being Pharaohs, they accepted it as a State religion. The character which that religion assigned to them permitted them to adopt a policy at once full of piety to the gods and firm towards the priesthood. Of their reverence for the gods we have abundant evidence, in Egyptian and in Greek, and many of the religious monuments of Egypt—at Tentyris, Thebes, Edfu, Philæ—were erected by them; but they kept the priests in hand.

The organization of the Egyptian priesthood might have made it dangerous. The priests formed a hereditary class, in that the first condition which they had to fulfil was to

¹ *XLI*, i, 39–51.

² *CC*.

³ Theocr., xvii.

be of priestly origin.¹ Their office attached them to a temple, and the temples were divided into a first, second, and third class. The priesthood, properly so called, comprised, in order of dignity, the High Priests, the Prophets, the *Stolistai* (who dressed the gods in the temples), the *Pterophoroi* or Wing-bearers, and the *Hierogrammateis* or Sacred Scribes. The *Pastophoroi* (who carried the statues of the gods about in their shrines), *Choachytai*, *Taricheutai*, and *Paraschitai* formed religious corporations, but were not priests (*uabu*). The priests were divided into tribes, four at first, and five after 238, the fifth being the Tribe of the Benefactor Gods. Each temple was managed by a Council, composed of representatives of the priests, five for a tribe. Also, the delegates of the priests met in synod under the presidency of the King. It may, therefore, be said that there was an Egyptian Church, if one does not attach to the term an idea of dogmatic unity, for cults were independent.

These institutions, most of which seem to date at least from the Saïte period, could not be overthrown by the Ptolemies. But they kept them under their own control. We have seen the system which they imposed upon the sacred land. Not only did they administer, through their officials, the landed property of the temples, which paid dues like other land-holders, but they made sacerdotal appointments. Those which were lucrative, they sold for the profit of the Treasury; the unproductive ones they gave away, but in this case the holder received a regular salary to maintain him, and so became like a State official. The Kings supervised the recruiting of priests,² and saw that rules of ritual and discipline were observed; the priests had to keep their heads shaved, and could only wear linen. The administration of the temples was in the hands of a representative of the King, the Epistates.³ He was not altogether an official, for he held the post for life, and it was often hereditary in a family. But he was still a representative of the King. The appointment of Monographi,

¹ For the dynasty of the High Priests of Ptah at Memphis see CC, i, pp. 204 ff.

² CC, i, pp. 211-12. On taking up their office, priests paid *telestikon*.

³ ~~CLXXX~~ (Wilcken), i, p. 111.

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the sacred notaries who made out Egyptian deeds, was strictly controlled.¹ Even the forms of worship and the religious doctrines taught in the temples required the royal approval.² Lastly, it was the King who convoked the synod, at Canopos or Memphis, and determined its competence. Down to the time of Epiphanes, this assembly met every year on the King's birthday, and, far from considering this annual trip a privilege, the priests thanked Epiphanes for releasing them from it. The priesthood was so submissive that the Ptolemies were able to cut down and almost abolish the industrial monopolies of the temples, such as the weaving of fine linen, and the tax of one-sixth on the produce of vineyards and orchards, formerly paid to the gods, was diverted by the second Ptolemy in favour of the Goddess Philadelphos alone.³

So the rule of the Greek Pharaohs was a despotic government, but the despots were not all barbarous tyrants. The earlier of them ruled ably, certainly in the interest of their own wealth and power, but with some thought for their subjects. They, too, had listened to the teaching of the philosophers, and had formed a certain idea of their duty. In the 3rd century, the selection of fine names like Soter and Euergetes was not always pure hypocrisy.⁴ So we find the Kings concerned to ensure speedy and fair justice to their subjects—a task which was rendered difficult by the diversity of the populations now living side by side in the valley of the Nile, who were accustomed to very different laws. Unfortunately, we know little about Egyptian law, and it is only in certain special points that we can see how far it differed from Greek law.⁵ The Egyptian family, for instance, was constituted quite unlike the Greek family.* Diodorus⁶ no doubt exaggerates, when he says that the wife ruled the husband, who undertook in the marriage-contract to obey her. But she does seem to have enjoyed a liberty such as would impress the Greeks. There were fairly loose unions

¹ CLXXXI, p. 302.

² P. Roussel, in LXXXIV, 1919, pp. 237 ff.

³ XXVIII ; CLXXX (Wilcken), i, p. 95 ; ii, p. 284.

⁴ E. Schwartz, in LXI, xl, pp. 254–62.

⁵ CLXXX (Mitteis), i, pp. 200 ff.

* For marriage in ancient Egypt, see Moret, *The Nile*, pp. 274–5.

⁶ Diod., i.27.

(ἀγραφος γάμος ?) and others more binding (ἐγγραφος γάμος ?), but it is believed that in either case the wife could leave her husband freely, without incurring a penalty, whereas the man was obliged at least to give back the dowry (?) and to relinquish his wedding-present. Unlike her Greek sister, the Egyptian woman was not in the position of a ward, and the Greek institution of the tutelage of women does not seem to have been accepted by the ladies of Egypt before the reign of Philopator. Lastly, native custom authorized unions between brothers and sisters, whereas the Greeks allowed them only between half-brothers and sisters. The system of ownership was also very dissimilar, as can be gathered from the forms used for the sale of real property. But, except in a few details, we are not in a position to compare the laws of the two peoples very thoroughly.

On principle, the King had absolute legislative power, but how could he have thought of overthrowing institutions which were hoary with age ? The natives were allowed to keep their laws, and the Greeks followed theirs. The latter were in force chiefly in the cities, where they were applied in the local law-courts. But there were Greeks all over the country, and this made a somewhat complicated organization necessary.¹

At the head of the system stood the King, and perhaps, also, the Archidicast, immediately below him. The native judges were called Laocritæ ; the origin and composition of this court are unknown. That of the Chrematistæ, founded by Philadelphos to administer Greek law, was apparently an itinerant jury of three judges, with an introducer of cases, a clerk, and an usher. Sometimes we find ten Greek judges or jurymen sitting, under the presidency of one of their number, also assisted by an introducer of cases. Lastly, a mixed court, of which we know only the name (κοινὸν δικαστήριον), tried cases between litigants of different nationalities. The jury of ten and the mixed court disappear in the 2nd century, and, according to an ordinance of Euergetes,² lawsuits between Greeks and Egyptians relative

¹ CLXXX (Mitteis), i, pp. 1-22 ; Zücker, in LX, Supp. xii, 1911 ; COXVII.

² XXXI, 1, 5, ll. 207 ff.

to contracts came before the *Laocritæ* or the *Chrematistæ*, according to the nature of the case and the language of the documents. So we see something of the personal and real competence of these jurisdictions, but it is very difficult to determine it exactly. We do not even know whether they tried criminal cases as well as civil.

The *Chrematistæ* dealt, according to our texts, with "current cases—those affecting the King, the revenue, private individuals", but one can hardly say more than that. In the 3rd century, application to bring an action was made by a petition addressed to the King, but usually it only went as far as the *Strategos*, who seems to have sent the litigants to the competent court, after first ordering the local *Epistates* to attempt to reconcile the parties. It was also possible, at least in the 2nd century, to place the application directly in an urn set up for the purpose at the place where the *Chrematistæ* would hold their court. Lastly, there are instances of summons—before what jurisdiction, we do not know—by *kleteres*, as in Greek law. In the 2nd century, the famous suit of *Hermias* against the *Choachytai*, after commencing before the *Chrematistæ*, was continued for ten years before the *Strategi*, the *Epistrategi*, and, above all, the *Epistatæ* of the nome, who seem to have been most usually entrusted with rendering justice. These judges were surrounded by assessors, and one has the impression that this jurisdiction of officials, developing by the side of the law-courts, became more important as time went on. It has been compared to the evolution in the Roman Empire of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the magistrates at the expense of the ordinary jurisdiction of the *Prætors* and *juries*.¹ In Egypt, it has been taken as a sign of the advance, from one century to another, of the spirit of monarchical despotism. But such observations are perhaps more ingenious than true. Even if the liberties of the Greek cities were more and more cut down from the 3rd century onwards (and we should note that even in the 3rd century the royal judges, the *Chrematistæ*, are found at Alexandria and Ptolemaïs), in the Chora the Kings were quite as absolute in the 3rd century as in the 2nd, and it would be necessary to prove that the juris-

¹ Zücker, *loc. cit.*

diction of officials did not exist there in the 3rd century. The question rises in connexion with the documents referred to the Strategos. As often happens, interpretations do not agree. Some ascribe to him a civil and criminal jurisdiction, which others deny him absolutely. An intermediate opinion makes him a judge, but only in criminal cases; others, while denying him any true jurisdiction, regard him as an arbitrating judge.¹

Lastly, there was a special jurisdiction, to which the royal tenant-farmers, the employees of the monopolies, and all persons involved in the administration of the State revenues were subject. Here the highest court was that of the Diœcetes. An ordinance of Soter II ² clearly refers to this rule, which we find applied in the 3rd century. Beneath the Diœcetes were the stewards and Epimeletæ. In certain cases the Diœcetes could delegate a Chrematistes to whom he dictated the sentence beforehand, the Chrematistes merely judging the fact. In the case of a Comogrammateus accused of peculation, in the 2nd century, we find the court composed of the Epimeletes, the Basilicogrammateus, and Chrematistæ. It is not surprising to hear that this fiscal justice was very summary. For merely making remarks which were considered criminal by the controller of his brewery, a brewer was in danger of being dragged through the streets and hanged without more ado.³

This is the general picture which we obtain of the organization of justice in the kingdom of the Ptolemies. It is easy to distinguish institutions which recall Greece—the juries, the procedure of reconciliation, the summons by *kleteres*. But these features may not all have been unknown in ancient Egypt; the Laocritæ, too, may have been a jury. Other institutions—the jurisdiction of officials, for example—were more in harmony with the monarchical constitution of the State. The great weaknesses of the system were the arbitrariness inherent in despotism and authority of a personal character, and a certain confusion in the competence of various courts. The case of Hermias leaves

¹ Cf. **CLXXX** (Mitteis), i, ch. 1; Zucker, *loc. cit.*; Taubenschlag, in **LXV**, iv, 1 ff.

² **XXXI**, 1, 7.

³ Edgar, in **LXXXII**, xix, 33-4.

the impression that the pursuer had great latitude in the choice of a jurisdiction and in appealing to one judge against the sentence of another. But, after all, in this same suit, the sentence given by the Epistates, after the abundant oratory of the advocates, does not give an unfavourable impression of Ptolemaic justice.¹

The people had, perhaps, less cause for congratulating themselves on the administration of finance.² The revenue system of the Ptolemies is celebrated. They certainly took it over in part from the ancient rulers of Egypt. But they perfected the art of exploiting all the resources of the country. One great advance was the extension of the use of money.³ Without it, Egypt could never have come into the economic movement of the Ægean world, where money had long been in use. It is possible that the need for it had already been felt by the Saïtes, who seem to have had gold coins, perhaps for paying their Greek mercenaries. A great stride forward had been made under the Persian dominion. Darius I reckoned tribute in money. In lieu of 120,000 *artabai* of corn, Egypt paid 7,000 talents for the Fayum fisheries. Nevertheless, Egypt was still a country of natural economy. It did not disappear under the Lagids. The tax on corn-land, for example, was always paid in kind, as were many other supplies and dues, the produce thus collected being destined chiefly for payments inside Egypt, where barter was still practised, although the handiness of money brought it more and more into use.

The King's revenues were, therefore, either in kind (σιτική πρόσσδος), being stored in granaries or treasuries managed by the Sitologi, or in money (ἀργυρική πρόσσδος), being paid into the *trapezai* which were at once State coffers and banks. On principle, there were a granary and a bank in each village. The granaries and *trapezai*, containing, as they did, the funds of the State, came under the Treasury, the *Basilikon*, and the administration of the *Basilikon*, or *dioikesis*, was done by the Diœcetes. There was no public treasury other than the *Basilikon*, but there were extraordinary receipts (unclaimed legacies, the proceeds of the

¹ XLIII, 1.

² CCIV; CCV; XLIX; L; CLXXX (Wilcken), i, pp. 146 ff.; CLXXXI, pp. 252 ff.

³ Above, p. 277.

confiscation and sale of property, fines for unlawful occupation of uncultivated land, etc.), the collection and book-keeping of which, at least after 162, were in the competence of a special official, in charge of the special account (*ἴδιος λόγος*). We also hear of a reserved revenue (*κατακεχωρισμένη πρόσσδος*), which has been explained as an apanage in favour of princes of the royal family. But one cannot speak of "Crown property"; it is a contradiction to distinguish the wealth of the State from that of the Kings.

Ordinary revenues came chiefly from monopolies, rents, and taxes. The organization of certain monopolies is known to us, such as that of oil.¹ The cultivation of oleaginous plants was strictly controlled; the quantity to be sown in each nome was fixed by the State. The grower sold his crop to the State at prices which were likewise fixed. The oil was manufactured in the royal oil-mills, and then distributed for retail sale at a rate officially laid down, the greater part of the receipts being kept by the King. All operations were supervised by officials, especially the steward and the farmer of the monopoly, who was assisted by a controller (*ἀντιγραφεύς*) appointed by the steward. It is hard to understand what profit the farmer got from the business under these conditions. It has been supposed that a tax on the consumption of the oil was also farmed out to him, and that he obtained his profit from that; and it is possible that, when he did his work well, he, like all the other farmers of taxes, was paid five per cent (in the second century, ten per cent) on receipts. The sale in the towns and villages was farmed out to a person (*ἐλαιοπώλης*) who received the supply of oil to be distributed to the retail merchant (*ἐλαιοκάπηλος*).

The spinning and weaving monopolies were organized in a similar manner; but, in addition to the royal mills, there were those of the temples, as well as some private concerns. These must have sold their output to the King.²

The brewer both made and sold beer, but under strict official control. Not only had he first to purchase a licence

¹ **XXVIII**, 38-72; **CLXXX** (Wilcken), i, pp. 240-5; ii, no. 299; **CLXI**, iii, pp. 253 ff.; Rostovtzev, in **LXXI**, 1920, p. 161 ff.

² Rostovtzev, *loc. cit.*, p. 176.

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from the King, but he had to pay him a great part of his receipts, under the name of tribute (*phoros*). The State supplied him with the raw material, the barley, in quantities officially laid down, and the amount of the "tribute" was probably in proportion to that supply. The licence was perhaps issued and the "tribute" collected by farmers of the beer-trade.¹

These are the best-known monopolies, and they will suffice to give an idea of the rest. We have seen above that they were many. Nor were industry and home trade alone thus in the King's hands. Having complete control of foreign trade, he usually carried it on himself, only granting privileges to favourites—certain Greeks, particularly the merchants (*ἐμποροὶ*) and warehousemen (*ἐγδοχαῖς*) of Alexandria.²

The rent of the Royal Lands, which were farmed out in lots by a board of officials, one whole district being dealt with at a time (*διαμίσθωσις*), was paid in kind by the royal farmers (*βασιλικοὶ γεωργοί*), whose servile condition we have already observed. The latter had to transport the corn to the village threshing-floor, and associations of donkey-men conveyed it thence to the granaries, donkeys being requisitioned from individuals for the purpose. The corn was taken to Alexandria by the Nile. The barges belonged to the King, or, at least, the owners and skippers were under strict supervision.³

There were many direct taxes. The land-tax was assessed at so much per *aroura*, according to the fertility of the soil. Corn-land was subject to the *artabieion*, paid in kind. Vineyards and orchards paid, not only the *eparourion*, in money, but supplementary taxes, including the sixth due to the gods, which was devoted to the cult of Arsinoë Philadelphos under the second Ptolemy. Houses were subject to an *ad valorem* tax, and leases to one of 5 per cent, paid by the lessor. In addition, there were professional licences, taxes on livestock, the poll-tax for non-privileged persons, and, finally, taxes for the upkeep and use of certain public services, such as

¹ CCXII, pp. 118–20; XLI, ad. no. 57.

² Rostovtzev, in LXXI, 1920, p. 169.

³ CLXXX (Wilcken), i, pp. 272–8, 376–7; Rostovtzev, in LXV, iii, pp. 201–12.

those for the maintenance of dikes and water-channels, surveying, and the maintenance of the gendarmerie and the scribes, and pasturage-dues. The indirect taxes best known are customs (as at Pelusion) and excise (as at Hermopolis), and the tax on transfers of property (from 5 per cent to 10 per cent).¹

To the burdens thus laid on the population, we must add impressed labour and various obligatory services, such as certain forms of police work.²

The assessment of taxes was based on the statement of the rate-payer, after verification. From statements of persons, probably annual, lists of the population were made up. But there were probably also statements of goods and chattels—houses, corn, cattle, etc. The land alone was not included in this declaration, for a register of all the land in Egypt was carefully kept up to date in the scribes' offices. The books were kept by an accountancy service, under a chief accountant, attached to the Diocetes, with a staff of accountants, one for each nome, in Alexandria, and many scribes and offices (λογιστήρια) in the country.³

The land-tax on corn-land was levied direct by the State, in the same manner as the rent of the Royal Land. This very simple system may have been a legacy from ancient Egypt. For most of the other taxes, the Macedonian Kings, copying Greece, introduced the system of farming. This was, no doubt, not an improvement. To adapt the system to the spirit of their despotic government, the Ptolemies placed the farmer under the strict supervision of officials. In this way they may have meant to safeguard the State, and to some extent the tax-payer, against the greed of the contractor. As it proved, they created a cumbersome and costly system, which must have weighed heavy on the people and discouraged business men. The farmers, who had to furnish sureties and get others to guarantee those sureties, might combine in associations. Their articles were regulated and checked in detail by the steward and the controller whom the steward attached to them. They could not hope for much profit except

¹ **CLXXX** (Wilcken), i, pp. 169–73.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 330 ff.; **CLXXXV**; cf. Rostovtzev, in **LXXI**, 1920, p. 177.

³ **CLXXX** (Wilcken), i, 173–9.

in very good years, when the taxes yielded an extra amount (*ἐπιγένημα*). They therefore drew a salary, 5 per cent on the proceeds of taxes in the 3rd century, and 10 per cent in the 2nd, when the State found more difficulty in obtaining bidders for these contracts. No sum could be levied unless the controller was advised. Every month, the money collected was paid into the bank, and the balance of the account must have been established by the steward and the farmer. If there was the smallest irregularity, the farmer was suspended, and the steward collected the taxes himself. The penalties to which officials, contractors, and employees connected with the farming of taxes were liable were very severe.¹

This administrative system, which on the whole was so well calculated to bring all the resources of the country into the King's hands, and, above all, the abundance of those resources and the docile industry of the fellah, made the Ptolemies the wealthiest sovereigns of their time. Cleomenes had already amassed 8,000 talents. Under Philadelphos, the *Basilikon* contained 14,800 talents. When Egypt had lost all her foreign possessions, Auletes still had 12,500 talents. Even after the colossal expenditure of that hapless King, who had to purchase so many noble Romans, and after the extravagances of Cleopatra VI and Antony, drawing from the Treasury in armfuls, the wealth of Egypt saved Italy, ruined by the Civil Wars.

On that wealth the Lagids founded their power. They had no difficulty in maintaining a redoubtable army and navy.² We know next to nothing of the organization of the fleet, to which the Lagids owed their sea-empire. It was not, of course, composed entirely of Egyptian ships and crews; the cities of the Empire supplied their contingents. We have proof of this for Halicarnassos.³ The army must have been similar to the other Greek armies, but we know little of its armament, tactical divisions, and command. By the side of the mercenaries, whom the Kings were able to levy in great numbers, there were regular troops, which included native soldiers in the lowest rank, but

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179 ff.

² CCXIV.

³ Wilcken, in CCXXV, pp. 93-9.

preserved their Macedonian and Greek character as far as the largest and strongest part was concerned. The Kings kept only a few troops in permanent garrisons. The rest of the men were settled in colonies on the Royal Land. So what the documents tell us about the army chiefly concerns the Hellenic colonization of Egypt, and, therefore, the policy of Hellenization pursued by the Lagids.

We have just seen that a strongly organized power gave them the means to pursue it. But it was a delicate problem, to spread Hellenism in a country whose institutions and manners were so contrary to the Greek spirit.

CHAPTER IV

THE HELLENIZATION OF EGYPT

I

THE GREEKS IN EGYPT

THE monarchical institutions of Ptolemaic Egypt form, as it were, a compact monument, solidly resting on foundations thousands of years old. The foreign kings who restored the edifice adapted its plan with a rigid logic which is one of the features of the Greek intelligence. But, to make a place for Hellenism in such a crowded fabric, a breach had to be made somewhere. The Kings effected a fairly large one by the maintenance or creation of the cities. These should preserve and hand on the traditions of Hellenic culture which, in the eyes of the ancients, were bound up with the civic spirit. It was, therefore, necessary to develop that spirit and to shelter it from the harmful influences which, in that Oriental world, threatened it on every hand. This seems to have been understood by the Greek cities of the Hellenistic period. By the way in which they developed the institution of the gymnasium and the Ephebeia they showed a concern for education which we also find in the states of classical Greece. Unfortunately, we know hardly anything about the organization of the Ephebeia and the gymnasiums in the cities of Ptolemaic Egypt.¹ We find mention of the *kosmetes*, *gymnasiarchos*, and *paidotribes*, whom we should doubtless regard as magistrates of the city. We may take it that the age of Ephebeia was that of political majority, namely, fourteen years. This was also the age at which a youth entered his deme. But there were other divisions of the body politic, besides that into demes; certain indications suggest that in Alexandria and Ptolemaïs there were also age-classes—children, Ephebi, striplings, young men, fully developed men, and old men, the last of whom

¹ **CLXXX** (Wilcken), i, pp. 136 ff.; **CLXXXI**, p. 269; **XCV**, pp. 150 ff.

formed a body called the Gerusia. These classes, which were, no doubt, closely connected with the gymnasiums, were certainly well adapted to preserving the cult of Hellenic traditions.¹

There would have been some danger of those traditions being contaminated, if the citizenship had been made too easy for natives and foreigners to acquire. There were, indeed, cases of naturalization, but the new citizens were usually chosen in Hellenic circles. They were sometimes soldiers from the regular army, which had preserved its Macedonian and Greek character. Moreover, the statutes of the cities placed obstacles in the way of mixed marriages, doubtless because they would have diminished the purity of the blood. The charter of Naucratis refused to recognize marriages between citizens and natives as lawful. The text which tells us this is of the 2nd century of our era, but the regulation was probably ancient.² Was it different in Alexandria? It seems that great importance was attached to purity of race, since the citizenship was refused to the illegitimate son of a citizen,³ and in the Roman period Alexandria certainly did not have *connubium* with Egyptians.⁴ Is it too rash to refer this arrangement back to the Lagid period? The same must have been the case in Ptolemaïs. The names borne by the Ptolemaïtes, in contrast to what we observe in the Greeks of the Chora, always preserve their Hellenic character.⁵

Three or four Greek cities were not enough to Hellenize the country, especially if they were closed to the Egyptians and withdrawn within themselves. Now, the Kings, as we have seen, had reasons for not wanting any more. They must attract Hellenes to Egypt and settle them there without attaching them to cities. The movement which was at the time carrying the Greeks Eastwards could easily be diverted to the valley of the Nile, so rich and so full of opportunities for making one's fortune.

First, there was the career in the Government service. From the top of the departmental ladder to the bottom,

¹ Plaumann, in *LXV*, vi, pp. 85 ff.

² *CLXXX* (Wilcken), ii, 27.

³ *Ibid.* (Mitteis), ii, 372, col. 4.

⁴ T. Reinach, *Un Code fiscal de l'Égypte romaine*, pp. 82-8.

⁵ Wilcken, in *LXV*, iv, p. 537.

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there were chances of considerable profit. All the higher posts in the central departments were held by Greeks, and so were the chief local offices. Before the 2nd century, it would be hard to cite a governor of a nome, a Strategos, that is, who was an Egyptian. It seems fairly certain that a native could not in the ordinary way rise above the rank of Nomarch, and Greeks are found even in the humblest official positions. This was, no doubt, an almost inevitable result of the conquest. Where the whole machinery of government was a well-disciplined bureaucracy, the foreign dynasty can have felt secure only when resting on a body of foreign officials. It was also a result of the superior capacity of the Greeks. The Saïtes had already allowed that superiority to assert itself and had made considerable use of the resources of Greece to establish their power and to reconstruct the country. Under the Lagids, Greek officials put new life into the old administrative machine. Greek architects built cities, set up the light-house of Pharos, dug the Red Sea canal, and drained Lake Mœris. Literature has preserved the names of Deinocrates and Sostratos of Cnidos, the creator of Alexandria and the builder of the light-house. The papyri have preserved the less distinguished, but still significant, names of the engineers Cleon and Theodoros,¹ who took part in the improving of the Arsinoïte Nome under Philadelphos. So the language of Government was Greek. If documents written in Egyptian had to be accepted from a native, they were accompanied by a note or précis in Greek. Egyptian contracts had to be recorded in a Greek bureau.²

The revolutions which were so frequent in the cities of Greece in the 4th century, and also in the 3rd, had thrown a multitude of exiles and homeless men upon the world. Alexander's conquest had fostered the spirit of adventure and increased the number of adventurers. The army of the Ptolemies offered them the greatest opportunities for satisfying their valour, ambition, or greed.³ First, there were the many bodies of mercenaries, who were raised at

¹ **XXXV**, pp. 102 ff. ; Bouché-Leclercq, in **LXXXVII**, 1908, pp. 121 ff. ; **XLVIII**, pp. 1 ff.

² **CLXXX** (Mitteis), i, pp. 48 ff. ; **CCXVI**, pp. 85-90.

³ **CCXIV**, c, iv.

the time of a campaign—foot, horse, and special branches—and were not all dismissed when it was over. There were mercenaries in the King's Guard and among the troops of the Court. The Ptolemies had a name for generosity. Pay was high. After your service, you might hope for the concession of an estate on the fertile soil of Egypt. The senior officers became important personages in the State. At Raphia the troops had been recruited and were commanded by the most celebrated *condottieri* of the time. So there flowed into the valley of the Nile representatives of every warlike race of the ancient world, and if there were many barbarians among them—Thracians, Galatians, Mysians, Lycians, Libyans—there were also many Greeks—Arcadians, Cretans, and men from the Northern states bordering on Macedonia—and sometimes Macedonia itself furnished mercenaries to the armies of the Lagids.

That army did not consist of mercenaries alone. I have already mentioned the native corps, the *laarchies*, in which the *machimoi* served both as foot-soldiers and as cavalry. But the military strength of the monarchy could not, any more than its administrative power, be based wholly on the Egyptians. We see clearly in the military institutions of the Lagids that they did not intend to restore the Egyptian nation, nor did they intend to create a new nation, Greek or Macedonian, above or in the midst of an enslaved population. The Greek idea of the nation was bound up with the city, and was incompatible with the monarchical character of the states which sprang up from the conquest and with the native political traditions of Egypt. Macedonia could never have supplied enough immigrants to form another Macedonian people in the valley of the Nile. So the Lagids, unable to rely on the mercenaries alone, and probably mistrustful of the Egyptians, were compelled, in forming a regular army corresponding to the civic armies of the cities and the national army of the Kings of Macedon, to call once more upon the immigrant populations, the majority of which were Greek.

It is very likely that the Macedonians had a special position. The term *Μακεδόνες*, Macedonians, does not mean the Guard, but there were Macedonians in the Guard, and these regiments of Macedonians, stationed at the Court,

seem to have played a part in the proclamation of the Kings copied from that of the Assembly of the army in Alexander's time.¹ It is possible, too, that this same term *Μακεδόνες* was applied, by extension, to the whole regular army, excluding the native corps. That army consisted, in the main, of a cavalry of the line of numbered hipparchies, a light cavalry of hipparchies distinguished by race-names, a heavy infantry of numbered chiliarchies, and a light infantry of peltasts and hypaspists. There were also chiliarchies with race-names, but these may have been recruited only among the mercenaries. The race-names of the hipparchies and chiliarchies were those of warlike peoples, who had special arms and tactics—Thracians, Thessalians, Mysians, and Persians for the cavalry, and Cretans, Thracians, and Galatians for the infantry. It was in these nations that the corps in question had originally been recruited, but probably men of other races, armed and fighting in the same way as those peoples, were incorporated at an early date. Whatever may be the truth of a whole mass of questions of detail, much discussed but not solved, it is incontestable that, with the exception of barbarians who were privileged because of their superior courage, the regular army was mainly composed of Macedonians and Greeks. "The Greeks of the army" is an expression which one finds in the texts. Macedonia, the Western parts of the Greek mainland, the Peloponnese, the Isles, and Cyrene were the reservoirs of men on which Egypt chiefly drew. But those countries supplied not only common soldiers, but staffs and senior officers.²

War was not the only industry of the Greeks. Egypt had seen that in Saïte times. With the mercenaries of Daphnæ and Memphis, she had welcomed the merchants of Naucratis. The Ptolemies needed capital and men of business as much as they did troops. They wanted companies of contractors to take over the taxes and monopolies, engineers for the King's workshops, who should not only use the industrial resources of the country but should introduce new processes, agricultural experts for the crops which were being acclimatized or developed, such as the vine and olive, and

¹ Polyb., xv.26.1.

² CVI, iii, pp. 8-85 ; CXCVIII, pp. 36 ff.

financiers to manage the banks, which for many reasons could hardly be entrusted to natives, who, moreover, were not much used to handling money. With what rapacity the speculators of every nation flung themselves on the country, we can see when we turn over the correspondence of Zenon, the agent of the Diocetes Apollonios, in the last years of Philadelphos.¹ In a world so bent on making money, it is certain that the Jews were active from the beginning, but the most numerous and the most favoured were the Greeks. There was a fever of energy and greed, perhaps similar to that which consumed countless adventurers in the time of the Khedive Ismail. But in the Ptolemies they had to deal with a Government which was not so easily duped. The Kings opened wide all the roads into their kingdom, but they took good care that the labour and fortune of individuals should not be unprofitable to themselves.

Immigration not only encouraged the economic progress of the country; in every sphere it contributed to the glory of the ruling house and to the civilization of Egypt. The same regions which supplied the army with officers peopled the Court and the cities, and not all who came to Egypt to seek their fortunes were adventurers or intriguers. Many, if they were not yet famous, were making a name for themselves in literature, science, and the arts. The sea-board cities of Northern Greece sent philosophers and scientists; Greek Asia sent artists. The influence of Athens, especially at the beginning, was considerable. It became stronger with the arrival of Demetrios of Phaleron, under the first King, and is manifested in many of the monuments which have escaped the utter destruction of Alexandria. In the 2nd century, Syria also contributed largely to the intellectual element. Lastly, in the 3rd century, Western Hellenism—the great name of Theocritus proves it—had its share in the glory of Ptolemaic Egypt.²

To Hellenize the country, all these new-comers and their descendants had to be attached to the soil. As the owners of all the land of Egypt, the Ptolemies were able to show a generosity which served their policy.³ Perhaps both to

¹ XLVI, iv–vi; Edgar, in LXXXII, xviii–xx; *Zenon Papyri*.

² CXCIII, pp. 86 ff.

³ CCXI, 1 ff.; CLXXX, 270 ff.; CCXII.

colonise the country and to encourage certain forms of cultivation—the vine and fruit-trees—they conceded certain uncultivated parts of the Royal Domain to individuals, who had to plant them, but enjoyed a fiscal immunity which was at first complete, and later was partial for many years. Certain corn-land was even sold by auction by the King, for a price payable in instalments, and abandoned to the purchaser in return for an annual rent by which the King's eminent ownership was asserted. So a form of hereditary private possession was constituted, with a class of free husbandmen, whom it was easy for the King to recruit chiefly among the Hellenic element. There were also leases of an emphyteutic character, which, in moments of economic crisis, were granted to the farmers of the Royal Land for a reduced rent, slightly raised at the end of ten years. But these do not seem to have been given to Greeks so often; these royal farmers were usually small men, and natives.

To tell the truth, we do not know exactly how far Hellenism benefited by these measures. We know more about the military colonies.¹ The Ptolemies settled the soldiers of the regular army in cleruchies—that is, they gave them holdings (*kleroi*) on the Royal Land to cultivate. A triple origin is assigned to this institution. First, the military colonies of Alexander are recalled; but these were generally accompanied by the foundation of towns, and the colonists who cultivated the territory were also citizens of the city. Athens, too, had her cleruchies, or colonies of citizens on foreign soil, and the legal status of the Egyptian holding has suggested comparison with that of the Athenian *kleros*. But it must not be forgotten that in Egypt military colonization was a custom going back to the Ramessids and preserved for centuries. Herodotos bears witness that in the 5th century the Hermotybies and Calasiries, who, he says, formed the Egyptian militia, had allotments of twelve *arourai*.² *

¹ CCXIV, pp. 162 ff.

² Hdt., ii.168. The *aroura* was a superficial measure represented by a square with a side of 100 royal cubits. Since the cubit was about 20·7 inches, the *aroura* was about 3,305 square yards. * [For soldiers' land in ancient Egypt, see Moret, *The Nile*, pp. 299–302, 339–40. Tas.]

The military cleruchs of the Ptolemies usually had much larger holdings—100 *arourai* for the troopers of the numbered hipparchies and the infantrymen of the Guard, 70 *arourai* for the troopers of the hipparchies with race-names, and 30 *arourai* for the infantry; certain mercenaries received 25 *arourai*; the Egyptian soldier only got between five and seven. But we find still bigger estates given to officers—for example, in round figures, 154, 223, 315, 342, 1,640, and even 10,000 *arourai*.¹

In Egypt the husbandman could not build his house in his field; the inundation compelled him to group his dwellings in a compact village raised above the plain. So the cleruchs had to be lodged in the towns or villages. The quartering of soldiers is a burden which many states lay on their subjects, but as a rule it is a temporary burden. The Lagids made it almost permanent, requisitioning rooms in the houses of their subjects for the cleruchs. This was the *stathmos*, and we have royal ordinances which lay down the position of the householder and the cleruch, who was generally tempted to abuse his rights.

The *stathmos* and *kleros* belonged to the King. The cleruch could not do what he liked with them; he could farm out his *kleros* to others, no doubt, and doubtless his *stathmos* as well.² He could not sell or cede either. There were cessions of *kleroi*, but they were supervised by the King. The holding could, perhaps, serve as a security in certain circumstances. But it could not be bequeathed, nor could the *stathmos*, although it appears—doubtless illegally—in the wills of some cleruchs. In practice, the cleruch naturally tended to leave his *stathmos* and *kleros* to his son, in consequence of the latter's situation.

For the Kings had to consider the recruiting of their regular army, and they naturally tried to enlist the sons of soldiers, following Alexander's example. But it was difficult to compel them to take over their father's duties without their rights. So the son who succeeded his father in the service also succeeded him in the possession of a *kleros*. Of course, the King could assign whatever *kleros* he chose, but a father would naturally want the holding which he had cultivated to go to his son, and there can have been no imperative reason

¹ **XLI**, 30-8.

² **XIX**, no. 92.

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for opposing his wish. Indeed, at least in the time of Euergetes, it was not opposed. On the death of a cleruch, his holding was sequestrated and, when the rights of the children had been examined, it was given to that son who was considered eligible for service.¹ This procedure seems to have been customary in the middle of the 3rd century and to have been maintained in the next century, at least until the reign of Euergetes II.

The sons of cleruchs, and even of soldiers who had no *kleros*, and probably all sons of foreign immigrants, formed what was called the *Epigone* or Offspring. Now, there were corps of Epigoni, and it has been supposed that these were bodies in which soldiers' sons were trained. But these Epigoni were part of the fighting army. Polybius mentions them at Raphia. They received holdings of 25 *arourai* on their own account.² Perhaps they were the sons of cleruchs, but younger sons, who did not succeed to their fathers' *kleros* but were kept or enlisted in the army.³

Among the officers' holdings, we have already noticed one of 10,000 *arourai*. Being mentioned among the holdings of cleruchs, it, too, is probably a military *kleros*. But it is as big as a *dorea* (δωρεά), the name given to the huge estates which the Kings conceded to their favourites or to high officials of the Government. The best-known *dorea* is that of Apollonios, Philadelphos's Diocetes.⁴ His lands in the Fayum covered an immense area. They comprised several villages, including the town of Philadelphieia, and in the immediate neighbourhood they embraced 10,000 *arourai* of desert land to be irrigated and reclaimed. A plan and estimate for the construction of channels and dikes have been preserved on a mummy from Ghoran (Pl. IV).⁵ On principle, the concessionnaire of a *dorea* seems to have

¹ XLI, 4 (but the date should be corrected); XXXI, i, 124.

² XLI, 39. The question of the men τῆς ἐπιγονῆς (*mes n Kmi* "those born in Egypt", in Demotic) is very much discussed. See below, p. 332 n.11.

³ The military cleruchs would not have contributed much to the Hellenization of Egypt, if, as Herr Gelzer believes (LV, 1914, 2, pp. 61 ff.), the soldier did not reside on his allotment, but the State worked it and gave him the revenues as pay. But cf. Lesquier, in LXXXVII, 1919, pp. 359 ff.

⁴ CCXII.

⁵ XLI, 1.

received full administrative powers from the King, but he was not lord of the domain, for he had no rights of justice, and on his death the domain reverted to the King. For all that, these domains were vast regions of Egypt opened to Hellenization. The people of Apollonios's household were almost all Greeks, and, since the Diœcetes directed commercial undertakings, for which he needed a fleet, and was in political and business relations with Syria and Asia Minor, his agents were constantly coming and going and exchanging correspondence. Around them was a busy crowd of domestic servants, husbandmen, workmen, and even intriguers, and in that multitude the Greeks naturally far surpassed the rest in activity and numbers.

In the reign of Philadelphos, the wealth, and especially the soil, of Egypt were worked intensively. Land was reclaimed in the Fayum. The country was covered with a horde of colonists. A system of loans granted by the State—loans of seed, loans for the costs of labour—encouraged individual activity for the benefit for the State.¹ A whole foreign population from every corner of the Mediterranean world seems to have descended upon the valley of the Nile.

The personal and fiscal status of the Greeks was much better than that of the natives. The citizens of Greek cities could not be treated quite like subjects. We see them keeping the name of their original city. The witnesses to a marriage-contract of 311, found at Elephantine, declare that they are from Gela, Temnos, Cyrene, Cos. Zenon says that he is from Caunos and Panacestor, another steward of Apollonios, describes himself as a Calyndian. The Egyptian Government must have recognized these official descriptions and the rights which they entailed. These Hellenes were not subject to the impressed labour with which the fellah was burdened, nor to the poll-tax, a sign of servitude. By their side, there were other privileged foreigners. The Jews, attracted by the first Ptolemy, formed important communities, both in the Chora and in Alexandria, and the Thracians and Mysians entered the army in masses.

The Greeks would not have been Greeks if they had not felt the need of combination; they were collected in

¹ XLI, i, 39-51.

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"nations". So the Hellenomemphites had formed an association in Memphis long ago, and they still survived in the 2nd century, being governed by *Timouchoi*. It is supposed that these communities sprang up spontaneously, but, if the Kings did not create them, they very soon adopted and supervised them. It is possible that, to have the status of a Hellene, a man had to belong, either by origin or by naturalization, to one of these Hellenic *politeumata*.¹ Perhaps he was thereby qualified for service in the King's army. We have evidence, certain or more doubtful, of *politeumata* of Cretans,² Boeotians,³ Achæans,⁴ Thracians,⁵ Cilicians,⁶ Mysians, Idumæans,⁷ Persians,⁸ and Jews,⁹ and it is highly probable that there was one of Macedonians, treated with especial consideration. Most of the above are not Greek communities, as the names show, but that is probably due to the chances of our evidence. We do not know whether these *politeumata* had any connexion with the cities of Egypt. But they were certainly organized bodies, with their magistrates, their priests, and their seat established in a determined place. It is possible that not all foreigners formed communities of this kind; and within the *politeumata* the number of members may have been limited.¹⁰ Lastly, it has been asked whether the men of the Offspring, the men *τῆς ἐπιγονῆς*, belonged to them.¹¹ What is certain, is

¹ CCXIV, 142 ff.; CLXXXI, pp. 247, 257, 280, 286; CXCVIII, p. 80 n. 3.

² CCXIV, pp. 143 ff.

³ Breccia, in LXXXIII, 1923, no. 19, p. 119.

⁴ CCXXI, p. xi.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Henne, in *Bull. Inst. fr. d'Arch. orient.*, xxxv (1924), p. 179.

⁷ CCXIV, pp. 143 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁹ CLXXX (Wilcken), i, p. 24; Engers, in LVII, xviii, pp. 79-80.

¹⁰ Many consider the *politeumata* as exclusively military groups. W. Ruppel, *Πολίτευμα de historia vocis*, Jena, 1923, quoted in CXCVIII, p. 80 n. 3.

¹¹ Opinions differ greatly on the men *τῆς ἐπιγονῆς*; sons of cleruchs (CCXIV, pp. 52 ff.; CXCV, pp. 12 ff.); born in Egypt of soldiers (Wilcken, in LXV, vi, p. 368; vii, p. 96; XXIV, i, p. 163); new immigrants (Schubart, in LXV, v, pp. 104 ff.); descendants of immigrants (Von Woess, in LXIII, xlii (1921), pp. 641-3; *Das Asylwesen Ägyptens* Munich, 1923, p. 67; LXIII, xlvi (1926), pp. 42 ff., 55). I am inclined to think that they were, in the third century, the first descendants of the immigrants. Cf. below, p. 342 nn. 1-3. Schonbauer, in LXIII, xxxix (1918), p. 243, thinks that there were *politeumata* of men *τῆς ἐπιγονῆς*. For opposite opinion, see von Woess, *loc. cit.*

that the status of every inhabitant of Egypt was carefully defined and recorded.¹

In these associations the Greeks could the more faithfully preserve the traditions of their race. They created centres of Hellenic education everywhere. Egypt was covered with palæstræ and gymnasiums. They existed even in villages. What part did the King take in this movement? It is hard to say. Those gymnasiums whose origin is known to us were founded by private individuals. But with the Ephebi we find *kosmetai* and *gymnasiarchoi* mentioned. Were these magistrates belonging to a body of Archons, who administered the Hellenized community of the nome-capital, as we find them doing in the Roman period? For the Lagid period, we know nothing about the capitals, and this concentration in them of Greek institutions seems to have been a reform of Octavian. It is more likely that in Egypt the gymnasiums were private foundations, perhaps dependent on the *politeumata*, but supervised by the State. They were in the same position as private weaving-mills or sanctuaries built by private persons. They could not be demolished or rebuilt without the King's permission. Weaving was a monopoly, and the King was the head of religion; so workshops and chapels were under his control. Now, the King was not only the sovereign, but the *patronus* of the Greeks of Egypt. So he also controlled the *politeumata* and their gymnasiums.

II

THE NATIVE REACTION²

The Egyptians must have felt themselves despoiled. So, indeed, they were. Never, it seems, had any of the foreign dominations under which Egypt had passed—not that of the Ethiopians, nor that of the Assyrians, nor that of the Persians—so taken possession of all the resources of the country. No doubt, at the time of conquest and in the

¹ This seems to be proved, for example, by such an expression as 'Ανδρόμαχος ὃς ἐγράφετο Ναγιδεύς (an unpublished text). There must have been lists (γραφαί) in which persons were classified according to their racial designation.

² Jouguet, in *LXXIX*, 1923, pp. 419 ff.

repression of revolts, there had been the usual Oriental violences and cruelties, from which the first Macedonian Kings seem to have abstained. But that was only at moments of crisis, and usually, if the tribute was paid, the life of Egypt went on as it had done for thousands of years. Now the people was subject, not only to a foreign reigning house, but to a whole new race, whose tyranny was all the more oppressive in that it spread and insinuated itself all over the country. The Egyptian had to give up to the Greeks the best fields, sometimes even part of his house, and the public offices by which he was accustomed to make his living.

Discontent smouldered for a long time; for long the Egyptians were conscious of their weakness. Perhaps, too, they benefited somewhat from the general prosperity brought about by more active exploitation of the country and a better disciplined administration. At last, however, revolt broke out.

We hear of disorders as early as the beginning of the reign of Euergetes I,¹ but we do not know of what kind they were, and, according to Polybius, the first great native rebellion came shortly after the battle of Raphia (217).² To resist the menace of Antiochos III, it had been necessary to recruit native troops. The *machimoi* of the regular army had not been thought sufficient; a whole multitude of Egyptians had been taken on, and had even been armed as phalangites. This gave them confidence, and they thought themselves capable of throwing off the yoke. A leader whose name we do not know rose, perhaps at Heracleopolis, for a popular prophecy speaks of "the Heracleopolitan who shall reign after the Foreigners and the Ionians".³ The war must have been long and terrible. It has been supposed that it began in Central Egypt and the Delta. But in the year 16 of Philopator (206) "it raged in the North and in the South", and the rebels took refuge in the temple at Edfu, founded by Euergetes I and then in course of construction; work was not resumed until the year 19 (186).

¹ Just., xxvii.1.9; Jerome, *In Dan.*, 11.

² Polyb., v.107.2-4.

³ W. Spiegelberg, *Die sogenannte demotische Chronik*, p. 6 n. 1; cf. Jouguet, *loc. cit.*, p. 435 n. 3.

These rebels were supported and perhaps led by Harmachis, a Nubian prince who had ruled since 206 in the Thebaïd, which seems to have been detached from the Ptolemaic kingdom.

The troubles continued everywhere until the beginning of the reign of Epiphanes. Abydos was besieged in the year 6 of his reign.¹ Lycopolis in the Busirite Nome was taken by him in the year 8 (198–197)² and the “impious men” were severely punished. The so-called Rosetta Decree consecrates, in the year 9, the memory of the King’s amnesties. But, if there was a moment of pacification, it did not last long. Anchmachis, who had succeeded Harmachis about 200, held out until he was defeated and captured by a Greek officer on the 27th August, 186, as we are told by a decree of the priests who met in Alexandria in September of the same year.³ Nor was the rebellion yet put down in the Delta. It collapsed only when Saïs was taken by Polycrates in 184–183. The measures of repression were terrible. Epiphanes led his troops as far as Nubia.

The hostility of the Egyptians may, perhaps, have manifested itself again during the sixth Syrian War, when Antiochos IV was marching against Alexandria.⁴ Delivered from the peril by the intervention of Rome, Philometor, who was then reigning with his younger brother, had to cope with a civil war fomented by Dionysios Petoserapis.⁵ He was a native, who was esteemed for his military talents, and had the rank of “Friend” at the Court. On the pretext of supporting the younger Ptolemy, who was more popular than his brother at the time, he raised the capital, and the mob, as was its wont, gathered in the Stadium yelling threats. The intention of Petoserapis, who had already negotiated with the native troops, was certainly to profit by the disturbances to overthrow the reigning house. The attitude of the two Kings, who showed themselves to the populace together, frustrated his plan and restored calm in the city.

¹ CCXXI, 82, 82b.

² IX, 90, l. 22.

³ Sethe, in LXVIII, 1917, pp. 35 ff.

⁴ Jouguet, in LXXIX, pp. 420, 421 n.

⁵ Diod., xxxi.15A.

But Petoserapis and his supporters had occupied Eleusis (Hadra), at the junction of the two canals which brought fresh water from the Nile to Alexandria. Philometor was compelled to give him battle. The rebel fled, swimming across the Nile, and we hear no more of him. But the movement must have had its repercussion in Memphis and the Fayum and even in the Thebaïd, for Panopolis was besieged and taken. Panopolis was still treated as a conquered city under Euergetes II,¹ and when Philometor undertook the colonization of Nubia and the organization of the frontier at Philæ it was partly in order to cut the people of the South off from the support which the Ethiopians gave to national aspirations.² He hardly succeeded. His colonies disappeared, and when Euergetes II was fighting Cleopatra II, the texts still mention disturbances, especially in the Thebaïd, in the years 40 and 48 of the reign.

To make an end of a stubborn opposition which was always reviving, it was necessary to destroy the old native capital. Thebes had revolted again at the end of the reign of Alexander I, profiting by the crisis which ended with his fall and death (88). Soter II had hardly been recalled by the Alexandrians, when he marched against the Thebaïd. This time he resolved to have done with it. Thebes was taken, looted, and partly destroyed, so that it was no more than an agglomeration of villages, as Strabo saw it later.³

The Egyptians, then, emerged defeated from the struggle which had gone on for more than a hundred years. It could not be otherwise. Neither the soldiers of Ethiopia nor those of the native army were a match for the numbers and armament of the Greek troops. The dynasty was saved; but it was not to force alone that it owed its salvation. The Kings had been obliged to make concessions, and the measures which they took, either while putting down the rebellion or afterwards, permit us to guess that those whom they had to conciliate—probably because they were the soul of the revolt—were chiefly the warriors and the priests. After the defeats of the rebels, we find the priestly synods meeting and manifesting their loyalty by voting new honours

¹ XXXI, 5, ll. 135 ff.; cf. Jouguet, *loc. cit.*

² IX, 111.

³ P. Collart, in *Recueil Champollion*, pp. 273 ff.

to the King—for example, after the fall of Lycopolis and after the capture of Anchmachis. But, to judge from the first of these decrees of the priests, the famous Rosetta Stone, such honours were not bestowed without compensation. The ordinances issued by the King were recalled to memory. Many of these were intended to put down abuses and to safeguard the traditional privileges of the priests, and perhaps to grant them new ones; or else they were amnesties and remissions of arrears. One has the same impression when one reads the ordinances of Euergetes II, published in 118, some time after the troubles in the Thebaïd.¹ In the 2nd century the rigidity of the principles of the royal power seems to have been relaxed. The hereditary possessions detached from the Domain became more numerous. The military cleruch, for example, had almost free disposal of his *kleros*, and in the end he could bequeath it, not only to his son, but to a kinsman, provided, perhaps, that the latter was fit for service. In the army, the position of the *machimos* was improved, and the size of his holding was increased. Natives made their way into the Greek units.

In spite of all its difficulties, the Kings triumphed. But they did not owe their victory to force and favours alone. Perhaps they would not have conquered if Hellenism had not penetrated the whole country.

III

THE FUSION OF RACES

Let us follow its fortunes in Egypt from the conquest onwards.

Fairly soon, in spite of the hostility of the natives, at first secret and then open, it had become acclimatized—that is, it had adapted itself to the country and grown familiar to the people. Proud as they were of their civilization and race, the Greeks could not live shut off from their neighbours, especially those who were settled in agricultural colonies, and so were mingled with the peasants of the countryside. We do not find the holdings collected in compact groups, but scattered about the territory of the

¹ XXXI, i, 5.

Egyptian towns and villages. The cleruchs were billeted in the very houses of the natives. Intercourse was inevitable. At first, perhaps, it was not very easy. There were striking contrasts between the two peoples. Herodotos speaks of them; he observes the actual religious antipathy which hampered relations between native and Greek, the refusal to kiss on the mouth, the need for purifying crockery after a foreign guest had used it. But one must not exaggerate this superstitious hostility. Religion, which may have been an obstacle at first, in the end became a bond. The Greeks certainly had brought their gods and rites with them, and when we find dedications to such deities as Artemis Soteira, Apollo Hylates, or Zeus Olympios,¹ we clearly have to do with Greek deities. But we do not find them so very often. For long, Egyptian gods had been assimilated to Greek gods, and there is no doubt that Egyptian gods were worshipped under Greek names. Setet and Anuqet, the goddesses of the Cataract, became Hera and Hestia. The Falcon Horus of Edfu called himself Apollo. Amon-Ra-Sonther of Thebes was Zeus, and the city took the name of Diospolis. At Tentyris, Hathor was Aphrodite; at Hermopolis, Thoth was Hermes; at Heracleopolis, Herishef was Heracles; Neith of Saïs had long been Athene. This list, which could easily be increased, shows the respect in which the Greeks held the gods of Egypt. They had no objection to worshipping the oddest of them, under names scarcely Hellenized—Thueris, the She-hippopotamus of Oxyrrhynchos, Suchos, Socnebtynis, Pnepheros, and Mestautmis, the Crocodiles of the Fayum, and the like. For the Greek was the guest of these gods, since they were the lords of the country, and he owed them homage. This followed from the tolerant and local character of the ancient religions; and the Egyptian religion, with the pomp of its worship, the mystery of its temples and their secret sanctuaries, and the strangeness of its rites and doctrines, which were supposed to be profound and esoteric, exercised a special attraction in an age of religious curiosity and effervescence. It conquered the Greeks. The more human, less remote gods of the Greek, on the other hand, do not seem to have attracted the Egyptian.

¹ *IX*, 18, 53, 65.

It has been said that the Egyptian religion was exclusive and closed to the foreigner. The statement should, perhaps, be modified. The Greek must have been admitted to the courts and porticoes of the temples, like other worshippers; and, like other worshippers, he went no further. No doubt, there were rites reserved to born Egyptians. But the sanctuaries did not close their doors to foreigners without exception. Already, probably before Alexander's conquest, we find a Greek woman of Memphis depositing in the shrine of Osor-Api a curse against the man who has deserted her and her daughter.¹ This is the celebrated papyrus of Artemisia, preserved in Vienna. Moreover, by the side of the official religion, we see the appearance of popular cults, open to all, which seem to have had a great following. There is an example in the ruined and disestablished temple of Seti I at Abydos,² where, in the open halls, the cult of a healing Osiris was installed, who, to judge by the Greek *graffiti* written on the walls, had many worshippers at the time.

The authorities would naturally encourage these tendencies. Ptolemy Soter aimed at creating a common worship, in which all his subjects should take part, and succeeded.³ There is certainly some truth in the tradition recorded by Plutarch, to the effect that the King formed a commission of theologians, among whom were the Egyptian priest Manetho and Timotheos, the Exegetes of the Eleusinian cult.⁴ These conferences did not create the religion of Serapis, which was to have such a future, but they organized it. We have seen that this god was none other than Osor-Api of Memphis assimilated to a Greek Pluto. But Serapis also had something of the character of Dionysos, and, like Asclepios, he was a healing god. The features of the cult-statue recalled those of all these gods, and especially of Zeus and Pluto. On his head he bore the *kalathos*, the sacred basket of the Mysteries. By his side was a three-headed Cerberus. Serapis was associated with Isis and Horus the Younger, the child Harpocrates. These three deities formed the Alexandrian Triad, worshipped on the Acropolis of Alexandria, and very soon all over the world.

¹ XXIV, i.

² CCXXI, Preface.

³ Bouché-Leclercq, in XCIII, 1902, pp. 1 ff.; I. Lévi, *ibid.*, 1913, pp. 1 ff.; CCI; XXIV, pp. 25 ff.; CLXI, i, pp. 113-21; iv, pp. 303 ff.

⁴ *De Iside*, 28.

We do not know the exact time at which the iconographical types of the new gods became fixed. But it is certain that the cult spread at an early date, under the protection of the Government. We still have the letter written to Apollonios by a worshipper who had been cured by the god and favoured with visions. He begs Apollonios, the Diœcetes, to help him to found a temple of Serapis by the sea.¹ The favour and protection of the Kings was also extended to other cults, especially that of Dionysos, which was very popular in the Hellenistic period. Philopator wanted to make him play the same part as Serapis, and even a larger one, by identifying him with all the great gods, including the God of the Jews. He must have failed with Israel, which he persecuted in vain.²

So the Greeks took to the gods of Egypt, and they must have taken to the manners of the country as well. Some of the earliest immigrants, in their pride as free citizens, may have shown contempt for the enslaved barbarians, but this feeling must have grown weaker as time went on, and it must certainly have been almost extinct in the Greek born in the Chora. He had never known city life. As his father had perhaps done, he might be tempted to take a wife of the country. Then, what difference was there between his children and natives? The law must have recognized at least some of these marriages. It had, no doubt, been a wise measure to forbid the citizens of the Greek cities of Egypt to marry native women, so as to keep the source of Hellenism pure; but it would have been an impossibility to prohibit such unions for all the Greeks settled in the countryside, and a mistake, if it was really desired to Hellenize Egypt. In fact, such unions seem to have become more and more frequent, and the Egyptian practice of marriage between brother and sister was introduced among these Greeks or half-Greeks of Egypt. We do not know the legal status of these mixed marriages, nor the condition of the children born of them. It is possible that they did not all get Hellenic status by their birth, but Hellenism in Egypt does not seem to have been exclusive and closed. Could a man not become the equal of a Greek, if he had received

¹ *Zenon Pap.*, 59084.

² Perdrizet, in *LXXXVIII*, 1910, pp. 213 ff.

a Greek education, such as was given in the schools and gymnasiums? So the idea of Isocrates was applied, that it is not blood, but education (*παίδευσις*) that makes the Hellenic. There are examples of naturalization by inscription in a *politeuma*. When a man became a Greek, he took a Greek name, but did not lose his Egyptian name. He bore both together, one often being a translation of the other, as in the case of Dionysios Petoserapis. But of course these changes of name required official authorization. Civil status was strictly controlled, and frauds on the part of officials were punished with death.¹

These tendencies to assimilation between Greeks and Egyptians were more and more encouraged by the Kings, as they came to identify themselves more and more with the Pharaohs. In the 2nd century they could hardly call upon immigrants any longer, for Greece was exhausted; so they had to increase the number of Greeks born in Egypt. Besides, the native revolts obliged them to make concessions. We now find Egyptians at the Court, in the higher posts of the army and civil service. The Strategos who had the task of pacifying the Thebaïd under Euergetes was called Paos. But the Kings do not seem to have thrown over the traditional rules which preserved the Græco-Macedonian character of their domination. The privileged persons who were called to office were still, on principle, men of Hellenic status; only that status was conferred on Egyptians more often.

Indeed, our documents lead us to suspect that there was a reorganization of the classes. We cannot, unfortunately, be sure of all the details, but the intention does seem to have been both to concentrate the forces of resistance to the native reaction and to effect a cautious and partial assimilation of the non-Hellenic population.² Whereas in the 3rd century we find a great variety of racial names, it is observed that many of them are no longer found in the 2nd century. On the other hand, the Macedonian, Cretan, Mysian, and Persian *politeumata* are swelled by numerous naturalizations; the quality of Offspring (men *τῆς ἐπιγονῆς*) appears only with these racial designations, and, instead of being applied only to the sons of immigrants, it becomes

¹ Jouguet, in **LXXIX**, 1923, p. 440 n. 4; **XV**, 1250.

² **CXCVIII**, pp. 8 ff.

hereditary.¹ It would be too much to say that the old groups disappeared altogether, but at least they seem to fall into the background. It is as if the population were distributed in fewer categories, and according to a rigid scale of rank, the degrees of which might be at once an obstacle and a step up. The Macedonians and Cretans were at the top, then came the citizens of the Greek cities and the Hellenes of the Chora, then the Mysians, and then the Persians.² These last became numerous in Upper Egypt, the least Hellenized part of the country, and that is certainly a significant fact. They admitted non-Iranian elements into their ranks, especially natives, and among these natives were many priests.³ While superior to the mass of the Egyptians, they were far below the Hellenes, with whom they perhaps did not enjoy *connubium*.⁴ The contracts affecting them show that the debtor was liable (according to different interpretations) either to be made a slave for the benefit of his creditor⁵ or to be forbidden to take sanctuary.⁶ These changes must of course, have been accompanied by reforms in the army, the organization of which, in antiquity, always reflects that of the State.

Although much of this picture is conjectural, the essential fact is beyond doubt. The policy of the Lagids aimed at

¹ Above, p. 332 n. 11.

² On the *Πέρσαι* and the *Πέρσαι τῆς ἐπιγονῆς*, in addition to the authorities quoted on pp. 330, 332, cf. A. Segré, in **CIII**, 1922, pp. 143-56; **CV** (Nuova), ii (1924), pp. 86-91; Pringsheim, in **LXIII**, xlv (1924), pp. 396-526; G. Tait, in **LXV**, vii, pp. 175-83.

³ Segré holds that the Persians of the 2nd and 1st centuries are not the descendants of the ancient Persians, but of the Egyptian *machimoi*, brought into the *politeuma* of the Persians by being enrolled in the army. It is possible that some descendants of *machimoi* were introduced into the *politeuma* of the Persians. But that on principle these Persians were descended from the true Persians is maintained by von Woess in **LXIII**, xlvi (1926), pp. 45 ff.

⁴ **CXCVIII**, pp. 26 ff.

⁵ H. Lewald, *Zur Personalexekution im Rechte der Papyri*, Leipzig, 1910.

⁶ Von Woess, in **LXIII**, xlii (1922), pp. 139 ff.; *Das Asylwesen Ägyptens*, pp. 66 ff.; **LXIII**, xlvi (1926), pp. 38 ff.; **CXCVIII**, pp. 18 ff. According to Woess, the reason for this *privilegium odiosum* was the memory of the sacrileges done by the Persians. Objections are raised in **CXCVIII**, p. 24, and discussed by Woess in **LXIII**, xlvi (1926), pp. 50 ff. On the legal position of the *Πέρσαι*, cf. Pringsheim, *op. cit.*, and Tait, *op. cit.*, who regards the *Πέρσαι τῆς ἐπιγονῆς* of the Roman period as a mere legal fiction.

creating, between the fellah in the country and the aristocracy of the cities and Court, a mixed Græco-Egyptian population, which might be penetrated with Oriental ideas, but, in the higher classes, was dominated by Hellenic culture. So Greek letters spread in the country, and the framework of the kingdom was constituted.

It was that framework, already established when rebellion broke out, that enabled the dynasty to resist. No doubt, it is possible that the rebels found many supporters in the Græco-Egyptian classes; but these cannot, as a whole, have been fundamentally hostile to the reigning house. Hellenized as they were, they had no reason for regarding a Greek dynasty as an anti-national dynasty. Even the Egyptian priests, or, at any rate, some of them, being themselves Hellenized, were in touch with those classes, or actually belonged to them, and that is why, in every crisis, even if one may suspect that the soul of the opposition was in the temples, we yet find many loyal subjects among the priesthood.

But what a distance there was between these half-Greeks and the genuine Hellene! It was as great as that dividing the political conceptions of Athens or Sparta from the principles on which the constitution of the Ptolemaic kingdom was based. These Greeks, distributed among the villages or nome-capitals of Egypt, knew nothing of the city life which was the only true Greek life, and were imbued with Oriental superstitions. They read and wrote Greek—they had learned it in Homer and the classics—but they wrote it more and more incorrectly. One can follow the degeneration of the language, a clear sign of the degeneration of men's minds, if one goes through the many documents preserved in order of date. In the 2nd and 1st centuries, the letters, ordinances, and circulars issued by high officials are drafted in a pretentious, incorrect, and hopelessly involved style. One may speak of the de-Hellenization of the Greeks of Egypt.¹ But when one reflects, the surprising thing is that this de-Hellenization did not take place quicker. "The son of an European and an Oriental woman is an Oriental" says Renan, and we know what usually happens to an immigrant race, even of conquerors, when it mingles with

¹ H. I. Bell, in **LXXI**, 1922, pp. 146 ff.

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that of the country where it has settled. In reality, the Greeks of the Egyptian Chora were hardly Greeks any longer.¹ Yet, for several centuries, they had no other civilization than the Hellenic. The reason, without doubt, was that they were within the radiation of a hearth where Hellenism, although transformed, had preserved all its fire and all its brilliance.

IV

ALEXANDRIAN CIVILIZATION *

That hearth must be sought in the Greek cities, and especially in Alexandria. But even there Hellenism was not isolated. The Greek community was only a part, and perhaps the least numerous part, of the population of the city. Not only were there all the people of the Court, who did not necessarily belong to the city, but there were the troops of the garrison, Greeks who were not citizens, Egyptians (although it was the constant policy of the Kings to keep the uneducated mass of fellahs away from the capital as much as possible), and, lastly, foreigners.

Among these foreigners, some were privileged. Chief of these were the Jews. We have already seen that Alexander and the Ptolemies attracted them. They were spread all over the country. Their oratories are found in Lower Egypt and in the villages of the Fayum. Egypt offered an immense field to their activities. In the course of the 2nd century, the disturbances in Palestine certainly sent a whole flood of them into the Ptolemaic kingdom. But the great centre of Egyptian Jewry was Alexandria.² There the Jews lived in a special quarter, which sometimes assumed the character of a Ghetto. In it they lived according to their Law, under the protection of the King, and formed a separate community, a *politeuma*, with their Sanhedrin and Genarch or Ethnarch. Occasionally there were persecutions of the Jews, particularly under Philopator, when that strange monarch thought that he had found in the worship of Dionysos the religion which should unite all his subjects. Dionysos ought to blend

¹ CCXX, pp. xxix-xxxi.

* See Grenier, *The Roman Spirit*, in this series, pp. 340 ff. TAs.

² See H. I. Bell, *Jews and Christians in Egypt*, pp. 10 ff.

with Jehovah quite as well as with Serapis or Osiris. But generally the Jews lived as loyal subjects, and formed a powerful party, on which the Kings relied for support. One of the finest triumphs of Alexandrian Hellenism was that it Hellenized them. At Alexandria the Bible was translated into Greek. Many of the Jews of Egypt knew no other language. They agitated for the Alexandrian citizenship until they got it. To indicate what they owed to Alexandrian culture, and what Alexandria owed to them, it will be enough to mention Philo.

The Greeks, at the beginning of the 3rd century, found in Alexandria every feature of a Greek city. The people met in an Assembly, and there were magistrates, a Council, perhaps a Gerusia or Assembly of Elders, as at Cyrene.¹ The fragments of Alexandrian laws which have been preserved reveal a purely Greek legal system. But such autonomy, which favoured the maintenance of Hellenic traditions, although it might be modified by the royal power, agreed ill with it, especially when the Kings turned more and more into Oriental monarchs. It is not surprising that the city lost its Council. Strabo, at the end of the Ptolemaic period,

¹ For the constitution of Cyrene, see S. Ferri, in *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin*, 1926, no. 5, inscr. no. 1. This document, which was published while the present work was in the press, seems to date from 248-247, when, by the marriage of the future Euergetes I and Berenice, the daughter of Magas (see above, pp. 191-2), Cyrenaica came under the power of Egypt again. According to Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, the inscription gives us the ordinance (διάγραμμα) of the King (Ptolemy II or III) governing the constitution of the city. It is remarkable that Ptolemy does not govern Cyrene as King, but as Strategos for life, and he has five colleagues, elected and temporary. The civic body (*politeuma*) formerly of 1,000 citizens, is raised to 10,000. The minimum income required for citizenship is 2,000 drachmas. Exiles who have fled to Egypt shall, on selection by Ptolemy, enter the *politeuma*, provided that they have this minimum income. There is a Council of 500 members, and the Gerusia is restored, the Gerontes, 101 in number, being over fifty years of age, and nominated by Ptolemy. The Council is chosen by lot from citizens aged fifty, and half of it is renewed every two years. The text also mentions the *Timetairoi*, selected by the Gerontes from among citizens aged over sixty, the eponymous Priest of Apollo, the nine Nomophylaces, and the five Ephors. So the Lagids seem to have reformed the constitution in a democratic direction. But Cyrene was not a democracy—far from it. It was, at most, a tempered aristocracy, to use the phrase applied by M. Glotz to Alexandria. Needless to say, it would be unwise to press the comparison and to draw conclusions about Alexandria from Cyrene.

does not speak of it. Nor does he speak of Archons of Alexandria. He only mentions the Night Strategos and the director of the municipality, the Exegetes. There were, therefore, reforms in the constitution of Alexandria. What was their date? Certainly in the time of the earliest Kings. One has the impression that Philopator remodelled the institutions of the city, but the Council had perhaps already disappeared.¹

So the Greek city was mutilated by the royal power. The citizen body was still one of the mainstays of Hellenic civilization. But it was not sufficient support by itself. This was doubtless what the Kings wanted; they themselves were to be the patrons of Greek culture. Its centres would be the Library and the Museum, royal institutions, attached to the Palace buildings.

Here we have one of the essential features of Alexandrian Hellenism and the Hellenism of all Egypt. It was based on the power of the Kings. This was indeed a contrast to the past, and even the present, of Greece. The effect on the literature and thought of Alexandria was bound to be very serious. Aided by every resource which the Kings could furnish, the sciences made wonderful progress. Philosophy usually lost interest in the destiny of the State, and cultivated the ideal of the wise man, the Citizen of the World. Literature was a Court literature. Even the great poetical geniuses of the time—Theocritos, Callimachos, Apollonios of Rhodes—were Court poets. The reader is struck by the purely Greek nature of their inspiration. Of Egypt they know and say hardly anything—little more than a poet of Athens or Cos might have said. For they wrote for an essentially Greek circle—the Court folk (*αὐλικοί*), among whom the natives did not appear till later, and the citizens of the cities, who stood aloof from the people of the country and did not intermarry with them. By the side of this truly Alexandrian literature, a whole body of semi-literary writings sprang up, for the mixed Greek population of the nomes—tales and novels, full of magic and mysticism, sometimes of a coarse kind; we can obtain an idea of them from works like the romance of the Pseudo-Callisthenes, and we have fragments of them on the papyri.

¹ Jouguet, in *ΣΟ*, 1925, pp. 12 ff.

It is a platitude to talk of the cosmopolitanism of Alexandria. The Greeks of Alexandria must have been affected by it. Alexandria was a meeting-place of the world, and she must have been influenced by the Egypt which lay at her doors. The Alexandrians had not *connubium* with the natives, but they may have had it with the Greeks of the Chora, and these were Egyptianized. The truly original creations of Alexandrian thought had a Græco-Oriental character. Neo-Platonism would be a late fruit of it, but perhaps the finest and most permanent.

Such were the chief features of Alexandrian Hellenism, which broke more and more away from the civic spirit, and, being supported by the royal power, was suited to the capital of a kingdom like that of the Lagids.

How, exactly, should one describe that kingdom? The Ptolemaic monarchy was not a national state. The Lagids neither wished to revive the Egyptian nation nor to create a new national state, Macedonian or Greek. From Egypt they took the principle of the divine right of kings and the bureaucratic organization of the State. That organization they perfected. But the world had been drawn into the current of Greek civilization. They themselves had adopted that culture. Their work could be accomplished only with the help of Greeks. They therefore gave an important, but limited, place in their kingdom to the city. They propagated Hellenism by agricultural colonization, taking care not to group their colonists in autonomous centres like Greek cities. To Hellenize their realm, they selected those institutions of the city which were educational rather than political in character. Shall we find the same principles and some of the same features in the other Hellenistic monarchies?

THE HELLENIZATION OF ASIA

I

ANTIGONOS AND LYSIMACHOS

AFTER the death of Eumenes, the last champion of the Kings of Alexander's line, we find two great Macedonian powers forming in Asia, that of Antigonos One-eye and that of Seleucos. That of Antigonos was constituted first, immediately after his victory in Gabiene (317). The war which he maintained against the other Diadochi from 316 to 311 ended in failure against Cassandros in Greece, but consecrated his power in Asia as far as Mesopotamia. Seleucos, who had returned to Babylon in 312, had triumphantly held his own there and had in the end conquer'd the central Satrapies. In the South, the realm of Antigonos touched that of the Lagid, with whom he fought for Southern Syria. Even in Asia Minor, certain regions, such as Pisidia, were not reduced. Zipœtes, who succeeded Bas in Bithynia (between 328 and 325), had attacked the Greek cities of Chalcedon and Astacos (315). They were saved by a stratagem of Antigonos, but Bithynia remained independent. About the time of Ipsus, Cappadocia broke loose from his kingdom.

The power of Antigonos,² who was King from 306, had not, perhaps, all the features which were to appear in the Hellenistic monarchies. The worship of the King had hardly come into being. It is found in the Greek cities which had long been accustomed, in Ionia, to deify the living.³ Whether Antigonos was worshipped by his Oriental subjects, we do not know. They differed in language, race, and beliefs, and even if we had more information it is unlikely that we should find a royal religion among them of such a fixed kind as in Egypt. In other respects, the central power was

¹ To the bibliography of this chapter add E. Meyer, *Blüte und Niedergang des Hellenismus in Asien*, Berlin, 1925.

² U. Koehler, in *LIII*, 1898, pp. 824-43.

³ Above, p. 291.

organized on the same principles as in the other states. Under the presidency of the sovereign, we sometimes find a Council meeting.¹ Lastly, as in the other Hellenistic monarchies, one must distinguish between the native country and the Greek cities.

We know very little of the administrative organization of the native country. Did Antigonos keep the old Satrapies, or did he cut them up into smaller *Strategiai*, each governed by a Strategos like those of the Ptolemies, that is, holding civil and military powers? Both views have been maintained. We hear of Satrapies in the Empire of Antigonos—that of Caria, when Asandros joins his cause,² and that of Hellespontine Phrygia.³ Perhaps he kept the districts, but deprived the Satraps who had seized them after Alexander's death of the military power, and gave it to the Strategoi.⁴

The native territory must have comprised vast royal domains, with their colonists. But it was certainly not all royal land. In Asia Minor there had always been great lords who owned the land in practice, although in theory they were perhaps only tenants and were the masters of the peasants, attached to the soil.⁵ Sanctuaries—for example, those of Ma at Comana in Cappadocia⁶ and Comana in Pontus,⁷ of Anaitis at Zela in Pontus,⁸ and of Men Pharnacu at Cabeira⁹—also possessed extensive domains. Lastly, there were protected or vassal princes. We know something of Mithradates of Cios.¹⁰ He was the son of Ariobarzanes, the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who had revolted against Artaxerxes II (387–362), and Alexander dispossessed him. Through the friendship of Demetrios Poliorcetes for his son, he recovered his principality (309–308); for his treason, he lost it with his life, about the time of Ipsus. But these are only loose scraps of information; we know next to nothing of the political, economic, and social condition of the country outside the Greek cities.

These cities stood outside the Satrapies and *Strategiai*. Antigonos was a phil-Hellene. He proclaimed himself the

¹ Diod., xviii, 50.4–5.

² Diod., xix.75.

³ Diod., xx.19.2.

⁴ Koehler, in *LIII*, p. 882; *CCLXI*, p. 17.

⁵ *CCXI*, p. 254.

⁶ Strabo, 535.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 557 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 512, 559.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 557 ff.

¹⁰ *CLXII*, pp. 58 ff.

defender of Greek liberties. Demetrios re-established the Council of Corinth. In Asia, Antigonos took care not to create political confederations, but he respected religious confederations, like those of the Ionians. The Greek cities were allied states.¹ In 311 he wrote to them (only the letter to Scepsis is preserved)² acquainting them with the negotiations which had led to the peace with Cassandros and Ptolemy. He was careful to emphasize his concern for Hellenic interests. The cities took part in the treaty, swearing an oath, the form of which was sent to them by Antigonos. Their liberty and autonomy, always difficult to define, did not prevent Antigonos from wielding an authority over them which as a rule was not to be resisted. Towards the end of his reign, we see him effecting the amalgamation of two neighbouring cities, Lebedos being incorporated in Teos. He settled all the details of this synœcism in ordinances and decrees addressed to the Council and people of Teos.³ It has been thought that he acted as an arbiter⁴ chosen by the cities themselves, giving advice rather than commands; but he really seems to speak rather as a master. The laws of the new city, drafted by *Nomographi*, are to be submitted to him, and he reserves the right of punishing the proposers of laws of which he does not approve. This intervention in the internal government of cities is certainly not exceptional, for in the same document he proclaims as a general principle that he does not wish as a rule to authorize cities to import foreign corn at high prices, because they become burdened with debts through the practice.

Antigonos died before he had completed the amalgamation of Teos and Lebedos. But he had presided over other creations of the kind, and the object of his policy seems to have been to strengthen Hellenism by concentrating it in larger cities. Thus, Larissa, Colonæ, Chrysa, Hamaxitos, Cebrene, Neandreia, and Scepsis were united to form Antigoneia in the Troad.⁵ Smyrna was reborn, after being a collection of scattered villages for four hundred years,⁶

¹ IX, 5, 1.40; CLXX, p. 112.

² IX, 5.

³ VIII, 2nd ed., 177.

⁴ Koehler, LIII, 1898, pp. 838-43; but cf. CLXI, p. 23.

⁵ Strabo, 598, 604.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 646.

and entered the confederation of the Ionian cities.¹ If Antigoneia was founded on the Propontis, it was to counter-balance the power of Lysimacheia established by the King of Thrace on the site of the ancient Cardia.² Another Antigoneia arose in Bithynia, on the shore of Lake Ascania,³ and yet another preceded Antioch on the banks of the Syrian Orontes.⁴ This last was intended to be the capital, which had formerly been at Celænæ in Phrygia.

After the battle of Ipsus, the rule of Antigonus in Asia Minor was replaced by that of Lysimachos. But the war had thrown the whole country into disorder. It was at this time that the son of Mithradates of Cios took refuge in the Olgassys Mountains (Ulgaz Dag) and succeeded in carving out a kingdom for himself in the valleys of the Amnias (Gyuk Irmak) and Iris (Yeshil Irmak), and so founding the state of Pontus.⁵ Cappadocia was reconquered by Ariarathes II, the nephew of the Ariarathes whom Perdiccas had defeated and crucified.⁶ Lysimachos's efforts to subjugate Bithynia were in vain. Zipcetes, who took the title of King in 297, resisted him successfully (295).⁷ The death of Antigonus and the rivalry of the Diadochi resulted in a weakening of the Macedonian power.

For the Greek cities, too, the time of Ipsus was a period of trouble. Not all the cities sided with Lysimachos; for instance, Ephesos, in alliance with other cities, such as Rhodes, stood for Demetrios Poliorcetes. Priene, on the other hand, was kept in alliance with Lysimachos by the tyrant Hieron. Ephesos came to the aid of the exiles of Priene and joined them in a war on Hieron (*κοινὸς πόλεμος*), the memory of which is preserved in several inscriptions.⁸ About 299, the city honoured an ambassador from Demetrios

¹ *Ibid.*, 638.

² Koehler, in *LIII*, 1898, p. 843.

³ Strabo, 565. For other foundations ascribed to Antigonus, see below, p. 367.

⁴ Diod., xx.47; Strabo, 750.

⁵ Diod., xx.111.4; Plut., *Dem.*, 4; App., *Mithrad.*, 9.

⁶ Diod., xxxi.19; *CLXIII*, i, pp. 96-7.

⁷ Memnon, 20 (FHG, iii, p. 537).

⁸ V, 494; Heberdey, in *CCXXXIV*, ii, p. 95 (?) n. 1; *VIII*, i, 3rd ed., 364; Heberdey, no. 17; v, 87. Ilion, too, may have had a tyrant at this time; *IX*, 218.

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and Seleucos, who announced the reconciliation of the two Kings opposed to Lysimachos.¹ When Lysimachos established his authority, he seems to have been harsher than Antigonos. The thirteen Ionian cities now formed one administrative district, governed by a Strategos of the King.² The same may have been the case with the Confederacy of the Isles.³ In several places—in Lemnos, for example⁴—the vexatious policy and fiscal exactions of Lysimachos had left evil memories. At Ephesos, where he appears to have restored an oligarchical constitution,⁵ he compelled the inhabitants to leave the quarters in the plain and to found a new city on the hill, which he called Arsinoë, after his wife.⁶ The measure was justified by the condition of the harbours,⁷ but Lysimachos acted with a brutality which he aggravated by transporting the people of Lebedos and Colophon into the new city against their will. The Colophonians even ventured to make an armed resistance, and were defeated.⁸ There was more warrant for the severity with which the King treated Heracleia, which he held by virtue of his marriage with Amastris. When the Queen was murdered by her two sons, he had them put to death and annexed the city, which became the apanage of his new wife, Arsinoë.⁹ It was natural that memories of Antigonos should be obliterated. Antigoneia in Phrygia became Nicæa,¹⁰ and Antigoneia in the Troad became Alexandria.¹¹ Scepsis recovered its autonomy.¹² But we hear of cities being destroyed, such as Astacos.¹³ When Demetrios landed in Asia, he found the Greeks on the whole favourable to his cause.

But one must not suppose that the policy of Lysimachos was hostile to Hellenism. For example, we do not find him abolishing democracy; it survives at Samothrace, Priene, and Samos. He defended Samothrace and Ephesos against the pirates.¹⁴ He favoured certain cities, such as Priene,

¹ IX, 10.

² CCXLI, p. 28.

³ CLXX, pp. 118–23.

⁴ Radet, in XC, 1906, p. 263.

⁵ Memnon, 4–7 (FHG, iii, pp. 529 ff.); CLXIII, i, pp. 117, 119.

⁶ Strabo, 565.

⁷ Ibid., 597, 607.

⁸ Ibid., 563; perhaps rebuilt afterwards, LXXXVII, 1906, p. 308.

⁹ CCXLI, p. 28; Polyæn., v.10.

¹⁰ X, 485.

¹¹ Athen., vi.255A.

¹² Strabo, 640.

¹³ Paus., i.9.7; vii.3.4.

¹⁴ Ibid., 593.

which he helped in its struggle against the tribes of the plain and the Magnesians of the Mæander, and the city honoured him with priests and an altar on the Agora.¹ Ilios grew in size and beauty.² Lastly, Lysimachos seems to have acted as an impartial arbiter in the everlasting frontier dispute between Priene and Samos.³

But the cities were inevitably drawn into the wars which divided the Kings. The latter competed for their friendship or alliance. Even inside these small republics, each might have his own supporters. As early as 295, for example, one finds a "pro-Seleucos" party at Miletos.⁴

II

THE SELEUCID EMPIRE

The battle of Curupedion (281) completed the foundation of the Seleucid power. This had come into existence in 312, when, after Ptolemy's victory at Gaza, Seleucos returned to Babylon, where he seems to have been received with favour.⁵ Polyarchos, the Strategos of Antigonos, had surrendered, and the friends of the former Satrap, who were besieged in the fort, were delivered. Seleucos received the title of King from his peoples well before the year of the Kings.⁶ In vain Antigonos sent two armies against him in succession, one under Nicanor and the other under Demetrios Poliorcetes; the war continued after the peace of 311, in Seleucos's favour,⁷ and Antigonos, relinquishing the East, placed his new capital in Northern Syria.

The kingdom of Seleucos, then, was formed in the middle of Asia. In the course of his struggle with Nicanor, he had conquered Media, Susiana, and Persia; he subdued Bactriana after 311; and Appian tells us that he also reigned over Mesopotamia, Armenia, Parthia, the Arabs, the Tapurians, Arachosia, Hyrcania, and other peoples as far as India.⁸

¹ IX, 11-12.

² Strabo, 598.

³ IX, 18.

⁴ CCXLI, p. 34; IX, 218.

⁵ Above, pp. 149-50.

⁶ Diod., xix.92; Plut., *Demetr.*, 18. The so-called Seleucid era began, for the Greeks, on the 1st Dios (Oct.), 312, and, for the Babylonians, on the 1st Nisan (May or April), 312; cf. CLXII, pp. 515-20; Streck, in CVII, s.v. "Seleukeia".

⁷ Staehelin, in CVII, s.v. "Seleukos".

⁸ App., *Syr.*, 55.

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On that side his growing Empire was to find a limit in that of Sandracottus.

That prince, of the Maurya dynasty, was the son and successor of Nanda, King of the Prasians, who in the past had sent ambassadors to Alexander. One effect of the Macedonian conquest may have been to inspire the Indian princes with a sort of national imperialism and the idea of combining the divided forces of the country in a stronger and larger state. They were doubtless aided by the disorders created in the Satrapies of the Indus by the conflicts of the Diadochi. Eudamos, the governor of the Upper Indus, who had caused Porus to be assassinated, stood for Eumenes. Antigonos made away with him after his victory in Gabiene. Peithon, the Satrap of the Lower Indus,¹ a friend of Antigonos, who appointed him to the Satrapy of Babylon, had fallen at Gaza, and, out of a small kingdom on the Ganges, with its capital at Palibothra, Sandracottus was able to create a great empire, in which he incorporated the former possessions of Porus and Taxiles and almost all the valley of the Indus. War with Seleucos was inevitable. It seems to have lasted from 306 to 304, and to have been terminated by a friendly peace, sealed by a marriage.² Seleucos gave up the Indian provinces, and part of Aria, Arachosia, and Gedrosia. The Indus ceased to be the frontier of the Macedonian possessions.³ Sandracottus supplied his ally Seleucos with elephants.

The capital of the Seleucid state would naturally be placed somewhere near Babylon. That was the meeting-point of the routes radiating all over Asia, which had once carried Babylonian civilization everywhere, and must now carry Hellenic influence—northwards, by the valley of the two great rivers, to the plateau of Armenia, southwards to Ormuz and the Persian Gulf, eastwards over the Zagros Mountains to Iran, Bactriana, and India, and westwards across the deserts to the Orontes and the sea. About

¹ Satrap of the Lower Indus, despite Diod., xviii.39. Cf. Lehmann-Haupt., in CVII, s.v. "Satrap". For a contrary opinion, see CLXII, pp. 27 ff.

² Staehelin, *ibid.*, s.v. "Seleukos"; another interpretation in CLXII, p. 29.

³ Strabo, 624, confirmed by the Buddhist inscription of Asoka found at Jalalabad in the Kabul valley.

305,¹ Seleuceia began to rise on the site of Opis. Soon it would be the biggest Greek city in Asia.²

What would have been the fate of this Macedonian-Greek state, planted in the heart of the continent, if it had had no outlet on the Greek sea? It was in great danger of being absorbed by the Orient. The fall of Antigonus delivered it from that danger. Holding Northern Syria after Ipsus, Seleucos made it the true centre of his Empire, and, not far from Antigoneia, which he emptied of its inhabitants, he founded Antioch.

When the kingdom of Seleucos thus came into the circle of the great Mediterranean powers, its character and its position were transformed. Seleuceia on the Tigris and Antioch stood at the two ends of a "Royal Road" which ensured exchanges between West and East. It was a vital artery of the Seleucid state, making its unity and determining its mission as an intermediary between two worlds.³ The kingdom was thereby exposed to the rivalry of the Lagid kingdom, which was so well situated for attracting to itself all the traffic on the sea-routes to India, and, in addition, laid claim to Syria; but therein, too, lay the source of its prosperity and power. There would be a Seleucid Empire so long as the reigning house held these two essential points. When it was deprived of Mesopotamia by the Parthian invasion, it was no more than a little Syrian state, whose decline began almost at once. But in the days of its glory it extended its sway much further, along all the roads which branched off that main route, and the Seleucids long aspired to rule the whole of Asia.

Only seldom did they attain that ideal. When Seleucos Nicator fell by the dagger of Ceraunos, the edifice collapsed just as it was completed. The Gallic invasion, the struggles with Egypt, dynastic rivalries, and fratricidal wars brought on the dislocation of the Empire, and its history is far more often that of its dismemberment than that of its progress. In the West, the Bithynians inflicted a decisive defeat on the Strategoi of Antiochos I.⁴ Antiochos II intervened,

¹ Staehelin, *loc. cit.*

² Streck, in *CVII*, s.v. "Seleukeia".

³ G. Radet, in *XC*, 1918, pp. 801, 804.

⁴ Memn., 15 (FHG, iii, p. 534); *CLXII*, p. 586.

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no doubt, in the dynastic quarrel which broke out between Ziælas and Zipcetes¹ on the death of Nicomedes I, and his protégé Ziælas won the day, but Bithynia retained its independence. Seleucos II officially recognized that of Cappadocia, when he married his sister Stratonice to the heir apparent of the country, who afterwards became Ariarathes III.² At Pergamon, Philetæros was respectful, but Eumenes defeated Antiochos I at Sardis (261), and Attalos, who afterwards became King, at one time held all the Seleucid possessions north of the Tauros. Lastly, even if the Celtic invaders were defeated by Antiochos I in 270, they nevertheless established themselves in Greater Phrygia, which had nominally belonged to the Seleucid since the battle of Ipsus. The part of the country which they occupied, Galatia, was completely detached from the Empire.³ The rest was held by hereditary rulers who were vassals rather than subjects.

In the East,⁴ Diodotos, the Greek Satrap of Bactriana, struck coins which bear the image of Antiochos II, but also that of Zeus Promachos, the patron of the Diodotids, and took the title of King. From Parthia, we have coins of Andragoras, who may have been Alexander's Satrap or one of his successors, but seems to have affected the ways of a King. The danger was aggravated by the fact that Bactriana and Parthia remained the refuge of Asiatic nationalism. It was said that Zoroaster was a Bactrian. In Parthia, the inhabitants of which "came from Scythia, where the nomadic Iranians had mingled with heterogeneous tribes",⁵ separatist tendencies were favoured by a foreign invasion, that of the Parni or Aparni, of the tribe of the Dahæ. Arsaces, their leader, had, perhaps, first founded a small principality in Astavene, with Ashaak as its capital.⁶ His brother Tiridates (248-214) is said to have conquered the rest of Parthia and Hyrcania about 240, when Antiochos II

¹ Memn., 22 (FHG, iii, pp. 537 ff.) : CLXII, p. 83. Zipcetes, chosen by his father, was supported by Ptolemy, Antigonos Gonatas, Byzantion, Cios, and Heracleia, and Antiochos II was drawn into an unsuccessful war with Byzantion.

² Euseb., i, p. 251 ; Diod., xxix.19.6.

³ CLXIII, p. 40 n. 5.

⁴ Strabo, 515 ff. ; Just., xli.4 ; CLXII, pp. 85 ff. ; CLXIII, i, pp. 283 ff.

⁵ CCXXVII, pp. 104 ff.

⁶ Isid., 11 ; CLXIII, i, p. 285.

had his hands full with his war against Egypt, and later he is said to have defeated Seleucos II. His reign is the starting-point of the Arsacid era (14th April, 247).¹ "Ancestor-worship turned Arsaces into a god . . . At the same time, the dynasty was linked up with the Achæmenids by the story that the two brothers were sons of one Phriapites, son of Artaxerxes II."²

The "armed tour"³ which Antiochos III made in the Eastern part of his Empire between 212 and 204 restored at least the overlordship of the Seleucid, if not his direct rule, in those regions. The Parthians, who had been allied with Euthydemos, King of Bactra (222-187) since he had overthrown the dynasty of the Diodotids, had just invaded Media and taken Ecbatana. Antiochos collected considerable forces, commanded by experienced leaders. Through Commagene and Cappadocia he made his way towards Sophene. The King of that country, Xerxes, was besieged in Samosata and forced to make terms, only regaining his kingdom by submitting to Antiochos, whose sister he married.⁴ Antiochos is said to have subsequently had him killed and annexed Armenia.⁵ From there he marched into Media, and pillaged the Temple of Anaitis at Ecbatana⁶; then he went through Hyrcania, took Zadracarta, the capital, and compelled Artabanus (Arsaces III) to become his ally.⁷ Next, after forcing the crossing of the Arios, he laid siege to Bactra.⁸ After two years, Euthydemos came to terms. He was allowed the title of King, but Bactriana remained in the Empire; his son married the Seleucid's daughter. Then Antiochos set out for India.

Hitherto, relations between the Mauryas and Seleucids had been good. Sandracottus had been succeeded by Bindusara, whose son, Asoka Piyadasi, the propagator of Buddhism, boasted that he was the friend of the Kings of Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, and Cyrene. Asoka's son was King Jaloka, but it was Subhagasena that Antiochos met in the valley of the Kabul (Cophen). The Seleucid renewed

¹ CCXXVII, p. 104 n.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 104-5.

³ CLXII, pp. 157 ff.; CLXIII, ii, pp. 14 ff.

⁴ Polyb., viii.28.

⁵ John of Antioch, in FHG, iv, p. 537.

⁶ Polyb., x.27.

⁷ Polyb., x.28-31; Just., xli.5.7.

⁸ Polyb., x.49; xi.84.

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the alliance with India, and then, by Arachosia, Drangiana, and Carmania, he proceeded to winter quarters on the Persian Gulf.¹ An expedition to Gerrha in Arabia, the starting-point of the caravans which took the spices of India across the Arabian peninsula, and Tylos, the island of the pearl-dealers, was the occasion for accumulating masses of gifts.² He then returned to the centre of the Empire, after building an Antioch on the banks of the Eulæos, on the site of an Alexandria which had been destroyed by floods.³ This city was afterwards called Charax.

This reconstructive expedition won the King the name of the Great.⁴ His greatness was to be humbled, and almost crushed, by Rome. His successors never recovered it. But it is in the brief period in which it reached its full development that we must study the Empire of the Seleucids.

It was an immense, heterogenous Empire. "No Hellenistic monarchy presents such a variety of countries or such a motley patchwork of peoples. Next to Egypt, the Seleucid Empire embraced the most ancient and glorious centres of human civilization—Babylon, Susa, Jerusalem. It contained the ruins of Troy⁵ and the ruins of Nineveh. It was the strange common home of the most diverse forms of poetical and religious inspiration; the Psalms of David, the preaching of Zoroaster, and the epic of Homer were born under that radiant sky. The glory of Chaldæa belonged to it, and that of Ionia. In it a swarm of individual dominions lived again—merchant kingdoms, empires of warriors, and priestly states, the Lydia of Cræsus, the Media of Cyaxares, and the Judea of Solomon—but also the first universal dominion which had absorbed all the others—that of the Achæmenids. That fell to it with the inheritance of Alexander. Through the victor of Arbela, it continued the tradition of Darius and Cyrus."⁶

In so complex a world, the task of government was never easy, and it was perhaps harder for the Seleucids than for

¹ Polyb., x.34.11 ff.

² Polyb., xiii.9.

³ CXXIII, ii, p. 401; cf. Pliny, NH, vi.138. But see CXXIII, ii p. 13 n. 2.

⁴ In the course of 205; Holleaux, in LXXXV, 1908, p. 266; IX, 289.

⁵ At least under Seleucos I.

⁶ Radet, in XC, 1913, p. 800.

their forerunners. The Achæmenids based their power "on an inner force, strongly rooted in the heart of the Empire, the twin race of the Medes and Persians". The Seleucids were strangers in Asia. Alexander might hope to rule the East and the whole world by supporting himself on the Macedonian nation, whose country of origin was incorporated in his Empire. But Macedonia did not belong to the Seleucids. It was a reservoir of men and strength on which they could not draw for ever. All these Græco-Oriental monarchies lacked a national foundation. Nowhere was this lack more perceptible than in the great Asiatic monarchy. In the opinion of one of the most discerning modern historians of Hellenism, Seleucos was aware of this when, having made himself master of Asia, he tried to move the centre of his power back into his own country and to conquer the throne of Macedon.¹

The position of the Lagids was certainly much more favourable. Although strangers in Egypt—quite as much as the Seleucids in Asia—they had to deal with only one nation, whose soul was concentrated in the person of a god-king. With this god-king they were able to assimilate themselves by the second or third generation, by means of a skilful policy seconded by a powerful bureaucracy and the traditions of a people accustomed to obedience. But the Seleucid ruled a score of nations, differing in character and institutions. Like Ptolemy, he, too, governed the more or less autonomous Greek cities and the subject peoples according to different principles. But the subject peoples were different from one another, and each conceived the sovereignty of the King in its own way. The cities were far more numerous than in Egypt, and most were old states, wealthy and proud of a long past; their position on the shores of the Ægean was such that they were sometimes able to take advantage of the rivalries of the powers to obtain concessions and favours in payment for their submission.

Like the Ptolemies, and following the idea of Alexander, the Seleucids sought in the worship of the King the bond which should unite all their peoples in one monarchy. But the doctrine of the sacred power of kings varied from one people to another, and we do not quite know how the Seleucids

¹ Radet, *ibid.*, p. 301.

adapted themselves to it. Those doctrines had less force than in Egypt. The King was not a god, but he received his investiture from the gods, he was their vicar, or, as in Persia, their elected, he to whom Mithra and Anaitis gave the *hvareno*, the halo which adorned his brow and signified felicity and victory.¹ It is possible that the Seleucids were really *gods* only in the Hellenic cult which grew up in the cities, which they eventually organized.

Our information comes chiefly from the indications found in the Greek inscriptions. These are often very summary and commonplace, and historians are far from being agreed on the character of the royal religion. According to one view, the divinity of the Seleucids was more accentuated, so to speak, than that of the Ptolemies.² The latter were, in the native cult, only associates, *parhedroi*, of the Egyptian gods, and in the Hellenic cult they attained divinity only by association with the worship of the dead god Alexander. The Seleucid, on the contrary, was a god on his own account, was sometimes assimilated to one of the great gods; for example, he was Zeus Seleucos Nicator or Apollo Antiochos Soter. Other scholars think just the opposite.³ No doubt, they say, Ptolemy was only an associate in the temples of the country, but he was a living deity in the eyes of the natives, whereas the Seleucid was only a sacred person. It is quite true that in the Alexandrian cult the living King was associated with the dead Kings, but he was himself a god, *theos*, and was sometimes assimilated to a great god. The living Seleucid had his priests, but he was only treated as a king, βασιλεύς; he did not really become a god until after his death. Then he could bear the epithet *theos*, or, like a true god, be designated simply by his name.⁴

It is very difficult to decide this controversy, and, in the absence of evidence, one must confine oneself to noting certain facts. We know already that the first generation of Alexander's successors did not adopt the mystical concep-

¹ CCXXVII, p. 78; Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*, pp. 9, 94.

² Kornemann, in LVII, i, pp. 22 ff.; von Prott, LXVI, p. 467 ff.

³ Kaerst, in CXXIV, ii, pp. 24 ff.

⁴ Antiochos II was acclaimed as a god, *theos*, in his lifetime by the Milesians, but he assumed this epithet as a "surname". He was not the god Antiochos until after his death. CLXII, p. 467 n. 2. On these "surnames" see CLXII, pp. 610 ff.

tion of kingship formed by the conqueror. The Diadochi do not seem to have sought for divine honours themselves. That did not become necessary until later ; it was probably only the fourth Ptolemy who completed the organization of the royal cult in Egypt, and it was perhaps the third King, Antiochos Theos, who assumed the same rôle among the Seleucids.

But at an early date the cities of Asia Minor worshipped the Kings as benefactors or founders. Seleucos I was doubtless still alive when Ilion decided that the Gymnasiarch should sacrifice to the King every month, and that horse-races and gymnastic and musical contests should be held in his honour every four years.¹ Later, after his death, a festival named Seleuceia was observed at Erythræ, at the same time as Dionysia,² and a municipal worship of the Kings was organized in the Greek cities. Antiochos I had a priest at Ilion³ and gymnastic games at Bargylia.⁴ The Ionian cities celebrated his birthday, like Alexander's, and dedicated a *temenos*, a religious gathering, and a temple to him. Games were held in his honour and that of his son, Antiochos II, and Queen Stratonice.⁵ At Smyrna there was a temple of Aphrodite Stratoniceis, on which Seleucos II conferred the right of sanctuary.⁶ At Antioch in Persia, decrees were dated by the name of the priest of the Kings, dead and living,⁷ the priest of the living King, Seleucos IV Philopator, being distinct from the priest of the dead Kings.⁸ But the Kings were not content with accepting, and perhaps suggesting, the foundation of these honours and priesthoods ; at least, from Antiochos III onwards, we see signs of the organization of an imperial worship. In the capital of every Satrapy there were high-priests and high-priestesses of the deified Kings and Queens, and their names had to appear in the protocol of contracts.⁹

The Court of this god-king was very like that of the Lagid. Our documents have not preserved a complete list of the Court dignities, but those of which we hear—Friends, Chief Friends, Kinsmen, Somatophylaces¹⁰—are also found in

¹ IX, 212.

² X, 508.

³ IX, 219.

⁴ X, 457.

⁵ IX, 222.

⁶ IX, 228-9.

⁷ IX, 233.

⁸ IX, 245 ; cf. 246.

⁹ IX, 224 (inscr. of Durdurkar).

¹⁰ Somatophylax, not Archisomatophylax, as under the Lagids.

Alexandria. It is the same with the posts of the royal household—physicians, servants of the bedchamber, tutors, and companions of the young prince.¹ Like Ptolemy, the King had his Council, his Chief Minister, and his Secretariat, with the Hypomnematographos and Epistolographos. An inscription mentions the Diœcetes.² If we had more information, we could doubtless press the comparison still further. But for local government the conditions were very different, and the framework of the administration and provincial institutions, of which, outside the cities, we know very little, were certainly not the same as in Egypt.

Appian declares that the Seleucid Empire comprised seventy-two Satrapies.³ But its frontiers embraced not more than eighteen Satrapies of Alexander. Seleucos had certainly subdivided some of these old provinces—Syria, for instance, formed nine Satrapies—but he had kept most of them unaltered, and when we put together our evidence we can only make out about thirty Satrapies.⁴ Are we to accuse Appian of a bad mistake? Or shall we suppose, as has been suggested in the case of Antigonos One-eye, that the Satrapies had been divided into *Strategiai*, each under a Strategos, a civil and military governor, who was commonly called a Satrap, and that this led to a confusion in Appian? Herr Lehmann-Haupt, the last scholar who has discussed the question,⁵ does not admit this assimilation of the Strategos with the Satrap, at least in the Central Satrapies. He is certain that the official term designating

¹ CLXII, pp. 474 ff.; IX, 247, 256, 259.

² Schede, in LXVI, 1919, no. 13, p. 25, l. 17.

³ App., *Syr.*, 62.

⁴ Seleucid Satrapies (cf. CXVI, iii, 2, pp. 286 ff.; A. Corvatta, in CI, 1901, pp. 140–71): ASIA MINOR: 1, Lesser Phrygia; 2, Lydia; 3, Caria; 4, Greater Phrygia; 5, Cilicia. SYRIA: i, *Seleucid Syria*; 6, Antioch; 7, Pierian Seleuceia; 8, Apameia; 9, Laodiceia; ii, *Southern Syria* (from 197): 10, Coele-Syria; 11, Samaria; 12, Phœnicia; 13, Judea (Idumæa); iii: 14, Commagene. BEYOND EUPHRATES: 15, Mesopotamia; 16, Babylonia; 17, Parapotamia; 18, "Red Sea"; 19, Susiana. *Iranian Plateau*: 20, Persia; 21, Media with the principality of Atropatene; 22, Parthia; 23, Margiana; 24, Bactriana; 25, Sogdiana; 26, Paropamisadæ (in large part ceded to Sandracottus); 27, Gedrosia and Arachosia (partly ceded to Sandracottus); 28, Aria and Drangiana; 29, Carmania.

⁵ CVII, s.v. "Satrap".

the province was *Satrapy*. "Satrap" must, therefore, have been the proper title of the civil governor, while the competence of the Strategos was purely military. The two functions could in special cases be combined. But the Satrapies were subdivided into Hyparchies,¹ and the Hyparchs are sometimes called Satraps. In sum, at the head of the officials of the province stood the Satrap, the civil governor of the Satrapy; then came, in order of rank, the Strategos, the official in charge of finance (ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων), the Phurarch or fort-commandant, the high-priest of the royal cult, and, lastly, the Hyparch.

Unlike Egypt, Asia presents no uniformity in the territory controlled by the royal officials. The Royal Domain,² the χώρα βασιλική, was part of it, and in the 3rd century it seems to have been very extensive. It was cultivated by a serf population, the King's People (*laoi*, λαοὶ βασιλικοί), who may have been subject to a special jurisdiction.³ They were attached to the soil and could be sold with it. Like the Royal tenant-farmers in Egypt, they could not leave the town to which they belonged, and each town with its land seems to have formed a single unit. These peasants paid rent in kind or money. All matters connected with tribute and the working of the soil must have been in the hands of the stewards.⁴ Lands were entered in the register (*βασιλικαὶ γραφαί*),⁵ in which transfers were recorded, and these archives were kept by officials called Bibliophylaces.

By the side of this Royal Domain, which was administered directly and easily by the Satraps and their subordinates, there were in certain parts territories, often of enormous extent, held by peoples who were subject in name but almost autonomous in fact, or by nobles who, while recognizing a distant overlordship of the King, were practically sovereign rulers. There were, for example, in Phrygia, Armenia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, local nobles or Persian magnates who, from a fortified castle in the centre of their domains, ruled a people of slaves or serfs. In Phrygia, we find

¹ IX, 238 (p. 392).

² CCX, pp. 247 ff.

³ CCX, pp. 258 ff.

⁴ Haussoullier, in LXXXVI, 1901 p. 9.

⁵ IX, 225, l. 24; Wiegand, VI. Bericht, p. 36.

Eumenes,¹ after his victory over Crateros, selling several of these fortified properties (ἐπαύλεις καὶ τετραπυργίας) to his officers, who will have to take them by force of arms, but, if they win, will take the place of the former masters. In theory, the King must have maintained an eminent right over these possessions. Elsewhere—in Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, and several regions of Central Asia ; among the Uxians, for example—there were whole peoples, organized according to their own customs and laws, who recognized the authority of the Satraps only as a remote power. Lastly, there were the domains of the great temples, which were veritable religious principalities, with their populace of temple-slaves, worshippers, inspired persons (θεοφόρητοι), and sacred courtesans, and their periodical feasts and the fairs of which they were the occasion. Strabo, who describes several of these little priestly states, mentions an establishment of 6,000 temple-slaves of Ma-Bellona at Comana in Cappadocia, and another of 3,000 at Venasa, in the territory of Zeus Asbamæos.² He lays stress in general on the wealth and dignity of the priestly noble, who was often of royal birth and came next to the King, and indeed, in certain ceremonies in the “solemn outgoings of the God or Goddess”, wore the diadem. He was a sovereign lord on his own land, and enjoyed the revenue procured by the labour of a multitude of slaves or serfs (*laoi*).³

We see the conditions to which all rule in Asia is subject. The King's authority, far from being able to reach a uniform mass of subjects direct, is limited by a great variety of national institutions which are the traditions of peoples many of whom have long been independent. To rule the whole of Asia, the task of every central government must be to create “a system of obedience or vassalage applicable to the nations comprised in the Empire”. This system may be modified according to the ruler and the time. “The Achæmenid dominion, which was of a very pliant feudal type under Cyrus, assumed an administrative and fiscal form under

¹ Plut. *Eum.*, 8.

² Strabo, 537.

³ Above, p. 349. One may also mention the sanctuaries of Apollo at Dastarcon (Cataonia), Artemis Perasia at Castabala, Men Ascæos in Pisidia, Zeus Abrettenos in Mysia, the famous temple of Agdistis at Pessinus in Phrygia, that at Olbe in Cilicia, etc.

Darius which covered the nationalities but allowed them to survive." The Seleucids preferred the system of Darius. Like him, they substituted their Satraps for the native rulers or set them over them. "But they were often compelled by the very nature of things to return to the system of Cyrus and to be content with a more or less loose overlordship."¹ We have seen that this was the course which Antiochos III adopted in the East.

Among the peoples subject to the Seleucids, the Greek cities, and particularly those of Asia Minor, formed an important group. Without doubt, their position inside the Empire itself was an advantage to a Hellenizing dynasty. The west coast of Asia was like another Greece. It had seen the glory of the ancient civilization of Ionia, and the Kings could obtain there, in the activity of the Greek genius, all the resources needed for the organization and civilization of their Eastern realm. Their Lagid rivals, who had so many other advantages, were obliged to attract Greek immigrants to Egypt, and to encourage this by establishing a hegemony in Greek lands. They therefore had to compete both with the Seleucid for the coast towns and with Macedonia for the Archipelago, whereas the Seleucids had no need to go outside Asia.

There were other reasons why they should be anxious to hold the coast. They needed a free outlet to the trade-routes which came over their domains from the Far East. Also, in the interest of their very supremacy, they did not want their opponents to secure a footing in the kingdom by taking Greek cities under their dominion or protection.

It is not surprising, then, that they sought the favour of the Greek cities. The inscriptions reveal a perpetual exchange of courtesies. The Kings present cities with monuments and their temples with privileges and revenues; the cities vote statues, crowns, and feasts in honour of the Kings. Seleucos I,² who wished people to forget the favours of

¹ Radet, in *XC*, 1918, *loc. cit.*

² Miletos: offerings to the Temple of Apollo at Didyma, *IX*, 214; dedication of a statue of the King, *IX*, 744; decrees proposed by Deodamas (a soldier and historian who led an expedition of discovery among the Scythians of the Jaxartes for Seleucos) in honour of Antiochos who had presented the city with a portico, *IX*, 218, and of the Queen Mother Apama, *LIII*, 1908, p. 18 (Wiegand). See also *IX*, 212, 215, for Ilion and Priene.

Lysimachos and, still more, the phil-Hellenism of Antigonos, Antiochos I,¹ whose early years were very difficult, Seleucos II, who owed the restoration of his dominion in Asia Minor largely to the reaction in the Greek cities which followed the rule of the Ptolemies,² and Antiochos III,³ engaged in the heavy task of restoring the dislocated Empire, all frequently showed themselves generous, and their successors kept up the tradition. Their generosity could not go to the length of renouncing all authority, but, as always, it is almost impossible to define exactly the borderline between the liberties of the cities and the rights of the King.

That line must have varied with the King, city, and circumstances. But, since we find Kings granting certain cities autonomy, financial exemption, and *asylia* (immunity from the interference of the royal police inside the territory of the city), it is clear that not all cities enjoyed these privileges, and that even those to which they were granted had not always had them. Yet, on the whole, one has the impression that the Seleucids' control of the Greek cities of Asia was less strict than that of the Ptolemies,⁴ and the principles which they followed in their policy of Hellenization were much more favourable to the institutions of the city.

¹ At the time of his peace with Antigonos Gonatas (*cf.* above, p. 180), and after the repression of the disorders in Seleucid Syria, Ilion bestowed great honours on him; **IX**, 219, but *cf.* below, n. 3. Autonomy and financial exemption for Erythræ, **IX**, 225; liberty and democracy for Smyrna, **IX**, 229; honours decreed by Bargylia, **X**, 457; liberty and democracy for the Ionian cities, **IX**, 222. See also 223 (Erythræ), 220, etc.

² Antiochos II restores democracy at Miletos, **IX**, 226. Seleucos II, **IX**, 227-8. Antiochos III: *asylia* and democracy for Alabanda (Antioch of the Chrysaorians, between 205 and 196), **X**, 234; favours to Amyzon which left Ptolemy's cause for his (about 203), Wilhelm, in *Anz. Akad. Wien*, July, 1920; to win over Xanthos (about 197), he gives it freedom, dedicating it to Leto and Apollo, **IX**, 746.

³ **IX**, 219, may date from Antiochos III; see Sokoloff, in **LVII**, 1904, pp. 101-10. Decree of Iasos, **IX**, 237; after Cynoscephalæ Iasos goes from Philip V to Antiochos, who gives it autonomy and democracy.

⁴ It did not prevent them from interfering in internal administration. *Cf. e.g.* **IX**, 281-2.

III

THE HELLENIZATION OF SELEUCID ASIA

The Seleucids were great founders of cities, especially the first of the line. Appian,¹ without pretending to give a complete list, enumerates sixty cities which he built all over the Empire, and his successors followed his example. Syria was covered with Greek cities. This work of colonization had already been started by Antigonos. Before Antioch, there was Antigoneia. The same King² has also been credited with the foundation of Pella, which later became Apameia, Alexandria near Issos (Alexandretta), and in the South, in the region afterwards called the Dodecapolis, of Pella, Dion, and Gadara, the home of the poet Meleagros.

Under the Seleucids, four great cities arose, the capitals of four Satrapies—Antioch, Seleuceia, Apameia, and Laodiceia. Antioch was the capital of the whole Empire, but not its largest Greek city, being smaller than Seleuceia on the Tigris. It was named after Seleucos's father, and was called Antioch on the Orontes, or the Axios³ (for the Orontes had been given a Macedonian name), and sometimes Antioch by Daphne,⁴ so great was the renown, all the world over, of that delightful suburb, with its sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis, its groves, protected by special laws,⁵ and its running waters.

The city⁶ was built in the plain, south of the Orontes, between the river and Mount Silpios. It ran chiefly east and west. On the north, its ramparts barely came down to the river. On the south, it did not at the beginning reach the foot of the hills, from the steep ravines of which the water might suddenly come down in torrents. The rock-tombs of the city cemetery spread as far as Mount Stavrin on the east of Silpios and divided from it by the gorge of the Iron Gates.⁷ On these slopes, sculptured in the rock, by the side of an upright figure, is the strange colossal head which seems

¹ App., *Syr.*, 57 ff.

² CXVI, iii, 1, p. 263.

³ CXVI, iii, 1, p. 294 n. 8.

⁴ Strabo, 719, 759; Pliny, NH, v.76 or 79.

⁵ Procop., *Bell. Pers.*, ii.14; Liban., *Antioch.*, i, 301.

⁶ Benzinger, in CVII, s.v. "Antiocheia", and esp. R. Förster, in *Jahrb. d. K. Deutsch. Archäol. Inst.*, xii (1897), pp. 103-49.

⁷ E. Renan, in LXXXIV, 1865, p. 308; Förster, *loc. cit.*, p. 118.

to contemplate the city. According to a legend related by Malalas,¹ this was a face of Charon, the Charoneion, dedicated during an epidemic in the reign of Antiochos Epiphanes.²

Antioch was not populated all at once. Seleucos I transported the inhabitants of Antigoneia there, 5,800 in number, as a beginning. Then he installed Macedonians and Greeks from Heracleia, and, later, the Argive settlers from Iopolis and the Cretans and Cypriots from Acropolis, two places on the neighbouring mountain.³ Thus two quarters were constituted. Seleucos II and Antiochos the Great after him⁴ founded a third, the "New Town", on an island in the river, and Antiochos Epiphanes built a fourth, on the Silpios side, which was called Epiphaneia. Each quarter was surrounded by ramparts, and Strabo calls the city a "tetrapolis". Antiochos Epiphanes built a circuit-wall round the whole.⁵

It is difficult to form an idea of Seleucid Antioch. The city has never been methodically excavated. The few monuments of which traces remain are all of Imperial times, as are those described by travellers. The two great colonnaded streets of Epiphaneia, copied from those of Alexandria, seem to have been begun only by Tiberius. Those of the island quarter also date from the Roman domination.⁶

The population consisted of Greeks and Syrians. There were many Jews. Like those of Alexandria, they enjoyed privileges, and Josephus declares that Nicator gave them the same rights as the Greeks.⁷ The Greeks were divided into eighteen demes, and had their deliberative assemblies.

No doubt, the human spirit does not owe so much to Antioch as to Pergamon, let alone Alexandria. It was less

¹ Malalas, p. 205, 8 (Bonn). On Malalas and his source, John of Antioch, see Förster, *loc. cit.*, p. 105.

² Perdrizet and Fossey, in **LXXXV**, 1897, pp. 78-85 and pl., regard the Charoneion as a head of Attis and the other figure as Mithra, with some probability. They are probably works of the Roman period. On the legend related by Malalas, see *ibid.*, p. 84 n. 1.

³ Förster, *loc. cit.*, pp. 114 ff.

⁴ Seleucos II, according to Strabo, 750; Antiochos III, according to Libanius, p. 110 (Ars). Cf. Förster, *loc. cit.*, p. 116.

⁵ Strabo, *loc. cit.* Cf. Förster, *loc. cit.*, pp. 118-21.

⁶ Förster, *loc. cit.*, pp. 121-5. Roman Antioch is admirably described by Renan, *Les Apôtres*, pp. 215 ff.

⁷ *Antiq.*, xii.119 ff.; *Bell. Jud.*, vii.8.8.; 5.2.; *Apion*, ii.4.



THE FORTUNE OF ANTIOCH

After the statue by Eutychides
(Vatican Museum)

a city of learning and literature than a centre of amusement and luxury. But it was also a centre of religious effervescence, and it was embellished by art. Bryaxis had carved the Apollo of Daphne.¹ Eutyichides, a pupil of Lysippos, was the author of the Fortune of Antioch, the colossal statue which became the prototype of countless figures of cities. The goddess is represented with a mural crown on her head, while a river-god swims at her feet; he is the Orontes, bathing the ramparts of the city.²

Seleuceia,³ the great Syrian port of the Empire, was perhaps intended by its founder to become the capital. Diodorus⁴ says that this was the city which was filled with the inhabitants of Antigoneia. There stood the Nicatoreion, the tomb of Seleucos I. As at Antioch, there had been earlier Greek settlements at Seleuceia, and the old quarters were called Palæopolis. The town stood on the bank of the Orontes, in a very strong position on the northern bastion of Coryphæon, which dominates the whole country, not far from a steep ravine. It spread down the western slopes in terraces to the sea. The Macedonian place-name Pieria was given to this region.

Further south than Seleuceia, Laodiceia, called after the mother of Seleucos I, was also "a most beautifully built city with a good harbour".⁵ The mountain-side behind the city was covered with vineyards, and the wine harvested was largely exported and sold to Alexandria. Beyond the mountain, which presented a steeper side to the valley of the Orontes, there stood, on a hill surrounded by river, lake, and swamp, in the midst of fertile meadows where masses of cattle grazed, mighty Apameia,⁶ garrison, arsenal, horse-farm, and depot of the five hundred elephants which the Kings obtained from India. It bore the name of the Persian princess who had become Seleucos's wife at the Susa

¹ C. Robert, in *CVII*, s.v. "Bryaxis".

² Replica in the Vatican. Brunn-Bruckmann, *Denkmäler*, pl. 154. Cf. M. Collignon, *Sculpture grecque*, pp. 485-6; Förster, *loc. cit.*, pp. 145-9.

³ V. Chapot, in *Mém. de la Soc. des Antiquaires*, 7th ser., vi (1906), pp. 149-226; Ruge, in *CVII*, s.v. "Seleukeia"; Strabo, cc. 750-1; Polyb., v.59-60.

⁴ Diod., xx.48.

⁵ Strabo, 751-2; App., *Syr.*, 58; Steph. Byz., s.v.; Malalas, pp. 199, 202 ff. (Bonn).

⁶ Strabo, 752 ff.; Malalas, p. 208 (Bonn).

marriages and reigned with him. In the time of Antigonos, and perhaps, too, of Alexander, when it was still called Pella, it was a mere colony of Macedonian veterans.

The plateau south of the Tauros and Commagene, which connects the valley of the Orontes with Mesopotamia, had taken from the city of Cyrrhos the name of Cyrrhestice. From Antioch one could go by Cyrrhos to another Seleuceia,¹ connected by a bridge over the Euphrates with another Apameia, Apameia of the Bridge, or simply Zeugma. The old military road which ended, a little to the south, at the old Hittite city of Carchemish (now Jerablus), must have run part of the way with the Zeugma road. Carchemish had become Hellenized and had received the Macedonian name of Europos,² after the native town of Seleucos I. One could go by Berœa (Aleppo) to Barbalissos, or by Chalcis to the old ford of Thapsacos, which became Amphipolis. From Palmyra, a caravan-route ran to Dura on the Euphrates, and there Nicanor, one of Alexander's Companions, the man whom Antigonos sent to fight Seleucos in 312, had already founded a Macedonian colony, which was also named Europos³ (now Salahiyah). It stood on the left bank of the river, in the region known as Parapotamia.⁴ So Syria became a "new Macedon". Cities with Greek and Macedonian names abounded on all sides, but we do not always know where to place them. So it is with Seleuceia on the Belos⁵ and many others. Appian mentions, for example, Larissa, Maroneia, Arethusa, and Leucas.

There were as many in Mesopotamia. On the Euphrates one should also mention Nicephorion,⁶ which may be the same as Callinicon, founded by Seleucos II. In the interior of the country which afterwards became Osrhoëne was Edessa,⁷ which was called Antioch near Callirhoë, with the significant epithet of Mixobarbaros, and in the district

¹ Ruge, in *CVII*, s.v.

² Benzinger, *ibid.*, s.v. "Europos".

³ Haussoullier, in *Rev. hist. de Droit français et étranger*, 1923, pp. 526 ff.

⁴ Strabo, 753; Polyb., v.48.16; Isid., Charax, 1 (FHG, i, p. 247, 1). These texts place the region called Parapotamia.

⁵ Dussaud, in Lammens, *L'Orient chrétien*, viii, 314 ff.; Ruge, in *CVII*, s.v.

⁶ Strabo, 747.

⁷ E. Meyer, in *CVII*, s.v. "Edessa".

with the Macedonian name of Mygdonia was Nisibis,¹ which also was an Antioch. Nicanor had built another Antioch in the Arab country;² on the Tigris was Apollonia, in Apolloniatis, not far from Sittace, from which the region would afterwards get the name of Sittacene. Sittacene contained an Apameia.³ Ctesiphon was still only a camp.⁴ Its greatness came in the time of the Parthian Kings, who made it their capital. In the south, nearer the Persian Gulf, a few other cities have left a name in our mutilated tradition—Apameia in Mesene,⁵ which is placed at the point where the Tigris splits into two arms, Seleuceia by the "Red Sea",⁶ Antioch Charax.⁷ But Seleuceia on the Tigris, not far from Ctesiphon, outshone them all in beauty and glory.⁸

Since the foundation of Antioch on the Orontes, it had been the second city of the Empire; but it was the larger of the two until the 1st century of our era.⁹ Admirably situated at the point where the two great rivers come closest together, at the meeting of the roads from the Mediterranean and from Iran, it very rapidly became prosperous, and Strabo, who places it next to Alexandria, estimates the population at 600,000. It was the capital of the Eastern part of the Empire, and the Heir Apparent resided there when, like Antiochos I, he was acting as viceroy. It had been built with the materials of Babylon, and in part filled with the population of the great Semitic city, which thenceforward declined steadily, as the Greek Kings doubtless intended. The ruins, which have still been but little explored, prove that the city must have been very well built. The remains of the high circuit-wall, of fine Hellenistic masonry resting on foundations of Babylonian brick, and defended by moats and canals, give a high notion of the Seleucid architects.

The population was perhaps more mixed than that of Antioch. The Greeks dominated, if not by their number, at least by the influence of their civilization. Not only Greek art flourished, but Greek science, even when the city

¹ Strabo, 747; Steph. Byz., s.v.; Pliny, NH, vi.42.

² Pliny, NH, vi.117.

³ *Ibid.*, vi.182.

⁴ Polyb., v.45.4.

⁵ Steph. Byz., s.v.; Pliny, NH, vi.129; cf. Schwartz, in VI, pp. 171 ff.; IX, 238 n. 45. But cf. CXVI, iii, 2, p. 292 n.

⁶ IX, 238, 105.

⁷ Pliny, NH, vi.139.

⁸ Above, pp. 150-1.

⁹ Streck, in CVII, s.v.

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came under the sway of the Arsacids. With Diogenes, called the Babylonian, but really hailing from Seleuceia, and his successor Apollodoros, it was a centre of Stoic philosophy. Diogenes the Epicurean and Euphranor the Sceptic taught there, and about 170 the astronomer Seleucos was born there, the only "Copernican" of antiquity except Aristarchos of Samos.¹ But the Asiatic population was also very numerous. There were Syrians, Parthians, Persians, Armenians, and even Indians. The Jews were attracted to the city in great numbers, and anti-Semitism gave rise to disorders there as in Antioch and Alexandria.²

We know little of the constitution of the city. In the time of the Parthians it had a Council of 300, an Assembly of the people, and Prytanen. These institutions must have come down from the Seleucid period. But at that time the city had also an Epistates, or governor.³ Polybius speaks of the Adeiganes,⁴ who were banished by Hermias, the minister of Antiochos the Great. What does this word mean? The etymology is uncertain. Were the Adeiganes an aristocratic family, or a political faction, or a body of magistrates? We have not the faintest idea. The Parthian King Mithradates I (171-138) took Seleuceia from the Macedonian Kings. Antiochos VII (138-129) recovered it, but only for a short time.

On the Iranian plateau the colonizing activity of the Seleucids has left fewer traces. But Greek cities were not wanting. In Media,⁵ Rhagæ became Europos,⁶ and we find an Apameia near the Caspian Gates and a Laodiceia on the Persian border. Achaïs had taken the place of Alexander's Heracleia, destroyed by the barbarians. In Parthia, Appian mentions Soteira, Calliope, Charis, Hecatompilos, and Achæa.⁷ In Susiana, Susa became Seleuceia on the Eulæos.⁸ In Persia, Antiochos I founded or enlarged Antioch (perhaps

¹ We know what influence Babylonian astronomy and astrology had. Under Antiochos IV even Babylon was Hellenized.

² Joseph., *Antiq.*, xviii.9.8. (378 Naber).

³ Polyb., v.48.12.

⁴ Polyb., v.54.10.

⁵ Polyb., x.27.3.

⁶ Strabo, 524.

⁷ *Syr.*, 57; Pliny, *NH*, vi.48; Strabo, 516.

⁸ *IX*, 233, l. 108 and n. 47. But cf. *OVII*, s.v. "Seleukeia".

Persepolis), settling it with colonists from Magnesia on the Mæander.¹ In the oasis of Merv, the same Antiochos founded Antioch in Margiana.² According to Appian, there was an Alexandropolis in India, and the old road-map of the Roman Empire known as the Peutinger Table, which dates from the 5th century of our era, gives, south of the Ganges delta (near Pippli or Baleswara), an Antioch Tharmata, which may have been a Greek "factory".³

Moreover, the Seleucids were not content with creating Greek cities in regions where there were none before. They founded them even in Asia Minor. There Seleuceias and Antiochs abound. There were, for example, Seleuceia on the Calycadnos in Cilicia (Selefkeh), Seleuceia in Pamphylia, between Side and the mouths of the Eurymedon (north of Chaichi), and Iron Seleuceia in Pisidia (Selef, near Bayad).⁴ Mopsuestia became Seleuceia; Tarsos and Adana received the name of Antioch,⁵ and there was another Antioch on the Pyramos;⁶ Celænæ in Phrygia became Apameia;⁷ quite near, one finds Laodiceia on the Lycos;⁸ and in Caria there were Stratoniceia, Antioch on the Mæander,⁹ and Antioch of the Chrysaorians, the old Alabanda.¹⁰

Many though the cities were, vast regions of that vast Empire of the Seleucids remained outside their territories. By what means did the Kings endeavour to spread Hellenism in them? We do not know at all. Were there in Asia, as we have reason to suspect in Egypt, Hellenic communities distributed about the country and not attached to cities, Greeks who, without being citizens, nevertheless enjoyed a privileged status? That is a question which one cannot answer. But we can see some of the principles underlying the concession of land from the Royal Domain, and we can say that the policy of the Seleucids was far more favourable

¹ IX, 281 n. 4, 238. In Persia one finds, as early as the 3rd century, a national dynasty in the neighbourhood of Persepolis. It remained attached to Zoroastrianism. In the middle of the 2nd century it was the vassal of the Arsacids. Meyer, *Blüte u. Niedergang*, pp. 83-5.

² Strabo, 516; Pliny, NH, vi.47; Tomaschek, in CVII, s.v. "Antiocheia".

³ Tomaschek, in CVII, s.v.

⁴ Ruge, in CVII, s.v.

⁵ CKVI, iii, 1, p. 268; Hirschfeld, in CVII, s.v., 17 and 19.

⁶ CVII, s.v., 18.

⁷ Strabo, 579.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 660; Steph. Byz., s.v.

⁹ CVII, s.v., 16.

¹⁰ Holleaux, in LXXXVII, 1899, p. 845.

to the enlargement and multiplication of cities than that of the Lagids.¹

Antiochos I, for example, sells to Pitane a portion of Royal Land, which becomes the property (*παγκτητικὴ κυρεία*) of the city;² and when a King sells or cedes land to an individual, we sometimes find that the land thus detached from the Royal Domain has to be attached to a neighbouring city, to be chosen by the beneficiary or acquirer. In return, the city grants the latter at least a part of the rights of a citizen. Thus, Antiochos II sells to Queen Laodice, his wife, an estate which comprises whole villages, with authorization to alienate it.³ But, whether the property remains in her hands or not, it must be attached to the territory of a city. It is the same with 2,000 *plethra* of plough-land which Antiochos I concedes to Aristodicos of Assos,⁴ who is allowed to choose between Ilion and Scepsis and chooses Ilion. But it must not be supposed that the Kings intended to distribute all their domain in this way among an ever-increasing multitude of little Greek republics; when they conceded land, they did not always require the new possessor to incorporate it in the domain of one of these republics. This seems to be proved by the case of the same Aristodicos, who, in addition to his 2,000 *plethra*, receives 1,500 others, which are not subject to that condition. We cannot compare these 1,500 *plethra* to the Egyptian *dorea*, which remains the property of the King, and reverts to him on the death of the beneficiary; but one is reminded of certain assignments or sales under the Ptolemies, which were intended to create private possession, with the difference that the Lagids seem to have been more careful to maintain their eminent right over all the land.

Like the Lagids, the Seleucids made use of their Royal Domain to develop military colonization. But we know little about the Seleucid army. Armament, tactics, and the organization of formations and of the command cannot have been very different from those of other armies of the time.⁵ For recruiting, the Seleucids resorted to mercenaries and to native troops. But was there, as in Egypt, a regular

¹ CCXI, pp. 247 ff.

² XI, 235, l. 133.

³ IX, 225; and Wiegand, in *VI. Bericht*, 1908, p. 86.

⁴ IX, 221.

⁵ CLXIII, ii, pp. 284 ff.

Macedonian-Greek army, composed of cleruch soldiers who received an allotment of land detached from the Royal Domain? We find many military colonies in the Seleucid Empire. But historians are generally inclined to regard these as colonies of veterans.¹ This is, I think, an error, if "veteran" is taken in the sense of a retired soldier. They were mobilizable troops, and the Kings mobilized them. But these colonies, instead of consisting of allotments scattered about the country, as in Egypt, seem to have been grouped in settlements, *κατοικίαι*, which often took the form of a town. Sometimes the colonists were collected in towns already existing, and there constituted a category of domiciled persons. Sometimes they may have received citizenship. In any case, it did happen that their allotments of land were attached to the territory of a city, and villages of soldiers could be eventually raised to the rank of cities, *πόλεις*. Many cities owed their origin to military colonies.

Greek institutions and habits survived unadulterated in the cities, old and new. That is proved abundantly by the Greek inscriptions of Asia Minor. A fragment of parchment found at Dura, which has preserved the text of a law on inheritances, shows that the laws of that city, even under the Parthians, had remained purely Greek²—the laws, that is to say, to which the citizens were subject, for the natives who lived in the territory kept their own customs, and these natives must have been numerous. Often they had to cultivate the lands of the city as *laoi*. When a royal domain is made over by gift or sale to an individual, all the *laoi* are made over with the domain, and if it is attached to a city, these people are added to the *laoi* of the city. But between this serf class and citizens there were certainly Asiatics who enjoyed more favourable treatment—for example, as domiciled aliens. Many even obtained the citizenship. In accordance with the principle which we have observed in Egypt, culture was taken more into account than race, and Hellenic culture could be acquired in the gymnasium, and confirmed by the Ephebeia, which may perhaps have made a youth eligible for citizenship. Besides,

¹ *OLXII*, pp. 476 ff.; Schulten, in *LIX*, pp. 523-37.

² Haussoullier, in *XOII*, 1923, 515 ff.

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the Kings could step in, as in Egypt, at least in certain cities, and supervise naturalizations through the *Ephebeia* and gymnasium. At Halicarnassos, for example, the King's authorization is needed to build a new gymnasium.¹ In any case, it must certainly have been through the admission of the native to political life that a mixed population was formed, like that whose existence and importance we have observed in Egypt. Without it, although there would have been Greeks established in Asia, there could be no Hellenization of Asia. Unfortunately, we know almost nothing of the laws, doubtless complicated and variable, which governed the scale of rank and mutual relations of these racial and social classes. It is clear that, as in Egypt, these relations exposed the Hellenes to Oriental influence. M. Cumont had observed,² in the inscriptions of Dura (Salahiyah), the existence of marriages between close relations, and particularly between half-brothers and sisters, and he attributes their frequency to the influence of Asiatic environment and ideas. The religions of the East had always had a great influence on the Greeks of Asia. Many cults, even in the Greek cities, were simply Oriental cults. Here, as elsewhere, Hellenism deteriorated as it spread.

IV

THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS. THE EBB OF HELLENISM

The Hellenization of Seleucid Asia was mainly the work of the first Kings. After the defeat of Antiochos III by the Romans, the Empire fell to pieces. The treaty of Apameia had deprived it of all its possessions north of the Tauros, and in Asia Minor Eumenes of Pergamon was now the most powerful sovereign. When Seleucos IV (186-175) died, probably murdered, it was Eumenes who, to put an end to the disorders, enthroned Antiochos IV as his successor (175-164). Antiochos IV was the last King who showed any political initiative abroad. We know how he took advantage of divisions in the Lagid house to attempt the conquest of Egypt, when the Romans were busy with their

¹ IX, 46 n 3. The King in question is, it is true, a Ptolemy.

² LXXXIV, 1924, pp. 53 ff.

war against Perseus.¹ After that, the Seleucids had too much to do in their own kingdom, trying to keep hold of the provinces which were slipping away. Henceforward their history is that of the ebb of Hellenism in the East.

Yet, for almost fifty years more, we see Greek civilization making surprising progress at the ends of the earth. For it was supported by the Kings of Bactriana. Demetrios, the son of Euthydemos and son-in-law and ally of Antiochos III,² was earning his surname of Invincible, fighting southwards to the Himalaya and the mouths of the Indus, and northwards to the country of the Seres (Chinese) and of the Phrynæ or Faunians, who are the Huns. The Punjab was again opened to Hellenism. Sangala became Euthydeameia, and in Arachosia, which, with Gedrosia, was annexed to Bactriana, we hear of a Demetrias. It is true that, about 175, Demetrios was overthrown by the usurper Eucratidas, but, while the latter reigned in Bactriana, the Invincible kept his Indian kingdom.

The Seleucids did not cover themselves with such glory. Antiochos IV died during an unsuccessful expedition against Artaxias, who had made himself independent in Armenia, as Zadraspis had done in Sophene. Under Demetrios I Soter (162-145), Media and Commagene broke away from the Empire. Finally, the dynasty was to break its strength in dissensions at home and in an implacable conflict with the Jews.

The Jews were already dispersed over almost all the East, at least "in the vast triangle between Babylon, Ephesos, and Alexandria, and even in Cyrenaica",³ and the Lagids, like the Seleucids, had had to deal with the Jewish question. In Egypt, except in certain times of crisis, under Philopator and again under Euergetes II, they had been allowed privileges, so that they might be able to observe their Law, and on the whole the Ptolemies had not too much difficulty with Alexandrian Jewry, which was so much Hellenized that it could hardly speak anything but Greek.⁴ The earliest Seleucids showed the same tolerance. But in Syria there were Judea and the Temple of Jerusalem. This was an impregnable stronghold. Yet the region was surrounded

¹ See above, pp. 254-5.

² CLXII, p. 286.

³ Above, p. 357.

⁴ Above, pp. 344-5.

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by Greek and Græcized cities, which spread "the tolerant and sceptical spirit of Hellenism" even in the Holy Land. On the Phœnician coast were Anthedon, Gaza, Ascalon, Azotos, Apollonia, and Ptolemaïs; in the East were Damascus and Philadelphæia; in the South were a Seleuceia, Philoteria, Hippos, Gadara, Dion, and Pella.¹ The aristocracy of Jerusalem, even the priestly aristocracy, had become Hellenized, but there was a strong party of puritans, the Assideans (*Hasidim*, "Pious"), who clung to the Law, its meticulous practices, and the promises of their God with an obstinacy incomprehensible to other peoples. So the antagonism between two irreconcilable civilizations invested the resistance of the Jews with a peculiar bitterness, which was so unconceivable to the Kings and their Greek subjects that they were filled with an even greater hatred for those whom they accused of hating the whole of mankind. We know what effect these events had on the religious thought of Israel. They represent the most serious set-back in the history of Hellenism. They contributed greatly to the downfall of the Seleucid power. Inside the ever-shrinking state of the Seleucids, they brought about the formation of a priestly state, which grew steadily and survived the fall of the dynasty. The Seleucids bequeathed to the Romans the Jewish problem, whole and undiminished.²

War was promoted and brought on by the rapacity of the Kings, who were short of money and knew that the Temple was very wealthy, by the intriguing spirit of priestly families, Oniads and Tubiads, who sought the King's support for their rival ambitions, and by the fear which the Assideans inspired in the Hellenized Jews, who saw no effective protection but in the royal power. It began under Seleucos IV, whose coffers had been drained by the war-indemnity which the Romans had made him pay. On the advice of a steward of the Temple, an enemy of the High Priest Onias III, he ordered his agent Heliodoros to seize the sacred treasures and to take them to Antioch. According to Jewish tradition, Heliodoros was scourged by the angels. The conflict took

¹ CLXII, p. 237.

² This is not the place for an account of that dramatic struggle. It will be found in vol. v of Renan's *Histoire du Peuple d'Israel*, and in CLXII, pp. 262 ff., 319 ff., etc.

on its true form when Antiochos IV tried to impose Hellenism by force, and to put down the worship of Jehovah. We know how Judas Maccabeus defeated three royal armies in succession (battle of Modin). Under Antiochos V, the minister Lysias managed to take Jerusalem and dismantled it, but he had to allow the Jews to perform their worship freely. Under Demetrios I, Judas fell, and his son Jonathan was obliged to flee to Michmash. But they were only put down for a time.

It was easy for Jonathan to profit by the conflicts which rent the reigning house, and to make different pretenders pay for his support. In turn he supported Alexander Balas against Demetrios I, Demetrios II against Diodotos, who had revolted, and then Diodotos against Demetrios, two of whose generals he defeated at the battles of Hazor and Epiphaneia. It is true that Diodotos caused him to be killed, but his brother Simon declared for Demetrios II, who recognized the independence of the Jews, so that, about 143, the West of the Empire was divided. Demetrios reigned in Cilicia, while Diodotos and Antiochos VI, a son of Balas, were at Antioch. The Jews remained masters of Southern Syria. Now, it was just at this time that the Parthians took possession of the whole East, which had been thrown into confusion by barbarian invasions.

Almost our only information about these invasions comes from the narrative of the Chinese ambassador Chang-Kien. About 177, the Hiung-Nu, or Huns, drove the Yue-Chi southwards. The Yue-Chi, who are probably the Tocharians of the classical writers, fell upon Eastern Turkestan and drove out the Sse, that is, the Sacæ, who, crossing the mountains, invaded the valley of the Cophen, from which the Greeks were expelled. Meanwhile the Yue-Chi, pressed by the Ussun, descended on the Ta-hia, that is, Bactriana. The Greek kingdom, being also hard pressed by the Parthians, vanished, and in the Far East the sole surviving centre of Greek civilization lay in the Indus valley.

The Parthians advanced their power rapidly under Mithradates I (171-188 or 174-186). He conquered Media, Persia, Susiana, and Mesopotamia as far as Seleuceia (145), which he made his capital. The Seleucids were the natural protectors of Hellenism, and it was their provinces that the

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Parthians seized. The Greeks of these regions called upon Demetrios II, but he was defeated and taken prisoner (140-139).

Syria was falling into anarchy. Diodotos, after killing Antiochos IV, had proclaimed himself King. Revolts broke out on every side. But Demetrios II had a brother, Antiochos VII Sidetes, who hastened up from Rhodes, where he lived, and took up the cause of his house. The wife of Demetrios, the ambitious Cleopatra Thea, Ptolemy Philometor's daughter, made the new King marry her. Then, in alliance with the Jews, he managed to rid himself of Diodotos (138) and brought what was left of the kingdom under his sway. It was about this time that Sames founded an independent kingdom of Commagene at Samosata, and in Osrhoëne Edessa became a kingdom under a line of kings bearing the names of Osrhoës and Abgarus.

But the chief problems before Antiochos VII were the Jewish and Parthian questions. He quarrelled with the Jews, who were seeking the protection of Rome, and laid siege to Jerusalem. Hyrcanus surrendered and Jerusalem was dismantled, but the Jews kept their laws and religion, and Antiochos was content with a payment of tribute (132). He was less successful against the Parthians. At first he was victorious, and recovered almost the whole of Mesopotamia from Phraates II, who had succeeded Mithradates, but he was then defeated and killed, although the Parthian King allowed Demetrios II to escape (129).

So Demetrios reigned a second time, but over a diminished and divided kingdom, in which he soon had the whole world against him. While the Jewish state continued to increase, Demetrios wished to make an attempt on Egypt, in support of Cleopatra II, who had quarrelled with her brother Euergetes II; but Antioch rose, and asked Ptolemy for a king. Ptolemy proposed an adventurer, one Alexander known as Zabinas, "a slave sold in the market" (128). Demetrios II was killed (126), and then Zabinas, abandoned by Egypt, also fell, and a son of Antiochos VII and Cleopatra Thea, Antiochos VIII Grypos, ascended the throne of the Seleucids (125). He was soon at war with one of his brothers, Antiochos IX the Cyzicene, and the conflict was embittered by the two Queens, both Lagid princesses, who perished

tragically (117–111). Syria was broken up; Seleuceia and the cities of Phœnicia were independent. Rulers set themselves up on all sides, and the country would have been invaded by the Parthians if that power had not suffered a temporary eclipse under Phraates II.

That King was killed while fighting the Scythians, who had invaded his territory. His uncle and successor Artabanus fell in a war against the Yue-Chi (124). But it was given to Mithradates II (123–88) to restore the Empire of the Parthians. He drove the Scythians and Sacæ into India, and conquered more than half Bactriana, besides Sacastene (Sijistan), a part of Drangiana which the Sacæ had occupied. Armenia became a Parthian protectorate. Luckily for Antiochos VIII, Mithradates did not choose to cross the frontier of the Euphrates. But the menace always hung over the remnants of the Seleucid kingdom.

Syria was in a state of decomposition. Only the Jews made unceasing progress. The intervention of the Lagids—Ptolemy Lathyros and Cleopatra III¹—was on the whole favourable to them (104–102). It is as if the aim of the history of Syria was to further the greatness of that strange, predestined people. In spite of a dynastic crisis at the death of John Hyrcanus, in spite of the conflict between the Pharisees and the Hellenized Asmonæan family, the Jewish state, under Alexander Jannæus, extended over all Palestine. Antiochos VIII went, and Antiochos IX. What is the use of pursuing the annals of the crumbling dynasty? They were now only princelets, fighting each other and begging for the help of those stronger than themselves. The interest of Eastern history lies elsewhere. It now shifts to Rome, colliding in Asia with the power of Mithradates Eupator, King of Pontus, and these events are outside the scope of the present volume. If Sulla, after defeating Mithradates, had not forbidden it (87), the Parthians would have invaded Syria. The general disorder was so great that the Syrians offered the crown to Tigranes. Having become King of Armenia, with the aid of the Parthians (Mithradates II), and allied himself with Mithradates Eupator, he had already taken Sophene. When he was master of Syria, he attacked the Parthians, took all Northern Meso-

¹ Above, p. 254.

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potamia from them, and founded Tigranocerta. But he had to take part in the war between Rome and Pontus, and was defeated by Lucullus. The Seleucids were re-established in Syria for a time. When Mithradates fell (63) beneath the blows of Pompey, the latter, in reorganizing the East, pronounced the abolition of the dynasty. Syria, drawn into the immense conflict of the Civil Wars, had still much to endure. But the Roman Empire was able to cope with the twofold danger which threatened the country. It put an end to anarchy at home, and on the Euphrates organized defences against the East.

V

THE ATTALIDS AND THE HELLENIZATION OF ASIA MINOR

Greek civilization was not destined to disappear entirely in the country conquered by the Parthians. All the same, the phil-Hellenism advertised in the official title of some of the Arsacids cannot have been so useful to it as the support of the Macedonian Kings. North of the Tauros, on the other hand, the withdrawal of the Seleucids did not affect its future. Pergamon was a much smaller city than Antioch or Alexandria, but the Attalids had made it a hearth on which Hellenism burned with a stronger and perhaps a purer flame.

The Pergamene kingdom was now a great state. We have seen its birth; with skill and caution, Philetæros (283-263), Eumenes (263-241), and Attalos (241-197), protecting the cities against the Galatians, had taken advantage of the conflicts which had rent the Seleucid Empire since the 3rd century, and had made use of Egyptian support to establish their autonomy and power. But their power had no secure foundation until Attalos I turned to the Romans. At that time Egypt, weakened by the unhappy reign of Philopator, was no longer a sure support; Antiochos III was restoring his Empire, and the King of Macedon, who aspired to take up the inheritance of the Lagids on the coasts of Asia, might one day revive the policy of Lysimachos. Attalos therefore allied himself with the enemies of Philip V—as befitted his rôle as protector of the Greeks—and became the friend of the Romans. He

loyally helped them in their war with Macedonia, but it was his successor Eumenes II (197–159) who received the full reward, after the fall of Antiochos the Great.

The kingdom of Eumenes, which extended into Europe, in Lysimacheia in the Thracian Chersonese, comprised the wealthiest parts of Asia Minor, which had the most ancient civilization—Hellespontine Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia, and Caria. To them he added Greater Phrygia, Lycaonia, the Pisidian Mylias, and part of Pamphylia.¹ His neighbours on the mainland, often his enemies, were the Bithynians and the Galatians. On this side, the expedition of the Consul L. Manlius Vulso,² aided by Eumenes' brothers, and the King's own wars with Bithynia and Pontus brought the Galatians under the influence of Pergamon.

In this state, the Greek cities were preponderant. Most of them were old cities. Some had kept their liberty; others were subject cities. There were also military colonies, founded either by the Seleucids or by the rulers of Pergamon.³

The native country was probably greater in extent, but it was inhabited by barbarous tribes, and not by a true people, the heir to a civilization and a great historical tradition, like the Egyptians or the many peoples of Asia now absorbed in the Seleucid Empire. Mysia,⁴ consisting of the river-valleys which descended from Ida or Temnos to the Hellespont or the Bay of Adramyttion, formed a clearly defined region, distinct alike from Bithynia and the Sangarios Valley and from the country of the Hermos and Mæander. But the tie between the two parts of the country, one facing north and the other east, was often broken, and

¹ CCXLIII, p. 101.

² CCXLII, pp. 50 ff.

³ *Free cities*: Cyzicos, Parion, Lampsacos, Abydos, Dardanos, Ilion, Alexandria Troas, Lesbos, Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenæ, Erythræ, Colophon-Notion, Magnesia on the Mæander, Priene, Heracleia on Latmos, Miletos, Iasos, Chios, Samos, Alabanda, Mylasa, Bargylia, Halicarnassos, Myndos, Cnidos, Phaselis, Side, Aspendos, Selge, Pisidian Antioch. *Subject cities*: Byzantion, Lysimacheia, Sestos, Priapos, Assos, Scepsis, Elæa, Pitane, Phocæa, Temnos, Magnesia on Sipylos, Teos, Ephesos, Colophon, Telmissos, Hierapolis, Sardis, Tralles. *Military colonies*: Philetæreia, Gergitha, Attaleia, Nacrassa, Thyateira, Hyrcania, Mysomacedonians of the Calcos, Blaundos, Peltæ, Mardya, Doyda. Cf. CCXLIII, p. 101.

⁴ M. Rostovtzev, in CCXXXVIII, pp. 361 ff.; A. J. Reinach, in LXXXIX, 1908, 2, pp. 375 ff.

it was never kept united except by a political power, as in the time of the great Satraps of Phrygia, such as Pharnabazus, or his successor the rebel Orontes,¹ whom the Attalids seem to have regarded as a forerunner. The Mysians were "javelin-throwers and bowmen, untiring hunters, chasing the deer on little horses which they crossed so as to produce an excellent breed of mule. They were divided into clans, each with its stronghold, in which a feudal prince reigned, and sometimes they formed confederations round national cults served by priest-kings" (A. J. Reinach). They were acknowledged by the whole ancient world to be admirable fighting-men. They contributed largely to the recruiting of the Pergamene army, in which they seem to have had a special place, and they never caused the Kings serious difficulty. They were akin to the Bithynians and Thracians, and had some tribes in the Sangarios valley and south of the Caïcos, in the volcanic region called the *Katakekaumene*, the Burnt Land. Those of the plain were Hellenized. Of the other non-Hellenic populations of the realm, some, like the Lydians and Carians, were partly Hellenized and accustomed to living within the sphere of influence of Greek cities, while others, like the Pisidians, enjoyed the independence of bandits rather than of a nation.

As in all Hellenistic monarchies, then, we find under the Attalids a Greek element, consisting of isolated cities, and a native countryside. But the Attalids did not, like the Seleucids and Ptolemies, step into the shoes of Oriental kings by right divine. They were, however, the object of a royal worship, which was no doubt definitely organized by Eumenes II. Its centres were in the Greek cities—at least, we hardly hear of it elsewhere—and, although it is not so apparent in official records (so that it has been held that it consisted in honours rather than worship—*mehr eine Ehrung als eine Verehrung*),² yet it seems to have been fairly like that of the Seleucids. A divine origin had been found for the middle-class family whose ancestor, the father of Philætæros, born at Tios or Tieion³ in Bithynia, certainly had the Macedonian name of Attalos, but was said to have

¹ IX, 264.

² Kornemann, in LVII, 1900, p. 87.

³ CCXLIII, p. 7 n. 2.

married a Paphlagonian flute-girl. Like the Ptolemies, the princes of Pergamon traced their descent to Heracles and Dionysos,¹ and this has been taken as a sign of the rivalry of the Lagids and Attalids "in the domain of science, literature, and art, of musical and Dionysiac culture".²

The Kings, Queens, and princes of the royal family became gods at their death,³ but they were worshipped and had their priests during their lifetime also.⁴ There were associations for the royal worship, similar to the Basilistæ of Egypt.⁵ We know the bonds which connected the Kings with the association of the Dionysiac Technitæ of Teos. Eumenes II established one branch of this college at Pergamon; its religious centre was the Temple of Dionysos Cathegemon, who was perhaps the god of the Attalid family. Just as he probably nominated his own priests, the King nominated the priest of this god. A celebrated flute-player, Criton, son of Zotichos, who held this office, had founded the synod of the Attalistæ under Attalos II.⁶

The central power was organized on the same principles as in the other Græco-Macedonian monarchies. The King was assisted by a Council, composed chiefly of the members of his own family (whose unity is remarkable, compared with the bloody dissensions of the other ruling houses), but also of the chief minister and the great men of the realm.⁷ The Court was like all those of the time, and so were the secretariat and other administrative services, which were doubtless imitated from those of the Seleucids.

The Attalids claimed above all things to be phil-Hellenic monarchs, and they were good to the Greek cities, which were very prosperous at the time. All were allowed considerable freedom in the management of their internal

¹ O. Schneider, *Nicandrea*, pp. 1, 3-5; **IX**, 264. On Dionysos Cathegemon of Pergamon as god of the Attalids, see **CCXLIII**, pp. 146 ff.

² Von Protz, in **LXI**, 1898, pp. 460 ff.

³ **CCLXIII**, p. 154; **IX**, 339, 16; 308, 4; 309.

⁴ Polyb., xviii.16; **VII**, 43-5; Wiegand in *Jahrb.*, 1908; *Anz.*, 508. Priests: **IX**, 309, 313, 332; **CCXLIII**, p. 148 n. 2; Jacobsthal, in **LXVI**, 1918, pp. 375, 421; **II**, 3068. Temples: **VII**, p. 107; **IX**, 326, 329, 336.

⁵ **IX**, 130 n. 9.

⁶ **IX**, 326; **IV**, 75.

⁷ **IX**, 315, vi. Letter of Attalos II to the Attis or high-priest of the temple at Pessinus, over which the Attalids had a kind of protectorate.

affairs, and they could belong to the old confederations, the Ionian and that of the Isles, which were always on very friendly terms with the Kings.¹ But many cities were subject. "The cities which obey me,"² Attalos I says, and he has no doubts of their docility. There were many of these, especially after the peace of Magnesia. They were generally allowed to keep their laws and their traditional government, but they were under the control of the King's Strategos. This is seen clearly in a decree of one of these cities in honour of Corrhagos, the Strategos of the Hellespontine districts under Eumenes II.³ The citizens pay the King dues (τέλη, πρόσδοι), which all together probably make up the tribute, *phoros*. In return, the King protects the city. The Royal Treasury (*Basilikon*) gives it periodical grants of money, for religious services as well as civil, and often favours it with a bonus. Thus, the text in question speaks of oil supplied for the gymnasiums, and even of gifts or concessions of land for ruined citizens.⁴

On the whole, these cities were kept in strict subjection, and Pergamon, the capital, perhaps more than any other. There the citizen body, which was divided into tribes and demes, had its deliberative assemblies, Council and Assembly of the people, and its magistrates, the earliest known of whom are the Prytanes.⁵ But the King intervened in the government of the city, and the Prytanes seem to have effaced themselves before a board of five "Strategi" nominated by him, at least from the time of Eumenes I onwards.⁶ They presided at the Assembly and alone had the right of proposing motions.⁷ They supervised financial administration. There was also a governor of the city,

¹ CCXLIII, p. 230 n. 1.

² IX, 282.

³ Holleaux, in LXXXV, 1924, pp. 1 ff. The city in question might, according to Holleaux, be Apollonia on the Rhyndacos (*ibid.*, pp. 46-7). See also, for Teos, the decree published by Demangel and Laumonier, in LXXXV, 1922, pp. 312 ff. On Corrhagos, see Holleaux, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48-50.

⁴ Holleaux, *loc. cit.*, *pass.*, and esp. pp. 54-7.

⁵ IX, 264; CCXLIII, pp. 28, 37.

⁶ CCXLIII, pp. 253, 264.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 255 ff. Exception, VII, 18; cf. Swoboda, in LXI, 1891, p. 498; CCXLIII, p. 248 n. 4; G. Cardinali, *La Amministrazione finanziaria del Comune di Pergamo* (*Mem. d. Accad. Bologna*, ix, 1915-16).

appointed by the King.¹ The people appointed the other magistrates—clerks of the Assembly, treasurers (*tamiai*), director of finance (ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων), Agoranomi and Astynomi, Amphodarchs or Chiefs of Quarters, officials of the Gymnasium, etc. Of the priests, some were appointed by the King and others by the city.²

It was very natural that the city where the King resided should be under more direct control than others. But Strategi are found in many other cities, several of which were colonies.³ We cannot, however, say for certain that they were appointed by the King. Perhaps, after all, the policy of the Attalids towards the Greek cities was less liberal than that of the Seleucids, to say nothing of that of Antigonos. As a rule, in these Hellenistic kingdoms, as time goes on the royal power seems to become more exacting.

The native territory was divided into *Strategiai*,⁴ as in the time of Antigonos, and subdivided into Hyparchies. Great portions of it were taken up by the Royal Domain. The Attalids had appropriated the lands of the Great Kings and Satraps to themselves.⁵ As everywhere in the East, they were cultivated by tenant-farmers or by colonists of the King attached to the soil as serfs, the mass of the *laoi*. But by the side of the Royal Domain there were great secular and religious manors, with their *laoi* or even slaves. Among the lords of these manors, one would have found men of Greek descent. Thus, the family of Gongylos,⁶ to whom Xerxes gave an estate between Teuthrania and Halisarna, still survived in the 3rd century. I have spoken of the importance of the religious domains and the great temples all over Asia Minor.

The brilliance of the Attalid state was due to the liberal spirit of the reigning house, the self-appointed and acknowledged protectress of the Greeks against the Galatians in the

¹ CCXLIII, p. 282.

² IX, 331; CCXLIII, p. 291; VII, 251, 255.

³ They are found, according to CCXLIII, p. 234, at Pitane, Hierapolis, Magnesia on Sipylos, Synnada, Nacrassa, Ægina, Elæa, Temnos, Laodiceia on the Lycos, Phrygian Apameia, Thyateira, Dionysiopolis, Eumeneia, and Thomisonion; cf. also VI, 86 and 87.

⁴ That of the Hellespont is called τετραγμένος στρατηγός τῶν καθ' Ἑλλάσποντον τόπων (LXXXV, 1924, p. 2).

⁵ CCXLIII, pp. 182 ff.

⁶ Xen., *Hell.*, iii.1.6; *Anab.*, vii; cf. IV, pp. 22-3.

3rd century, whose magnificence has been compared to that of the Medici.¹ That magnificence presupposes wealth. Certainly, even in its great days, the state of Pergamon could not compare in size (66,486 square miles, or 66,676 if one includes Ægina and Andros, which were part of the Royal Domain)² with the Empire of the Lagids, and still less with that of the Seleucids. But the Attalids managed to make it yield great resources.³ Elæa was their port on the Ægean. The traditional friendship of Cyzicos and Lampsacos opened the Hellespont to them. By those ports they received the iron of the Chalybes ; of the other iron-markets, Sinope and Trapezus were in the hands of the Kings of Pontus, and Heracleia was on the other side of the hostile countries of Bithynia and Galatia. The wood and pitch needed for the fleet came from Ida. One centre of this industry was Aspaneus, near Antandros.⁴ Mysia and the Troad furnished precious metals—copper from Cisthene, orichalc from Andeira, silver from Palæscopsis, Pericharaxis, or Abydos. There were wild districts, like Abrettene, and Abbaitis in the massif of Temnos, but there were also fertile plains, like the territory round Gargara, which was very rich in corn. The Attalids transported the population of Miletopolis and of the Plain of Thebe thither. The Burnt Land produced an excellent wine, equal to the vintages of Priapos and Lampsacos. Stock-breeding flourished. Ida produced horses. In Æolis and the Troad, the pastures of Thebe and Mycale supported sheep. The wools of these parts (Miletos) were celebrated. Ægæ manufactured coloured garments ; Palæscopsis, Percote, and Gambreion made carpets. At Sardis this industry was very prosperous. Hierapolis was founded by Attalos to compete with Laodiceia. The industry of Pergamon soon eclipsed that of Sardis. By a fiscal system⁵ of which we know little, all this wealth was turned to the profit of the Treasury. Cities paid tribute or a tax, according as they were free or subject. In the native country, a tax was levied proportionate to the value of the land. Large revenues were obtained from the direct working of the Royal


¹ Collignon, in **CCXXIX**, p. 190.

² **CCXLIII**, pp. 173–4.

³ Rostovtzev, in **CCXXXVIII**, pp. 367 ff.

⁴ Strabo, 606.

⁵ **CCXLIII**, pp. 175 ff.



MONUMENTS
DE L'ACROÏA ET DE L'ACROPOLE DE
PERGAME

FAÇADE RESTAURÉE
A L'ECHELLE DE 001 PM

TRAIANEVM
TEMPLE DE CANACALLA

RE D'ATHENA POLIAS
THEATRE DE THEATRE

GRAND AUTEL DE ZEVS SOTER
TEMPLE DE DIONYSOS

A C R O P O L E

THE ACROPOLE OF PERGAMON

FR. Restoration

Great Altar of Zeus Soter

Domain. It was scientifically managed, and its produce fed manufactures which were many of them monopolies. There were royal workshops even in the cities.*

Here, as elsewhere, Hellenization was effected by the army and military colonies, but we know little about either. The Attalids founded military colonies themselves and inherited others from the Seleucids.¹ Some of them have been mentioned above. The army comprised corps of Macedonians and corps of soldier colonists or *katoikoi*, in which the Greek element must have predominated. The backbone of the native army seems to have been the Mysians. Lastly, there were great numbers of mercenaries.² But it was chiefly the cities which spread Hellenic civilization in the country. It was not that the Attalids had founded many cities, but the wealthiest and most glorious were in their realm. Their capital rivalled Antioch and Alexandria. It was much smaller in size, but it certainly contained a smaller admixture of Oriental elements. Its Library, in which parchment was chiefly used, vied with that of Alexandria, and there gathered round it a school of erudite writers, some of whom—Antigonos of Carystos, Crates of Mallos—are doubtless not the equals of the great Alexandrians, but have none the less justly earned a glorious name. The school of artists lives more for us, and especially that of the sculptors. It was already known by the beautiful replicas in our museums, particularly the celebrated statues of Galatians (Pl. III), copied from the monument commemorating the victories of Attalos, and has been partly restored to us by the German excavations. Everybody has admired, at least in reproductions, the War of the Giants from the great Altar of Zeus. But these excavations make it impossible to give a summary description of the city whose relics they have unearthed, and it is more useful to refer the reader to the works of the archæologists.³

The life of the kingdom of Pergamon was not long. It remained the ally of Rome throughout the reigns of

* For industry in the Hellenistic world see Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, pp. 349 ff. TRS.

¹ Radet, in CCXXXVIII, on Eumeneia.

² IX, 266, 338.

³ See especially CCXXXIX. [An account of the art of Pergamon will be found in Grenier, *The Roman Spirit*, pp. 237-40. TRS.]

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Eumenes II (197–159), Attalos II (159–138), and Attalos III (138–133), and its history is a chapter in that of Roman conquest in Asia. Attalos III at his death bequeathed his kingdom to the Republic, which made it the Province of Asia.

VI

THE PENETRATION OF HELLENISM IN ASIA

The date at which the Romans annexed the Empire of the Attalids (133) is very near that at which the Yue-Chi took possession of Bactriana (128). The valley of the Indus was at that time ruled by Greek kings, and Hellenism had already spread all through Asia. But had it sunk deep everywhere? The scholars who have discussed the question do not all reach the same conclusion, and it is very difficult to settle, or even to set forth completely, a problem about which there is so much controversy.¹

One of the most apparent results of the Hellenization of Asia is the influence of Greek civilization on kings who were neither Greeks nor Macedonians. The ruling houses of Bithynia, Cappadocia, Pontus, had adopted the manners and language of the Greeks, they protected and founded Greek cities, and Hellenism rested, there as elsewhere, on the traditional institutions of the city; but unfortunately the internal history of these kingdoms is very little known. It was not very different among the Parthians themselves, although their advance was a reaction against Hellenism. There were Greek cities in their Empire. The Greek language was sufficiently well known among the upper classes for Greek tragedies to be performed at the Court, as late as the time of the defeat of Crassus.² But the mass of the people was hostile to Hellenism, which was ceasing to be an influence at the beginning of our era. Intellectual activity gradually died out in the Greek cities. The literary history of Seleuceia on the Tigris stops for us about this time.

So, in the centre of the Asiatic world, the native populations had never been much affected by Hellenic civilization. When Justin and Strabo³ speak of the thousand towns

¹ V. Chapot, *Les Destinées de l'Hellénisme au delà de l'Euphrate* (*Mém. de la Soc. nat. des antiquaires*, lxiii (1904), pp. 207–96).

² Plut., *Crassus*, 33.

³ Strabo, 686; Just., xli.1.8; 4.5. Cf. W. Tarn, in *LXXX*, xxii (1902), pp. 268 ff.

of Bactriana in the time of Diodotos or Eucratidas, we must not understand a thousand Greek cities. They were native towns. To what extent was Bactra, which must have been the capital of Euthydemus, Hellenized? Eucratidas, the usurper, founded Eucratideia not far from Bactra, and it has been supposed that he had become so unpopular as to be regarded as a traitor, on account of a policy too favourable to Hellenism. His son Hierocles, who murdered him, returned to the national capital. It seems that the line of Euthydemus, being more moderate, made itself more acceptable to the natives. Eucratidas had introduced the cult of the Dioscuri-Cabeiri, and even a king-worship of the Seleucid kind, in spite of the fact that Bactra was still the stronghold of Zoroastrianism. Mr. Tarn, however, who has studied the narrative of Chang-Kien, written about 128, can find no trace of Hellenism in what the Chinese ambassador tells us about Bactriana. The history of Hellenism in India can hardly be written except by authorities on that country.¹ Greek rule lasted there until the Indo-Scythian invasion of Sacæ and Tocharians at the end of the 1st century. The coins give us the names of several kings. He who made most impression on the Indians was Menandros (Melinda), who on his coins is called the Just. It is supposed that he was converted to Buddhism; this would fit in with his surname. His capital was Sangala. He is said to have called it Euthymedia—another allusion to justice—and the name may have been chosen to please the Buddhists. There is no doubt of Greek influence in India, but there is little agreement about its origins and extent.²

In Hither Asia, Hellenism certainly sank deeper than on the plateau of Iran. It is interesting to note that at Avroman, in Assyria, deeds of sale have been found, which are written in Greek and date from the 1st century of our era, that is, the time of the Parthians. Yet parties and witnesses all bear Iranian names.³ Therefore in notarial business—at least in certain cases—Greek continued to be used. But

¹ CXLVIII; W. Tarn, *loc. cit.*

² A. Foucher, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhara*, Paris, 1905.

³ E. H. Minns, in LXXX, xxxv (1915), pp. 22 ff. See, too, the parchments of Dura; B. Haussoullier, in *Revue historique du Droit*, 1928, pp. 515 ff.; F. Cumont, in LXXXVI, 1924, pp. 97 ff.

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even in Asia Minor there were many regions which were hardly Hellenized, or not at all. Such was the case with Lesser Armenia, where the people spoke Armenian. Aramaic, the language of the Persian nobility who ruled the country, had not yet disappeared at the time of the Roman annexation (A.D. 72). "Nicompolis, founded after Pompey's victory over Mithradates, was the first centre of Greek culture in that remote region, which had hitherto been subject to Iranian influences."¹ Such, too, was the case with Phrygia, Cappadocia, Galatia. In these parts of Asia Minor, the work of Hellenism would have to be carried on by the Romans.

¹ F. Cumont, in **CCXXXVIII**, p. 115.

CONCLUSION

HELLENISM conquered the East by means of the armies of Macedonia and its own institutions. It is the history of that two-fold conquest that this volume has attempted to trace; it was hardly possible to succeed. Too often deprived of the help of the ancient historians, whose work has only come to us in fragments, modern criticism has endeavoured to reconstruct the succession of events by making use of every indication to be found in the authorities and in the ever-swelling mass of inscriptions. It has made an accumulation of researches, interpretations, hypotheses, some of which are gleams of light, while most are still uncertain and often contradictory.

We should more willingly remain ignorant of the details of the military conquest if we knew more of the progress of the pacific conquest. But Egypt is almost the only region where, thanks to the papyri, we can form a notion how Hellenism organized itself in its new domain, and how it opened its doors to the peoples in whose midst it established itself. We have seen that in Asia we lack the means to solve the problem which we have set ourselves. Even in Egypt, the papyri too often give us only detached pieces of information, sometimes very hard to interpret, which have to be connected with one another by conjectures. Moreover, most of these papyri date from the 2nd century before Christ or from the latter half of the 3rd. The beginnings of the Ptolemaic rule are obscure, and so is its end, so that we cannot follow the march of Egyptian Hellenism through its whole length. These gaps in our records are most exasperating. The origins of the government of the Lagids would throw light on its principles, and it is regrettable that we do not know how far the changes of the 2nd and 1st centuries prepared the condition in which we find Egypt under the Roman Empire.

Perhaps the future will fulfill the prayers of the historian. The sands and *kôms* of Egypt have many secrets in store. Past discoveries seem to have awakened a keen desire for

more methodical researches. They cannot fail to be fruitful. The interior of Asia has hardly been explored. Finds like those of Dura and Avroman permit one to hope that one day, for us as for the ancients, parchment will compete with papyrus.

In the meantime, it is not easy to determine with any certainty the progress of Hellenism in the East. In the history of its expansion, one must give full credit to the impulse imparted by the personality of Alexander. It was he who first took the idea of empire from Asiatic tradition and cast it into our Western world. It can hardly be denied that the consequences of that great deed last at this day.

In any case, not to go beyond antiquity, it determined, to a great extent, the character of the struggles which followed the hero's death. It was not Alexander's example which afterwards drove the Roman Republic to conquer the world, but it was certainly not without reason that Cæsar and many of his successors professed great admiration for him.

Imperialism carried Alexander, and Hellenism after him, to the ends of Asia. It would have taken them still further, perhaps, had Alexander lived. No doubt, it is a wonderful spectacle, to see Greek civilization spreading over those immense spaces, and all those new countries opened to the curiosity and activity of the West. But there was in the enterprise something immoderate, quite foreign to the Greek spirit, perhaps even contrary to the interests of Greece. Certainly it was not for Greece that the King of Macedon was fighting. Greek civilization was, as it were, only an instrument in his hands, and he was destined to exhaust Hellenism by making the world subject to the spirit of Greece. We may, therefore, believe that that spirit would have shed its influence equally far, and with as fruitful consequences for civilization in general, if, without extending her domain so widely, Greece had concentrated her forces and become a real nation. What is wrongly called the imperialism of Pericles would doubtless have had happier consequences than the Asiatic imperialism of Alexander. But the little republics of Hellas, jealous and narrow-minded, could never have made a united nation. Rotten with demagoguery, they were borne to their ruin by the bloody quarrels of their selfish interests, which were certainly fatal to their civiliza-

tion. The heterogeneous structure founded by Alexander had some stable portions, but in a century and a half a whole piece of the fabric fell to ruins. It needed the strength of Rome to stem the Orient at the Euphrates.

Alexander had aspired to a fusion of races in a world-empire. In this he went far beyond the ideas of his Oriental predecessors, and perhaps beyond the highest conceptions of Greek thinkers. The latter had declared that culture, not race, made the Hellene, but they stood for the superiority and domination of the Greek. Alexander had a vision of the equality of his peoples—at least, of the Greeks and Persians—under the wing of the Empire. Reality could not be bent to obey that dream. The two worlds which the conquest had brought together were far too different.

Hellenism was based on the system of the city, and that was ultimately based on the person of the citizen, that is, of the free man, lord of himself and of his land, and subject only to the laws, which were in part the expression of his own will. In the East, the State tended as a rule to be concentrated in the person of a king by right divine, and that State was all-powerful, the master of its subjects, persons and goods. No doubt, the Greek citizen owed himself wholly to his city, and the law might sometimes be a pitiless tyrant. But at least there was nothing servile in the obedience which it exacted; besides, within the walls surrounding his home, on the portion of the national soil which was his own, without restrictions, he enjoyed full liberty, even keeping something of the sovereignty which, in the patriarchal system out of which the city had grown, had been that of the fathers over the members of their families.

There was nothing like this in the monarchies of the East. There the whole population was in the power of the sovereign. Greece, too, no doubt, had subject populations in the Perioeci, and slavery, which her thinkers considered indispensable to the leisure required by the citizen; but in the East the King alone was truly free. The land and the serfs who tilled it, what it yielded and what it held, men and chattels, all belonged wholly to him. He might requisition the whole activity of his subjects for his own purposes. Even the *Grande*es, in theory, held their power,

land, and privileges only by a concession granted by the benevolence or weakness of the King.

To exercise his rights, the citizen only wanted a little self-governing republic. The ambition of conquest might take hold of a city, but it was not an inevitable result of the civic spirit. On the other hand, the absolute monarch of the East, who was himself the whole State and had nothing but subjects at home, could not imagine any limits to his divine power abroad. Imperialism and the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the State were here bound together.

No two things, therefore, could be more opposite than the principles of Oriental civilization and those of Hellenism. In Alexander's Empire and in those of his successors, we have seen the conflict of these tendencies. It was to go on long after the times described in this book.

There is no doubt that Western civilization is based on the Greek conception, nor that it is made of the free play of individual initiative. By Alexander's time it had already proved its superiority. The conquest had to make use of that superiority to organize a new world, and that organization could be made lasting only by the recruiting of adherents to Hellenism. Now, the only way was to bring the barbarians to what the Greeks call political life, and political life could hardly exist except in a city. The Greek city with its small territory stood in opposition to the immense regions in which the King exercised direct authority as absolute master. There was, therefore, a contrast between the town, Hellenic in character, and the country, the Chora, which remained Oriental. They differed in everything—political system, economic system, language, occupations, habits, and morals.

But we must not exaggerate the contrast. In Egypt there were Greek agricultural colonies. The villages, especially in the Fayum, were partly inhabited by Greeks. These were not always citizens, but they had a privileged status and could obtain a Greek education in the gymnasiums scattered about the country. We do not know whether there was an analogous class in the population of the Asiatic kingdoms. We have seen that in Egypt certain natives could enter this class by naturalization. But there is no doubt that Greek manners could develop fully only in city

life, and gradually the Hellenic population concentrated in the towns. In Egypt that concentration was completed by the first Roman Emperors, when they constituted a Greek municipality in the nome-capital, round the gymnasium, which soon ceased to exist anywhere else. In Asia it may have taken place in the Seleucid period.

So the fate of Hellenism was bound up with that of the cities. They seem to have been prosperous all through the period which we have been studying. The Roman Empire continued to rest on them so long as it was in essence, as it has been called, a confederation of free and autonomous cities ruled by the Emperor and Senate. But a day would come when the cities would be ruined. The causes of their downfall were doubtless complex, and it is not for us to inquire into them. The system of *munera* developed by the Roman Empire, by which the costs of the municipality were laid upon the citizens, until at last all their activity and wealth were absorbed in very onerous offices, certainly contributed greatly to the disaster. The crisis of the 3rd century completed it. The war in which the military Emperors then engaged against the Senate was also a war against the privileged class in the towns. The army was, perhaps, not merely the instrument of their imperial ambition. Mr. Rostovtzev has shown that it actually instigated the conflict.¹ For the soldiers of the time were recruited among the population of the countryside. In the East they were the descendants of the old *laoi*, and their condition was similar to that of their ancestors. Hellenic civilization had not touched them, and they had many motives for being hostile to the citizens of the towns. When the Empire emerged from the crisis, it was transformed. It was now "an absolute monarchy of Oriental type, maintained by an army of barbarian mercenaries and a powerful bureaucracy". In the East, one can say that this was a serious defeat for Hellenism.

We have not here to pursue its history, which in any case is hard to trace. In Egypt, where one can see a little more of it than elsewhere, we find in the towns, in the time of the Byzantine Empire, a Hellenized aristocracy of big land-owners. It is not clear how their estates were formed—

¹ In **LXXVIII**, 1926, pp. 233 ff.

perhaps it was by the appropriation of public land, made possible by the crisis at the centre of government. The peasants who cultivate the soil are bound to their lease by very severe conditions ; they are hereditary serfs. Between these *coloni*, whom everything proves to have remained fundamentally Egyptian, and the Hellenized minority which exploited them, there was no intermediate class, and the only tie between them was servitude. Then came the Arab deluge ; one can understand that all memories of Hellenism were rapidly carried away.

Macedon.	Egypt.	Seleucid Asia.	Pergamon.
		Alexander Balas, 150-145.	
	Ptolemy VII Eupator, 145.	{ Demetrios II Nicator, 146-125.	
	Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, 145-116.	Tryphon and Antiochos VI, 145-142.	
		{ Antiochos VII Sidetes, 138-129.	Attalos III, 138-129.
		{ Alexander II Zabinas, 128-123.	
		Seleucos V, 125.	
		Antiochos VIII Grypos, 125-95.	
	Ptolemy X Soter II, 116-107.	Antiochos IX the Cyzicene, 116-95.	
	Ptolemy XI Alexander I, 107-88.		
		{ Antiochos X, 94-83.	
		{ Seleucos VI, 96-95.	
		{ Philip I, 92-83.	
		{ Demetrios III, 95-88.	
	Ptolemy X Soter II, 88-80.	Antiochos XI, 89-84.	
	Berenice III, Ptolemy XII Alexander II, 80.	Tigranes, 84-69.	
	Ptolemy XIII Auletes, 80-51.		
		Antiochos XII, 69-65.	
	(Berenice IV, 55.)		
	Cleopatra VI, 51.		

Bithynia.	Cappadocia.	Pontus.	Parthians.
Nicomedes II, 149-95.			Arsaces VII Phraates II, 138- 128.
	Ariarathes VI, 130-112.		Arsaces VIII Artabanus I, 128-123.
		Mithradates IV Eupator, 121-63.	Arsaces IX Mith- radates II, 123- 88.
	Ariarathes VII, 112-100.		
	Ariarathes VIII, 100-96.		
Nicomedes III, 95-74.			Arsaces X Arta- banus II (?), 87- 76.
			Arsaces XI Sana- troices, 76-70.
			Arsaces XII Phraates III, 70- 57.
			Arsaces XIII Mithradates III, 57-55 ca. (Orodes).

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² See note on CXXII.

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Perg. = Pergamon ; Ptol. = Ptolemy, Ptolemaic Egypt ;
Sel. = Seleucus, Seleucid Kingdom.

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
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
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
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